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ABSTRACT 
In Africa generally, orphaned and vulnerable children are traditionally cared for by their relatives or close 
family friends; this is an abiding practice even in contemporary times. This was historically considered to be 
a moral obligation binding on different relatives in different ways or at differing levels. In the face of the 
increasing complexities and changing demographics in African societies, high levels of poverty and socio-
economic inequalities as well as the incidence of HIV and AIDS, among others, the traditional family 
continues to undergo structural changes and experience various challenges which make child rearing 
responsibilities difficult to cope with especially in the context of loss of parental care. Nonetheless, the 
extended family system still bears the greatest burden in caring for such children, despite the obligation of 
governments to provide alternative care for children without parental care. The care of children who have 
become deprived of parental care by other relatives/family members or family friends is generally 
described as kinship care.  
This study seeks to examine kinship care against the background of international children’s rights law as 
encapsulated in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, the United Nations Guidelines on 
the Alternative Care of Children and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, among 
others. Thus, this research seeks answers to a number of related research questions such as: Does the 
international children’s rights framework recognise or provide for kinship care as a measure of alternative 
care for children deprived of a family environment? What is the history and practice of kinship care in 
Africa and what are the challenges confronting kinship care in contemporary African societies? What is the 
relationship between kinship care and the child protection system? And what forms of support are 
available for kinship care at both the international and national levels? 
Four main themes are considered in separate chapters of the thesis as follows: the contextual and historical 
background to kinship care in Africa; the international and regional legal framework on the right to 
alternative care; the conceptualisation of kinship care as alternative care; and the law and practice of 
kinship care in selected domestic jurisdictions. South Africa and Namibia are the main focus of this study in 
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the chapter on the status of kinship care at the domestic level. This is mainly because both countries have 
made some progress in the attempts at (legally) providing for kinship care and addressing some of its 
attendant challenges, with a particular emphasis on the provision of support for kinship care.  
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CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background  
In June 1993, during the United Nations World Conference on Human Rights, which among others, called 
for the universal ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) by 1995,1 the Conference 
proclaimed in the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action that ‘the child for the full and harmonious 
development of his or her personality should grow up in a family environment which accordingly merits 
broader protection.’ 2 By so doing, the importance of a family environment and the family as a social unit 
for the overall well-being of children was universally reaffirmed.3    
However, millions of children around the world have lost either or both parents, or are at the risk of doing 
so due to the incidence of HIV and AIDS, with a global estimate of 34 million people living with HIV as at the 
end of 2011.4 Of the over 145 million children worldwide who have lost one or both parents due to various 
causes, 15 million of these are due to AIDS.5 With 69% of all people living with HIV concentrated in sub-
Saharan Africa, it is clear that the region is the worst hit by the epidemic resulting in the highest number of 
AIDS-related deaths occurring in the region.6 Within sub-Saharan Africa, the impact of HIV and AIDS is most 
felt in the southern Africa sub-region, with over 30% of people living with HIV worldwide residing in ten 
countries in the sub-region.7 In Lesotho, South Africa, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe, for example, ‘more than a 
quarter of children under 15 years old are living without a parent, and in Namibia the proportion has 
reached more than one third.’8 
                                                 
1 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), World Conference on Human Rights, 14-25 June 1993, Vienna, 
Austria, para 12, at < http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ABOUTUS/Pages/ViennaWC.aspx > (accessed 31 May 2013). 
2 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (1993) Part 1, para 21. Unless otherwise indicated, the use of the pronoun ‘his’ 
throughout this study refers to children of both sexes. 
3 Hodgson D Individual duty within a human rights discourse (2003) 150. 
4 UNAIDS Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic (2012a) 8. 
5 Biemba G, Beard J, Brooks B, Bresnaham M, Flynn D & Simon J The Scale, Scope and Impact of Alternative Care for OVC in 
Developing Countries: A Review of Literature (2010) 1. 
6 UNAIDS (2012) 8. 
7 UNAIDS ‘East and Southern Africa’, at < http://www.unaids.org/en/regionscountries/regions/easternandsouthernafrica/ >; 
UNICEF Eastern and Southern Africa ‘HIV and AIDS’, at < http://www.unicef.org/esaro/5482_HIV_AIDS.html > (accessed 31 May 
2013). 
8 UNICEF Progress for Children: A Report Card on Child Protection (2009a) 24. 
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The incidence of HIV and AIDS and its devastating impact on children in sub-Saharan Africa is further 
compounded by other factors, such as, abuse and exploitation, armed conflict, natural disasters and 
poverty, which contribute to the loss of parental care in the region.9 The impact of HIV and AIDS on children 
in terms of the loss of parental care has become so widespread that it has resulted in the rise of ‘an entirely 
new children’s rights language’, such as, the ‘orphan generation’, ‘AIDS orphans’, ‘orphaned and vulnerable 
children’ (OVC), ‘mother-to-child-transmission’ (of HIV) and ‘child-headed households’, among others.10 All 
of these have significantly impacted on family structures and situations in the region.11 
It has long been established that the absence of parental care has great implications for the lives of children 
and poses huge challenges for the realisation of their other rights, such as, health care and education.12 
Moreover, there are often long-term implications which follow children into adulthood due to a lack of the 
stability and security that a family environment provides.13 Under international law therefore, children have 
a right to be provided with suitable alternatives when they are deprived of parental care. This right is 
articulated in both the CRC and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (African 
Children’s Charter/ACRWC).14  
In Africa, however, orphaned and vulnerable children are traditionally cared for by other family members 
and even in contemporary times, about 90% of all children deprived of parental care are taken into care by 
other (extended) family members, especially grandparents (grandmothers).15 Historically, the care of 
children in Africa was seen as a moral duty or obligation which was binding on all family members.16 
However, due to increasing adult mortality as a result of AIDS and other factors, changing demographics, 
increasing levels of poverty and socio-economic inequalities and challenges, many African families are 
                                                 
9 UNICEF Progress Report for Children Affected by HIV/AIDS (2009b) 17; UNICEF (2009a) 19. 
10 Sloth-Nielsen J & Mezmur BD ‘HIV/Aids and Children’s Rights in Law and Policy in Africa: Confronting Hydra Head On’ in Sloth-
Nielsen J (ed) Children’s Rights in Africa: A Legal Perspective (2008) 279. 
11 South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR) First Steps to Healing the South African Family (2011) 1. 
12 Kwak A ‘Children’s Rights and Adoption’ in Maclean M & Kurczewski J (eds) Families, Policies and the Law: Perspectives from East 
and West Europe (1994) 185. 
13 Parkinson P ‘Child Protection, Permanency Planning and Children’s Right to Family Life’ (2003) 17 International Journal of Law, 
Policy and the Family 154. 
14 Art 20 CRC and Art 25 ACRWC. 
15 Biemba et al (2010) 2; Save the Children UK Kinship Care: Providing positive and safe care for children living away from home 
(2007) 2. 
16 Bennett TW Human Rights and African Customary Law under the South African Constitution (1999) 6. 
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being stretched to the limit and are no longer able to cope with child rearing responsibilities.17 This is 
generally the case whether or not children have become deprived of parental care. This notwithstanding, 
despite the obligation of governments to provide alternative care for children deprived of parental care, 
the extended family system still bears the greatest burden in caring for the affected  children.18 Such 
alternative care of children who have become deprived of parental care by other relatives/family members 
or family friends is generally described as kinship care.19 
  
1.2 Problem Statement 
Although kinship care has been practised since time immemorial, particularly in Africa, it is only just 
beginning to be acknowledged in the child protection framework, within the confines of the provision of 
alternative care for children deprived of parental care. This is unlike the position in the United Kingdom 
(UK), the United States of America (USA), and other parts of the ‘Western’ world where kinship care began 
to be formally regulated and utilised in child welfare policies and practice over two decades ago.20 Kinship 
care in Africa remains largely unregulated by the State, with individuals and families arranging for kinship 
care privately.21 Typical kinship carers include aunts, uncles and older siblings, but grandparents (especially 
grandmothers) are the majority of kinship carers.22   
Neither the CRC nor the African Children’s Charter makes any direct reference to kinship care as a form of 
alternative care. However, the United Nations General Assembly welcomed a set of guidelines aimed at 
promoting the practical implementation of the provisions of the CRC in respect of the right to alternative 
care: United Nations Guidelines for the Alternative Care of Children (2009) (UN Guidelines).23 The UN 
Guidelines are significant because they provide for the recognition of kinship care as a form of alternative 
                                                 
17 UNICEF (2009a) 24; Roby JL Children in Informal Alternative Care (2011) 1: UNICEF (Child Protection Section) Working Paper 
available at < www.unicef.org/protection/Informal_care_discussion_paper_final.pdf >; Roeland M & Boerma J ‘Orphanhood and 
Childcare Patterns in sub-Saharan Africa: An Analysis of National Surveys from 40 countries’ (2004) 18 AIDS S55-S65. 
18 UNAIDS, UNICEF & USAID Children on the Brink: A Joint Report of New Orphan Estimates and a Framework for Action (2004) 8-12; 
UNICEF (2009a) 24; Biemba et al (2010) 2. 
19 Roby (2011) 41. 
20 Ince L ‘Kinship care: An Afrocentric perspective’, unpublished PhD thesis, University of Birmingham, 2009, 10. 
21 Save the Children UK (2007) 1. 
22 Save the Children UK (2007) 2. 
23 UN General Assembly, A/RES/64/142, 2010. 
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care in the general alternative care framework; in fact, the prioritisation of kinship care when parental care 
is not available was a major impetus for drafting the Guidelines.24 A companion document to the UN 
Guidelines has also been prepared to explain the key themes of the Guidelines and outline appropriate 
policy responses.25 
These international developments are set against the background of current child law reform initiatives in 
several African countries, in terms of Article 4 of the CRC (and 1 of the ACRWC) which place an obligation 
on States to put in place legislative and other measures to appropriately implement all children’s rights. 
Thus, a particular feature of child law reform processes across the continent is the provision of measures to 
enhance child protection, including the provision of alternative care for children deprived of parental care. 
Kinship care is often touted as the best form of family-based alternative care that should be encouraged for 
the care and protection of children deprived of parental care.26 However, this universal endorsement of 
kinship care as a suitable form of alternative care raises several questions, chief of which is how to situate 
kinship care within the child protection framework as an alternative care option given the large number of 
children who are placed in kinship care, mostly informally. This is also to be seen against the background of 
the fact that the traditional understanding and practice of kinship care in Africa is not necessarily the 
manner in which kinship care operates in contemporary African societies. Roby points this out thus: 
While in the past kinship care may have been based more on reciprocity with the purpose of child 
socialisation, its current swell may be more related to crises in both developing and industrialised 
countries.27  
It is therefore necessary to examine the factors giving rise to this change. For a start, kinship caregivers 
today tend to be poorer and oftentimes older (and less/un-educated) people who may be subject to 
deteriorating health conditions.28 Thus, the children in kinship care tend to be invisible to the State such 
that their situations cannot be properly monitored and their best interests cannot be safeguarded as 
                                                 
24 Para 29(b)(i) & (c)(i), UN Guidelines; Save the Children UK (2007) 6. 
25 Cantwell N, Davidson J, Elsley S, Quinn N, & Milligan I Moving Forward: Implementing the ‘Guidelines for the Alternative Care of 
Children’ (2012). 
26 Statement of Shay Bilchik, President/CEO, Child Welfare League of America, for the Senate Briefing on Kinship Care and the Re-
Introduction of the Kinship Caregivers Support Act, available at < http://www.cwla.org/newsevents/kinshipcare050118.htm > 
(accessed 1 June 2013). 
27 Roby (2011) 41. 
28 Roby (2011) 41. 
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contemplated under the CRC and the ACRWC.29 As such, the children in kinship care face the risk of 
violations of several of their rights, violations which impact negatively on their proper growth and 
development.30 Further, with reference to accessing social protection interventions, among others, children 
and caregivers in kinship care (who form the majority of those in alternative care situations) contend with 
numerous obstacles and yet receive little or no support from the State.31 Whatever support some receive 
usually comes through the interventions of non-governmental and charity or religious organisations. Yet, 
reliance on kinship care ‘entails a responsibility to ensure that carers are supported and children protected 
within placements.’32   
In the context of the right to alternative care, kinship care appears to be developing in piecemeal fashion 
and independently or separately from international and national legal or formal child welfare or child 
protection systems. Thus, there is no coordinated approach towards conceptualising and incorporating 
kinship care into the system. The aim of this study, therefore, is to examine children’s right to alternative 
care with a focus on the role and recognition of kinship care as a form of alternative care. This will be done 
in light of existing international standards for children’s rights as enumerated in the CRC, the ACRWC, and 
the UN Guidelines, among other relevant international, regional and domestic instruments. With regards to 
domestic instruments, the right to alternative care and the child protection system generally, as 
domesticated in the legislation of South Africa and Namibia will be the main focus. Examples will also be 
drawn from several African countries (particularly others in the southern African sub-region). The aim is to 
investigate whether legislation or policy in support of kinship care exists and, if so, to examine how kinship 
care is addressed in comparison to, and in relation to, other forms of alternative care particularly foster 
care. Kinship care is in some cases transformed into foster care (kinship foster care) and not addressed as a 
distinct form of alternative care separate and/or different from foster care. 
If kinship care is properly construed and regulated within the alternative care and child protection 
framework, it becomes easier to provide adequate support and assistance to children in kinship care and to 
                                                 
29 Art 3 CRC; Art 4 ACRWC; Save the Children UK (2007) 4. 
30 Roby (2011) 41. 
31 Save the Children UK (2007) 4. 
32 Save the Children UK (2007) 6. 
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monitor their best interests since their legal status and visibility would be better enhanced. However, the 
question is: considering the significant number of children in kinship care and the circumstances by which 
they enter into kinship care, is it practical, reasonable or cost-effective to address all kinship care situations 
as alternative care in the child protection context? In other words, should all situations of kinship care be 
concerns of the formal child protection system? 
 
1.3 Argument and Significance of the Study 
Kinship care was traditionally understood and practised as a system of care within the extended family 
network in Africa, rather than as an actual alternative to ‘parental care’ (except in cases of the death of 
parents). Today however, kinship care is generally considered to be a self-standing form of alternative care 
within the care continuum, in the same manner as foster care, adoption or placement in institutions – at 
least theoretically. Nonetheless, kinship care is the least protected and least supported form of alternative 
care for children deprived of parental care, yet children in kinship care form the bulk of children in (need of) 
alternative care. There are also several debates and controversies around kinship care. The major ones 
include challenges relating to how to provide support for kinship care, whether through direct cash 
payments or other services ‘without interfering unnecessarily in family life, and in a way that is feasible in 
particularly low-resource settings’,33 as is the case in many African countries. 
My contribution to knowledge in this regard is to highlight the fact that the link between the history or 
traditional practice of kinship care in Africa and its ‘new’ identity as a family-based form of alternative care 
has not been well established. This, in my opinion, accounts for some of the controversies and debates 
around kinship care in contemporary child protection discourse. Establishing the link and highlighting 
changes and differences along the way will impact on international, regional, and local legal and policy 
approaches towards the application of kinship care as an alternative care form in a manner similar to other 
established forms of care, particularly foster care. 
                                                 
33 Save the Children UK (2007) 6. 
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I intend to show that there are different ways of understanding kinship care, each of which has implications 
for its place (or non-place) within the framework of children’s right to alternative care in the child 
protection context. I intend to propose (particularly for the African context) for kinship care to be 
addressed in three forms: as (an existing) ‘family environment’; as a form of ‘supplementary care’ (to 
existing parental care); and as a form of ‘alternative care’ (in the same manner as foster care and other 
alternative care options in the care continuum, that is, in the child protection context). Each of these should 
be subject to different standards or models of state support, regulation and monitoring, if necessary. In 
effect, for example, the obligation of the State to provide adequate protection and support for a kinship 
care situation which is an existing (original) family environment may be different from the obligation of the 
State towards a kinship care situation functioning as a child’s right to alternative care, in the child 
protection context.  
 
1.4 Research Questions 
This study will address a number of questions, the primary question(s) being: 
Is kinship care envisaged as one of the possible options within the framework of the right to alternative 
care? If so, what is the relationship between kinship care and the child protection system? If not, to what 
extent should kinship care as a form of alternative care within the framework of the right to alternative 
care be included in the child protection context? Finally, to what extent should kinship care be subject to 
financial incentives or support by the State generally and how is kinship care supported by the selected 
States in this study and how does support for kinship care compare with other forms of alternative care?  
Secondary questions to be examined in this study through the different chapters are as follows: 
Chapter 2 
 What were the traditional understandings, practice and historical role of kinship (and kinship care) 
in Africa, within the context of the extended family system?  
 Which factors gave rise to a reliance on kinship care in traditional African societies? 
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 How are those factors different from those which give rise to the need for and practice of kinship 
care in contemporary African societies? / What are the challenges confronting the traditional 
‘African family’ today? 
 What is a ‘family’, what are the rights applicable to the family, and what are the obligations of 
States Parties towards the family? 
Chapter 3 
 Which instruments regulate the right to alternative care for children deprived of parental care and 
which obligations do they impose on States? 
 What are the elements of the right to alternative care as derived from international and regional 
instruments governing the subject? 
 What are the major forms of alternative care provided for, and where does kinship care fit in the 
care continuum? 
 Given the prevalence of kinship care in Africa, does the African Children’s Charter offer any added 
meaning or standard for the understanding and practice of kinship care? 
Chapter 4 
 How do the UN Guidelines on the Alternative Care of Children address the subject of kinship care? 
 What is meant by ‘kinship care’, and who qualifies as a kinship carer or how is kinship determined?  
 What is (or should be) the relationship between kinship care and the child protection system, and 
how does kinship care compare with other forms of alternative care? 
 To qualify as kinship care, should the care provided be on a part-time or full-time basis? 
 What are the merits and demerits of kinship care and what are the challenges facing kinship care? 
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Chapter 5 
 To what extent is the right to alternative care and particularly kinship care provided for in the 
domestic legislation of the selected countries examined in this study and what is the place of 
kinship care in their child protection systems? 
 How are alternative care measures, and kinship care particularly, supported (financially and 
otherwise) in law and policy generally and in the domestic legislation of the selected countries 
examined in this study? 
 How are these countries addressing the problems around the provision of financial incentives and 
other support for kinship care? 
 Taking into account the large number of children in kinship care and the challenge of limited 
resources, can the author’s proposed approach for delineating kinship care into distinct categories 
subject to different standards or models of state support, regulation and monitoring, if necessary, 
assist in addressing some of the debates and controversies around kinship care? 
 
1.5 Methodology and Choice of Jurisdictions 
This study is conducted largely by analysis of the international law governing the right to alternative care 
for children deprived of a family environment, and child protection generally, as contained in a range of 
literature on the subject, including both primary and secondary sources. With regards to primary sources, 
the provisions of international, regional and national law (both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law) on children’s rights, 
and human rights generally, will be analysed. They include Conventions, Charters, Resolutions, 
Declarations, States Parties reports, Concluding Observations and Recommendations, Constitutions, Acts, 
Bills, Regulations, Directives, Policies, and case law, among others. 
Secondary sources including books, academic articles as well as relevant and reliable materials from the 
internet are also considerably relied on for the purposes of this study, forming part of a detailed desk 
(library and digital) research. While field studies were not conducted in order to have actual interactions 
 
 
 
 
10 
 
with children in alternative care and particularly those in kinship care (in order to observe their exact 
circumstances), existing qualitative and quantitative studies and reports have been relied upon in parts of 
the study. This is particularly so with reference to the focus countries in the study. 
Further, this study relies to a very limited extent on interviews, observations and personal communication 
with some of the stakeholders with knowledge and practical experience of different aspects of realising the 
right to alternative care. Examples include social workers, members of the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law and established academic experts and legal practitioners dealing with children’s rights. 
A number of countries, particularly in the southern African sub-region, will serve as reference points in this 
study. Besides the factor of geographical proximity and some similarity in legal history and tradition, these 
countries also share the devastating impact of the scourge of HIV and AIDS in common, albeit at varying 
levels. Further, these countries have been undergoing their child law reform process within the same time 
period and as such, they have to varying degrees been borrowing from the examples and experiences of 
one another in developing their legal framework. Examples include Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland 
and Tanzania.  
However, South Africa and Namibia will form the main focus of the study on a comparative basis. Apart 
from the reasons already cited, Namibia’s new legislation on children’s rights is in the final stages of 
becoming law, and the law-making process was quite heavily influenced by the South African process and 
legislation. Further, compared to all other countries in the sub-region and in Africa generally, both 
countries have made more progress in the attempts at (legally) providing for kinship care and addressing 
some of its attendant challenges. They are perhaps the only countries so far on the continent that have 
attempted to address kinship care in the context of the law, beyond mere policy or in a piecemeal manner. 
In the chapter(s) where the situation in both countries shall be examined, the situation in South Africa will 
be explored first. This is because South Africa has the most comprehensive legislation and regulations 
which are hailed across the world as models and from which inspiration has been drawn by other countries 
in the region (other than Namibia) in putting in place their own legislation and policy measures. Further, 
South African courts have decided on several cases relevant to the subject of alternative care unlike in the 
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other countries where relevant case law jurisprudence has not developed. Consequently, some theoretical 
conclusions can be drawn from the jurisprudence provided by South African courts from which others can 
borrow, deviate from or improve upon. 
 
1.6 Limitations and Scope 
As already highlighted, this study was not based on empirical research; it places reliance rather on existing 
work done on the subject-matter.  Apart from information obtained from existing qualitative and other 
research studies carried out by various researchers and research institutions, the views and opinions of 
children in kinship care are not included in this study. 
With reference to the place of kinship care in traditional African societies, it is not expected that this study 
will do justice to the diversity of experiences that exists across the entire continent. However, attempts will 
be made to focus on and distil the main issues that are predominantly similar and generally applicable. 
It is important to point out that this study proceeds from the position that the child is generally better off in 
a family environment, except where it is not in the child’s best interests to be in a particular environment. 
In relation to kinship care, it is not intended to state that a child deprived of parental care in Africa must be 
placed with a ‘relative’, ‘kin’ or extended family member. The risks of abuse, neglect, exploitation and other 
challenges associated with kinship care are duly acknowledged.  
However, against the background of the fact that the majority of children deprived of parental care in 
Africa find themselves placed in kinship care (largely informally), it is important to put in place some 
measures of identification, regulation and protection or assistance (where necessary) not just to the child 
but to the caregiver(s) as well. Proceeding from there, these children are no longer invisible to the law and 
as such their concerns can be exposed or identified and appropriately addressed. After all, measures for 
monitoring child protection are always required in relation to all vulnerable children whether or not in 
alternative care. 
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1.7 Organisation of Thesis 
The thesis will be structured into six chapters as follows: 
Chapter 1 provides a general background to the study, spelling out the statement of the problem, the 
research questions, the aims and significance of the study, the limitations of the study, methodology and 
choice of jurisdictions, a literature review as well as the organisation of the thesis. This chapter also 
provides a definitional guide on some of the key terms that will recur throughout the study. 
Chapter 2 will attempt to discuss kinship care from an African historical perspective, with a view towards 
providing information on the variations in the understanding, practice and experiences of kinship care. The 
chapter will also attempt to highlight how the practice of kinship care in traditional African society differs 
from what obtains in contemporary African societies. The aim of this chapter is to provide a contextual 
background for understanding the place of kinship care in traditional African societies and how this impacts 
on childcare practices today. 
Chapter 3 highlights the international and regional legal and policy framework on the right to alternative 
care for children deprived of a family environment, chiefly in the CRC and the African Children’s Charter. 
This will include relevant historical background to these instruments and how they aid in a proper 
interpretation and understanding of the right and its attendant obligations. Key elements of the right will 
be examined, as well as key principles underlying the right, in an attempt to examine the content of the 
right. The jurisprudence of the CRC Committee and the African Committee on the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child and other bodies, if any, will be considered here in an attempt to examine the extent and manner of 
application of the principles underlying the right to alternative care. A discussion on the main forms of 
alternative care as provided in the relevant instruments will also be presented in this chapter. 
Chapter 4 will dwell on kinship care including a discussion on the role of the UN Guidelines in establishing 
kinship care as alternative care. With regards to international instruments, the UN Guidelines is the only 
instrument from which guidance can be sought in this regard.  The relationship between kinship care and 
child protection systems will also be discussed, and the benefits and problems of kinship care will also be 
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highlighted. In this chapter, a proposal will be presented as to the different forms in which kinship care 
should be understood or addressed with reference to its place in the child protection framework. 
Chapter 5 will focus on legal and policy developments on the right to alternative care in the country case 
studies, focusing on the place of kinship care in the alternative care and child protection framework in 
comparison to the other established forms of alternative care, particularly foster care. Further, existing 
measures of state support applicable to alternative care generally, and kinship care particularly, will be 
discussed, with a view to highlighting the challenges involved. 
Chapter 6 will highlight the main conclusions derived from the various themes explored in the study and 
provide a summary of findings. The chapter will also provide recommendations to a number of 
stakeholders including African governments, relevant regional and international bodies such as the African 
Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and the CRC Committee, as well as the 
international community at large. The recommendations will be based on the suggested approach as to 
how kinship care should be understood and addressed in relation to the right to alternative care and child 
protection generally. 
 
1.8 Literature Review 
The author has relied on a vast array of literature in putting together this study. In this section, a review of 
the frontline literature (incorporating both primary and secondary sources) relied upon in each chapter of 
the thesis will be presented.  
Chapter two provides the underlying historical and contemporary context to the study of kinship care in 
Africa. The works of Bennett, Chanock, Gordon, Roberts and Snyder feature prominently in this regard. 
They provide a background to the role of customary law and the impact of colonialism on traditional 
African practices, such as kinship care. Mutua and Radcliffe-Brown also examine the practice of kinship care 
in terms of assigned roles and responsibilities for different family members as well as the different ways in 
which kinship relations are formed. Other scholars whose works feature prominently in this chapter include 
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Adepoju, Ankumah, Bourdillon, Cobbah, Elmer, Ezewu, Murdock, Ncube, Njungwe, Ojo, Okafor, Quashiga, 
Rwezaura and Sudarkasa. They together show, among others, that although there is no homogenous 
description of the ‘family’ in Africa, the Eurocentric nuclear family structure does not accurately portray 
how the family is understood in the African context. The chapter also addresses the conceptualisation of 
the family in international law. To this end, the works of scholars, such as, Goode, Graff, Grosh, Hodgson, 
Okon, Onyango, Roscoe and van Bueren are critically examined. In this chapter, the author attempts to 
establish a link between the practice of kinship care in traditional African societies and the role it occupies 
in contemporary children’s rights discourse. 
Chapter three proceeds to lay the theoretical framework for the study of children’s rights with particular 
focus on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and the African Charter on the Rights 
and Welfare of the Child. In this regard, the works of Van Bueren, Freeman and Veerman as well as Detrick 
thoroughly examine the historical background leading up to the drafting of the CRC including the process 
around the inclusion of the provisions dealing with the right to alternative care generally and kinship care 
particularly. The works of Cantwell and Holzscheiter, Davel, Delplace, Freeman, LeBlanc, Newell, Tolfree, 
and Vandenhole are also examined in this chapter. On the complementary relationship between the CRC 
and the African Children’s Charter, with particular reference to the right to alternative care and the status 
of kinship care, the works of Chirwa, Gose, Kaime, Kamchedzera, Lloyd, Olowu, Mezmur, Ssenyonjo, Sloth-
Nielsen, and Viljoen are also discussed. The gap this chapter seeks to fill is to highlight to what extent (if at 
all) kinship care was envisaged within the context of the right to alternative care under the CRC and the 
ACRWC. 
Chapter four which dwells on the ‘conceptualisation of kinship care’ utilises a broad range of literature that 
are directly relevant to alternative care to highlight the relationship between kinship care and other forms 
of alternative care, particularly foster care. The chapter examines the transition of kinship care from a 
family environment to an alternative care option in the light of new developments confronting the African 
family and society at large. Thus, this chapter relies heavily on an analysis of the United Nations Guidelines 
for the Alternative Care of Children (2009) and the accompanying Handbook to the Guidelines. In defining 
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and understanding kinship care as well as in discussing the relationship between kinship care and other 
forms of alternative care, the works of several scholars are examined. These include Atwool, Barber and 
Delfabbro, Broad, Cantwell, Doyle, Greeff, Hegar, Isiugo-Abanihe, Kurtz, O’Brien, Oswald, May, Roby, 
Scannapieco, Sellick, Stack, Takas, Williamson, and a host of others. Chapter four is very significant to the 
thesis of this study because it seeks to diminish the obscurity to which kinship care is often subjected within 
the broader subject of the right to alternative care. Thus, it stands as a comprehensive study on the status 
and practice of kinship care in international law. 
In chapter five, the status of kinship care in the domestic legislation of South Africa and Namibia is 
presented, together with the relationship between kinship care and social assistance provisioning. 
Consequently the works of established scholars, such as, Ballard, Barberton, Berry, Biersteker, Boezaart, 
Bray, Budlender, Davel, Dawes, Doek, Dugard, Dinokopila, Duncan, Gallinetti, Goldblatt, Hall, Haarmann, 
Hosegood, Jamieson, Jordan, Kalula and Strydom, feature prominently throughout the discourse in this 
chapter. Others include Kangandiela and Mapaure, Kassan, Kaseke, Kruger, Kruuse, Lake, Leatt, Liebenberg, 
Lund, Matthias and Zaal, Mahery, Mbazira, Meintjes, Monson, Nkosi, Olivier, Pendlebury, Proudlock, 
Rensburg, Rosa and Dutschke, Ruppel, Seyisi, Skelton, Smit, Smith, Sloth-Nielsen, Triegaardt, van Sloten, 
Viviers, and Woolard. Against the background of the ongoing child law reform all across Africa, this chapter 
seeks to unravel the controversies around the practice of kinship care in domestic jurisdictions. It also 
addresses some of the uncertainties surrounding the inclusion of kinship care within the framework of 
domestic legal reform on alternative care. 
In concluding this study, the author attempts to draw from all of the works mentioned above and more, to 
address the existing gap(s) in international, regional and domestic law as it concerns the subject of the right 
to alternative care generally and the law and practice of kinship care particularly. Thus, in chapter six, the 
author attempts to provide clear answers to all the research questions raised at the beginning of the study 
as contained in this introductory chapter. 
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1.9 Glossary/Definition of Terms 
African Context: This does not refer to a unified or single concept since the aim of this study is not to claim 
that there is a universal childhood or family experience in Africa. It is rather a general attempt to show the 
distinctions that exist between the understanding and practices around this concept in Africa and in other 
parts of the world.  
Child Protection: This refers to formal responses or measures of intervention by the State to respond to the 
abuse of children within the family or a domestic environment in order to protect the child from harm; 
usually by ensuring the separation of the child from that environment and placing the child in State 
protective custody. Foster care is the main form of State protective custody that is the focus of this study. 
Family/Family Environment: A non-institutional or non-State established structure within which the care 
and upbringing of the child generally take place. 
Foster Care: This generally refers to the placement of a child in the domestic or family environment of a 
family other than his own (usually with the caregivers being unrelated to the child biologically) for a 
temporary period ranging from a few months to two years. 
Kinship Care: This generally refers to care provided for the child by relatives other than the biological (or 
legal) parent(s).  
Orphan: A child (anyone younger than 18 years) who has lost either or both parents (‘single’ or ‘double’ 
orphan) to death or abandonment among others, and who lives in difficult circumstances, such as, lacking 
food, support and other services, including the support of any adult. 
OVCs: Orphans and other groups of children who are more exposed to risks of deprivation than their peers. 
It is a broad term which is not a replacement for ‘children orphaned by AIDS’; it is rather a reference to 
various categories of children, including but not limited to children orphaned by AIDS or other factors. 
Examples of other groups include children from minority groups, children affected by armed conflict, 
refugee or internally displaced children, and children with disabilities. 
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Parental Care: Care and protection provided for the child within the confines of a family environment 
established or regulated by a biological (or legal) parent. 
Vulnerability: This includes the physical weakness of children, including weakness in power relations with 
adults, as well as their lack of certain social and other skills with which to protect themselves from 
manipulation and other forms of harm and abuse generally. 
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CHAPTER TWO – KINSHIP CARE OF CHILDREN IN AFRICA: THE UNDERLYING CONTEXT 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Kinship care is historically an important source of care and support within the social structure of families in 
traditional African societies. Such support was largely unremunerated and voluntary but determined by 
cultural norms and traditional values.1 Kinship care was, among others, a tool for the socialisation of 
children and a means of reducing family vulnerabilities. Thus, it was considered a mutually beneficial 
exercise for all family members.2 The aim of this chapter is to trace the ‘origins’ and practice of kinship care 
in Africa with the goal of showing that it has always been an integral part of child care in Africa, despite the 
heightened focus and attention kinship care receives today in child care practice and literature. The chapter 
seeks first, to explain and contextualise kinship care from an African perspective. The reference to an 
‘African perspective’ in this study is important given the erroneous thought by many that kinship care is 
peculiar to Africa. Kinship care of children (and other family members) is a practice that has been in 
existence across various cultures and generations the world over.3 
An understanding of this historical context vis-à-vis the role and practice of kinship care in traditional 
African societies will contribute towards understanding how kinship care has evolved over time and how it 
exists and functions in contemporary African societies. Since it continues to have an impact on child care 
today, an investigation into kinship care in the past will provide insights into the realities, attitudes and 
practices of recent years. In other words, the chapter will serve to lay a foundation for understanding some 
of the challenges, problems or difficulties associated with kinship care today, and perhaps provide some 
guidance on to how to address them.4 Kinship, as a concept, existed and exists within a cultural milieu 
                                                 
1 Kosberg JI Family care of the elderly: Social and cultural changes (1992) 265. 
2 The World Bank (Orientations in Development Series) Reducing vulnerability and increasing opportunity: Social protection in the 
Middle East and North Africa (2002) 50. 
3 Ince (2009) 12. 
4 As pointed out in the introductory chapter of this study, some of the challenges concern the role of financial incentives in kinship 
care as well as poverty and its impact on the health, education and general well-being of children in kinship care. 
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based on the relationship between the family and community, and plays a significant role in the care and 
upbringing of children, including those deprived of parental care.5  
Secondly, this chapter will present a discussion on how the concept of the family has evolved in 
international law, and on the various shades of understanding of the family as the basic or fundamental 
unit of any society. In addition to a discussion of the existing and changing forms of the family, a discussion 
of the challenges confronting the family in contemporary times will be presented, with a focus on Africa. 
The chapter will also include a discussion of some of the rights applicable to the family as an institution 
with a focus on how they apply to children, showing their application to care within the kinship context. 
Although some of these rights are guaranteed in other international law instruments (which will be alluded 
to), the focus of this chapter will be the provisions of the CRC and the African Children’s Charter. This is 
premised on the fact that children’s need for protection and priority care is the rationale behind the 
adoption of these international instruments dedicated to children’s rights.6 While the provisions of these 
instruments on the right to alternative care will be discussed in great detail in chapter three, it suffices to 
note here that the adoption of these international instruments has promoted the visibility of children 
beyond the scope of the family to that of being subjects of State protection such that childhood is regarded 
as a separate status in law. However, this does not mean ‘that the rights of the child can be best protected 
when treated in isolation from the rest of the family’7; as will be shown in the discussions in the third part 
of this chapter. 
 
2.2 Kinship Systems and the Extended Family in Africa: Historical Perspectives 
A large body of existing knowledge about aspects of African culture is generally situated in Africa’s pre-
colonial past, an era characterised by the absence of a central state or government as exists today; the 
cohesion of African societies depended on the kinship system.8 Since contemporary African societies have 
                                                 
5 Ince (2009) 24. 
6 Detrick S (ed) The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: A guide to the “travaux preparatoires” (1992) 19; ACRWC 
preamble, para 5; CRC preamble, para 4. 
7 Van Bueren G The international law on the rights of the child (1995) xx. 
8 Bennett TW ‘Human rights and the African cultural tradition’ (1993) 22 Transformation 32. 
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changed radically from what obtained in the past, several scholars have criticised accounts of the African 
past as stereotypical and largely utopian, based in many respects on the inventions or imaginations of the 
authors – with no ‘possibility of empirical verification.’9 During the 20th century however, other scholars 
criticised the idea of ‘invented accounts’ as racist, perhaps due in part to the need to make the colonial 
enterprise seem less ‘evil’ than it was considered to be – especially by African scholars.10 But, ‘whatever the 
state of the historical record, it is undeniable that differences did, and still do, exist between notional 
western and African cultures.’11 And whether ‘relatively true or relatively false, the African stereotype has 
been critical in shaping a certain consciousness and thereby a secure identity’,12 which still holds sway in 
modern African societies. 
Although the concept of ‘kinship’ cannot be strictly defined in a manner that cuts across all cultural 
arrangements and belief systems, it is ‘an important point of reference for analysing the conceptual 
framework that supports family organisation from an African perspective’.13 The social institution of kinship 
greatly underscores the definition and understanding of the concept of family in Africa. This is so in relation 
to how kinship regulates such matters as patterns of marriage, social positions, rules governing inheritance, 
and the care of weaker or disadvantaged members of society, among others.14 Kinship ‘refers to formal 
systems of relationships with regard to alliances of marriage and lines of descent’15 or ‘the web of 
relationships woven by family and marriage’.16 The term ‘kin’ (or ‘relatives’) generally describes a collective 
of people with whom one has particular relational connections usually based on blood or marriage ties, 
across several generations.17 However: 
                                                 
9 See generally Snyder FG ‘Colonialism and legal form: The creation of customary law in Senegal’ (1981) 19 Journal of Legal 
Pluralism; Roberts S ‘Some notes on “African Customary Law”’ (1984) Journal of African Law; Chanock M Law, custom and social 
order: The colonial experience in Malawi and Zambia (1985); Gordon R ‘The white man’s burden: Ersatz customary law and internal 
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10 Bennett (1993) 35. This paved the way for the elevation and popularity of the idea of cultural relativism within the human rights 
discourse. See Kaplan D & Manners RA Culture theory (1972) 5-8; 38-38.  
11 Bennett (1993) 36. 
12 Bennett (1993) 37. 
13 Ince (2009) 24. 
14 Mataranyika P ‘Zimbabwe: Extended Family System’, 5 May 2011, available at < http://allafrica.com/stories/201105091071.html 
(accessed 2 August 2013). 
15 McCarthy J R & Edwards R Key Concepts in Family Studies (2011) 126. 
16 Mataranyika (2011). 
17 McCarthy & Edwards (2011) 127.  
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Although perceptions of someone as kin or non-kin may have implications for such issues as identity and 
personhood, property and authority, the distinction may be centred primarily on emotion and the moral 
quality of relationships, rather than on ideas of biological or ‘natural’ connections.’18 
In effect, genetic or biological ties may not be definitive for determining kinship relations; rather, ‘what is 
significant is the ways in which different cultures give social meaning to ties that may be understood as 
biological.’19 Thus, kinship relations could be deliberately created by affinity, on the basis of common social 
ties, such as, religion or social status, and for purposes of rendering financial or other assistance to one 
another whenever the need arises.20 Thus, kinship relations also encompass the acknowledgment of social 
relationships which may not necessarily coincide with genetic or physical relationships.21 
The notion of kinship ‘includes a network of responsibilities, privileges, and support in which individuals 
and families are expected to fill certain roles.’22 Historically and traditionally, organised kinship networks 
served as central organising structures in the absence of a formal government,23 (particularly in pre-colonial 
Africa). Thus, kinship goes beyond personal relationships to ‘having broader social and political significance 
for the distribution of power and resources.’24 As a social institution, kinship works based on relationships 
of descent, with the community placed at the head, the next level being the clan, followed by the family 
(lineage) and then the individual.25 In terms of defining relationships, the clan is a larger unit while the 
lineage is smaller. In a lineage, all members usually know or are able to trace their exact (blood/marriage) 
relationship to one another while members of a clan are unable to do so although all members are keenly 
aware of belonging to the group, usually on the basis of sharing a common ancestor.26  
Kinships are broadly classified into four main types: patrilineal, matrilineal, double and bilateral, all of which 
exist in different parts of Africa.27 The clan to which a person belongs is determined by birth and the type of 
                                                 
18 McCarthy & Edwards (2011) 128. 
19 McCarthy & Edwards (2011) 128. Ties with unrelated (by blood, marriage or other deliberate acts) individuals may be described 
as ‘fictive kinship’ or ‘quasi kinship’. 
20 Abebe T & Aase A ‘Children, AIDS and the politics of orphan care in Ethiopia: The extended family revisited’ (2007) 64 Social 
Science & Medicine 2059.  
21 Radcliffe Brown AR ‘Introduction’ in Radcliffe Brown AR & Forde D African systems of kinship and marriage (1950) 5. 
22 Mataranyika (2011). 
23 McCarthy & Edwards (2011) 127. 
24 McCarthy & Edwards (2011) 127. 
25 N’Sengha MN ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: An African contribution to the project of global ethic’ (1998) 
available at < http://globalethic.org/Center/mutombo1.htm > (accessed 4 September 2013). 
26 Radcliffe-Brown AR (1950) 39-40; Mataranyika (2011). 
27 Mataranyika (2011). 
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kinship governing the particular community.28 Patrilineal kinship focuses on the father’s side of the family, 
that is, relationships are traced through generations from fathers. This system is common in South Africa, 
Swaziland and Zimbabwe, among others. Matrilineal descent infers tracing lineage through mothers, 
although matrilineal societies are not necessarily governed by women as political authority usually resides 
in men. This system exists among certain peoples of Malawi and Zambia. Double descent kinship, which is 
rare, is one in which every individual belongs to his father’s patrilineal group and his mother’s matrilineal 
group, with rights and obligations split between both sides. This exists in parts of West Africa, such as in 
respect of the Yako of Nigeria, and in parts of southern Africa, such as in respect of the Herero of Namibia. 
Bilateral descent, which is an even rarer kinship system, is such that an individual is considered equally 
related to his kin on both the father’s and mother’s sides.29 
The hierarchical relationship of descent in a kinship network is aimed at the promotion of complementarity 
and not subordination. It allows for people to co-exist peacefully and cooperate harmoniously within an 
orderly social arrangement.30  It is based on the African tradition of Ubuntu31 which promotes harmony 
between the individual and the larger group, as the individual finds his true essence through a mutually 
cooperative relationship with the group (‘one for all and all for one’).32 An entirely independent individual is 
considered an aberration.33 This is so because ‘the African conception of man is not that of an isolated and 
abstract individual, but an integral member of a group animated by a spirit of solidarity.’34 As described by 
Bennett: 
In Africa individualism would not be valued as it is in the west. Rather, a person would be expected to 
compromise his or her interests for the good of the larger unit; to stand on one’s right would be thought anti-
social. It follows that whenever rights were in issue they would be the concern of the family as a group.35 
                                                 
28 Radcliffe-Brown (1950) 40. 
29 Mataranyika (2011); Radcliffe-Brown AR ‘Introduction’ in Radcliffe-Brown AR & Forde D African systems of kinship and marriage 
(1950) 3, 13-15. 
30 Radcliffe-Brown (1950) 5-6. 
31 This tradition is fully expressed in the Xhosa (South African) proverb Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu which means ‘I am, because 
we are’. See also Mbiti J African Religion and Philosophy (1970) 141. 
32 Gildenhuys JSH Ethics and Professionalism: The battle against public corruption (2004) 107. 
33 Benedek W ‘Peoples’ rights and individuals’ duties as special features of the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ in Kunig P, Benedek W & Mahalu C (eds) Regional Protection of Human Rights by International Law: 
The Emerging African System – Documents and three introductory essays (1985) 63. 
34 Mutua M ‘The Banjul Charter and the African Cultural fingerprint: An evaluation of the language of duties’ (1995) 35 Virginia 
Journal of International Law 359. 
35 Bennett (1993) 33. 
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Similarly therefore, no individual family is viewed in isolation but as part and parcel of the kinship-
communal system, mutually supportive of one another.36 The larger unit or community is defined as a 
‘network or networks of informal relationships between people connected with each other by kinship, 
common interests, geographical proximity, friendship, occupation or the giving and receiving of services or 
various combinations of these.’37 Thus, the kinship system is founded on a balanced combination of 
entitlements and obligations such that the African notion of rights could not be conceived independently of 
duties. Consequently, ‘the right of one kinship member is the duty of the other and the duty of the other 
kinship member is the right of another.’38 
The practice of Ubuntu, which traditionally forms the bedrock of African societies, can be distilled into 
seven elements which together characterise family life and social interactions and impact on all aspects of 
life within the kinship system and larger African societies: respect, responsibility, restraint, reciprocity, 
reverence, reason and reconciliation.39 Respect must be directed to others especially parents, relatives, 
elders and leaders in the community while responsibility means being accountable for self and for the less 
fortunate in one’s extended family and community. Similarly, reciprocity envisages giving back to the 
community on the basis of mutual assistance while restraint means that due consideration must be given to 
the family and community when making decisions. Reverence is an attribute to be directed towards God 
and the ancestors and other things in nature while reason and reconciliation are applicable to the manner 
in which disputes are settled and peace is maintained within the family and community.40 These are 
cherished values in traditional African communities.41 Based on this view of the interconnectedness of the 
individual with the kinship community at large, it has been argued that in modern African states, ‘the duty 
upon States to protect families cannot be dissociated from its protection of the community at large.’42 
                                                 
36 Ankumah E The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Practice and Procedures (1996) 163. 
37 Barclay P Social Workers: Their role and tasks (the Barclay Report) (1982) 199 – cited in Kosberg (1992) 130. 
38 Cobbah J ‘African values and the human rights debate: An African perspective’ (1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly 321. 
39 Sudarkasa N The strength of our mothers: African & African American women & families - Essays and Speeches (1996) 218; Mutua 
(1995) 362. 
40 Aranda-Narajo B & Davis R ‘Psychosocial and cultural considerations’ in Anderson J (ed) A guide to the clinical care of women with 
HIV (2000) 276-277.  
41 Ojo V ‘Culture, Identity and the Self: Africanisms in the Americas’, 2005, 11 – available at 
http://theafrican.com/Magazine/Africanisms.html 
42 Njungwe E The international protection of children’s rights: an analysis of African attributes in the African Charter on the rights 
and welfare of the child (2009)3 Cameroon Journal on Democracy and Human Rights 18. 
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The ‘nuclear family’ is often associated with the idea of being the ‘traditional’, ‘ideal’ or ‘proper’ family or 
family form.43 As such, it is assumed to be the benchmark from which all other family forms differ or 
deviate.44 This view usually fails to take into consideration particular eras and social contexts in which the 
nuclear family form existed or exists. This family form which usually refers to a married heterosexual couple 
together with their biological children ‘may *however+ be an assumption that is relevant primarily to white 
middle-class European and New World societies at a particular point in history.’45 In Africa however, the 
perception of family extends beyond this narrow confines to include other relatives, such as, uncles, aunts, 
cousins, nephews and grandparents. Thus, the ‘typical’ African was extended both vertically and 
horizontally. Vertical extension refers to the incorporation of ‘ascending and descending generations into 
lineages and clans’ while horizontal extension refers to the incorporation of members by marriage or 
polygamous unions.46 In essence, the ‘nuclear’ or ‘elementary’ family unit, arranged in terms of husband-
wife, parent-child and siblings, may only be understood to be the first level of a network of relations that 
serves as the foundation for the larger kinship system.47 Thus, based on how households were generally 
structured, the extended family in most of Africa was considered to be the core family, and no individual 
would ordinarily conceive of his family without the inclusion of individuals other than his parents and 
siblings.48  
Thus a household would contain a man, his wives and their children, his unmarried brothers and sisters, 
possibly his parents, and any kinfolk or other people who chose to attach themselves to him. This unit 
provided for all the individual’s material, social and emotional needs. Such kin-based societies are 
characterised by the overriding emphasis placed on loyalty to the family and the stress placed on duties 
rather than rights.49 
While there is no homogenous family form that can be referred to as ‘the African family’,50 the typical 
nuclear family structure does not accurately depict what was historically understood to be a family in 
                                                 
43 ‘Family forms’ refer to ‘the variety of patterned, or structured, ways in which people live and relate together as family members, 
sometimes raising the technical issues of how to describe individuals’ relationships to each other.’ See McCarthy & Edwards (2011) 
70. 
44 McCarthy & Edwards (2011) 71. 
45 McCarthy & Edwards (2011) 72. 
46 Bennett (1993) 32. 
47 Bourdillon MFC The Shona peoples: An ethnography of the contemporary Shona, with special reference to their religion (1976) 44; 
Radcliffe-Brown (1950) 6. 
48 Njungwe (2009)17; Mataranyika (2011). 
49 Bennett (1993) 33. 
50 Adepoju A ‘Introduction’ in Adepoju A (ed) Family, population and development in Africa (1997) 8. 
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Africa.51 The traditional African extended family refers to ‘a family form in which intergenerational, and 
other wider family relationships, are an important feature of residence, contact, and/or various forms of 
support and control *including norms, values and beliefs+.’52 Within this composition are understood roles 
and functions, the practice of which maintains the family cohesion within the larger social kinship 
collective.53  
Ezewu provides an elaborate and comprehensive explanation of the extended family which incorporates 
both a historical and contemporary understanding of how the extended family is viewed in Africa generally: 
...the following characteristics can be observed: 1. the extended family system is a combination of several 
nuclear, polygamous, or polyandrous types of family, and the relationships between the members are 
biological and social. 2. The members through biological relationships usually trace their origin to a common 
ancestor, lineage and a common genealogical line. 3. The members usually occupy a specific geographical 
location in a village or city as a home place for all members, even if they live in other parts of the world,54 
returning to it from time to time. 4. The members have a common identity and group feelings, looking up to 
one another for help at times of disaster or misfortune and sharing one another’s happiness.55 
From the above, the African family is defined or established by the following factors: marriage; a common 
biological ancestry; sharing a common geographical location or place of origin; and sharing a common 
identity coupled with a common sense of responsibility for one another’s well-being. With reference to 
family members living in different parts of the world, Ezewu alludes to the disruptions that have changed 
the traditional or historical structure of the family in Africa since the eras of colonisation and 
decolonisation. However: 
Maintenance of kinship ties may also be valued regardless of geographical movements; indeed, for people 
moving across the world, networks of wider kin may be a crucial part of life in both their place of origin and 
their destination.56 
 
                                                 
51 South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR) First Steps to Healing the South African Family (2011) 1. 
52 McCarthy & Edwards (2011) 72; Adepoju (1997) 4. 
53 Ince (2009) 24. 
54 Emphasis added. 
55 Ezewu E ‘The relative contribution of the extended family system to schooling in Nigeria’ (1986) 55 The Journal of Negro 
Education 222. 
56 McCarthy & Edwards (2011) 73. 
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2.2.1 Marriage and Children: The Basis of African Kinship Systems and Family Environment 
In traditional African societies, clear lineages were extremely crucial for the organisation of family 
structures because those kinship ties were necessary for the establishment of rules providing for the care 
of children, including those who become orphaned or otherwise deprived of parental care.57  For example, 
orphans automatically became the responsibility of their paternal or maternal uncles, depending on the 
tradition by which the kinship line of descent is traced.58 Marriage was therefore considered to be the 
resource for founding and growing kinship and kinship relations. In fact, most villages in pre-colonial Africa 
comprised of people related either by blood or by marriage.59 As such, a marriage was understood to be an 
alliance between ‘two families or bodies of kin’ and not simply a union between a man and a woman.60 
Consequently, the birth of children not only unites the husband and wife, but also unites two families or 
bodies of kin by producing for them common descendants to further cement the kinship bond.61  
Thus, procreation was considered to be the fundamental goal of marriage such that being childless was 
considered a tragedy, affecting not only the (married) couple but the extended family at large.62 As the 
‘value’ of a married woman was measured in her ability to produce children, barrenness in certain cases led 
to a refund of the bride price or the provision of another woman who could bear children.63 Having children 
conferred a higher social status to the child bearer in comparison to the childless individual, couple or 
family.64 Thus, children were also viewed as a both a form and a source of wealth,65 with particular 
reference to their role as labourers or producers for the family and community by assisting their parents in 
production activities, such as, farming, hunting, fishing and trading, among others.66 It must however be 
stressed that the value of children to the family was not measured merely in economic terms; rather 
                                                 
57 Ince (2009) 24. 
58 Ince (2009) 24. 
59 Cobbah J ‘The Banjul Charter and the African cultural fingerprint: An evaluation of the language of duties’ (1995) 35 Virginia 
Journal of International Law 362. 
60 Radcliffe-Brown (1950) 51. 
61 Radcliffe-Brown (1950) 48. 
62 Fortes M ‘Kinship and marriage among the Ashanti’ in Radcliffe-Brown A & Forde CD African systems of kinship and marriage 
(1950) 262; Asirifi B ‘The value of children in Africa’ in Sai FT (ed) Family welfare and development in Africa. (Proceedings of the 
IPPF Regional Conference, Ibadan, Nigeria, August 29-September 3, 1976) (1977) 114-118. 
63 Radcliffe-Brown (1950) 51. 
64 Harkness S & Super C ‘Shared child care in East Africa: Socio-cultural origins and developmental consequences’ in Lamb ME, 
Sternberg KJ, Hwang CP & Broberg AG (eds) Child care in context: Cross-cultural perspectives (1992) 445. 
65 Harkness & Super (1992) 444. 
66 Belembaogo A ‘The best interests of the child: The case of Burkina Faso’ (1994) 8 International Journal of Law, Policy and the 
Family 212. 
 
 
 
 
27 
 
children’s real value was also socially, emotionally, culturally and spiritually construed.67 On the whole 
therefore, ‘children were cherished and valued, as semi-productive contributors of the future for the 
kinship unit.’68 
Childhood in traditional African societies was largely a social construct not necessarily determined by the 
child’s biological age. ‘Rather, it was a time-limited period of consummate dependency, followed by a 
gradual and inexorable progression into adult life: this progression commenced almost immediately a child 
could function independently.’69 Thus, childhood and the process of transition into adulthood were 
determined by conformity to established rules and patterns of authority. The transition period was fluid, 
characterised by several changes in status, roles and responsibilities over time - each assigned role or 
responsibility having been successfully and satisfactorily executed.70 
    
2.2.2 Kinship Responsibilities for the Care of the Child in Traditional African Societies 
In traditional African societies, the care of children was understood to be the responsibility not only of the 
parents but of the extended family and larger community; it was an obligation to be discharged with a 
great sense of responsibility.71 This collective sense of responsibility for the proper upbringing of children is 
the background to the African saying that ‘it takes a village to raise a child’, with the ‘village’ referring to 
the extended family and kinship community at large.72  
Culturally, children were not considered to belong exclusively to their parents but to the larger community 
which was in turn responsible for the care and socialisation of the child.73 Thus, the concept of ‘parent’ and 
by implication parental responsibilities was wide in scope to include individuals other than the biological 
                                                 
67 Rwezaura B ‘Competing “images” of childhood in the socio-legal systems of contemporary Sub Saharan Africa’ (1998) 12 
International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 253. 
68 Sloth-Nielsen J ‘Modern African childhoods: Does law matter?’ in Freeman M (ed) Law and childhood studies (2012) 119. 
69 Sloth-Nielsen (2012) 118. 
70 Sloth-Nielsen (2012) 118. 
71 Fall-Sow D ‘The rights of children in the African judicial system’ in Verhellen E (ed) Understanding children’s rights (1996) 493; 
Benedek (1985) 63. 
72 Ojo (2005). 
73 Ocholla-Ayayo ABC ‘The African Family: Between Tradition and Modernity’ in Adepoju (1997) 60. 
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parents.74 These individuals were, together with the biological parents, responsible for exercising a variety 
of functions in relation to the child.75 This enabled the extended family to operate as a ‘reproductive, 
economic and socialization unit.’76 Thus, the care of the child was never construed in terms of rights, it was 
simply a natural process regulated by custom. The default position was that a child would be collectively 
cared for even if he was an orphan or had parents who were unable or unwilling to care for him.77 The main 
focus was on what the birth and existence of the child meant for the family and kinship group as a whole: 
In the African tradition, children’s rights were not a social issue; a child was a welcome addition to any 
household, where it would be assured of food, shelter and support. There were no formal mechanisms to 
protect children, but then none would have been necessary. Abundant land, a subsistence economy, and the 
highly developed sense of generosity due to all family members, underwrote the support obligation. African 
law had no concern with a child’s rights to a proper upbringing; its interest was in a family’s right to claim the 
child as one of its members.78 
Thus, it was taken for granted that all family members, including children, would be sufficiently cared for in 
terms of food, shelter and other needs. Besides, most families were sufficiently capable of catering to the 
needs of their members, life was generally simple and needs were much fewer.79 Parents and relatives of 
the same generation (uncles and aunts) were generally responsible for the care, control and education of 
children.80  
The relationship between children and adults at this level was generally based on the ‘exercise of authority 
on the one side and respect and obedience on the other’.81 With grandparents however, the relationship 
was much less formal and much more interactive; a relationship based on ‘friendly familiarity and almost of 
social equality.’82 This was because grandparents had the duty to protect children’s interests and safeguard 
them from harsh treatment. They also served as the medium through which the voices of children were 
heard.83 Thus, while children showed a lot of restraint in their behaviour towards their parents and other 
                                                 
74 Ankut P ‘Balancing parental responsibility and state obligation in fulfilling the socio-economic rights of children under the African 
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child’, unpublished LLM thesis, University of the Western Cape 2003, 26. 
75 Armstrong A & Barzelatto J ‘Towards a cultural understanding of the interplay between children’s and women’s rights: An 
Eastern and Southern African Perspective (1995) Women and Law in Southern Africa working paper No 11, 10. 
76 Cobbah (1987) 320. 
77 Armstrong & Barzelatto (1995) 11. 
78 Bennett (1993) 33. 
79 Ankut (2003) 27. 
80 Cobbah (1987) 320; Radcliffe-Brown (1950) 27. 
81 Radcliffe-Brown (1950) 28. 
82 Radcliffe-Brown (1950) 28. 
83 Sloth-Nielsen (2012) 118-119. 
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family members of their generation, they were much less restrained with their grandparents.84 It is 
submitted that this cultural practice counterbalanced the cultural invisibility of children reflected in the 
notion that in Africa, a child is only to be seen and not heard,85 thereby maintaining the equilibrium within 
the larger social kinship system. In effect, children’s voices were heard but just not directly and not in the 
manner developed by the notion of rights. It is further submitted that the practice is not removed from the 
notion of child participation as it exists today in that children are generally heard through representatives 
except if they are of sufficient maturity and reasoning to speak for themselves.86 Further, because 
childhood in Africa was not a time-bound period determined by biological or physical age, the allowance for 
the child to be heard would also depend on sufficient maturity as determined by the successful execution 
of certain cultural practices.87  
All of these do not however mean that children were never exposed to incidents of maltreatment, neglect 
or other forms of abuse in traditional African societies.88 Further, with the changing nature of modern 
society characterised by factors, such as, deteriorating socio-economic conditions, the geographical 
separation of family members or kin, the individualisation of rights and limited social interactions among 
kinship groups, the role of biological parents for the care of the child has increased and become the 
standard while the active role of extended family members (as a collective) has decreased and become 
almost non-existent. As such, the imposition of ‘real legal duties of a socio-economic nature on people who 
care only de facto for a child’ raises difficulties if not being entirely impossible.89  
Radical changes are clearly evident in domestic relationships. Christianity, capitalism, industrialisation and 
urbanisation have all had a corrosive effect on ties of kinship. The exigencies of labour migration and urban 
accommodation alone have succeeded in fragmenting the extended household.90  
                                                 
84 Radcliffe-Brown (1950) 28. This practice has been used to explain why grandparents are generally ‘more indulgent towards their 
grandchildren than are parents to their children.’ 
85 Stephen AN ‘The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and its influence on the legislations of African states’ 
(2009) http://stannescatholic.wordpress.com (accessed 5 September 2013). 
86 Children’s right to express their views and have such views considered will be discussed in the following chapter. 
87 See Ampim M ‘The Five Major African Initiation Rites’, Africana Studies, September 2003, available at < 
http://www.manuampim.com/AfricanInitiationRites.htm > (accessed 10 September 2013). See also Hipple A ‘Coming of age rituals 
in Africa: Tradition and change’ (2008) IV Prudence International Magazine Journal, available at < 
http://www.annikahipple.com/writing.samples > (accessed 28 June 2010). 
88 Sloth-Nielsen (2012) 119. 
89 Ankut (2003) 27. 
90 McCarthy & Edwards (2011) 129. 
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All these factors and more resulted in the rise of phenomena such as city-dwelling single parents, female-
headed households,91 and many rural households containing only women, children and the elderly, among 
others.92 As the weakest and/or most vulnerable members of any group, children have had to bear the 
brunt of these radical changes: 
such units obviously cannot provide reliable support networks for the indigent. The cost of educating and 
raising children, for example, a burden exacerbated by growing poverty, means that a child without parents is 
no longer automatically welcomed into a family. It might be rejected as a financial burden. And the former 
guardians of morals – paternalistic chiefs and vigilant ancestral shades – are no longer there to insist on 
performance of family obligations.93  
The changes described above notwithstanding, kinship care of children traditionally played two key roles. 
First, it was a cultural requirement integral to the African conception of family and community, requiring 
the direct involvement of almost every member. Secondly, it was ‘a way of maintaining the child’s links 
with his/her biological family.’94 
 
2.2.3 Kinship and the Responsibilities of the Child 
Childhood in traditional African societies was not understood as a period of total dependence; children 
were expected to assume responsibilities towards the household from an early age.95 Children were viewed 
not in terms of rights but in terms of their need for care and protection as well as in terms of their duties 
towards parents, other relatives and the community at large.96 Thus, children were expected to take part in 
productive activities for the sustenance of the family by which they acquired the capacity to grow in status 
and be able to assume greater responsibilities in the larger society.97 Such duties were considered as 
important, if not more important than the right of children to be cared for.98 In other words, that children 
                                                 
91 Ojo argues that the existence of female-headed households is not new as it had its place in traditional African societies based on 
certain cultures where women had central roles to play in the family. It is therefore not an aberration in the manner in which it is 
addressed in literature today. See Ojo (2005). 
92 Bennett (1993) 34. 
93 Bennett (1993) 34-35. 
94 Ince (2009) 12. 
95 Ncube W (ed) Law, Culture and Children’s Rights in Eastern and Southern Africa (1998) 21; Sloth-Nielsen (2012) 118.  
96 Cobbah (1987) 311, 321. 
97 Ankut (2003) 28. 
98 Badamasiuy J Obligations and rights of the parents under the Child’s Rights Act: A Shariah perspective (2009) 1; Rajabi-Ardeshiri 
M ‘The rights of the child in the Islamic context: The challenges of the local and the global’ (2009) 17 The International Journal of 
Children’s Rights 479. 
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would take responsibility for aspects of family and communal life was taken for granted in the same 
manner that the care of children was taken for granted. Examples of duties expected of children in 
traditional African societies include respect for adults, and actively taking responsibility for the care of 
younger siblings. Others include farming, the rearing of livestock, and trading in family-produced goods, 
etc.99  
Despite the universal (legal) acceptance of the age of 18 as marking the end of childhood, there exists the 
‘cultural view that children still have responsibilities towards their families and duties to contribute to the 
maintenance of the family’s means of production.’100 In fact, apart from the mantra of a lack of adequate 
resources, that the majority of African states do not (legally) contemplate or execute welfare programmes 
for the care of the aged and needy, finds its root in the culture of children owing their parents and families 
a ‘duty of respect and maintenance.’101 
The idea that rights come with corresponding duties is one which is ingrained in each kinship member from 
birth.102 This African worldview greatly influenced the language of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR)103 and the Children’s Charter. With regards to the latter instrument, the inclusion 
of Article 31 on the duties or responsibilities of the child has been criticised as being incompatible with the 
best interests of the child.104 This is however an imbalanced approach which places excessive focus on 
rights while almost totally ignoring the corresponding duties, the interrelationship between rights and 
duties being a settled principle of law.105 Further, such criticism or reservation betrays a lack of 
                                                 
99 Cobbah (1987) 309; Sloth-Nielsen (2012) 118. 
100 Sloth-Nielsen (2012) 126. 
101 Mutua (1995) 369. 
102 Mutua (1995) 361. 
103 It was adopted in 1981 and entered into force in 1986. See also the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, 
1948. 
104 See generally Gose M The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (2002); Olowu D ‘Protecting children’s rights in 
Africa: A critique of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child’ (2002) The International Journal of Children’s Rights 
127; Chirwa DM ‘The merits and demerits of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child’ (2002) 10 The International 
Journal of Children’s Rights 157; Lloyd A ‘Evolution of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and the African 
Committee of Experts: Raising the gauntlet’ (2002) 10 The International Journal of Children’s Rights 180. 
105 Chapman AR ‘Reintegrating rights and responsibilities: Towards a new human rights paradigm’ in Hunter KW & Mack TC (eds) 
International Rights and responsibility for the Future (1996) 9; Cooray M The Australian Achievement: from Bondage to Freedom, 
available at < http://www.ourcivilisation.com/cooray/btof/chap226.htm > (accessed 22 May 2013). It should be noted that the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) also make provisions for the duties or responsibilities of individuals to 
others and the community at large. See for example, articles 29(1) UDHR and paragraph 5 of both preambles to the ICCPR and the 
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understanding of the concept of rights and responsibilities within the African context and a lack of 
appreciation of the valuable contribution such a provision makes to children’s rights globally.106 Article 31 
of the Charter provides: 
Every child shall have responsibility towards his family and society, the State and other legally recognized 
communities and the international community. The child, subject to his age and ability, and such limitations 
as may be contained in the present Charter,107 shall have the duty: 
a) to work for the cohesion of the family, to respect his parents, superiors and elders at all times and to 
assist them in case of need;108 
b) to serve his national community by placing his physical and intellectual abilities at its service;109  
c) to preserve and strengthen African cultural values in his relations with other members of the 
society, in the spirit of tolerance, dialogue and consultation and to contribute to the moral well-
being of society;110  
d) to preserve and strengthen the independence and the integrity of his country;111  
e) to contribute to the best of his abilities, at all times and at all levels, to the promotion and 
achievement of African Unity.112  
 
Sloth-Nielsen and Mezmur provide a detailed analysis of each of the duties listed above, painstakingly 
showing their compatibility with children’s rights, with particular reference to the African context.113 It is 
important to note that in providing for the duties of the child, the ACRWC drew inspiration from the 
ACHPR, wherein the terminology of ‘duties’ and ‘peoples’ was adopted based on the African conception of 
                                                                                                                                                                  
ICESCR. See also Alfredsson G & Eide A ‘Introduction’ in Alfredsson G & Eide A (eds) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A 
Common Standard of Achievement (1999) xxix. 
106 In an era of increasing globalisation with the world becoming more of a ‘global village’, a sense of responsibility and duties 
towards all individuals from all races, is key to harmony and peaceful co-existence all across the globe. Article 31 is also ‘has the 
great potential to advance the participation rights of children.’ See Sloth-Nielsen J & Mezmur BD ‘A dutiful child: The implications of 
article 31 of the African Children’s Charter’ (2008) 52 Journal of African Law 187. Children’s participation rights in all matters 
affecting them cannot be interpreted as referring only to rights as responsibility issues also affect children. 
107 Emphasis added. 
108 Speaking about the place of ‘respect’ in Africa, Cobbah (1987) 321 notes as follows: 
‘Although African society is communal, it is hierarchical. Respect governs the behaviour of family members toward the elders in the 
family. It has been said that the African child learns to respect his elders even before he learns to speak. … This respect is 
manifested in greetings, bows, curtsies, and other gestures that signal recognition of seniority. As one grows up in the society, 
therefore, one acquires seniority rights and moves up in the hierarchy of the community. Seniority rights bear no relation to one’s 
other attributes. These rights are strictly guaranteed. Ideally every member of the family with the exception of the very young 
enjoys some seniority rights.’ 
109 A classic example of this which is generally accepted all across the world is the role of young sports men and women who make 
their services available in international sporting events such as football. 
110 This refers to selflessness; an attitude disposed towards giving back to society and not just seeking to receive or exploit others. 
See Sloth-Nielsen & Mezmur (2008) 183. 
111 An example of this is the leeway provided by article 38(2)(3) of the CRC which allows children younger than 18 but not less than 
15 years to be conscripted into their nations’ defence forces, and this duty is viewed with pride as an act of patriotism. 
112 The political situation and historical background at the time is a justification for this provision, and remains justified today in 
light of the objectives of the Constitutive Act establishing the African Union. Sloth-Nielsen & Mezmur (2008) 186-187. 
113 Sloth-Nielsen & Mezmur (2008) 187. 
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human rights as going beyond the individual to encompasses all members of a community.114 The placing of 
the responsibilities of the child as the last substantive provision in the ACRWC ‘underlines the point that 
responsibilities are complementary to rights, rather than undermining them … duties *are+ the balancing 
elements to reinforce rights.’115   
It should however be noted that the CRC is not necessarily incompatible with the African view of the 
relationship between children’s rights and responsibilities, despite the lack of any express provision 
imposing duties on the child under the CRC.116 This is especially so when viewed from the perspective of the 
complementary role the ACRWC plays to the CRC.117 It has been argued that the concept of the duties of 
the child under the ACRWC can be related to Article 5 of the CRC, which deals with the evolving capacity of 
the child.118 The effect of this is that while the duties of the child are not incompatible with the rights of the 
child, such duties must be based on the capacity of each child depending on the age, maturity and other 
personal attributes of the child.119 This in itself is consonant with the reality that childhood is based on a 
variety of cultural traditions, as earlier mentioned.120 In effect, in both pre-modern and modern African 
societies, duties are not imposed on the child without regard to the age and maturity of the child, as 
defined either by custom or by law. Thus, the child’s evolving capacities cannot be divorced from the duties 
of the child as contemplated under the Charter. 
 
                                                 
114 Sloth-Nielsen & Mezmur (2008) 164. See also Cobbah (1987) 321; Udombana NJ ‘Between promise and performance: Revisiting 
states’ obligations under the African Human Rights Charter’ (2004) 40 Stanford Journal of International Law 111; Quashigah EK & 
Okafor OC ‘An Introduction’ in Quashigah EK & Okafor OC (eds) Legitimate Governance in Africa: International and Domestic Legal 
Perspectives (1999) 7; Heyns C ‘Where Is The Voice Of Africa In Our Constitution?’, Occasional Paper No. 8, Centre for Human 
Rights, University of Pretoria (1996), available at < http://www1.chr.up.ac.za/index.php/occasional-papers.html > (accessed 22 May 
2013). 
115 Sloth-Nielsen & Mezmur (2008) 187. 
116 Sloth-Nielsen & Mezmur (2008) 162, 170: ‘Throughout the CRC, duty bearers seem to be parents and the state.’ 
117 Mezmur BD ‘The African Children’s Charter v UN Convention on the Rights of the Child: A Zero-Sum Game?’ (2008) 23 South 
Africa Public Law 1. 
118 This will be discussed further in the following chapter. 
119 Sloth-Nielsen & Mezmur (2008) 170. See also Assim UM ‘20 years down the line: Assessing the impact of the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child’ unpublished LLM research paper on Children’s Rights and the Law, UWC (2009) 9. 
120 Van Bueren (1995) xxi. 
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2.3 The Family in International Law  
The United Nations General Assembly in 1994 proclaimed that year as ‘The International Year of the Family’ 
(IYF), with the theme  ‘Family: resources and responsibilities in a changing world’, thereby placing the 
family at a higher level on the international agenda.121 This recognition was in acknowledgement of the 
various ‘destabilizing trends’ confronting the family institution, the world over: 
Due to economic and social changes and the drive towards development, however, the family has been 
undergoing considerable transformation. Families are experiencing increasing stress in having to cope with 
unemployment, poverty, domestic violence, drug and alcohol addiction, child abuse and neglect, disease and 
sickness, and displacement due to armed conflicts, environmental degradation and famine. Rising rates of 
divorce and births out of wedlock and the emergence of single parenting of children have had the effect of 
transferring traditional family duties and responsibilities from the private to the state sector.122  
The objectives of the 1994 proclamation therefore included, among others, the need ‘to increase 
awareness of the importance of the family and family issues among governments and the private sector, to 
enhance understanding of the functions and problems of families.’123 In keeping with the need to maintain 
flexibility with regard to defining the family, the United Nations did not focus on definitional issues since: 
Families assume diverse forms and functions from one country to another, and within each national society. 
These express the diversity of individual preferences and societal conditions. Consequently, the International 
Year of the Family encompasses and addresses the needs of all families.124 
With the passage of time and constant changes in societies, traditional or hitherto accepted family forms 
are being altered resulting in new family forms. In most African societies for example, the family typically 
comprised of a patriarchal husband and/or father with his wife and/or wives and their children organised 
under a traditional kinship structure.125 With industrialisation and globalisation, however, have come 
                                                 
121 Resolution 44/82 of 9 December 1989; Hodgson (2003) 150. 
122 Hodgson (2003) 150. Challenges confronting the family still abound even as the 20th anniversary of the IYF comes up in 2014. 
See United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), ‘Twentieth 
Anniversary of the International year of the Family, 2014’ available at < 
http://social.un.org/index/Family/InternationalObservances/TwentiethAnniversaryofIYF2014.aspx > (accessed 06 May 2013):  
Owing to rapid socio-economic and demographic transformations, families find it more and more difficult to fulfil their numerous 
responsibilities. Many struggle to overcome poverty and adequately provide for the younger and older family members. It is also 
more and more difficult for them to reconcile work and family responsibilities and maintain the intergenerational bonds that 
sustained them in the past. 
123 Hodgson (2003) 150. Another critical objective is the need ‘to focus on the rights and responsibilities of all family members.’ 
124 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), ‘The International 
year of the Family (IYF) 1994’ available at < 
http://social.un.org/index/Family/InternationalObservances/InternationalYearoftheFamily.aspx > (accessed 06 May 2013). My 
emphasis in italics. 
125 Pretorius E ‘Family life in South Africa’ in Roopnarine JL & Gielen UP (eds) Families in global perspective (2005) 368; Okon E 
“Towards defining the ‘right to a family’ for the African child” (2012) 12 African Human Rights Law Journal 379. 
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changes in the ‘traditional structure of families in most cultures, resulting in a preference for the nuclear 
family form.’126 This has however not eradicated the role of the extended family or kinship network system 
as ‘post-modern families feature extended family members coming to the rescue of stressed nuclear family 
members.’127 In fact, this is the context in which many children in need of alternative care in contemporary 
times enter into the kinship care system. This is different from what obtained in pre-modern times where 
extended family members were expected to take part in raising the children of their relatives based on 
culturally assigned roles and responsibilities.128 Thus, the kinship or extended family system has only 
undergone a structural change in that it is no longer necessarily residential in nature or strictly composed of 
kin and does not necessarily function as a self-sufficient economic unit.129 This structural change has 
however not affected familial obligations among family members however spread apart they may have 
become.130 
Generally, the African family, through the existence of strong kinship networks, serves as a safety net and 
source of economic and social security benefits to its members whether or not some of the members are 
gainfully employed.131 In the past where almost every family had a common economic resource, such as a 
farm, the profitability of such a resource depended on the active involvement of each member in the 
utilisation of the resource or in the production process.132 Writing from a sociological perspective, Goode 
asserts that in a family, ‘people are actually producing goods and services for one another...They are 
engaged in ... a wide array of services that would have to be paid for in money if some member of the 
family does not do them.’133 Even today with the shift from defined forms of economic resource like 
farmlands to other forms of capital, the earnings or income of any of its members is generally considered to 
                                                 
126 Okon (2012) 380. 
127 Okon (2012) 380. 
128 Sloth-Nielsen (2012) 118; Sloth-Nielsen J ‘Children’s rights in Africa’ in Sessononyo M (ed) The African Regional Human Rights 
System: 30 years after the ACHPR and beyond (2012) 155; According to Cobbah: “These roles are essentially rights which each 
kinship member customarily possesses, and duties which each kinship member has toward his kin.” Cobbah (1987) 320-321. 
129 Adepoju (1997) 8. 
130 Adepoju (1997) 9; Oppong (1997); Foster (2002) 346. Other structural changes include the proliferation of female-headed 
households and new forms of polygamy which are bi-residential rather than co-residential in nature, as well as the rise of child-
headed households. 
131 Grosh M ‘Weaving the Social Safety Nets’, Paper presented at the HDNSP course, Protecting the Vulnerable: The Design and 
Implementation of Effective Safety Nets, December 2-13, 2002, World Bank, Washington DC (slide 41). 
132 Graff EJ What is Marriage For? The Strange Social History of Our Most Intimate Institution (1999) 16.  
133 Goode WJ The family (1982) 1. 
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be part and parcel of family resources to be utilised whenever necessary.134 The family thus functions not 
only as the basic unit of society but also as the basic unit of production, besides reproduction and 
consumption.135 This situation still continues today against the background of the fact that, unlike in 
industrialised nations where the government bears the burden of social security, this responsibility falls 
almost solely on the family in Africa.136 Adult men were traditionally the custodians of wealth in both the 
family and community. But today, there is a growing number of female-headed families with no males or 
fathers and where present, they have been undermined, economically and in many other ways. Thus: 
The myth of the desirability of male economic dominance still holds very strong currency for many working-
class families, but unemployment and low wages are a feature of the lives of many men.137 
Consequently, nowhere is the widespread poverty in Africa felt as much as in the family, and the analysis 
shows that the majority of the world’s poorest populations live in Africa.138 While the population continues 
to grow exponentially, the current situation in the majority of the countries in the region is ‘characterised 
by lack of resources, absence of social security, inequality, and aid dependency.’139 The majority of African 
countries have weak, if any, public social security mechanisms to assist individuals and families in coping 
with increasing financial and other burdens.140 Thus financial burdens are collectively borne by the pooling 
of resources within the family, clan and tribe for any financial obligations concerning any individual 
member of the family.141 Such obligations include getting married, discharging a debt or paying a fine, 
conducting funeral rites and more importantly, meeting the day-to-day basic needs of food, clothing and 
even shelter.142 Lack of sufficient resources and infrastructure, among other factors, makes it difficult if not 
impossible for most African governments to establish and implement welfare programmes for those who 
                                                 
134 Adepoju (1997) 7. 
135 Gakuru ON, Kariuku P & Bikuri K ‘Children in debt: The experience of street children in Nairobi’ in Lugalla JLP & Kibassa CG (eds) 
Poverty, AIDS, and street children in East Africa (2002) 27; Adepoju (1997) 2. 
136 Zimmer Z & Dayton J ‘Older adults in sub-Saharan Africa living with children and grandchildren’ (2005) 59/3 Population Studies 
296; Adepoju (1997) 7. 
137 Campbell C ‘Learning to kill? Masculinity, the family and violence in Natal’ (1992) 18 Journal of Southern African Studies 618. 
138 Sala-i-Martin X ‘THE WORLD DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME: FALLING POVERTY AND… CONVERGENCE, PERIOD (*)’ 22, October 9, 
2005, available at < http://www.columbia.edu/~xs23/papers/pdfs/World_Income_Distribution_QJE.pdf > (accessed 11 May, 2013). 
See also United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Africa Human Development Report 2012: Towards a Food Secure Future 
22; The World Bank’s Annual Report 2012 and THE WORLD BANK ANNUAL REPORT 2008: YEAR IN REVIEW (2008) 2, 30. 
139 Mezmur (2009) 80. 
140 Ghai D ‘Social security priorities and patterns: a global perspective’, Education and outreach programme Discussion paper 
DP/141/2002, International Institute for Labour Studies, 13, available at < 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inst/download/dp14102.pdf > 
141 Kayongo-Male D & Onyango P The sociology of the African family (1984) 81. 
142 Roscoe J The Baganda: An account of their native customs and beliefs (1965) 12. 
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are financially vulnerable due to one or other form of disability or inability.143 The situation becomes even 
worse for children who are usually left on the periphery of such interventions, unless concerted efforts 
have been made and proactive steps taken to reverse the situation. Thus social services targeted at 
children are largely absent with a few exceptions, as in Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, and 
South Africa.144  
From the foregoing, what emerges is that globally, the modern conception of the family goes beyond the 
traditional understanding of a man, woman and children. It includes, among others, single parent families 
and other cohabiting individuals, whether married or not and whether of the same or opposite sex.145 The 
emphasis is on the existence of a ‘primary living unit in which the care and upbringing of children take 
place’.146 Thus, the family should be understood in the context of its functions and not necessarily based on 
its structure or form.147 
 
2.3.1 The ‘Right to a Family’: Definitional Issues 
Most international instruments describe the family as the basic unit of society.148 The family is also the unit 
upon which the primary responsibility for the upbringing and protection of children rests.149  Although 
some international and non-governmental organisations have asserted that ‘all children have a right to a 
                                                 
143 Mezmur (2009) 75; Lim (2010) 56. 
144 Sloth-Nielsen J ‘A developing dialogue-children’s rights, children’s law and economics: Surveying experiences from Southern and 
Eastern African law reform processes’ (2008)12 European Journal of Comparative Law 1. The Child Support and Foster Care grants 
in South Africa, as part of a comprehensive social security programme, are particularly worthy of note, being the first of their kind 
on the continent. See Kaseke E ‘The role of social security in South Africa’ (2010) 53 International Social Work 160. These initiatives 
will be further examined in a later chapter of this study. 
145 South Africa Law Commission ‘Report on the Review of the Child Care Act’ (2002) 58 
<http://www.doj.gov.za/salrc/reports/2002dec.pdf> (accessed 3/10/2011). 
146 Terpstra E ‘Children on the move: A perspective from the Netherlands’ in Doek J, van Loon H & Vlaardingerbroek P Children on 
the move: How to implement their right to family life (1996) 22. 
147 Elmer MC The sociology of the family (1945) 17. 
148 See among others, arts 12 & 16(1) UDHR; Preamble & art 23, ICCPR; Art 10, ICESCR; art 18, ACHPR; art 16, European Social 
Charter & art vi, American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, 1948. According to Cobbah, social contract theorists opine 
that the individual is the basic unit of society, but philosophers such as Aristotle (as well as African philosophers) consider the 
family (including the extended family in the African context) to be the basic unit of society as the individual is a function of his social 
relationships, the first of which is the family. This position is what holds sway globally and found its way into international law. See 
Cobbah (1987) 319. 
149 UN General Assembly, Special Session on Children (SSC), Declaration and Plan of Action on A World Fit for Children (WFFC), 
Resolution S-27/2, 10 May 2002. 
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family, and families have a right to care for their children’,150 the ‘right to a family’ is not expressly provided 
for in international law.151 This notwithstanding, Okon argues ‘for the recognition of the right of the child to 
a family as a canopy for other familial rights enjoyable by the child.’152 Such other related ‘familial’ rights, 
include the ‘right to respect for family life’153 the ‘right to found a family’154 and the right not to be 
arbitrarily separated from the family.155 She notes further that the ‘right to a family’ does not exist because 
‘family’ has not been defined.156 It is however my view that the lack of a definition for ‘family’ (which may 
be unnecessary as further discussions will reveal) does not in any way detract from the recognition and 
protection of the family as an established institution at international, regional and national levels. 
According to Hodgson: 
Repeated reference to the family by these various instruments reflects the continuing concern and respect of 
states for this institution. In light of this wide recognition, it is at least arguable that state and societal 
protection of the family has crystallised into a rule of customary law.157 
Neither the CRC nor the ACRWC defines ‘family’ although the approach of the CRC Committee as to what 
constitutes the family is flexible taking into account the diverse family forms in different parts of the 
world.158 This was a deliberate approach on the part of the CRC drafters as the discussion in chapter three 
will show, in order to leave the definitional issue (if at all) to States’ Parties discretion while focusing on the 
role and functions of the family for the proper growth and development of the child.159 Other international 
                                                 
150 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), International Rescue Committee (IRC), Save the Children UK, UNICEF, UNHCR & 
World Vision International (WVI) Inter-Agency Guiding Principles on Unaccompanied and Separated Children (2004) 16. This 
assertion is rooted in the ‘principle of family unity’ or ‘integrity of the family’ under international humanitarian law in the context of 
armed conflict. 
151 See Sloth-Nielsen J, Mezmur BD & van Heerden B ‘Inter-country Adoption from a Southern and Eastern African perspective’ 
(2010) International Family Law 86-96. 
152 Okon (2012) 375. 
153 Art 8(1) European Convention on Human Rights. 
154 Art 9 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 
155 Art 9 CRC & arts 19 & 25 ACRWC. 
156 Okon (2013) 391. Citing the case of  Re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996 10 BCLR 1253 (CC)), 
she correctly points out that the court noted that the existence of various family forms or the changing constitutions of families 
makes it inappropriate to define the concept of family in constitutional terms. 
157 Hodgson (2003) 150. See for example, arts 12, 16 & 25 UDHR; 23 ICCPR & 18 ACHPR: ‘But state and societal protection alone is 
no guarantor of its success. Such protection is a necessary, but not sufficient, precondition for its maintenance and development.’ 
158 Hodgkin R & Newell P Implementation handbook for the Convention on the Rights of the Child (2007) 76. See also CRC 
Committee General Comment (GC) No 7 ‘Implementing child rights in early childhood’ (2005) para 15. 
159 Okon (2012) 387; Mezmur BD ‘Intercountry adoption in an African context: A legal perspective’, unpublished LLD thesis, 
University of the Western Cape (2009) 156. During the 2005 Day of General Discussion on ‘Children without Parental Care’, the CRC 
Committee included the ‘re-constructed family’ and ‘joint family’ to the list of family forms listed in the 1994 Day of General 
Discussion. See also GC 7 (2005) para 15 which states that family ‘refers to a variety of arrangements that can provide for young 
children’s care, nurturance and development, including the nuclear family, the extended family, and other traditional and modern 
community-based arrangements, provided these are consistent with children’s rights and best interests.’ 
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instruments and their monitoring bodies have also followed the same approach: an acknowledgement of 
the existence of various family forms and a focus on the functions and responsibilities of the family.160   
This approach which is mindful of the African understanding of family has played a role in influencing 
legislation on children’s rights in several African states. ‘Family’ in some of the legislation is defined in a 
manner broad enough to encompass the care of children by persons other than their parents. This is in 
recognition of the role of extended family members in the care and upbringing of children within the 
African context. For instance, the Nigerian Child’s Rights Act (2003) defines ‘family’ to include ‘a person 
who has parental responsibility for a child and a person with whom the child is living or has been living.’161 
The South African Children’s Act 38 of 2005 is even more explicit; in Section 1 it defines a child’s ‘family 
member’ as including:162  
a) a parent of the child; 
b) any other person who has parental responsibilities and rights in respect of the child; 
c) a grandparent, brother, sister, uncle, aunt or cousin of the child; or 
d) any other person with whom the child has developed a significant relationship, based on 
psychological or emotional attachment, which resembles a family relationship. 
Identifying persons who form family in relation to a child is therefore based on ‘key characteristics’, such 
as, ‘parenthood (natural or adoptive) and blood relationship; acquisition of parental responsibility in 
respect of the child; and significant relationship, akin to a family relationship, resulting from psychological 
and emotional attachment.’163 Sub-section (d) above provides for ‘flexibility in understanding the family, 
away from traditional consanguineous relations.’164 
                                                 
160 See for example the UN General Assembly Resolution on A World Fit For Children, A/S-27/19/Rev, (2002) Art 44(19); Aguirre S & 
Wolfgram A ‘United Nations policy and the family: Redefining the ties that bind: A study of history, forces and trends’ (2002) 16 
BYU Journal of Public Law 113.  See also Art 4 UN Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members 
of Their Families (1990) which defines ‘members of the family’ as: 
Persons married to migrant workers or having with them a relationship that, according to applicable law, produces effects 
equivalent to marriage, as well as their dependent children and other dependent persons who are recognised as members of the 
family by applicable legislation or applicable bilateral or multilateral agreements between states concerned. 
161 Sec 277, Nigerian Child’s Rights Act, 2003. 
162 Sec 1, South African Children’s Act 38 of 2005. Emphasis added in italics. 
163 Okon (2012) 389. 
164 Okon (2012) 389: ‘This definition appears to extend family membership to persons (excluding blood relatives to the second 
degree) who may have cared for a child for a period of time, and thereby became psychologically and emotionally attached to the 
child without necessarily acquiring legal rights and responsibilities in respect of the child.’ 
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‘The word ‘family’ is derived from the Latin word ‘familia’ which means household.’165  Citing Cicero, 
Hodgson points out that the family is considered to be the ‘seed-plot of the whole commonwealth’,166 a 
metaphor suggesting that ‘successful family nurture is vital to the well-being of the civic order.’167 This 
means that only a family (also in the alternative care context) with adequate resources and support can 
ensure the proper growth and development of the child, and in turn produce well-rounded and responsible 
citizens for the larger society. 
Over the years however, several writers have defined the concept in diverse ways based on their different 
educational, cultural and other backgrounds, as well as the time period in which they wrote. In 1949 
Murdock, an Anthropologist, defined the family as: 
[A] social group characterised by common residence, economic co-operation and reproduction. It includes 
both sexes, at least two of whom maintain a socially-approved sexual relationship, and one or more children, 
own or adopted, of sexually-cohabiting adults.168   
Murdock’s definition leaves out categories, such as, same-sex couples or partners and even families or 
couples without children, his definition being underscored by or in conformity with what is termed ‘socially-
approved sexual relationships.’ Perceptions of what amounts to ‘socially approved sexual relationships’ 
continue to shift and change over time in different societies such that heterosexual adult relationships are 
not the only foundational basis for a family, albeit the most common.169 Silverstein & Auerbach define the 
family as ‘two or more people who are in a relationship created by birth, marriage or choice.’170 Based on 
the inclusion of ‘choice’, this definition is inclusive of families involved in adoption, foster care or kinship 
care, which is also covered by ‘birth’. A more open definition states that the family is ‘one or more adults 
related by blood, marriage or affiliation who co-operate economically, who may share a common dwelling 
                                                 
165 Hodgson (2003) 147. This already suggests that an exact definition for ‘family’ is futile since the structure and composition of 
households vary from culture to culture. 
166  Cicero Offices, Essays and Letters translated by T Cockman (1690), London (1909) I, xvii cited in Hodgson (2003) 147. 
167 Hodgson (2003) 147. 
168 Murdock GP Social Structure (1949) 1. 
169 Popenoe D ‘American family decline 1960-1990: A review and appraisal’ (1993) 55 Journal of Marriage and Family 529-535. See 
also Gittins D The family in question: Changing household and familiar ideologies (1995) 15; Gubrium JF & Holstein JA What is 
family? (1990) 1. 
170 Silverstein LB & Auerbach CF ‘(Post-) modern families’ in Roopnarine JL & Gielen UP (eds) Families in a global perspective (2005) 
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place, and who may rear children.’171 Central to the understanding of what family means is attachment to 
or self-identification with the group and the role of support, nurturing and socialisation that the family 
plays as the ‘haven of primary fulfilment and meaningful experience.’172  
To support the argument for a definition of family, Okon suggests no definition but gives pointers to 
ingredients which such a definition, in relation to children, should be composed of. They are: responsible 
adult(s); blood relationship; parental rights and responsibilities; ‘a unit or persons to whom a child is 
emotionally and psychologically attached and from whom the child enjoys material and physical security’; 
permanence or intended permanence (excluding most foster families).173 She concludes that the focus 
should not be on ‘its structure or form, but rather in the functions of family members, one to another, and 
the intention to establish permanence in the execution of such functions.’174 Further, she proposes that 
whatever definition is developed ‘should be revisited regularly and adapted to changing times and 
needs.’175 It is submitted that these conclusions further serve to justify my position that arriving at a fixed 
definition of family is unnecessary and may be counter-productive. As shown in the discussion above, the 
ingredients Okon suggests are already present in existing definitions, and the understanding of the family 
globally is dynamic; subject to change as time progresses. In the context of the right to alternative care 
however, Okon’s exclusion of foster families from the definition of family is problematic and quite 
impractical because foster families have in reality become an established form of alternative family care for 
many children. 
 
2.3.2 Existing and Changing Family Forms and Functions 
Despite the established recognition and protection of the family as an institution, the ‘family’ as a concept 
is not static but is constantly in ‘transitional development’ because the understanding and practice of 
                                                 
171 Strong B, DeVault C & Sayad BW The marriage and family experience: Intimate relationships in a changing society (1998) 14. See 
also Benokraitis NV Marriage and families – Changes, choices and constraints (2005) 3. 
172 Zinn B & Eitzen S Diversity in families (1990) 14. See also Benokraitis (2005) 3; Winch RF ‘Toward a model of familial 
organisation’ in Burr WR, Hill R, Nye FI & Reiss I (eds) Contemporary theories about the family (1979) 162; Hodgson (2003) 151. 
173 Okon (2012) 386-387. 
174 Okon (2012) 393. 
175 Okon (2012) 393. 
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family varies from place to place, and each variation has profound implications for children and their 
upbringing.176 Contemporary society therefore requires an increasing reliance on a multi-disciplinary or 
interdisciplinary approach for properly capturing the essence of what is termed ‘family’.177 As noted by 
Graff, ‘marriage and the family have been in violent flux throughout history, the rules constantly shifting to 
fit each culture and class, each era and economy.’178 However, the central assumption underlying the 
concept is the ‘long-term stability of the family as a close physical, economic and emotional unit within 
which children are planned, born and reared.’179 Consequently, the family is distinguished from other social 
groups by ‘the kind and degree of emotional, socio-cultural and legal relationships between the various 
members.’180  
The family, with particular reference to Africa, was about two decades ago described as being ‘sandwiched 
between tradition and modernity, between tyrannical regimes and democratic reforms.’181 This position 
remains the same today as ‘traditional practices and modern structures are strongly combined and 
intertwined in the African social and legal systems.’182 Thus, families continue to be defined and re-defined 
by several contemporary and historical factors that comprise economic, social and cultural processes.183 
Consequently, there is no universally accepted definition for the ancient concept of ‘family’ as it is 
practically impossible to arrive at a definition ‘that is capable of including families from different cultures 
and historical periods.’184 In fact, most of the definitions that existed in literature for a long period of time 
                                                 
176 Van Bueren (1995) 68; CRC Committee GC 7 (2005) para 19. 
177 Muncie J, Wetherall M, Langan M, Dallos R & Cochrane S (eds) Understanding the family (1997) 1; Ogletree CJ ‘Parentage issues 
challenging California’s judicial system: What is a family?’ (2005) 6 Journal of the Center for Families, Children and the Courts 99. 
See also Okon (2012) 376: ‘modern day understanding of family relationships has been fuelled by scholarship in diverse disciplines, 
including sociology, anthropology, psychology, history, family studies, child development studies, family therapy, education, 
medicine, economics, demography, social work and law. 
178 Graff (1999) x. 
179 Adegboyega O, Ntizi JPM & Ssekamatte-Ssebuliba JB ‘The African family: data, concepts and methodology’ in Adepoju et al 
(1997) 28. 
180 Adegboyega, Ntizi & Ssekamatte-Ssebuliba (1997) 29. 
181 Adepoju (1997) 8. 
182 Mezmur (2009) 37. 
183 Montgomery CM, Hosegood V, Busza J & Timaeus IM ‘Men’s involvement in the South African family: Engendering change in the 
AIDS era’ (2006) 62 Social Science & Medicine 2412. See also Ocholla-Ayayo ABC ‘The African family between tradition and 
modernity’ and Oppong C ‘African family systems and socio-economic crisis’ in Adepoju (1997) 60 & 158; Foster G, Makufa C, Drew 
R & Kralovec E ‘Factors leading to the establishment of child-headed households: the case of Zimbabwe’ (1997) 7 Health Transition 
Review, Supplement 2 to Volume 7 155-168. 
184 Okon (2012) 376-377: ‘The role and functions of family also vary immensely from era to era, region to region, state to state, and 
culture to culture. This diversity hinges on the variety in culture, religion, sociological order (including individual lifestyle 
preferences) and legal perspectives that exist around the globe.’ 
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were generally based on the nuclear or monogamous family system leaving out the extended family 
network and polygamous families, common in most of Africa and other parts of the world.185     
In terms of classification, the United Nations understands the diverse family forms as currently existing 
under three broad types: nuclear families (comprising of biological, social, single-parent, adoptive and in 
vitro families); extended families (comprising of at least three generations, kinship/tribal groups and 
polygamous families); and reorganized families (comprising same-sex couples, divorced and remarried 
couples and community living families, among others).186 These classifications and sub-classifications allow 
for family unions of various kinds not based solely on biological ties.187 The extended family form which 
incorporates kinship relations is particularly significant in the context of alternative care because of the 
huge role it plays in child care in Africa.188  Despite having grown smaller in scope and size, the extended 
family remains a major support structure for children deprived of their family environment through the 
death or incapability of their biological parents.189 
In recognition of the existence of various family forms, the UN General Assembly notes that Article 5 of the 
CRC provides the broadest statement of principle in the Convention about the relationship between child, 
family, and state.190 The broadness of Article 5 is in recognition of the fact that the typical western family 
structure and family environment is not necessarily the norm in other parts of the world, particularly in 
Africa. Article 5 of the CRC provides: 
                                                 
185 Okon (2012) 377. It is acknowledged however that there are various theories in family studies that inform the definition of the 
family based on anthropology, culture, ecology, history and religion, among others. See for example: Boss PG, Doherty WJ, LaRossa 
R, Schumm WR & Steinmetz SK (eds) Sourcebook of family theories and methods: A contextual approach (1993); Ingoldsby BB & 
Smith S (eds) Families in multicultural perspective (1995) 8; Broderick CB Understanding family process (1993). 
186 Aguirre & Wolfgram (2002) 36-41. See also CRC Committee, GC 7  (2005) para 19. 
187 Mezmur (2009) 157. 
188 See Foster G ‘Supporting community efforts to assist orphans in Africa’ (2002) 346 New England Journal of Medicine 1907; 
Foster G ‘Understanding community responses to the situation of children affected by AIDS - Lessons for external agencies’ in 
Sisask A & SIDA (eds) One Step Further – Responses to HIV/AIDS (2002) 91-115; Drew R, Foster G & Chitima J ‘Cultural practices of 
orphaned families in the North Nyanga District of Zimbabwe’ (1996) 11 Journal of Social Development in Africa 79; Ntozi JPM, 
Ahimbisibwe FE, Odwee JO, Ayiga N & and Okurut FN ‘Orphan care: The role of the extended family in northern Uganda’ (1999) 
Health Transition Review: The Continuing African HIV/AIDS Epidemic 225. 
189 Bessler J ‘In the spirit of Ubuntu: Enforcing the rights of orphans and vulnerable children affected by HIV/AIDS in South Africa’ 
(2008) 31 Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 80, citing  Davel C & Mungar U ‘AIDS orphans and children’s rights’ 
(2007) 70 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg  77; Roeland M and Boerma J ‘Orphanhood and childcare patterns in 
sub-Saharan Africa: An analysis of national surveys from 40 countries’ (2004) 18 AIDS S55-S65 Alternative care in this context may 
also take the form of ‘customary adoption’ in Africa, which is different from domestic adoption in terms of law. See Mezmur (2009) 
46. 
190 United Nations General Assembly (November 1989) Adoption of a convention on the rights of the child (U.N. Doc. A/Res./44/25) 
New York: UNGA cited in Melton (1996) 1236. 
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States Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents or, where applicable, the 
members of the extended family or community as provided for by local custom, legal guardians or other 
persons legally responsible for the child, to provide, in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of 
the child, appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise by the child of the rights recognized in the 
present Convention. 
The very fact that there exists a rich diversity in the understanding and practice of family across the globe is 
what makes arriving at a fixed definition of family a difficult task (if at all necessary).191  However, ‘*t+he 
family is a universal phenomenon and one of the most basic social institutions. Indeed, the family is our 
earliest experience of community [which lays the foundation for our social interactions in and with society 
at large.+’192 
  
2.3.3 Contemporary Issues Affecting the Family: Focus on Africa  
Although the loss of parents and parental care, giving rise to the need for alternative care, has always been 
a feature of every society, the incidence of HIV and AIDS has in recent years led to an increase in the rate of 
loss of parental care, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa.193 Although the global rate of HIV and AIDS 
orphaning is on the decrease, sub-Saharan Africa, and particularly southern Africa, is the most affected 
area.194 As such, the impact of the pandemic will continue to be most felt in the region particularly due to 
the length of time between infection and death.195 Other than the implications HIV and AIDS have for the 
health of parents, children and entire households, there are also economic impacts. These take their toll in 
different phases spanning from direct costs for medical expenses and the additional burden of caring for 
                                                 
191 Freeman J ‘Defining family in Mossop v DSS: The challenge of anti-essentialism and interactive discrimination for human rights 
litigation’ (1994) 41 University of Toronto Law Journal 57. 
192 Hodgson D ‘The international legal recognition and protection of the family’ (1994) 8 Australian Journal of Family Law 219, cited 
in Hodgson (2003) 147. 
193 In its fifth stocktaking report, UNAIDS noted that over 9 million children had been orphaned as at 2009, with another estimated 
47 million children having lost one parent mostly due to HIV and AIDS. See UNAIDS Children and AIDS: Fifth Stocktaking Report 
(2010) 48. 
194 In its 2013 report, UNAIDS reports that new HIV infections among adolescents and adults dropped by over 50% in 26 countries 
between 2001 and 2012. And since 2005 (the peak of the crisis), AIDS-related deaths have fallen by 30%. The report however shows 
that South Africa’s HIV prevalence rate among people aged 15 to 49 increased to almost 18% of the total population from 17.3% in 
2011; the number of people living with HIV and Aids is estimated to have increased by a million (6.1 million) over the past decade. 
See UNAIDS ‘Report on the global AIDS epidemic 2013’; 
<http://www.unaids.org/en/resources/presscentre/pressreleaseandstatementarchive/2013/september/20130923prunga/>. 
195 Innocenti Insight Caring for children affected by HIV/AIDS (2006) 5. Survival rates however continue to be boosted due to the 
increasing availability of antiretroviral therapy. See UNAIDS Report on the Global AIDs Epidemic (2010) 96. The risk of decline 
however remains due to economic conditions in the global north due to the (2009) economic meltdown and other factors.  
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sick members to funeral expenses and post-funeral expenses, usually at a time when the family is already 
drained financially.196 
With the rapid increase in the number of children orphaned by HIV and AIDS in the 1990s, it was becoming 
more obvious that the extended family and kinship system could not cope with caring for the affected 
children. During this period, local and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) became more 
involved in the process while the role of the African governments was generally minimal – only six out of 40 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa had in place a policy for orphans and other vulnerable children.197 Although 
many more countries have in recent years documented national policies for OVCs, interventions for 
alleviating their situation remain largely inadequate.198 
Besides the scourge of HIV and AIDS, other contributory factors to the instability of the family, with 
particular reference to child care, include natural disasters, high and increasing levels of poverty, child 
labour, poor governance and insecurity due to armed conflicts, and trafficking in children, among others. 
These highlight and increase the vulnerability of children resulting in the loss of parental care or lack of an 
adequate family environment.199 These are some of the factors that led to the coining of the phrase 
‘orphans and vulnerable children’ (OVCs)200 and the preparation of various action plans in different 
                                                 
196 Foster G Under the radar: Community safety nets for children affected by HIV/AIDS in poor households in sub-Saharan Africa 
(2005) 13-14; UNICEF Africa’s orphaned and vulnerable generations: Children affected by AIDS (2006) 10. 
197 UNICEF Africa’s orphaned generations (2003) 36. 
198 UNAIDS Children and AIDS: Fourth Stocktaking Report (2009) 32; Richter L, Foster G & Sherr L Where the heart is: Meeting the 
psychosocial needs of young children in the context of HIV/AIDS (2006) 19-20. 
199 Sloth-Nielsen (2012) 129; Chirwa DM ‘Combating Child Poverty: The Role of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’; Kassan D ‘The 
Protection of Children from All Forms of Violence’; Kaime T ‘The Protection of Refugee Children Under the African Human Rights 
System: Finding Durable Solutions in International Law’; Mezmur BD ‘Children at Both Ends of the Gun: Child Soldiers in Africa’; 
Gallinetti J & Kassan D ‘Trafficking of Children in Africa: An Overview of research, International Obligations and Existing Legal 
provision’; Sloth-Nielsen J & Mezmur BD ‘ HIV/Aids and Children’s Rights in Law and Policy in Africa: Confronting Hydra Head On’; 
Combrinck H ‘The Hidden Ones: Children with Disabilities in Africa and the Right to Education’; Gallinetti J ‘Worst Forms of Child 
Labour: A View from Out of Africa’ all in Sloth-Nielsen J (ed) Children’s Rights in Africa: A Legal Perspective (2008) 91, 165, 183, 199, 
239, 279, 299, 323. 
200 Examples of related expressions include ‘most vulnerable children’ (MVC), the ‘orphan generation’, ‘AIDS orphans’, etc. See 
Sloth-Nielsen & Mezmur (2008) 279. 
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countries for ‘orphans and vulnerable children’, among others.201 ‘The concept generally refers to orphans 
and other groups of children who are more exposed to risks than their peers.’202   
Although there is no fixed definition of ‘vulnerability’, and neither the CRC nor the Children’s Charter 
provides a definition, its interpretation and application vary from country to country, and are subject to 
contextual differences in the circumstances of children (and their family environments, if any).203 
Vulnerability usually refers to involuntary circumstances that expose a child to a high risk of deprivation in 
varying degrees and forms.204 It ‘means to face a significant probability of incurring an identifiable harm 
while substantially lacking ability and/or means to protect oneself.’205 With particular reference to 
children’s vulnerability vis-à-vis their family environments, Skinner et al explain that childhood vulnerability 
is determined by reference to three core areas of life: material, emotional and social. Material problems 
include ‘insufficient access to money, food, clothing, shelter, healthcare and education’; emotional 
problems include the absence of care, ‘love, support, space to grieve and containment of emotions’ while 
social problems include ‘lack of a supportive peer group, of role models to follow, stigma or lack of 
guidance in difficult situations, and risks in the immediate environment.’206 
Consequently, vulnerable children require external or additional support due to the fact that ‘their 
immediate support system of families and caregivers can no longer cope thereby exposing them to 
deprivation or harm.’207 It is important to point out that the socio-economic condition of poverty is itself an 
                                                 
201 Examples include the Kenya National Plan of Action on Orphans and Vulnerable Children 2007 – 2010, the Malawi National Plan 
of Action for Orphans and Vulnerable Children 2005 and the Lesotho National Policy on Orphans and Vulnerable Children (2005). 
These are initiatives set up to ‘ameliorate the situation of children that lack parental care.’ See Chirwa D & Kaime T ‘Where are the 
missing pieces? Constructing a mosaic of the CRC and the African Children’s Charter in Malawi’s law and policy’ (2008) 2(1) Malawi 
Law Journal 102. 
202 World Bank ‘OVC Core Definitions’, available at < 
http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/164047/howknow/definitions.htm > (accessed 29 May 2013). 
203 Herring J ‘Vulnerability, Children, and the Law’ in Freeman M (ed) Law and Childhood Studies: Current Legal Issues 2011 (2012) 
245;Sloth-Nielsen J, Gallinetti J, Wakefield L & Murungi N ‘Good practice examples in law reform for children from selected Eastern 
and Southern African countries.’ UNICEF Draft Research paper (2010 - copy on file) 29; Dunn M, Clare I & Holland A ‘To Empower or 
to Protect? Constructing the “Vulnerable Adult” in English Law and Public Policy’ (2008) 28 Legal Studies 234. 
204 SADC Secretariat Strategic Framework and Program of Action 2008 – 2015: Comprehensive care and support for orphans, 
vulnerable children and youth (OVCY) in the Southern African Development Community (2008) 5. 
205 Schroeder D & Gefenas E ‘Vulnerability Too Vague and Too Broad’ (2009) 18 Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 113. 
206 See Tsheko GN (ed) Qualitative research report on orphans and vulnerable children in Palapye, Botswana (2007) 2. See also 
Skinner D, Tsheko N, Mtero Munyatsi SM, Chibatamoto P, Mfecane S, Chindiwana B, Nkomo N, Tlou S & Chitiyo G Defining 
orphaned and vulnerable children (2004) 1.  
207 Sloth-Nielsen et al (2010) 28. 
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impetus for inadequate parental care and family environment in many areas. In relation to the root causes 
of widespread poverty, Ankut notes that: 
Some of the most notable changes in the functions of the African family are those influenced by the shift 
from traditional modes of economic production and economic relations to modern economic relations based 
on the cash economy which most African families still grapple to adjust to. On the other hand African states 
have not been able, due to their weak economies to, provide alternative social security to avert the serious 
economic risks faced by families. It is against this background that international human rights law provides a 
basis for imposing obligations on the state to assist families in fulfilling their child rearing functions.208 
The family is generally recognised as the first baseline of support for children. Thus, once that structure is 
no longer available to children, they inevitably become vulnerable and as such require support to safeguard 
them from the risks of vulnerability. What follows therefore is an examination of some of the family-based 
children’s rights for assisting the family in being a proper medium of support for children in its child rearing 
functions. 
 
2.4 Kinship Care and Children’s Familial Rights: The Relationship between Family and State 
Parties’ Obligations  
The importance of a family environment for the proper growth and development of the child is premised 
on the understanding that children’s rights are best protected within that environment. As the basic unit of 
society, the family serves as the first layer of protection for the rights of children, by which the State can be 
assured of productive citizens for the advancement of the society. This is generally the rationale behind the 
role of the State in ensuring the preservation of the family as its most fundamental unit.209 
While the next chapter of this study will specifically examine the right to alternative care, this section will 
discuss in greater detail some rights which are applicable to the protection of the family, especially in 
relation to its role in the care and protection of children. Thus, although there is no ‘right to a family’ as 
earlier discussed, these are rights which are applicable to the family or rights that ideally should be 
exercised or realised within the confines of a family environment. As such, these rights are equally 
                                                 
208 Ankut (2003) 32. 
209 Puras D ‘Institutional care as a violation of rights of children under three years of age: Document for discussion’ Sub-Regional 
Workshop on the rights of vulnerable children under three years of age Prague, Czech Republic 22 November 2011. 
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applicable to existing/original family environments (founded on parental care) and alternative family 
environments, such as, foster and adoptive families and situations of kinship care.  
The realisation of most of these rights often requires achieving a balance between parental responsibility 
and State obligation, and most of them should be read together or in conjunction with certain other rights. 
In recognition of this need, the CRC Committee indicated in its guidelines for State reporting that a number 
of these related rights should be reported on under the cluster heading of ‘Family Environment and 
Alternative Care’.210 Related to these familial rights are those categorised under the heading ‘Basic health 
and welfare’.211 As rightly noted by Kamchedzera, ‘the common tenet in all these Articles is not so much 
their reference to ‘family’ or ‘parents’ or ‘parent’, it is rather the ‘need to nurture the child for her or his 
survival, development, participation, and protection.’212 
It is therefore important to examine the content of these rights and to understand how the balance 
between family responsibility and State obligation is being achieved or ought to be achieved, given that 
they are mostly of a socio-economic nature in character. This is regardless of the fact that in no area of the 
human rights spectrum is the universality, indivisibility, interdependence and interrelation of human rights 
more visible and established than in the children’s rights sphere.213 Neither the CRC nor the ACRWC 
followed the old/traditional approach of classifying human rights into the so-called ‘three generations’.214 
Article 4 of the CRC provides: 
States Parties shall undertake all appropriate legislative, administrative and other measures for the 
implementation of the rights recognised in the present Convention. With regard to economic, social and 
cultural right, States Parties shall undertake such measures to the maximum extent of their available 
resources and, where needed, within the framework of international co-operation. 
                                                 
210 CRC Committee, General Guidelines Regarding the Form and Content of Periodic Reports to be Submitted by States Parties Under 
Article 44, paragraph 1(a) of the Convention (‘Initial Report Guidelines’) (1991) paras 16-18 and General Guidelines Regarding the 
Form and Content of Periodic Reports to be Submitted by States Parties Under Article 44, paragraph 1(b) of the Convention (Periodic 
Report Guidelines) (2005) paras 27-29. 
211 As above, paras 19-20 & 30-32 respectively. 
212 Kamchedzera G ‘Article 5: The child’s right to appropriate direction and guidance’ in Alen A, Vande J, Lanotte JV, Verhellen E, 
Ang F, Berghmans E & Verheyde M (eds) A commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (2012) 5-6. 
213 UNICEF Protecting the world’s children: Impact of the Convention on the Rights of the Child in diverse legal systems (2007) 2; CRC 
Committee, General Comment No. 5 ‘General Measures of Implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child’ (2003) 
para 6. 
214 Abagkwa SC ‘Reclaiming humanity: economic, social and cultural rights as the cornerstone of African human rights’ (2002) 5 Yale 
Human Rights and Development Law Journal 180. 
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The ACRWC similarly obliges the State to adopt all measures necessary ‘to give full effect to the provisions 
of this Charter.’215 On the face of it, the Children’s Charter seems to contain no limitation clause with 
respect to the realisation of all children’s rights, including rights that are socio-economic in nature. It has 
therefore been argued that, under the Charter, children’s rights are immediately realisable or enforceable 
without the constraint provided by the principle of the progressive realisation of socio-economic rights.216 
The special status and vulnerability of children notwithstanding, this is an incorrect interpretation because 
the relevant provision of the Charter cannot be read in isolation from others which make it expressly clear 
that in terms of rights of a socio-economic nature, States Parties obligations are ‘in accordance with their 
means and national conditions.’217 Thus, resource availability and the principle of progressive realisation 
cannot be divorced from the protection of children’s rights under the Charter. In effect, there is no practical 
difference between the CRC and the ACRWC in terms of the interpretation and realisation of socio-
economic rights.218 The South African Constitutional Court in Government of Republic of South Africa & 
Others V Grootboom and Others addressed the nature of children’s socio-economic rights and came to the 
conclusion that children’s (socio-economic) rights are subject to the availability of resources and 
progressive realisation.219 
 
2.4.1 The Right to Preservation of Identity: Name, Nationality and Knowledge of and Care by 
the Child’s Parents 
Although classified as civil and political rights and thus not ‘directly’ linked to the socio-economic familial 
rights as explained above,220 it is important to discuss the elements of a child’s identity because of its 
relationship to the child’s family background or ‘family environment’. Article 8 of the CRC provides that the 
elements of a child’s identity include his or her name, nationality and family relations.221 Article 8 is read 
together with Article 7 which provides for the child’s right to birth registration, including the acquisition of 
                                                 
215 Art 1(1) ACRWC. 
216 Olowu (2002) 130. 
217 Art 20(2)(a) ACRWC. 
218 Ankut (2003) 39. 
219 (CCT38/00) [2000] ZACC 14. 
220 CRC Committee Periodic report Guidelines (2005) paras 15 & 24-26 respectively. 
221 Art 8(1) CRC. 
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a name and nationality as well as ‘the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents’, which relates to 
‘family relations’ in Article 8. While Article 8 of the CRC has no counterpart in the ACRWC (or in any other 
international treaty for that matter),222 Article 6 of the ACRWC similarly provides for the child’s right to 
birth registration including the acquisition of a name and nationality.223 The Article also presumes against 
the separation of a child from his parents, which is further developed in Article 19. 
The ICCPR was the first instrument to address birth registration (by name) as a human right that is linked to 
the establishment of a person’s identity in society, and in respect of the State.224 It is the basis for, and the 
first means by which the State can perform its duty to promote, protect and fulfil the rights of children, by 
affirming their status and ensuring their visibility. In other words, birth registration is the ‘State’s first 
official acknowledgement of the child’s existence.’225 
The crucial element in the registration of a child’s birth is the name (followed by the birth date and 
information on the parents, etc.).226 Names are not only important to the State for children’s rights, they 
are equally (or more important) to families and societies because they generally reflect a person’s cultural, 
religious or other roots or heritage. A child’s name (particularly the surname) is particularly important in 
the context of kinship care in Africa because names served the purpose of distinguishing between kinship 
groups in traditional African societies. Descendants of a common ancestor usually could identify 
themselves on the basis of family names. Regardless of how ‘scattered’ extended family members may 
have become in Africa today, this still holds true. Ceremonies associated with the naming of children were 
therefore considered as sacred. 
Closely linked to a child’s right to a name (and the registration of the name and other related details) is the 
right to know and be cared for by one’s parents.227 The participation of Islamic countries in the drafting of 
the CRC played a significant role in the inclusion of this right in the CRC. It was argued that knowing one’s 
                                                 
222 Doek J ‘Article 8, The right to preservation of identity; Article 9, The right not to be separated from his or her parents’ in Alen et 
al (2006) 5. 
223 Art 6(1)-(4) ACRWC. 
224 Art 24(1) ICCPR. See also Van Bueren (1995) 118. 
225 Hodgkin & Newell (2007) 98. See also Nowak M UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1993) 432. 
226 The acquisition of a name, as a right, first appeared in Article 24(2) of the ICCPR. As a desirable principle, it was first provided for 
in the 1959 Declaration on the Rights of the Child, which will be discussed further in the next chapter of this study. See Newell & 
Hodgkin (2007) 101 for details on what should be registered. 
227 Art 7 CRC. 
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parents or family background plays an important in the psychological well-being of the individual resulting 
in well-developed sense of self-esteem.228 The uniqueness of this right in the CRC (and by indirect 
implication the ACRWC) is that it is a right that can be exercised by children, during their childhood years. In 
the past, the right was generally exercised by adults who were adopted during childhood in a bid to trace 
their origins.229 Thus, unlike other rights, such as those attached to parental responsibility for the child, this 
right is focused on the child (while still a child, not as an adult) as the right holder.230 It is in the best 
interests of the child to know their parents or at least, their identity, especially in the context of the right to 
alternative care generally. Such knowledge determines what form of alternative care is considered for a 
particular child. In other words, it plays an important role in the making of placement decisions.231 This is so 
because the rules concerning identity and family origins are different for each form of alternative care, for 
example, adoption, foster care and kafalah of Islamic law.232  
It has however been rightly noted that the ‘right to know’ one’s parents is not the same thing as the ‘right 
to be with’ one’s parents; the emphasis is on knowledge of one’s biological and/or kinship ties and not on 
social relations or ties underscored by physical co-habitation.233 The distinction can also be linked to the 
understanding that there is no ‘right to a family’ as already discussed, although there are rights applicable 
to the family to ensure its preservation and development as the basic and fundamental unit of society. This 
also serves to explain why the right is qualified by the phrase, ‘as far as possible.’234 The qualification is 
justifiable since it is not always possible to identify parents and even where they are identified or 
identifiable, there are situations where ‘it may not be in the child’s best interests235 to be cared for by 
                                                 
228 Blauwhoff R (2009) ‘Foundational facts: relative truths: A comparative law study on children’s right to know their genetic origins’ 
(2009) 50. As further discussions in chapter three of this study will reveal, the participation of Islamic countries was particularly 
significant in the drafting of the provisions governing the right to alternative care for children deprived of a family environment. 
229 Mezmur (2009) 192. 
230 Hodgkin & Newell (2007) 108. 
231 Arts 20(3) CRC & 25(3) ACRWC.  See also Ziemele I ‘Article 7: The right to birth registration, name and nationality, and the right 
to know and be cared for by parents’ in Alen et al (2007) 31; Mezmur (2009) 190-198. 
232 These alternative care options will be discussed in greater detail in chapter three. 
233 Besson S ‘Enforcing the child’s right to know her origins: Contrasting approaches under the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
and the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2007) 21 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 145-146. 
234 Art 7 CRC. 
235 The concept of a child’s best interests is an indeterminate one which is nowhere defined and as such is often difficult to 
understand or grapple with; in practice, it is usually determined by contextual circumstances. The concept will be discussed further 
in the following chapter. 
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them.’236 Examples include cases of abandoned children, children born out of wedlock (especially where the 
mother refuses to identify the father), children born of incestuous relationships or rape, etc.237 
 
2.4.2 Parental Direction and Guidance  
Article 5 of the CRC is unique in international law in linking the child’s evolving capacities with appropriate 
direction and guidance.238 The drafting history of the Article reveals that it was clearly intended to be 
revolutionary by, among others, making a clear distinction between parental authority or responsibility 
over the child and the child’s right to enjoy or exercise his rights, that is, to firmly establish that the child is 
a rights holder in international law.239 Consequently, the right is not particularly focused on the family as a 
unit, but on the role of particular adults (usually parents) in the child’s development trajectory as well as on 
the participation of the child in following that trajectory.240 To this end, Article 5 is said to have ‘a two-
pronged purpose.’241 It provides: 
States Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents or, where applicable, the 
members of the extended family or community as provided for by local custom, legal guardians or other 
persons legally responsible for the child, to provide, in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of 
the child, appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise by the child of the rights recognized in the 
present Convention. 
Although guidance and direction are semantically related, the latter ‘entails a way and the existence of 
purpose’ while the former ‘entails supervision, assistance and instructions in the process of proceeding in a 
direction.’242 Taken together therefore, ‘the point is that a child’s life must be purposeful.’243 The first 
observable thing about Article 5 is that it makes a clear distinction between the role of parents and 
extended family or (kinship) community (as determined by custom), on the one hand, and ‘legal guardians 
or other persons legally responsible for the child’, on the other. In effect, the CRC recognises that there are 
                                                 
236 Hodgkin & Newell (2007) 97, 105-109. It should however be noted that the phrase was discussed and adopted against the 
background of discussions on adoption in order to make room for varying national legislation on matters such as anonymous births, 
secret adoptions, artificial fertilization and other forms of genetic parenting, etc. 
237 Hodgkin & Newell (2007) 106. 
238 Kamchedzera (2012) 6. 
239 As above, 13. 
240 As above, 20. 
241 As above, 33. 
242 As above, 22. 
243 As above, 22. 
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societies and nations where the duty to provide guidance and direction to children is not strictly that of 
parents but also culturally involves other members of the extended family and community at large.244 This 
accords with the notions of the family and parental responsibility in (traditional) African societies as 
discussed earlier in this chapter.245 The thrust of Article 5, however, is the notion that adults, particularly 
parents or caregivers in the child’s environment, are participants in and not determiners of the child’s 
life.246  
A similar provision is found in Article 9 of the ACRWC as follows: 
Parents, and where applicable, legal guardians shall have a duty to provide guidance and direction in the 
exercise of these rights having regard to the evolving capacities, and best interests of the child. States Parties 
shall respect the duty of parents and where applicable, legal guardians to provide guidance and direction in 
the enjoyment of these rights subject to the national laws and policies.247 
The ACRWC provision appears both surprising and confusing in certain respects.  First, unlike the CRC, the 
Charter only makes reference to the role of ‘legal guardians’ after parents, with no mention of the 
extended family or community, thereby seeming to revert ‘to a more Western concept of the family’248 
which ‘fails to recognise the multiplicity of ways in which care can be provided.’249 It has been rightly noted 
that this ‘is an anomalous position for a continent still characterized by extended family ties, albeit 
attenuated by the cash economy and increased mobility.’250  
Secondly, Article 9 of the ACRWC is captioned ‘Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion’. Thus the first 
sub-section, Article 9(1), which leads to the provision on ‘guidance and direction’ above, provides that 
‘every child shall have the right to freedom of thought conscience and religion.’ It therefore appears that 
the duty to provide direction and guidance to the child is applicable to the right to ‘freedom of thought 
conscience and religion.’251 A general difference between the CRC and the ACRWC has been pointed out to 
be the fact that, for ease of reference, rights and obligations in the ACRWC ‘are classified and marked with 
                                                 
244 Kamchedzera (2012) 24. 
245 See section 2.2.2. 
246 Kamchedzera (2012) 14. 
247 Article 9(2)-(3) ACRWC. 
248 Gose (2002) 97. 
249 Lansdown G The evolving capacities of the child (2005) 18.  
250 Kamchedzera (2012) 10. 
251 Article 9(1) ACRWC. 
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captions that make it easy for reference and to understand at a glance what article deals with which 
right.’252 While this is generally the method that runs through the Charter, it is however my thinking that 
the inference that may initially be drawn from the framing of Article 9 as a whole is not what the drafters 
intended, since the provision on guidance and direction cannot be applicable to the right to religious 
freedom alone. This is so because (sub) Articles 9(2) & (3) make reference to the ‘exercise of these 
rights’,253 which can be interpreted to refer to all rights provided for in the Charter generally. To argue 
otherwise would mean that the ACRWC dissects the general right to religious freedom into three distinct 
rights: thought; conscience; and religion. Such an argument cannot be justified given that Article 9(1) 
provides that every child shall have ‘the right to’ and not ‘the rights to’. Also, the ‘and’ placed between 
‘conscience’ and ‘religion’ is used conjunctively and not disjunctively. It should also be noted that there is a 
separate provision in the CRC, Article 14, which is more specific to the right to religious freedom and is 
framed in a manner similar to Article 9 of the ACRWC.254 It provides as follows:255   
1. State Parties shall respect the right of the child to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. 
2. States Parties shall respect the rights and duties of the parents and, when applicable, legal guardians, to 
provide direction to the child in the exercise of his or her right256 in a manner consistent with the evolving 
capacities of the child. 
The CRC is thus much clearer on the fact that the provision of direction to the child in Article 14 above is 
specific to the child’s right to religious freedom. The writer is not ignorant of the fact that a thorough 
analysis of the right to religious freedom necessarily requires an in-depth discussion of what is meant by 
the individual components of ‘thought’, ‘conscience’ and ‘religion’. However, this does not translate to each 
component standing alone as an individual right in international law, and the ACRWC, being an instrument 
complementary to the CRC, cannot contradict the latter in such a fundamental manner.257  
In relation to the complementary relationship between the two instruments, Kamchedzera points out that 
the absence of a corresponding provision like Article 5 of the CRC in the ACRWC points to an African bias 
                                                 
252 See Mezmur (2008) 8. 
253 Emphasis added. 
254 Art 14 CRC. 
255 Art 14(1)-(2) CRC. See also 14(3) for limitations on the right to religious freedom. 
256 Emphasis added to show that the exercise of the child’s right in this context is linked specifically to the right to religious freedom 
in (1). 
257 See for example Arts 18 UDHR and 18(1) ICCPR. In chapter three, there will be further discussions on the complementary 
relationship between the CRC and the ACRWC. 
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against the rights of the child as an independent bearer of rights and a preference for a 'welfares' approach 
to children’s rights founded on a preference for family autonomy, inclusive of the duties of the child.258 
While conceding the fact that the ACRWC generally places greater emphasis on family relations as closely 
connected to the rights of the child, it is my opinion that this is not necessary based on bias, neither can it 
be described as a weakness in the Children’s Charter. It is rather a reflection of the African collectivist 
notion of human rights (including children’s rights) as earlier discussed in this chapter.259 The emphasis on 
family relations does not in any way detract from an African acceptance of the notion of children’s rights as 
established by the CRC, hence the complementary nature of the ACRWC to the former. Besides, the 
explanation offered above on the relationship between Articles 9 of the ACRWC and 14 of the CRC is 
sufficient to show that the provision of Article 5 (on parental direction and guidance) of the CRC is perfectly 
acceptable in the African context. 
The notion of the ‘evolving capacities of the child’ is intricately linked to the child’s right to be heard or to 
participate in matters affecting him.260 Providing direction and guidance in accordance with the evolving 
capacities of the child refers to a recognition and acknowledgement of the fact that children’s capacity to 
exercise personal autonomy in decisions affecting them increases as they gain more competencies and 
maturity in the course of growing and developing.261 For instance, the nature of guiding and directing a very 
young child may almost take the form of commands, while in directing and guiding  an older child (for 
example, a teenager), parents and others must make room for some measure of independent thought and 
action by the child. This means that what the child decides to do may not be exactly what the adult directed 
or may not be done in the particular manner in which the adult directed or suggested. The CRC Committee 
has therefore noted that children are aware of their own uniqueness and have a sense of identity. Even 
when very young, children ‘make choices and communicate their feelings, ideas and wishes in numerous 
                                                 
258 Kamchedzera (2012) 6-8. He however notes that a proper construction of article 31 on the duties of the child implies the 
requirement of parental guidance and direction in terms of supervision. As such, parents and others are responsible for accounting 
for those duties until children become adults, 10. 
259 See section 2.2. 
260 Arts 12 CRC & & ACRWC. The principle of child participation will be discussed in greater detail in chapter three of this study. 
261 Mezmur (2009) 151. 
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ways, long before they are able to communicate through the conventions of spoken or written language.’262 
The Committee exhaustively explains the notion thus: 
Article 5 draws on the concept of “evolving capacities” to refer to processes of maturation and learning 
whereby children progressively acquire knowledge, competencies and understanding, including acquiring 
understanding about their rights and about how they can best be realized. Respecting young children’s 
evolving capacities is crucial for the realization of their rights, and especially significant during early 
childhood, because of the rapid transformations in children’s physical, cognitive, social and emotional 
functioning, from earliest infancy to the beginnings of schooling. Article 5 contains the principle that parents 
(and others) have the responsibility to continually adjust the levels of support and guidance they offer to a 
child. These adjustments take account of a child’s interests and wishes as well as the child’s capacities for 
autonomous decision-making and comprehension of his or her best interests. While a young child generally 
requires more guidance than an older child, it is important to take account of individual variations in the 
capacities of children of the same age and of their ways of reacting to situations. Evolving capacities should 
be seen as a positive and enabling process, not an excuse for authoritarian practices that restrict children’s 
autonomy and self-expression and which have traditionally been justified by pointing to children’s relative 
immaturity and their need for socialization. Parents (and others) should be encouraged to offer “direction 
and guidance” in a child-centred way, through dialogue and example, in ways that enhance young children’s 
capacities to exercise their rights, including their right to participation (art. 12) and their right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion (art. 14).263 
As the principal duty bearer of children’s rights, the State has the obligations to respect, protect, promote, 
and fulfil the enjoyment of children’s right to appropriate direction and guidance. Respect implies non-
interference with parents and other key caregivers in the exercise of their role in this regard, except where 
the best interests of the child are at stake.264 The State must also respect, without interference, the right of 
the child to receive appropriate direction and guidance as provided by the parent(s) or others.265 Non-
interference does not equate to ‘blanket autonomy’ for parents in exercising their part of this right. Thus, 
protection refers to the State taking proactive measures to prevent and respond to violations of this right 
as it applies to children and parents or caregivers.266 While protective measures for the benefit of the child 
may be directed at parents, protective measures for the benefit of the parents or caregivers may be 
directed at other persons or groups putting the proper exercise of the right at risk. 
The promotion of the right to parental direction and guidance underscored by the evolving capacities of the 
child generally ‘entails raising awareness and understanding regarding the nature, scope, and implications 
                                                 
262 CRC Committee, GC 7 (2005) para 14. 
263 CRC Committee, GC 7 (2005) para 17. 
264 Kamchedzera (2012) 26-27. 
265 Kamchedzera (2012) 26-27. 
266 Kamchedzera (2012) 27-28. 
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of the right’.267 The duty to fulfil encompasses the provision of measures for facilitating the enjoyment of 
the right, such as providing practical support and education to both parents and children towards properly 
exercising the right.268 It is however important to stress that the State is not the only duty bearer, parents 
and others responsible for the child bear the responsibility while the State has a role to play in facilitating 
the process as the principal organ to which the realisation of human rights is directed.  
 
2.4.3 Parental Responsibility 
Closely related to the above is the principle of parental responsibilities towards children, which serves as 
the flip side of the coin to children’s right to appropriate guidance and direction in accordance with their 
evolving capacities. In other words, while the right to parental guidance and direction is focused on the 
child, the focus of parental responsibility is the parent(s) and/or other key caregivers. A major way in which 
the CRC revolutionised the child-parent relationship in the context of the family environment is evidenced 
by the shift from the doctrine of parens patriae (which basically entrusted parents with rights over children) 
to the doctrine of parental responsibilities for children. In an attempt to balance this ‘new’ relationship 
between the rights of parents over their children and the rights of children as autonomous individuals in 
accordance with their evolving capacities, the CRC Committee notes that: 
Children’s rights will gain autonomy, but they will be especially meaningful in the context of the rights of 
parents and other members of the family – to be recognized, to be respected, to be promoted. And this will 
be the only way to promote the status of, and the respect for, the family itself.269   
Neither the CRC nor the ACRWC provides a definition of (parental) ‘responsibility’, but it has been defined 
as follows: 
Parental responsibilities are a collection of duties and powers which aim at ensuring the moral and material 
welfare of the child, in particular by taking care of the person of the child, by maintaining personal 
relationships with him and by providing for his education, his maintenance, his legal representation and the 
administration of his property.270 
                                                 
267 Kamchedzera (2012) 28. See generally also Arts 4 & 42 CRC and CRC Committee, GC No. 5. 
268 Kamchedzera (2012) 29. 
269 CRC Committee General Day of Discussion ‘Role of the Family in the promotion of the Rights of the Child’ (1994) para 198. 
270 Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Recommendation No. R(84)4 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on 
Parental Responsibilities (1984) Principle 1(a). 
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The concept of parental duties/responsibilities towards children has its roots in English common law as 
described below: 
The duty of parents to provide for the maintenance of their children, is a principle of natural law; an 
obligation not only by nature itself, but by their own proper act, in bringing them to this world … By begetting 
them … they have entered into a voluntary obligation to endeavour, as far as in them lies, that the life which 
they have bestowed shall be supported and preserved. And thus the children will have a perfect right of 
receiving maintenance from their parents.271   
 ‘Parental duty, however, goes well beyond preserving the life of the child through protective oversight 
measures and the provision of basic material necessities such as food, clothing and shelter.’272 These 
measures fall into the category of an additional component of parental responsibilities described in modern 
legal terms as ‘maintenance’.273 Historically described as ‘parental authority’ or ‘parental power’, the 
concept of parental responsibilities includes the transmission and preservation of intangible elements, such 
as, identity, cultural, religious and other values, which together help to mould the character of the child and 
prepare him for responsible adulthood.274 These are some of the elements children deprived of a family 
environment miss out on, and which alternative care is expected to make up for to ensure that the affected 
children develop into well-rounded adults and responsible citizens. 
Under common law, parental responsibilities and rights comprised of guardianship, custody and access, 
which today translate to ‘acting as the child’s guardian’, ‘caring for the child’, and ‘maintaining contact with 
the child.’275 ‘Custody’ (or care) refers to ‘a person’s capacity physically to have the child with him or her 
and to control and supervise the child’s daily life *with reference to+ … health, education, safety and 
                                                 
271 Sir William Blackstone Commentaries on the Laws of England Vol. 1 (1829) p. 446 – cited in Hodgson (2003) 151. The modern 
1989 Children Act of England defines it as: ‘all the rights, duties, powers, responsibilities and authority which by law a parent of a 
child has in relation to the child and his property’. See Chapter 41, Art 3(1) of the Act. On the flip side, under traditional common 
law conceptions, parents and especially fathers were in absolute control of their families and children. Thus, all goings-on within 
the family were considered entirely private and outside of any possible intervention by the State. This policy meant that children 
were vulnerable to various forms of violence and abuse within the family and had no recourse to the law or State for reprieve. All 
of these have changed due to the recognition of the rights of children as individuals subject to the protection of the State in at least 
the same manner as adults. See Bilsky L ‘Child-Parent-State: The Absence of Community in the Courts Approach to Education’ in 
Douglas G & Sebba L (eds) Children’s Rights and Traditional Values 134; Van Bueren (1995) 73; Robinson JA ‘An introduction to 
international law on the rights of the child relating to the Parent-Child relationship’ (2002) 13 (2) Stellenbosch Law Review 309; 
UNICEF Regional Office of South Asia and Save the Children Sweden Children’s Rights: Turning principles into practice (2000) 79. 
272 Hodgson (2003) 151. 
273 Cronje DSP & Heaton J South African Family Law 2 ed (2004) 272. 
274 Hodgson (2003) 151. 
275 Heaton J ‘Parental responsibilities and rights’ in Davel C & Skelton A Commentary on the Children’s Act (2007) 3-3 – 3-4. This is 
an established interpretation in South Africa and may differ elsewhere. 
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welfare’, among others.276 ‘Access’ refers to regularly communicating with the child based on the 
maintenance of a personal relationship with the child.277 ‘Guardianship’ is broad enough to incorporate 
elements of care of care but is narrowly understood to refer to the duty to 
administer and safeguard the child’s property and property interests, assist or represent the child in 
administrative, contractual and other legal matters, and give or refuse any consent that is legally required in 
respect of the child.278   
According to Article 18 of the CRC, ‘parents or, as the case may be, legal guardians, have the primary 
responsibility for the upbringing and development of the child.’279 In the ACRWC, reference is made to 
‘other persons’ in place of ‘legal guardians’, which caters for the numerous informal forms of child care 
(including kinship care) in Africa.280 States have a duty to appropriately assist ‘parents and legal guardians in 
the performance of their child-rearing responsibilities and shall ensure the development of institutions, 
facilities and services for the care of children.’281  
The position of the ACRWC is quite different with regards to State assistance.282 First, the duty of the State 
to assist is qualified by resource availability and prevailing circumstances.283 This qualification is itself 
underscored by an acknowledgement that the exercise of parental responsibilities towards children can 
only be secured within the ‘abilities and financial capacities’ of those responsible for the child.284 This 
provision highlights States’ recognition of the inadequate socio-economic conditions of many African 
families and individuals. Thus, ‘the drafters were mindful that socio-economic rights of children cannot be 
applied with uniformity across all households [due to conditions of poverty and inadequate financial 
                                                 
276 Heaton (2007) 3-4. 
277 Heaton (2007) 3-5. 
278 Heaton (2007) 3-3 – 3-5. It should be noted that by law, parental responsibilities are automatically conferred on married parents 
of a child (if married at the time of conception, at birth or anytime in between) or a mother of a child born out of wedlock. In South 
Africa, certain criteria are provided for the acquisition of parental responsibilities by unmarried fathers and other people who may 
be or wish to be responsible for the child’s upbringing. Other countries have other rules and standards for the conferment of 
parental responsibilities on unmarried fathers. 
279 Art 18(1) CRC. 
280 Art 20(1) ACRWC. 
281 Art 18(2) CRC. 
282 Art 20(2) ACRWC. 
283 ‘States Parties to the present Charter shall in accordance with their means and national conditions take all appropriate 
measures…’(emphasis added). Art 18(2) CRC above does not contain a similar qualifier to the obligation on the state to assist with 
parental responsibility.  
284 Art 20(1)(b) ACRWC. Art 27(2) CRC however provides similarly. 
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security+.’285 In cases where parents are thus unable to discharge their parental responsibilities, they are 
not likely to be held to be in violation of the rights of the child.286  
Secondly, State assistance under the ACRWC goes beyond the scope of the CRC. While the CRC appears to 
narrow assistance to the provision of child care ‘institutions, facilities and services’ for the benefit of 
working parents,287 assistance under the ACRWC goes further to encompass the provision of material 
assistance for the survival of the child. Examples include ‘nutrition, health, education, clothing and 
housing.’288 Consequently, where States fail to assist by providing ‘material support and support 
programmes’, they are in violation of the right of the child to conditions of living necessary for the child’s 
development.289 The provision of measures of support forms the core of the family’s right to ‘enjoy the 
protection and support of the State for its establishment and development’ under the ACRWC.290 In effect, 
States have a responsibility towards children even while they are in family or parental care especially when 
their socio-economic needs cannot be adequately guaranteed in that environment.291 This is by no means a 
licence for States to remove children from poor parents or families as poverty cannot be a justification for 
separation. Rather, it is a call for States to discharge their obligations to support poor families in their child-
rearing responsibilities.292 Such socio-economic living conditions necessary for the child’s development 
would include, among others, adequate education, shelter, food, clothing, and medical aid for the child.293 
It is important to highlight that in the context of alternative care, where new caregivers assume 
responsibility for the upbringing of the child, the provisions on parental responsibilities are also 
                                                 
285 Ankut (2003) 31. 
286 Ankut (2003) 31-32: 
287 Art 18(2)-(3) CRC. Art 20(2)(b)-(c) of the ACRWC contain similar provisions, making it clear that assistance under the latter is 
broader in scope. 
288 Art 2(a) ACRWC. 
289 CRC Committee, General Comment No 1 ‘Aims of Education’ (2001) para 9. It is important to stress that African states cannot 
perpetually rely on having ‘weak economies’ or ‘inadequate resources’ as a justification for not fulfilling their obligation to assist. 
This is because the socio-economic rights principle of progressive realisation of rights requires that there must at least be a 
minimum level, based on the ‘available resources’, at which a State is operating with clear policies and plans to increase the levels 
of intervention. 
290 Art 18(1) ACRWC. The family is entitled to the protection and support of the State as the ‘natural unit and basis of society.’ 
291 Ankut (2003) 44. 
292 States Parties obligations in this regard are also provided in Art 10(1) ICESCR that ‘the widest possible protection and assistance 
should be accorded to the family, which is the natural and fundamental group unit of society, particularly for its establishment and 
while it is responsible for the care and education of dependent children.’ Similarly, Art 24(1) of the ICCPR guarantees the child’s 
right to protection by the family, society and the State. See also Art 18(1)-(2) ACHPR. The European Social Charter also provides 
similarly in its Article 16 for the right of the family to social, legal and economic protection ‘by such means as social and family 
benefits, fiscal arrangements, provision of family housing, benefits for the newly married, and other appropriate means.’ 
293 Ankut (2003) 30. 
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applicable.294 This is in line with earlier discussions on the ‘family’, with particular reference to Article 5 of 
the CRC which recognises persons other than biological parents. It must again be stressed that the 
expression ‘parental responsibilities’ does not strictly apply to biological parents alone but also to any other 
adult who has direct responsibility over the child or children under his or her care. This understanding is of 
particular importance to kinship care as the main subject matter of this study. 
 
2.4.4 The Rights to Social Security and an Adequate Standard of Living 
The provision of social security has become a major area of interest for various stakeholders concerned 
with matters affecting children and other vulnerable groups including persons with disabilities and the 
elderly.295 In relation to children, social workers, development practitioners, policy makers, children’s rights 
advocates and organisations, among other stakeholders, are increasingly becoming aware of the 
importance of social security measures for the realisation of children’s rights.296 This is particularly so in 
developing countries where poverty levels are high. The promotion of human well-being and social justice 
requires the development of appropriate social security systems.297 The role of social security in 
compensating beneficiaries’ loss of or lack of income due to exposure to some contingency functions as 
both a poverty reduction and prevention mechanism; poverty being the biggest threat to human security in 
Africa.298 It also plays a role in redistributive justice through the redistribution of income, thereby 
preventing social exclusion and promoting social inclusion.299 In other words, social security is ‘designed for 
the purposes of poverty prevention, poverty alleviation, social compensation and income distribution.’300 
                                                 
294 UNICEF ‘CHILD PROTECTION INFORMATION SHEET: Children without Parental Care’, May 2006, 1. However, this does not 
preclude the original parent(s) or caregivers from maintaining relations with the child, unless it is not in the child’s best interests or 
where such original parent(s) or caregivers are no longer available. Examples include a case of separation from parents ‘where the 
parents are living separately and a decision must be made as to the child’s place of residence (Art 9(3) CRC).’ Where a child is 
separated from his or her parent(s) at the initiative of a State Party due to death or other factors involving the parent(s), alternative 
care is to be provided for the child and parental responsibilities are then conferred on the new caregivers. See art 9(4) CRC read 
together with art 20 CRC. See also art 19(1) ACRWC read together with art 25 ACRWC. 
295 Kaseke E ‘The role of social security in South Africa’, (2010) 53 International Social Work 160. 
296 Kaseke (2010) 160. 
297 Kaseke (2010) 160. 
298 Kaseke (2010) 162. 
299 United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (UNCESCR) ‘General Comment No. 19: The Right to Social 
Security (Art. 9 of the Covenant), E/C.12/GC/19 (2008) paragraph 3. 
300 Nkosi G ‘An analysis of the South African social assistance system as it applies to children in rural communities: A perspective 
from the Grootboom case’ (2011) 26 Southern African Public Law 83. 
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This is said to be particularly important in societies with high levels of inequality such as South Africa, for 
example.301    
Although not a fixed concept, social security is generally understood to be an umbrella concept 
encompassing social assistance and social insurance.302 While social insurance is more applicable in the 
labour context for the protection of employees or workers, social assistance, which is the focus of this 
study, generally relates to strategies contemplated as State interventions to provide support for categories 
of citizens in need and who lack the means to support themselves.303 Thus, social assistance has been 
defined as ‘a range of benefits and services available to guarantee *a+ minimum (however defined) level of 
subsistence to people in need, based on the test of resources.’304 In other words, it is an income ‘safety net’ 
paid to ‘bring incomes up to some minimum level’,305 and it rests on two pillars: the provision of various 
kinds of social services and the payment of social grants (whether in cash or in kind).306 As a State 
intervention measure, social assistance is usually regulated by legislation, financed through taxes and is the 
exclusive responsibility of the State through specialised government agencies such as the South African 
Social Security Agency (SASSA).307  
Social assistance is generally sub-categorised into two strands: means-tested social assistance and national 
or universal social assistance.308 Means-tested social assistance is applicable or available only to those who 
qualify on the basis of a means test; the test being based on an evaluation of the applicant’s income and 
assets to determine if they are below a stipulated minimum.309 The aim of the means-tested social 
assistance is to guard against severe deprivation by ensuring the maintenance of a basic subsistence 
                                                 
301 Kaseke (2010) 164. 
302 Jordaan B, Kalula E & Strydom E (eds) Understanding social security law (2009) 1; Olivier MP ‘The concept of social security’ in 
Olivier MP, Smit N & Kalula ER (eds) Social security: A legal analysis (2003) 24. It should be noted that there is no consistency in the 
definition of any of these concepts and they are often used interchangeably along with other descriptions such as social welfare 
and social protection. 
303 Triegaardt J & Patel L ‘Social security’ in Patel L (ed) Social Welfare & Social Development in South Africa (2005) 124; Nkosi G ‘An 
analysis of the South African social assistance system as it applies to children in rural communities: A perspective from the 
Grootboom case’ (2011) 26 Southern African Public Law 82; Kaseke (2010) 163. Social assistance is theoretically meant to at least, 
raise the floor for those living below the poverty line. 
304 Eardley T, Bradshaw J, Ditch J, Gough I & Whiteford P ‘Social assistance in OECD countries’ (1997) 7 Journal of European Social 
Policy 4.  
305 Nkosi (2011) 84. 
306 Olivier & Kulula ‘Scope and coverage’ in Olivier, Smit & Kalula (2003) 143. 
307 Strydom EML (ed) Essential Social Security Law (2001) 7. Visit DSD at < http://www.dsd.gov.za/ > 
308 Nielsen K ‘Counteracting material deprivation: The role of social assistance in Europe’ (2012) 22 Journal of European Social Policy 
148; Gough I ‘Social Assistance Regimes: A Cluster Analysis’ (2001) 11 Journal of European Social Policy 165; Strydom (2001) 8. 
309 Nielsen (2012) 149; Strydom (2001) 8. 
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level.310 The National or Universal social assistance, on the other hand, differs from the means-tested 
category only in one main respect: it is ‘premised on the notion that the state should aim to provide a 
minimum standard of living for all’, irrespective of ‘means’ or ‘qualification’.311 The means test element of 
social assistance is what has given rise to various programmes known as cash transfer schemes, whether 
social cash transfers (SCT), conditional cash transfers (CCT), or unconditional cash transfers (UCT), among 
others. All these form ‘part of a bigger strategy of social assistance in poverty reduction and assisting the 
most destitute in society.’312 
 
2.4.4.1 The Relationship between Children’s Rights to Social Security and an Adequate Standard 
of Living 
The rights to social security and an adequate standard of living are guaranteed in several international and 
regional human rights instruments.313 However, the International Labour Organization (ILO) is the 
specialised UN agency for standard setting on and implementation of the right to social security on a global 
scale; the ILO played a significant role in the inclusion of these rights in the CRC.314 Consequently, 
understanding children’s rights to social security and an adequate standard of living cannot be isolated 
from the instruments already mentioned and the work of the ILO. This is more so because: 
The CRC Committee has so far not comprehensively clarified its understanding of Article 26 of the CRC, e.g. 
by way of a general comment. Nor has systematic attention been paid to the right to benefit from social 
security in the concluding observations on reports of States Parties. Moreover, it is usually adults who have 
direct claim to social security benefits, including children’s benefits which are supposed to be administered 
on the children’s behalf.315 
                                                 
310 Nielsen (2012) 150; Strydom (2001) 8. 
311 Nielsen (2012) 150; Strydom (2001) 8. 
312 Govender M ‘Conditional cash transfers as a means of addressing poverty in South Africa’, unpublished PhD thesis, University of 
South Africa (2011) 144. 
313 See: Arts 25(1) UDHR; 11(1)(e) & 14(2)(c) CEDAW; 9 & 11 ICESCR & 27(1) ICRMW. 
314 Scheinin M ‘The Right to Social Security’ in Eide A, Krause C & Rosas A (eds) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2001) 214. See 
also Commission on Human Rights, Summary Record of the Two Hundred and Twentieth Meeting (UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.220) 13 – 
cited in Vandenhole W ‘Article 26: The Right to Benefit from Social Security’ in Alen et al A commentary on the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (2007) 4. 
315 Vandenhole (2007)15. 
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‘The right to benefit from social security is also today an important right, both in itself and for the 
realisation of other rights in the CRC’,316 including the right to alternative care.  Article 26 of the CRC 
provides: 
1. States Parties shall recognize for every child the right to benefit from social security, and shall take the 
necessary measures to achieve the full realization of this right in accordance with their national law. 
2. The benefits should, where appropriate, be granted, taking into account the resources and the 
circumstances of the child and persons having responsibility for the maintenance of the child, as well as any 
other consideration relevant to an application for benefits made by or on behalf of the child. 
Article 26 does not guarantee the right to social security but the right to benefit from social security. From 
the Travaux Preparatoires of the CRC, the rationale for this formulation is that the right to receive social 
security benefits is granted to the parent or caregiver of the child who is responsible for maintaining the 
child.317 Sometimes, parents and (in the context of alternative care) other caregivers are unable to properly 
provide for their own well-being and consequently lack sufficient resources to cater for the needs of the 
children in their care.318 Vandenhole rightly points out, however, that the reasoning behind this formulation 
appears contradictory to the meaning of Article 26(2) which ‘makes clear that the CRC does not exclude 
that a child itself is entitled to social security benefits, and is even the applicant.’319 In fact, it was the 
express intention of the drafters that children could apply directly for benefits.320 Thus, the 2005 reporting 
guidelines of the CRC Committee required States to indicate ‘the circumstances under which children 
themselves are allowed to apply for social security measures, either directly or through a representative.’321 
During the drafting of the CRC, it was thought that there might be no added value in including the right to 
social security in the CRC.322 This was due to the provisions of Articles 18 (parental responsibilities) and 27 
(adequate standard of living) of the CRC, both of which were considered to already cover the concerns in 
                                                 
316 Vandenhole (2007) 1. 
317 Detrick (1992) 364-365. 
318 Govender (2011) 27. 
319 The wording of Art. 26(2) refers to ‘application for benefits by or on behalf of the child’ (emphasis added): Vandenhole (2007) 
15. 
320 UNICEF (2007) 379. 
321 CRC Committee, Periodic Report Guidelines (UN Doc.CRC/C/58/Rev.1, 2005) para. 100. See also para 35 of the updated 2010 
CRC Committee periodic report guidelines. It has also been pointed out that in making a reservation to Article 26 implying 
children’s independent entitlement to social security, the Netherlands seems to confirm the Committee’s interpretation. See 
Vandenhole (2007) 16. 
322 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) Legislative history of the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (2007) 614. 
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the draft Article 26 on social security. Article 27(1) of the CRC provides that ‘States Parties recognize the 
right of every child to a standard of living adequate for the child’s physical, mental, spiritual, moral and 
social development.’ Additionally, 
States Parties, in accordance with national conditions and within their means, shall take appropriate 
measures to assist parents and others responsible for the child to implement this right and shall in case of 
need provide material assistance and support programmes,323 particularly with regard to nutrition, clothing 
and housing.324 
Despite these provisions, the ILO successfully argued in favour of a separate provision on social security 
based on the fact that Articles 18 and 27 ‘only dealt with specific aspects *of social security+ and did not 
expressly mention social security.’325 It is however clear that the issues covered in both Articles 18 and 27 of 
the CRC form part and parcel of the issues contemplated under the umbrella right to social security (Article 
26), and specifically social assistance. In other words, children’s right to social security cannot be isolated 
from other rights in the CRC, particularly children’s right to an adequate standard of living, because the 
right to social security is generally instrumental to securing an adequate standard of living. 
This link is further evidenced by the fact that the CRC Committee usually makes no clear distinctions 
between both rights when making recommendations on States Parties’ reports in its concluding 
observations.326 Detrick has noted that the close relationship between both rights justifies such an 
approach.327 The interdependence and inter-relatedness of the these two rights, along with other rights of 
the child, such as, the right to life, survival and development, to basic health and welfare, and all other 
socio-economic rights particularly, is further highlighted in the reporting guidelines of the CRC Committee 
as well as in its General Comments. The Committee has noted for example that: 
Growing up in relative poverty undermines children’s well-being, social inclusion and self-esteem and reduces 
opportunities for learning and development. Growing up in conditions of absolute poverty has even more 
serious consequences, threatening children’s survival and their health, as well as undermining the basic 
                                                 
323 See also the discussions above in section 2.4.3. 
324 Art. 27(3) CRC. Art. 27(2) of the CRC again re-states the principle that parents have the primary responsibility to secure the 
child’s right to an adequate standard of living. Hence, Art. 27(3) again comes into effect where or when parents are unable to 
discharge their responsibility towards the child. 
325 Detrick (1992) 368-369; OHCHR (2007) 614. 
326 Vandenhole (2007) 11. See for example CRC Committee Concluding Observations: Gabon (UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.171, 2002) 
para 52(c); Georgia (UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.222, 2003) para 53; Antigua and Barbuda (UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add. 247, 2004) para 55; 
Latvia (UN Doc. CRC/C/LVA/CO/2, 2006); Nepal (UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.261, 2005) para 72; Nigeria (UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.257, 
2005) para 59. 
327 Detrick S A commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1999) 446. 
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quality of life. States Parties are urged to implement systematic strategies to reduce poverty in early 
childhood as well as combat its negative effects on children’s well-being. All possible means should be 
employed, including “material assistance and support programmes” for children and families (art. 27.3), in 
order to assure young children a basic standard of living consistent with rights. Implementing children’s right 
to benefit from social security, including social insurance, is an important element of any strategy (art. 26).328 
 
Thus, the CRC Committee interprets children’s right to benefit from social security in an instrumental way, 
that is, ‘to the extent that it is beneficial for the realisation of the general principles or other rights in the 
CRC, such as the right to survival and development and the right to health, or for the reduction of 
poverty.’329 It is instructive to note that this multi-faceted approach to the right to social security (social 
assistance) is what underlies the social security interventions made in favour of children deprived of their 
family environment and in need of alternative care, as discussions in subsequent chapters will show. 
 
2.4.4.2 Children’s Rights to Social Security and an Adequate Standard of Living under the ACRWC 
With regards to the ACRWC, it has been noted that, like the ACHPR, the African Children’s Charter contains 
no provision on social security (with specific reference to social assistance) as an autonomous right.330 
Several factors have been presented as possible reasons for the absence of the right to social security in the 
ACHPR. First, it has been argued that the omission is due in part to the different political ideologies 
prevalent at the time of drafting the ACHPR, and in part to the ‘African worldview’ that considers taking 
care of those in need as the responsibility of the family and community rather than the State.331 This is a 
major reason for the criticisms levelled against the conception of duties in both the ACHPR and the 
Children’s Charter, since it appears to relieve the State of its responsibility to secure the welfare and 
protection of its citizens.332  
                                                 
328 CRC Committee GC 7 (2005) para 26; emphasis added. 
329 Vandenhole (2007) 12. See for example: CRC Committee, General Comment No. 3: HIV/AIDS and the Rights of the Child (2003) 
para 6. Vandenhole has however also noted that ‘Article 26 of the CRC, if read in light of other human rights and ILO treaties, could 
be given a more technical reading, thus imposing more specific obligations on the State than Article 27 does.’ Thus, the distinction 
between both rights is not merely artificial. On the indivisible nature of the rights in the CRC, with particular reference to the right 
to social security and an adequate standard of living, see: Eide A ‘Article 27: The Right to an Adequate Standard of Living’ in Alen et 
al (2006) 13. 
330 Ankut (2003) 15; Chirwa (2008) 91. 
331 Vandenhole (2007) 11; Ouguergouz F The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A Comprehensive Agenda for Human 
Dignity and Sustainable Development in Africa (2003) 42. 
332 Art. 29(1) ACHPR provides that the individual shall have the duty to among others, maintain his parents ‘in case of need.’ 
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Secondly, there is the argument about the ‘socio-economic circumstances prevailing in most African 
States.’333 As was pointed out earlier however, this is not a sustainable argument, especially in the long 
term, based on the socio-economic rights principle of the progressive realisation of rights.334 In effect, 
States cannot continually avoid their responsibility by claiming to have inadequate resources; rather they 
have a responsibility to act, in accordance with what is available and with international cooperation,335 
which has continuously been on the increase in Africa in recent years. In furtherance of this, Odinkalu has 
argued that a combined reading of several provisions in the ACHPR reveals that the right to social security 
and other socio-economic rights are contemplated in the instrument.336 This position was accepted and 
adopted by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the ACHPR enforcement body)337 in the 
case of Social and Economic Rights Action Centre and Another v Nigeria (SERAC case),338 among others, 
showing that social security and other socio-economic rights are in no way outside the interpretative scope 
of the African human rights system.339 
With specific reference to children’s social security rights, it has been argued that the absence of a specific 
provision on social security in the ACRWC, as is the case under the CRC, is rather unfortunate and 
‘extremely disturbing.’340 This is because the right ‘would have been of utmost importance in the context of 
Africa where most families are grappling with basic survival needs and require, to a large extent, state 
support.’341 It is however my submission that the ACRWC does provide for children’s rights to social security 
and an adequate standard of living. The ACRWC’s provision on ‘parental responsibilities’ which obliges 
States Parties to provide material assistance and support programmes to needy parents to ensure child 
survival represents the Children’s Charter’s equivalent of the CRC’s provisions on the rights to social 
security and an adequate standard of living for children. Thus, the relevant portion of Article 20 of the 
                                                 
333 Gose (2003) 120. 
334 See the discussion in section 2.4. 
335 Arts 4 CRC & 1(1) ACRWC.  
336 Odinkalu CA ‘Implementing economic, social and cultural rights’ in Evans M & Murray C (eds) The African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights: The System in Practice,1986-2000 (2000) 192; Examples include Arts 5, 15-17 ACHPR. 
337 Art 30 ACHPR. 
338 Communication 155/96 (ACHPR 2001) (2001) AHRLR 60. 
339 Oloka-Onyago J ‘Reinforcing Marginalised Rights in the Age of Globalisation: International Mechanisms, Non-State Actors and 
the Struggle for Peoples’ Rights in Africa’ (2003) American University International Law Review 852-911. 
340 Gose (2002) 120. 
341 Ankut (2003) 19. 
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ACRWC must be understood and interpreted as equivalent to the CRC’s provision in Article 27 on an 
adequate standard of living. According to the ACRWC, ‘States Parties … shall in accordance with their 
means and national conditions [take] all appropriate measures’ 
To assist parents and other persons responsible for the child and in case of need provide material assistance 
and support programmes particularly with regard to nutrition, health, education, clothing and housing.342 
A comparison between Article 27(3) of the CRC and Article 20(2)(a) of the ACRWC clearly shows that the 
latter was largely a repetition of the former.343 The main difference lies in the fact of the headings provided 
for each section of the ACRWC; Article 20 of the ACRWC is titled ‘Parental Responsibilities’ while Article 27 
of the CRC is known as the CRC’s provision for the right to an adequate standard of living. Engaging with the 
contents however reveals that the contents are substantially the same. In relation to Article 20 of the 
ACRWC, Mezmur notes: 
In addition, article 20(2)(a) of the ACRWC, which finds no corresponding provision in the CRC, provides that 
State Parties shall assist parents and guardians, in case of need, to provide material assistance and support 
programmes especially with regard to health, education, clothing and housing. Taking into account the 
continental scourge of HIV/AIDS and the attendant problem of orphans and child-headed households, this 
duty may prove to be an invaluable addition where parents or de facto care-givers are no longer able to 
provide or are no longer present, a positive duty is imposed on the state.344    
While the quotation above is correct to the extent that it shows the importance of States Parties 
obligations in Africa, in the context of social security and an adequate standard of living, it is however 
wrong to the extent that it asserts that ‘article 20(2)(a) of the ACRWC finds no corresponding provision in 
the CRC’; as already shown above. Based on this analysis, it will therefore be incorrect to claim or assert 
that the ACRWC makes no provisions for children’s rights to social security and an adequate standard of 
living. Further, it must be stressed that it is extremely important that the ACRWC be at all times read as an 
instrument that is complementary to the CRC, which is the original intention. To do otherwise is to hold 
that rights that are not expressly contained in the ACRWC but in the CRC are not applicable to African 
States Parties. This is not the case particularly given that the ACRWC provides very importantly as follows: 
                                                 
342 Art 20(2)(a). 
343 Art 20 of the ACRWC however includes health and education, both of which are absent in the CRC’s Article 27. 
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Nothing in this Charter shall affect any provisions that are more conducive to the realization of the rights and 
welfare of the child contained in the law of a State Party or in any other international Convention or 
agreement in force in that State Party.345 
All African States (except Somalia)346 have ratified the CRC (and 46 of 54 countries have ratified the 
ACRWC),347 and thus none can be absolved of its obligations under the CRC based on any difference, real or 
perceived, contained in the ACRWC. 
2.4.4.3 Social Security and Adequate Standard of Living: States Parties’ Obligations 
States Parties’ obligations to provide social assistance to children should take into account the resources 
and circumstances of the child, including of those responsible for the child’s maintenance.348  When 
reporting before the CRC Committee, States Parties need to show: 
The legal provisions relevant to the implementation of this right, the circumstances under which children 
themselves are allowed to apply for social security measures, either directly or through a representative, the 
criteria taken into account to grant the benefits, as well as any relevant disaggregated information 
concerning the coverage and financial implications of such measures, its incidence by age, gender, number of 
children per family, civil status of the parents, the situation of single parents, and the relationship of social 
security to unemployment.349  
Like all other socio-economic rights, the right to benefit from social security is subject to the principle of 
‘progressive realisation’ as expressed in Articles 4 of the CRC and 20(2) of the ACRWC, among others.350 The 
interrelated elements of availability, accessibility and quality are relied upon to define and/or measure the 
realisation of socio-economic rights generally.351 Thus the first component of the right to benefit from 
social security is the establishment of a system of social security (availability).352 While expressing concern 
at the absence of such systems in a number of countries, the CRC Committee has emphasised that ‘the 
                                                 
345 Art 1(2) ACRWC. 
346 The newly independent South Sudan is currently in the process of finalising the ratification process. 
347 See ‘LIST OF COUTRIES WHICH HAVE, SIGNED, RATIFIED/ACCEDED TO THE AFRICAN UNION 
CONVETION ON AFRICAN CHARTER ON THE RIGHTS AND WELFARE OF THE CHILD’, available at < http://acerwc.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/03/French-and-English-ACERWC-Updated-Status-of-the-ACRWC.pdf > (accessed 20 September 2013). 
348 CRC Committee, Periodic Report Guidelines (2010) para 35. See also the 2005 periodic report guidelines. 
349 As above, para. 100. 
350 Art 4 CRC provides: States Parties shall take all appropriate…measures…With regard to economic, social and cultural rights, 
States Parties shall undertake such measures to the maximum extent of their available resources and, where needed, within the 
framework of international co-operation.’ 
351 The ICESCR Committee has a long history in the development of the elements of availability, accessibility and quality which have 
sometimes been adopted by other monitoring bodies including the CRC Committee. See for example, CRC Committee General 
Comment No. 4 ‘Adolescent Health and Development in the Context of the Convention on the Rights of the Child’ (2003) para 41. 
352 Vandenhole (2007) 22. 
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general lack of financial resources cannot be used as a justification for neglecting to establish social security 
programmes and social safety nets to protect the most vulnerable groups of children.’353 
Accessibility contemplates a wide coverage of social security programmes, without discrimination, which 
should particularly target those most in need of the interventions. Consequently, States are obligated to 
take measures through which a significantly larger number of children and their families may benefit from a 
minimum of social security protection, with an emphasis on children from poorer families, communities or 
backgrounds, children of unemployed or self-employed parents, and children with disabilities, among 
others.354  
With regard to the quality of social security measures, the adequacy of the benefits is an indicator which 
the CRC Committee has often emphasised although what is considered adequate is not always clear.355 
Concerns have however been raised about the low level of social security benefits and lack of promptness 
in making payments and services available to the recipients.356 Adequacy can also refer to a system which 
provides a minimum level of social security for the child and the family, and is measured by whether the 
child is able to enjoy an adequate standard of living based on the minimum.357  
With reference to social assistance benefits applicable to children, the CRC Committee has mainly paid 
attention to child allowances and benefits with a focus on vulnerable families and families living in 
                                                 
353 CRC Committee Concluding Observation: Nigeria (UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.61, 1996) para 33. See also Nepal (UN Doc. 
CRC/C/15/Add.261, 2005) para 73. See further Weissbrodt DS & de la Vega C International human rights law: An introduction 
(2007) 133; UNICEF (2007) 382. 
354 This has been re-stated by the CRC Committee in several concluding observations over the years. See for example, CRC 
Committee Concluding Observations: United Kingdom (Isle of Man) (UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.134, 2000) paras 32-33; Congo (UN 
Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.153, 2001) paras 58-59; Portugal (UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.153, 2001) para 28; Mozambique (UN Doc. 
CRC/C/15/Add. 172, 2002) para 55; United Kingdom (UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.188, 2002) para 46; Georgia (UN Doc. 
CRC/C/15/Add.222, 2003) para 53; Pakistan (UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.217, 2003), para 59; Australia (UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.268, 
2005) para 64; Yemen (UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add. 267, 2005) para 62; Mexico (UN Doc. CRC/C/MEX/CO/3, 2006) para 54; Trinidad 
and Tobago (UN Doc. CRC/C/TTO/CO/2, 2006) paras 57-58. See also UNICEF (2007) 380; US Social Security Administration ‘A Profile 
of Social Security Child Beneficiaries and their Families: Sociodemographic and Economic Characteristics’, available at < 
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v71n1/v71n1p1.html > (accessed 31 October 2013). 
355 Vandenhole (2007) 39. 
356 UNICEF (2007) 388. See CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: Russian Federation (UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.110, 1999) para 
13; Moldova (UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.192, 2002) para 39; Georgia (UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.222, 2003) para 54. 
357 UNICEF (2007) 382; Gordon D, Nandy S, Pantazis C, Pemberton S & Townsend P The distribution of child poverty in the 
developing world (2003) 23; ILO Report VI ‘Social security: Issues, challenges and prospects’, 89th session, Geneva, June 2001; Viet-
Wilson J Setting adequacy standards: How governments define minimum incomes (1998) 11. See also CRC Committee, Concluding 
Observations: Solomon Islands (UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.208, 2003) para 45; Czech Republic (UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.201, 2003) 
para 43; Hungary (UN Doc. CRC/C/HUN/CO/2, 2006) para 46. 
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poverty.358 Assistance through child and family benefits is seen as central to the fight against poverty based 
on the means-testing system or a universal scheme; such assistance is deemed to protect more families 
from economic deprivation unlike fiscal reforms which generally benefit only middle- and high-income 
families.359 
2.5 Conclusions 
This chapter presented discussions on a number of key issues necessary for laying a foundation for 
understanding the right to alternative care for children deprived of a family environment, with particular 
reference to kinship care in Africa. Purposefully, the chapter began historically by dwelling on the 
understanding and practice of kinship care in traditional African societies. It was shown that kinship care is 
part and parcel of what a family environment means in the African context; the kinship system is an 
intricate foundation upon which the very essence of family is built and defined. Several issues have 
impacted on the role of kinship systems in maintaining the cohesion of the family, ranging from changes in 
economic systems to HIV and AIDS. However, kinship bonds continue to exist and play a critical role in 
several aspects of life especially with regards to child care experiences and practices. As noted by McCarthy 
and Edwards: 
Kinship connections are often a source of fascination to people in their everyday lives … Indeed, kinship may 
be a key way in which people’s ideas about their families are linked to the past and future, constituting family 
projects rooted in historical time. Kinship also continues to be an important part of people’s everyday lives, 
despite the often repeated - but probably misleading – belief that kin relationships are declining in 
importance or that friends may be seen to be equivalent to kin. Grandparents often continue to play 
significant roles in family lives, and siblings and wider kinship ties also continue to be important throughout 
adult lives. Generally, kinship may be the basis for expectations and negotiations of obligations and support, 
and for (moral) identity.’360 
With reference to child care, a major finding which will be explored in subsequent chapters is that unlike in 
the past when kinship care was a communal practice based on shared responsibilities among several 
members of the same kinship group or extended family, kinship care today is in the main the entire 
responsibility of the particular kinship carer with whom the child is placed. 
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Secondly, the chapter presented a discussion on the concept of the ‘family’ in international law, showing 
that while there is no right to a family, the duty to uphold and protect the family as society’s most 
fundamental unit has become established as a rule of customary international law. Discussion of the 
various attempts to define what is meant by ‘family’ showed that the family, both as a concept and an 
institution, continues to evolve in nature and practice as the years go by. The main point therefore is that 
regardless of what form it takes, the family remains the basis and fundamental unit of society subject to the 
protection and support of the State. 
Following from the above, the discussions progressed to show that although there is no right to a family, 
there are rights of or rights applicable to or within the context of the family, with particular significance for 
the proper growth and development of the child. These include the rights to knowledge of one’s origins, 
parental direction and guidance and an adequate standard of living, among others. The importance of the 
discussion in that section is in the fact that those rights are significant for the survival of children regardless 
of what form the family takes. This is even more so in the context of kinship care because, as has been 
highlighted in the previous chapter, kinship care is the most prevalent family form for many children in 
Africa, within the framework of alternative care for children deprived of parental care. 
The chapter also discussed the importance of the rights to social security and an adequate standard of 
living as they apply to children and their families. It was clearly pointed out that the right to an adequate 
standard of living cannot be separated from the right to social security; the latter generally serves as the 
means through which the former is realised. These rights are important in the context of any discussion on 
the right to alternative care because as highlighted in the chapter (and as will be further explored in 
subsequent chapters), the socio-economic condition of poverty is a major trigger for loss of parental care 
and the need for alternative care in many African countries. Increasingly therefore, States’ obligation to 
provide the right to alternative care for children deprived of their family environment or parental care 
cannot be separated from States’ obligations to guarantee children’s rights to social security and an 
adequate standard of living. 
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In the following chapter, the right to alternative care as a whole will be the focus of the discussion. It will be 
argued that while kinship care is a child care reality for many children in Africa, the right to alternative care 
as construed in international law did not contemplate kinship care as alternative care within the framework 
of the relevant instruments. Kinship care was clearly understood to be a family environment and this 
understanding has an impact on the provision of adequate measures of support and protection for kinship 
care circumstances. This will serve as a background for understanding the focus on kinship care in recent 
years as a viable alternative care option, within the alternative care framework, for children without 
parental care. 
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CHAPTER THREE – THE INTERNATIONAL AND AFRICAN REGIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
FOR THE RIGHT TO ALTERNATIVE CARE 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 2, it was argued that kinship care has always been part and parcel of child care practices in 
Africa; kinship care in today’s African societies is however different from its practice in the past due to 
changes in legal, political and socio-economic conditions. A second discussion dealt with understanding the 
concept of ‘family’ in international law and how it is understood in the African context, especially in relation 
to child care obligations. Challenges facing the family in contemporary times were also addressed as well as 
the evolving nature of the family across the globe. This led on to a discussion on the rights applicable to the 
family as the fundamental unit of society, and the family’s right to State protection and support when 
necessary, with a particular emphasis on the implications of this right for children. 
This chapter seeks to define and describe broadly, the right to alternative care with the aim of showing 
whether or not and to what extent, if at all, kinship care is contemplated within the context of the right to 
alternative care as encapsulated in the relevant international instruments. The CRC and the Children’s 
Charter both place a high premium on the need for children to grow up in a family environment; it is a 
necessary precondition for the full and harmonious development of a child’s personality.1 The protection of 
the rights of children today is an investment into securing a sustainable future for them as adults 
tomorrow,2 and to that extent the family is the ideal first environment for securing the protection of these 
rights. It is against this background that the CRC and the Children’s Charter give an additional level of 
assistance and protection to children deprived of their natural family environment.3 This is justifiable in 
light of the fact that children who lack the security of a family are more vulnerable to the violation of all 
other rights that they are entitled to, as children and rights-bearing individuals in society. Childhood and 
adolescence in the life of an individual are stages that impact significantly on the formation of character 
                                                 
1 ACRWC preamble, para 4; CRC preamble, para 6. 
2  Viljoen F International human rights in Africa (2012) 391. 
3  Arts 20 CRC & 25 ACRWC. Both articles make it clear that such children are entitled to ‘special protection and assistance.’ 
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and personality. They are important periods for laying the foundation for an emotionally balanced and 
secure adulthood.4  
The aim of this chapter is to present and analyse the legal and policy frameworks that are relevant to the 
care and protection of children deprived of a family environment, within the context of the right to 
alternative care. To do this, the chapter is structured into seven parts: law and policy prior to the CRC and 
the ACRWC; general overview of the CRC; general overview of the ACRWC; analysis of the general principles 
of the CRC and the ACRWC; analysis of the principles underlying the right to alternative care under both the 
CRC (together with relevant general comments of the CRC Committee) and the ACRWC, including the forms 
of alternative care provided therein; and general conclusions derived from the discussions. 
 
3.2 Before the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the African Children’s Charter 
Prior to the CRC and the ACRWC, there are some other international instruments which, although non-
binding, serve as reference materials for States in the interpretation and implementation of children’s right 
to alternative care. More importantly, some of these instruments actually gave inspiration to the drafting 
of, or formed the basis of, the CRC’s and Children’s Charter’s provisions on alternative care. Additionally, 
they provide insight into the historical development of children’s rights generally, and the right to 
alternative care particularly. They are: the 1924 Geneva Declaration on the Rights of the Child (1924 
Geneva Declaration), the 1959 Declaration on the Rights of the Child (1959 Declaration); the 1986 
Declaration on Social and Legal Principles Relating to the Protection and Welfare of Children, with Special 
Reference to Foster Placement and Adoption Nationally and Internationally (1986 Declaration); and the 
1979 Declaration of Rights and Welfare of the African Child (1979 African Declaration). 
  
                                                 
4  Delplace M ‘Participation in Adoption’ in Ang F, Berghmans E & Cattrijsse L et al Participation rights of children (2006) 179. 
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3.2.1 The Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child (1924) 
In 1924 the League of Nations, the first intergovernmental organisation for the maintenance of world peace 
(subsequently replaced by the United Nations Organisation), adopted the Geneva Declaration on the Rights 
of the Child.5 Though formulated as moral duties of ’mankind’ towards children, rather than as rights, it was 
the first international instrument on matters affecting children.6 It provides a concise list of five obligations 
targeted at the well-being of children generally;7 they are: 
1. The child must be given the means requisite for its normal development, both materially and spiritually; 
2. The child that is hungry must be fed; the child that is sick must be nursed; the child that is backward 
must be helped; the delinquent child must be reclaimed; and the orphan and the waif must be sheltered 
and succoured;8 
3. The child must be the first to receive relief in times of distress; 
4. The child must be put in a position to earn a livelihood, and must be protected against every form of 
exploitation; 
5. The child must be brought up in the consciousness that its talents must be devoted to the service of 
fellow men.9 
While the second duty on the list is of particular relevance to alternative care for children deprived of a 
family environment, it is instructive to note that the Geneva Declaration hinted at rights which are today 
considered the general principles of the CRC;10 the principles will be discussed subsequently in this chapter. 
It is also significant to note that obligation 5 of the Geneva Declaration bears a resemblance to Article 31 of 
the Children’s Charter on the responsibilities of the child.11 It can therefore be concluded that although ‘the 
Declaration is merely an appeal for understanding and a set of basic principles concerning the well-being of 
children, with a view to improving their lives’,12 it offered a formidable start to the advanced jurisprudence 
on children’s rights as it exists globally today. 
 
                                                 
5 The League of Nations existed from 1919 to 1946 and the ‘’Geneva Declaration’’ was drafted against the background of the 
impact of the first world war on children. 
6 Phillips C Child-headed households: A feasible way forward, or an infringement of children’s right to alternative care? (2011) 34. 
7 Freeman M A Commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 3: The best interests of the child 
(2007) 11. 
8 Emphasis added. 
9 ‘Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child’ < http://www.unicef.org/vietnam/01_-_Declaration_of_Geneva_1924.PDF > 
(accessed on 30/09/2011). 
10 They are: non-discrimination (‘above all considerations of race, nationality or creed’); best interests of the child (‘the best that it 
has to give’); life, survival and development (‘means requisite for its normal development’); and child participation (‘position to 
earn a livelihood ’and ‘be brought up in the consciousness…’). 
11 See the discussions in chapter 2, section 2.3.4. 
12 Phillips (2011) 35. 
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3.2.2 The Declaration of the Rights of the Child (1959) 
The 1959 Declaration was adopted by the UN General Assembly as a follow-up to the Geneva Declaration,13 
but the principles this time were formulated as ‘rights’ and not as moral obligations of adults towards 
children.14 In addition to being a follow-up to the 1924 Geneva Declaration, the 1959 Declaration also 
attempted to build on the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) as it applies to 
children.15 
The 1959 Declaration contains 10 Principles which, though expressed as rights, are referred to as 
‘Principles’ rather than as ‘Articles’, highlighting their non-binding nature.16 It also provides for the rights 
considered to be the general principles of children’s rights.17 However, although it covers a wider scope 
than the 1924 Declaration, it remained limited in impact due to being a mere ‘statement of intent’ rather 
than a legally binding instrument.18 
Of particular relevance to the right to alternative care is Principle 6 which provides: 
The child, for the full and harmonious development of his personality, needs love and understanding. He 
shall, wherever possible, grow up in the care and under the responsibility of his parents, and, in any case, in 
an atmosphere of affection and of moral and material security; a child of tender years shall not, save in 
exceptional circumstances, be separated from his mother. Society and the public authorities shall have the 
duty to extend particular care to children without a family and to those without adequate means of support.19 
Payment of State and other assistance towards the maintenance of children of large families is desirable. 
 
This Principle legally established the generally accepted fact that the family environment is important for 
the ‘full and harmonious development’ of the child as recognised in more recent and legally binding 
instruments on children’s rights.20  Therefore, where a child is deprived of his family environment, 
‘particular care’ for such a child would include the provision of suitable alternative care. 
                                                 
13 Preamble to the 1959 Declaration, para 4. 
14Art 1 of the 1959 Declaration provides: ‘The child shall enjoy all the rights set forth in this declaration’ (emphasis mine). See also 
Detrick (1992) 14. 
15 See the preamble to the 1959 Declaration, para 2. Art 25(2) of the UDHR provides that ‘’Motherhood and Childhood are entitled 
to special care and assistance’’. For more on how the 1959 Declaration amplifies the child-related provisions of the UDHR, see the 
note to the 1959 Declaration by the Circumcision Reference Library (CIRP) < http://www.cirp.org/library/ethics/UN-declaration/ > 
(accessed on 30/09/2011). 
16 Veerman PE The rights of the child and the changing image of childhood (1992) 168. 
17 See Principles 1&10 (non-discrimination); 2&& (best interests of the child); 2&4 (life, survival and development); and 10 (child 
participation). 
18 Phillips (2011) 37. 
19 Emphasis added. 
20 These include among others, the CRC and the African Children’s Charter. 
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The drafting of Article 20 of the CRC on the right to alternative care was greatly influenced by Principle 6 of 
the 1959 Declaration.21 However, some of the elements of Principle 6 did not make it into Article 20 of the 
CRC for a number of reasons. Of significance is the exclusion of the portion about not separating a child of 
‘tender’ years from his mother.  
The first reason for this exclusion is that such an approach is biased against the interests of the father, in 
cases of divorce or separation. Since the law today is generally to the effect that both parents are entitled 
to custody of their child/children in cases of dispute, the court should be left to decide mainly on the basis 
of the best interests of the child.22 Secondly, the phrase does not take into account current realities of 
working mothers in that it ignores the practice of placing ‘children of tender years’ in day care or other such 
facilities where the children can get better care and attention than they would from their working mothers, 
fathers or both. According to the drafters of the CRC at the time, such practices had not been shown to be 
detrimental to children’s best interests.23 
It was also felt that, while the state has a responsibility to ensure an adequate standard of living for its 
citizens, parents should not be encouraged to birth large families especially if they are unable to cope with 
meeting all the needs of a large family.24 Thus, the sentence ‘payment of State and other assistance 
towards the maintenance of children of large families is desirable’ was removed and does not feature in 
Article 20. To do the contrary would further nullify ‘efforts to decrease population in the world.’25 These 
progressive changes in the law go to show how the development of children’s rights has evolved over the 
years, shaped by the social and other realities of the time. 
 
                                                 
21 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner Human Rights (UNHCHR) Legislative History of the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child (1978-1989): Article 20 Children deprived of a family environment (2007) 5. 
22 UNHCHR (2007) 8. 
23 As above. 
24 UNHCHR (2007) 5. 
25 UNHCHR (2007) 10. 
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3.2.3 The Declaration on Social and Legal Principles Relating to the Protection and Welfare of 
Children, with Special Reference to Foster Placement and Adoption Nationally and 
Internationally (1986) 
Adopted in 1986 by the UN General Assembly, the Declaration on Social and Legal Principles Relating to the 
Protection and Welfare of Children, with Special Reference to Foster Placement and Adoption Nationally 
and Internationally (1986 Declaration) begins by affirming Principle 6 of the 1959 Declaration, on the 
importance of children being raised by their parents and in a stable family environment.26 By stating that 
‘child welfare depends upon good family welfare’,27 the 1986 Declaration further highlights the double 
vulnerability of children deprived of a family environment, underscoring the importance of the right to 
alternative care. More specific to kinship care, the Declaration provides: 
When care by the child’s own parents is unavailable or inappropriate, care by relatives of the child’s parents, 
by another substitute – foster or adoptive – family or, if necessary, by an appropriate institution should be 
considered.28 
Although another non-binding instrument, as a precursor to the CRC on alternative care, the 1986 
Declaration is valuable for expounding on the right to alternative care. First, article 4 of the Declaration 
makes the first direct reference to kinship care as one of the alternative care options for children deprived 
of a family environment.29 In effect, a ‘stable family’ in the context of this Declaration is synonymous with 
parental care or care by one’s parents, and the role of relatives in the care and upbringing of children was 
not envisaged to be a core part of the child’s family. As such, only when parents are ‘unavailable or 
inappropriate’ should relatives be considered as the first alternative choice for care of the child. It will be 
recalled from discussions in the previous chapter that this understanding while popular and acceptable in 
the ‘Western’ context is not (traditionally) applicable in the African context. Proof of this, it will be argued, 
is found in the fact that this approach was not adopted in the CRC although the UN Guidelines on the 
Alternative Care of Children, which will be examined in the next chapter, attempted to re-introduce it.  
                                                 
26 Preamble to the 1986 Declaration, para 3 & art 3. 
27 Art 2, 1986 Declaration. 
28 Art 4, 1986 Declaration. 
29 Art 4 of the 1986 Declaration makes reference to ‘care by relatives of the child’s parents.’ 
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Secondly, the approach of the Declaration to the right to alternative care pioneered the hierarchical 
manner in which alternative care options should be sought and provided. That is, it points to a hierarchy (or 
descending scale of preference) among the alternative care options: (beginning with) kinship care; foster 
care; adoption; and institutional placement (as a last resort).30 Thus, the ideal situation is that the first 
measure of alternative care to be considered should resemble, as far as possible, a ‘typical’ family 
environment and only when such is unavailable should other less desirable ones be considered. This would 
explain why the Declaration, solely focused on foster care and adoption, provided first for kinship care as 
the first or highest level of alternative care in the absence of parents. 
The 1986 Declaration also recognises the importance of some general principles which were subsequently 
adopted in the CRC, as being important not only to the realisation of the right to alternative care but to the 
realisation of children’s rights generally: the best interests of the child and child participation. The 
Preamble (paragraph 5) and Article 5 of the Declaration provide for the ‘paramountcy’ of the best interests 
of the child ‘in all matters relating to the placement of a child outside the care of the child’s own parents’,31 
while Articles 12 and 15 provide for the involvement of the child in reaching decisions to place the child in 
foster care or adoption. 
Article 21 of the CRC on intercountry adoption and the provisions of the 1993 Hague Convention on 
Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption (Hague Intercountry Adoption 
Convention) are also traceable to Articles 17 to 24 of the 1986 Declaration.32 Of the 24 Articles of the 
Declaration, adoption is dealt with under Articles 13 to 24; but while four of these 12 Articles focus on 
adoption generally, eight are devoted to the subject of intercountry adoption. In terms of the Declaration, 
the ‘primary aim of adoption is to provide a child who cannot be cared for by his own parents with a 
                                                 
30 This suggests a preference for family-based forms of alternative care, that is, priority should be given to such alternatives before 
considering other options such as institutional placement. And among the family-based options, a preference for the least 
disruptive form of care in terms of the child’s cultural, social and other background is also suggested. The dynamics of this will be 
discussed further in the chapter; see section 3.3.2.5. 
31 It should be noted that the best interests of the child is only made a primary consideration in all matters affecting the child, and 
not the primary or paramount consideration. The effect of this is that under the CRC, other considerations may trump the best 
interests of the child principle, depending on the circumstances of the case. Under the ACRWC however, all other considerations 
will take secondary positions to the best interests of the child principle. Only in relation to article 21 of the CRC on intercountry 
adoption is the best interest of the child made the paramount or primary consideration. The implications of this will be discussed 
later in this chapter; see section 3.3.1.2. 
32 See the Preamble to the Hague Intercountry Adoption Convention, para 5. 
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permanent family.’33 In relation to intercountry adoption, the various safeguards provided in the CRC and 
the Hague Intercountry Adoption Convention were developed with reference to the provisions of the 1986 
Declaration. These include the establishment of competent supervisory mechanisms,34 the prohibition of 
improper financial gain,35 and measures to guard against child abduction and trafficking.36 
3.2.4 The Declaration on the Rights and Welfare of the African Child (1979) 
The year 1979, being the International Year of the Child, marked the submission of a proposal by Poland for 
the enactment of a treaty specifically dedicated to the rights and concerns of children.37 The proposal set in 
motion the process for the drafting of the CRC a decade later. 1979 is also significant in the context of 
children’s rights in Africa because it was also the year in which the Organisation of African Unity (OAU – 
now known as the African Union) passed the Declaration on the Rights and Welfare of the African Child.38 
The 1979 African Declaration is significant in a number of ways. First, it followed in the direction earlier 
provided by the 1959 Declaration by formulating its principles in terms of ‘a rights-based language in the 
context of children’s rights.’39 It however went further than the 1959 Declaration by insisting on the need 
for States to embark on law reform ‘relating to the rights of children.’40 This provision was ‘remarkably 
prescient’41 as it formed the basis for the rights-based approach which is a dominant feature of child law 
reform today, not only in Africa but the world at large.42 
Secondly, the African Declaration expressly states the obligations of States towards children unlike the 
1959 Declaration which merely states what children are entitled to without being categorical about the 
duty-bearer of children’s rights.43 Thirdly, the African Declaration was very progressive on several issues: 
                                                 
33 Art 13, 1986 Declaration. 
34 Art 18, 1986 Declaration. 
35 Art 20, 1986 Declaration. 
36 Art 19, 1986 Declaration. 
37 UN GA RES. 31/169 of 21 Dec. 1976 
38 Kamchedzera GS ‘The complementarity of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child’ in Verhellen E (ed) Understanding children’s rights (1998) 550. 
39 Sloth-Nielsen J ‘Children’s rights in Africa’ in Ssenyonjo M (ed) The African Regional Human Rights System (2012) 162. 
40 Principle 2, 1979 African Declaration. 
41 Sloth-Nielsen (2012) 162. 
42 Sloth-Nielsen J ‘Domestication of children’s rights in national legal systems in African context: Progress and prospects’ in Sloth-
Nielsen (ed) (2008) 53; Sloth-Nielsen J, Chirwa D, Mbazira C, Mezmur B & Kamidi R Child friendly laws in Africa (2009) 1.  
43 Sloth-Nielsen (2012) 163. The African Declaration however places great emphasis on the role of non-governmental and inter-
governmental organisations in assisting states with fulfilling their obligations towards children. See for example, Principles 4 & 5. 
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The contents of the Declaration are, with hindsight, relatively forward looking towards some of the principal 
areas of concern in contemporary child rights jurisprudence: topics such as refugee and displaced children 
(Principle 12), provision of day care centres and early childhood development (Principal 6(c)), participation of 
beneficiaries to assure the fulfilment of children’s rights (Principle 11), and priority for the rights of children 
with disabilities (Principle 6(b)), are, coincidentally, all subjects on which the CRC Committee has issued a 
General Comment, albeit that the Committee commenced engagement with these themes some 25 odd 
years later!44 
In addition to all the above, the African Declaration was first to identify and address several issues of 
particular concern to children in Africa, such as, harmful cultural/traditional practices and the need to 
address the unequal status of the girl-child.45 The Declaration also concerned itself with the need to ensure 
the transmission of the values of African cultural heritage to African children to guarantee their 
preservation into the future.46 States were enjoined to achieve this objective through the development and 
preservation of African arts, languages and cultures, and the stimulation in children of interest in and 
appreciation of them.47 
In the context of the importance of a family environment and the right to alternative care, the African 
Declaration emphasised the existence of a strong link between the welfare of the child and that of his 
parents and larger family, especially the mother.48 In the African context, this shows the value that is placed 
on the family unit especially with regards to the care and upbringing of the child.49 
The African Declaration therefore laid the foundation for the eventual enactment of the African Children’s 
Charter as a regional instrument supplementary to the CRC. These two instruments are discussed in further 
detail below, followed by an analysis of their contents with regard to the right to alternative care. 
 
3.3 The Convention on the Rights of the Child 
The CRC was adopted on 20 November 1989 and has been ratified by all countries of the world except 
Somalia and the USA (and the recently independent South Sudan), making it a near-universal legal 
                                                 
44 Sloth-Nielsen (2012) 163. 
45 Principles 2 & 3, 1979 African Declaration. 
46 Preamble to the 1979 African Declaration, para 6. 
47 Principle 10, 1979 African Declaration. 
48 Preamble to the 1979 African Declaration, para 7. 
49 Njungwe (2009) 9.  
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instrument.50 Being exclusively devoted to children, it serves as an important tool for advancing children’s 
rights and preventing matters concerning children from being taken for granted or accorded less 
importance. This tends to be the case with other general human rights treaties which are equally applicable 
to children, although not drafted with a consciousness of children in mind.51 Thus, although the pre-existing 
major international instruments – the UDHR, the ICCPR, and the ICESCR – are generally applicable to 
children as human beings, and had particular Articles devoted to children,52 the need for a children-specific 
international instrument was influenced largely by the ‘recognition of children as rights-holders and the 
adoption of a rights-based approach to matters relating to child development, welfare and protection.’53 
The universal acceptance of the CRC represents a global consensus on matters concerning children in that it 
provides the ‘world with shared norms and values in relation to childhood’.54 The significance of this lies in 
the promotion of positive international uniformity as opposed to the subjectivity of cultural relativism.55 
From the Preamble to the CRC, it is clear that it is built on the Declarations drafted before it, as references 
are made to the 1924 Geneva Declaration, and the 1959 Declaration, as well as the UDHR, ICCPR and the 
ICESCR. The CRC is therefore a conglomeration of all international human rights for children;56 its 
uniqueness lies in the fact that it encompasses all rights, whether civil and political or economic, social and 
                                                 
50 Ratification in Somalia has been hampered by the absence of an effective government since 1991 while the USA has only signed 
the CRC. South Sudan gained its independence from the larger Sudan on 9 July 2011, and is in the process of ratifying the CRC. 
51 Miljeteig-Olssen P ‘Advocacy of children’s rights-The Convention as more than a legal document’ (1990) 12 Human Rights 
Quarterly 148; Cantwell N ‘The origins, development and significance of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child’ 
in Detrick (1992) 27. Some of the advancements made on the rights of the child as a direct consequence of the CRC include the 
adoption of the first and second optional protocols: ‘Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of 
children, child prostitution, and child pornography’ (2000) and ‘Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on 
the involvement of children in armed conflict’ (2002). More recently is the approval of a third optional protocol to the CRC on a 
Communications Procedure, which will allow individual children (or their representatives) to submit complaints regarding specific 
violations of their rights under the CRC and the first two optional protocols. Adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 
2011, the third protocol was opened for signature on 28 February 2012 and will enter into force upon ratification by 10 UN 
Member States. 
52 For example, art 25(2) of the UDHR provides for special care and assistance to childhood; art 24 of the ICCPR provides for 
children’s right to a name, nationality and non-discrimination; and art 10(3) of the ICESCR provides for the protection of children 
from economic and social exploitation. 
53 Lim H ‘Legally recognising child-headed households through a rights-based approach: The case of South Africa’ unpublished LLD 
thesis, University of Pretoria (2010) 98. 
54  Tomas, C ‘Childhood and Rights: Reflections on the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child’ (2008) 2 Childhoods Today 6 (An 
online journal for childhood studies available at < www.childhoodstoday.org/article.php?id=19 > accessed on 06/11/2011). 
55  A major challenge facing the advancement of human rights generally is the issue of cultural relativism. While elements of this 
exist within the realm of children’s rights, the CRC largely represents basic norms that resonate universally. 
56 Phillips (2011) 45. The proposal that culminated in the drafting of the CRC was put forward by Poland and in fact, the original 
proposal was that the 1959 Declaration be converted into a legally binding instrument. This was rejected but it paved the way for 
the eventual drafting of the CRC, based on the 1959 and other Declarations. 
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cultural, all of which should be regarded as justiciable.57 This is considered to be a progressive advance in 
the development of international human rights.58 As the climax to earlier Declarations on children’s rights, 
the Convention is very extensive and deals with a wide range of issues affecting children.59 However, the 
differences in the legal, social, political, cultural and economic backgrounds and systems of the different 
nations of the world demanded that the Convention be drafted in a broad and general manner that gives 
wide discretion to States in the manner of implementation of the Convention’s provisions.60 This probably 
explains the almost universal acceptance of the CRC as ‘a set of guidelines and directives for action and as a 
tool for promoting knowledge and understanding of children’s issues’ by making children a subject of global 
focus.61 
However, the greatest value of the CRC lies not in its being exclusively devoted to children, but more in the 
fact that it is a legally binding instrument, unlike those previously discussed. By being a legally binding 
document, the CRC has had, and continues to have, a significant impact on the evolution of law and 
practice affecting children in various domestic jurisdictions. Consequently, there has been a wave of 
domestic law reforms, amendments and the adoption of other practical measures over the last two 
decades (and much more recently in many African countries) in compliance with the CRC.62 More 
importantly, States can be held accountable for their treatment of children and for the violation of 
children’s rights.63 Such accountability is promoted by the CRC Committee on the Rights of the Child in 
terms of States Parties’ Reports, Concluding Observations and General Comments, among others.  
Additionally, in December 2011, a Third Optional Protocol to the CRC was adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly and opened for ratification in February 2012. The Protocol allows individual children (or 
their representatives) to submit complaints to the CRC Committee regarding specific violations of their 
                                                 
57 Sloth-Nielsen J Realising the rights of children growing up in child-headed households: A guide to laws, policies and social 
advocacy (2004) 4; CRC Committee GC 5 (2003) paras 24 &25. 
58 Kaime T, “‘Vernacularising’ the Convention on the Rights of the Child: Rights and Culture as Analytic Tools” (2010) 18 The 
International Journal of Children’s Rights 642. 
59 The CRC contains a comprehensive preamble and 54 articles ranging from the age definition of a child to the workings of the 
monitoring body of the Convention, the CRC Committee. 
60 Phillips (2011) 45. 
61 Detrick (1992) 29 
62 Sloth-Nielsen (2008) 53; Phillips (2011) 45. Article 2 of the CRC obliges States Parties to ensure compliance with the CRC while 
article 4 requires states parties to take necessary measures (legislative, administrative and otherwise) to accomplish this. 
63 Newell P ‘The CRC and the promotion of human rights’ in Bruning M & Ruitenberg G (eds) Rechten van het kind in (inter)national 
perspectief  (2005) 36.  
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rights under the CRC and its first two Optional Protocols on the sale of children, child prostitution and child 
pornography and on the involvement of children in armed conflict.  According to Save the Children: 
It will be the only complaint mechanism covering the full range of rights guaranteed under the CRC and 
should significantly contribute to empower victims whose rights have been violated under the CRC in seeking 
remedies. By ratifying the new Protocol, states will provide a crucial contribution to complement measures 
for respecting and protecting the rights of the child worldwide.64 
The CRC Committee is a body of independent experts established in terms of Article 43 of the Convention, 
for the purpose of monitoring the implementation of the CRC (and its two Optional Protocols) by States 
Parties.65 The Committee was established in 1991 and is currently composed of 18 members who are 
experts on children’s rights.66 The monitoring and evaluation of States Parties’ progress or otherwise is 
done mainly via the examination of periodic reports submitted by States Parties to the Committee, and 
additional information obtained from NGOs, INGOs and other agencies.67 The Committee’s concerns and 
recommendations to States Parties are subsequently made in the form of Concluding Observations.68 
Although Concluding Observations are in themselves not legally binding, ‘they have an authoritative status 
in that they reflect on violations of legal obligations deriving from treaties’;69 they serve to interpret the 
nature and scope of treaty obligations.70 
 
                                                 
64 Save the Children ‘Third Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child opens for signature 28 February 2012’, 
available at < http://resourcecentre.savethechildren.se/content/news/third-optional-protocol-convention-rights-child-opens-
signature-28-february-2012 > (accessed 11 April 2013). 
65 See art. 43, CRC for the establishment, composition, workings and operations of the Committee. 
66 Phillips (2011) 49. Note that art 43 provides for the election of ten members into the Committee, but this number has been 
increased to 18 at the moment. 
67 See art. 44 CRC for the general procedure for state reporting to the CRC Committee, and art 45 for the involvement of NGOs, 
INGOs and other agencies. 
68 For more information on the nature and contents of concluding observations see: African Child Policy Forum (ACPF) In the best 
interests of the child: Harmonising Laws in Eastern and Southern Africa (2007) 104; Boerefijn I ‘Establishing State Responsibility for 
breaching Human Rights Treaty Obligations: Avenues under UN Human Rights Treaties’ (2001) 56 Netherlands International Law 
Review 182; LeBlanc LJ The Convention on the Rights of the Child: United Nations Lawmaking on Human Rights (1995) 270. 
69 Phillips (2011) 50. 
70 As above. 
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3.4 The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 
Although a vast number of States participated in the drafting process of the CRC, many developing 
countries, particularly from sub-Saharan Africa, could not participate in the process.71 In fact, the few 
African countries that participated in the process towards the end were Islamic States from the northern 
African region.72 Thus, the Children’s Charter was drafted partly in response to the under-representation of 
African States in the drafting process of the CRC,73 and the need to address particular issues that are 
peculiar to children’s rights based on the economic and socio-cultural context in Africa generally.74  
However, the ACRWC draws inspiration from the CRC as evidenced by the fact that the provisions of the 
former are framed in similar manner to the latter. The ACRWC makes direct reference to the CRC in its 
Preamble and the ACRWC is equally premised upon the same fundamental principles of children’s rights 
established by the CRC.75 The Charter which was adopted in 1990 and entered into force in 1999 is 
considered to be the most comprehensive and important regional instrument on children’s rights,76 and like 
the CRC, it encompasses all rights whether socio-economic or civil and political.77 Nevertheless, by being 
region-specific in a number of areas, the complementary role that the ACRWC plays to the CRC in children’s 
rights is quite established.78 The ACRWC offers a higher level of protection to children in certain areas, such 
as, the legal definition of the age of the child,79 as well as the protection of children from armed conflict,80 
and establishes the supremacy of children’s rights over any inconsistent ‘custom, tradition, cultural or 
                                                 
71 LeBlanc (1995) 33. For more on the contributions and reservations of Islamic states in the drafting process of the CRC, see also 
LeBlanc LJ ‘Reservations to the Convention on the Rights of the Child: A macroscopic view of state practice’ (1996) 4 International 
Journal of children’s Rights 357. 
72 LeBlanc (1995) 33. 
73 Viljoen F ‘The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child’ in Davel CJ (ed) Introduction to child law in South  
Africa (2000) 218; Cantwell N & Holzscheiter A  ‘Article 20: children deprived of their family environment’ in Alen et al  
(2008) 22; LeBlanc (1995) 30. 
74 For a discussion of these factors, see: Zeleza PT ‘The struggle for human rights in Africa’ in Heyns, C & Stefiszyn, K (eds)  
Human rights, peace and justice in Africa: A reader (2006) 42; Chirwa (2002) 157; Lloyd (2002) 180; Olowu (2002) 127. 
75 Gose (2002) 17.  
76 Lloyd A ‘The African regional system for the protection of children’s rights’ in Sloth-Nielsen (ed) (2008) 33. See also, Lloyd A 
‘Evolution of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and the African Committee of Experts: Raising the gauntlet 
(2002) 10 The International Journal of Rights (2002) 180. 
77 African Child Policy Forum In the best interests of the child: Harmonising laws in Eastern and Southern Africa (2007) 12. 
78 Sloth-Nielsen (2011) 163; Sloth-Nielsen (2012) 124; Chirwa (2002) 157; Viljoen F  
‘Africa’s contribution to the development of international human rights and humanitarian law: the African Charter on the  
Rights and Welfare of the Child’ (2001) 1 African Human Rights Law Journal 1; Olowu (2002) 127; Mezmur (2008) 1. 
79 Art 2 ACRWC clearly defines a child as ‘every person below the age of eighteen years’ without variation, while art 1 CRC gives 
states the leeway of setting a lower age of majority. 
80 Art 22 ACRWC obliges state parties to refrain from recruiting children for armed conflict, effectively protecting children between 
15 and 18 years from recruitment while art 38 CRC only obliges states from recruiting children who are below 15 years. 
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religious practice.’81 This signifies an African acceptance of the global paradigm shift to the recognition of 
children as full and visible members of society, entitled to human rights in the here and now.82 The 
complementary nature of the ACRWC to the CRC reveals the distinct contributions that the ACRWC makes 
to children’s rights generally and the CRC particularly.83 The ACRWC adds positive values that resonate with 
the realities of children in Africa, and buttresses the fact that regional treaties are important for the 
resolution of regional human rights situations, while ‘upholding cultural traditions and history unique to the 
region’.84 
Against the background of the fact that the provisions of the CRC and the ACRWC are similarly expressed, 
all subsequent discussions in this chapter will incorporate the method of discussing the relevant provisions 
of both the CRC and the ACRWC, making comparisons and distinctions where relevant and necessary. The 
provisions of both treaties relevant to this study will be consecutively discussed since both treaties 
reinforce each other on the subjects concerned. 
 
3.5 General Principles of the CRC and the African Children’s Charter and the Right to 
Alternative Care 
In order to fully articulate the rights of the child, the CRC contains certain provisions considered to be the 
‘pillars’ or ‘cardinal principles’ of children’s rights which together inform the interpretation of the 
Convention.85 The realisation of all children’s rights, as expressed within the CRC, is hinged on these general 
principles on the basis of all children’s rights (as with all human rights) being interrelated and 
                                                 
81 Art 1(3) ACRWC; the CRC has no explicit provision on that. 
82 Arts 1(3), 7 ACRWC & 12 CRC; Freeman M ‘The moral status of children’, Van Bueren G ‘International children’s rights: A 
 stop-go history’, Kolosov Y ‘The juridical significance of the Convention on the Rights of the Child’ and, Lanotte JV &  
 Goedertier G ‘The procedure before the Committee on the Rights of the Child’ all in Verhellen E (ed) Understanding 
 children’s rights (1996) 28, 316, 369 & 471. 
83 See generally Bekker G ‘The African Committee of Experts on the rights and Welfare of the Child’ in Ssenyonjo (2011) 249-252. 
84 Lloyd (2002) 183; LL Senghor ‘Address delivered to the opening meeting of the African Experts in preparation of the  
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ reprinted in C Heyns & K Stefiszyn Human rights, peace and justice in Africa:  
A reader (2006) 49. For a schematic comparison of the ACRWC and the CRC, see: Mezmur (2008)1.   
85 Sloth-Nielsen J ‘Of newborns and nubiles: Some critical challenges to children’s rights in Africa in the era of HIV/Aids’ (2005) 13 
The International Journal of Children’s Rights 73; Hodgkin R & Newell P Implementation Handbook for the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (2002) 42. See also the ‘Treaty-specific guidelines regarding the form and content of periodic reports to be submitted 
by States parties under article 44, paragraph 1(b), of the Convention on the Rights of the Child’ by the UN Committee on the Rights 
of the Child, CRC/C/58/Rev.2, 2010, para 23. 
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interconnected.86 In fact, the need for the wholesome development of children makes the indivisibility and 
interdependence of rights more firmly applicable to the rights of children.87 This is the background against 
which all rights contained in the CRC and the African Children’s Charter, whether civil and political or 
economic, social, and cultural, are grouped together with no particular hierarchy.88 Flowing from this 
holistic approach, the CRC is said to have four aims (also known as ‘the four P’s’): Protection, Prevention, 
Provision and Participation.89 
A proper interpretation and implementation of the right to alternative care cannot be divorced from these 
principles which are fundamental to the implementation of the Convention in its entirety.90 In other words, 
these principles, which represent the very essence of the Convention, serve as guides in understanding the 
application of the right to alternative care and all other rights in the CRC.91 The principles of the CRC and 
the ACRWC are: the right to non-discrimination;92 the principle of the best interests of the child as a 
primary consideration in all matters affecting the child;93 the right to life, survival and development;94 and 
the child’s right to participate in (‘express views on’) all matters concerning the child.95 
 
                                                 
86 CRC Committee, General Comment No 1 ‘The aims of education’ (2001) paras 6 & 7. 
87 CRC Committee, General Comment No 4 ‘Adolescent Health’ (2003) para 5; Lopatka A ‘The Convention on the Rights of the Child: 
Universal Dilemmas’ (1999) 21 Whittier Law Review 86; Freeman M ‘Why it remains important to take children’s rights seriously’ 
(2007) 15 The International Journal of Children’s Rights 7. 
88 See Rios-Kohn R ‘The impact of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child’ (1996) 6 Transnational Law and 
Contemporary Problems 300. This approach is without prejudice to the fact that the principle of ‘progressive realisation’ of rights 
remains applicable to the socio-economic rights contained in the CRC (for example, article 4 of the CRC). However, the particular 
needs and vulnerabilities of children require that this principle cannot be used as an excuse not to priorities the rights and welfare 
needs of children. 
89 Sloth-Niesen J (2004) 4. Similarly, the aims of the rights contained in the CRC are also known by another classification as the “3 
P’s”: Provision, Protection, and Participation. See Quennerstedt A ‘Children, but not really humans? Critical reflections on the 
hampering effects of the “3 P’s” ‘(2010) 18 The International Journal of Children’s Rights 21. 
90 CRC Committee, General Guidelines for Periodic Reports, 2005, para 21; Rios-Kohn R ‘Intercountry Adoption: An international 
perspective on the practice and standards’ (1998) 1 Adoption Quarterly 146. 
91 Rios-Kohn (1998) 143, 146. 
92 Arts 2, CRC & 3, ACRWC. 
93 Arts 3, CRC & 4, ACRWC. 
94 Arts 6, CRC & 5, ACRWC. 
95 Arts 12, CRC & 7, ACRWC. 
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3.5.1 Non-discrimination 
The principle of non-discrimination, also positively described as the principle of equality,96 is considered key 
to the understanding and proper application of all the rights contained in the CRC.97 The principle is 
however not unique to the CRC as it is derived from almost all other pre-existing declarations and treaties 
on human rights,98 which establish the principle as a cornerstone for the realisation of global human 
rights.99 According to the Human Rights Committee, discrimination refers to: 
…any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference which is based on any ground such as race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status and 
which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all 
persons, on an equal footing, of all rights and freedoms.100 
By this definition, the principle of non-discrimination prohibits four discriminatory elements: the 
differentiation of similar situations; the absence of legitimate ends; the lack of proportionality of means to 
ends; and the use of suspect classifications.101 
However, the provisions of the CRC and the ACRWC on non-discrimination are unique in that they prohibit 
discrimination, not only against the child, but against the parents, guardians or relatives as well.102 In other 
words, a child may not be directly discriminated against and may also not be indirectly discriminated 
against on the basis of any status or opinion attributable to the child’s parent(s), guardians or relatives. This 
is a logical and comprehensive approach to the principle in relation to children’s rights because children 
tend to suffer discrimination flowing from existing discrimination against their parents or guardians. 
Article 2 of the CRC provides as follows: 
                                                 
96 Cohen C ‘The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: A feminist landmark’ (1997) 3 William & Mary Journal of 
Women and the Law 21. 
97 CRC Committee, General Comment No 1 (2001) para 6; General Comment No 3 ‘HIV/AIDS and the rights of the child’ (2003) para 
5; General Comment No 5 ‘General measures of implementation for the Convention on the Rights of the Child’ (2003) paras 4 & 12; 
Hodgkin & Newell (2002) 19. 
98 See among others: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR); the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR); the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); and the Convention on the Elimination of all 
forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). 
99 Nowak M UN Covenant on civil and political rights: CCPR Commentary (2005) 458. 
100 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 18 on the principle of non-discrimination (1989), para 6. 
101 Besson S ‘The principle of non-discrimination in the Convention on the Rights of the Child’ (2005) 13 The International Journal of 
Children’s Rights 435; as cited in Mezmur (2009) 135. 
102 Cohen (1997) 34. The provisions cover both de jure and de facto discrimination. 
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1. States Parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in the present Convention to each child within 
their jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the child’s or his or her parent’s or legal 
guardian’s race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, 
property, disability, birth or other status. 
2. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that the child is protected against all forms of 
discrimination or punishment on the basis of the status, activities, expressed opinions, or beliefs of the child’s 
parents, legal guardians, or family members. 
In the same vein, Article 3 of the African Children’s Charter provides: 
Every child shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms recognized and guaranteed in this 
Charter irrespective of the child’s or his/her parents’ or legal guardians’ race, ethnic group, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national and social origin, fortune, birth or other status. 
In a bid to widen the scope of the principle of non-discrimination and to target discriminatory practices that 
affect children in Africa, the ACRWC in its Article 3 goes further than the CRC by extending the obligation 
concerning non-discrimination to non-State actors also. This is achieved by the absence of any reference to 
the ‘State’ or ‘State Parties’; some customary law practices may fall within the category of discriminatory 
actions against children by non-state parties or private individuals and groups.103 
In the context of the right to alternative care, the principle of non-discrimination is important for a number 
of reasons. First, it addresses some of the causes of the loss of a family environment, such as being born 
out of wedlock. It also addresses discriminatory tendencies that occur in the placement process, that is, 
factors which make it difficult, if not impossible, for many children to be placed in alternative care. The 
principle also serves the purpose of ensuring that children who are placed in alternative care are not 
discriminated against in favour of children who live in their natural family environment.104 Some of the 
discriminatory practices which may exist in relation to alternative care include, among others, the 
preference for certain categories of children for adoption, the prohibition of homosexual couples from 
being adoptive parents or foster carers and discrimination against children with HIV, children with 
disabilities or children belonging to minority groups.105 
The non-discrimination principle is also applicable in relation to the different alternative care placement 
options available to children deprived of their family environment. The implication of this is that children in 
                                                 
103 Chirwa (2002) 159; Lloyd (2008) 38. 
104 Mezmur (2009) 138. 
105 As above. 
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one form of alternative care (especially those in institutional care) may not be discriminated against in the 
enjoyment of all their other rights, in favour of children in other forms of alternative care placement 
options.106 Thus, children’s rights to education, health care and religion, among others, must be guaranteed 
even within institutional care facilities in the same manner as obtains in other alternative care options.107 
 
3.5.2 The Best Interests of the Child 
Although the concept of the best interests of the child first appeared in international law in the 1959 
Declaration of the Rights of the Child,108 the concept came into existence in the early 19th century, when 
parents began to be regarded not as ‘owners’ of children but as ‘nurturers’ of children.109 This development 
was itself a consequence of the shift in the role of Western families from being ‘work/discipline units’ to 
being ‘nests for malleable hearts and minds.’110 Thus children began to be viewed differently: no longer as 
economic materials for productive labour but as personalities in need of love and nurturing.111  
Over the years, the principle has come to be accepted as a child-focused standard in dealing with all 
matters affecting children. Thus, it has been established in the CRC, the African Children’s Charter and 
other international law instruments applicable to children.112 According to Pais, the inclusion of the 
principle in the CRC is ground-breaking in that it has ‘helped crystallize the perception of the child as a real 
                                                 
106 Cantwell & Holzscheiter (2008) 53. 
107 It should however be noted that the right to non-discrimination does not amount to equal treatment in that the CRC and the 
ACRWC among others, recognise the need for special treatment for vulnerable or disadvantaged groups based on the principle of 
affirmative or positive action. Positive or affirmative action is generally aimed at ‘’redressing structural disadvantages and 
counterbalancing the underlying power inequalities in society’’. For more on this see, Mezmur (2009) 143; CRC Committee, General 
Comment No 5 (2003) para 12; preamble to the CRC, para 9; art 26 of the ACRWC; Van Bueren G ‘Of floors and ceilings: Minimum 
core obligations and children’ in Brand D & Russell S (eds) Exploring the core contents of socio-economic rights: South African and 
international perspectives (2002) 188. 
108 Principle 2 of the 1959 Declaration of the Rights of the Child provides: ‘The child shall enjoy special protection…In the enactment 
of laws for this purpose, the best interests of the child shall be the primary consideration’. The principle is also featured in the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), arts 5(b) & 16(1)(d). 
109 Graff (1999) 109. 
110 Graff (1999) 111. 
111 Graff (1999) 109. 
112 See art. 3, CRC; art. 4, ACRWC, para 4 preamble to, & art. 21, Hague Intercountry Adoption Convention, among others. 
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person in his or her own right, someone who must be considered autonomously.’113 Article 3(1) of the CRC 
provides: 
In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts 
of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary 
consideration. 
However, more than any other principle in the CRC, the best interests of the child principle has been the 
subject of the most academic analyses and debates due to its controversially indeterminate and subjective 
nature.114 The principle often connotes different and sometimes contradictory meanings, depending on 
who is analysing it and what the circumstances are.115 In determining what amounts to the best interests of 
the child in different situations, Save the Children suggests that objective answers to the following 
questions should be sought: ‘How and by whom has this vision (of best interests) been defined? What are 
the assumptions underlying it? What have girls and boys contributed to the development of this vision?’116 
According to Alston, the principle serves the role of clarifying, justifying or supporting particular 
applications of all rights under the CRC, and also serves as a tool for mediation in the resolution of conflicts 
between rights contained in the CRC.117 The principle may also be used to fill any existing gap within the 
framework of the CRC.118 According to the CRC Committee however, the aim of the principle is to ensure 
‘the full and effective enjoyment of all the rights recognized in the Convention and the holistic 
development of the child.’119 
                                                 
113 Pais MS (ed) A Human Rights Conceptual Framework for UNICEF (1999) 11 quoted in Tun AA, Cave G, Trotter D & Bell B ‘The 
domestic fulfilment of children’s rights: Save the children’s experience in the use of rights-based approaches’ in Alen A et al The UN 
Children’s Rights Convention: Theory meets practice. Proceedings of the International Interdisciplinary Conference on Children’s 
Rights, 18-19 May 2006, Ghent, Belgium (2007) 42. 
114 Vite S & Boechat H A Commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: Article 21 Adoption (2008) 23; 
Hodgkin & Newell (2002) 41. 
115 Tun et al (2007) 43; Graff (1999) 109. However, there are some extreme situations such as hunger and poverty which are never 
considered to be in the child’s best interests. See Freeman (2007) 27. 
116 International Save the Children Alliance (2002) 37 quoted in Tun et al in Alen et al (2007) 43. See also Elster’s approach: ‘For a 
determinate answer to the question of what would be in the child’s best interests, (a) all options must be known, (b) all the 
possible outcomes of each option must be known, (c) the probabilities of each outcome occurring must be known, and (d) the value 
attached to each outcome must be known.’ See Elster J ‘Solomonic judgments: Against the best interests of the child’ (1987) 54 
University of Chicago Law Review 12. 
117 Alston P ‘The best interest principle: Towards a reconciliation of culture and human rights’ (1994) 8 The International Journal of 
Law, Policy and the Family 15. 
118 Freeman (2007) 26. 
119 CRC Committee, General Comment No 14 (2013) ‘The right of the child to have his or her best interests taken as a primary 
consideration’, para 4. Prior to 2013, the CRC Committee has through other general comments, sought to shed light on the 
understanding of the concept of the best interests of the child. However, this has been done only with reference to specific 
contexts and particular themes. See for example: General Comment No 3 (2003) ‘HIV/AIDS and the rights of the child’ para 10, ‘the 
child should be placed at the centre of the response to the pandemic, and strategies should be adapted to children’s rights and 
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Nevertheless, what the best interests principle loses by being indeterminate and elusive,120 is made up for 
by the flexible nature of its application which makes it adaptable to specific circumstances,121 as ‘what is 
best for a specific child or for children in general cannot be determined by any degree of certainty.’122 
Consequently, the best interests principle is itself based on the principle of individualised treatment; that is, 
‘best interests’ does not mean the same thing for every child but refers to what Thomas and O’Kane 
describe as a ‘highly individualised choice between alternatives.’123  However, Alston and Gilmour-Walsh 
note that this indeterminacy may give room for non-compliance with some of the provisions of the CRC, in 
deference to the concept of cultural relativism.124 The CRC Committee however addresses this concern in 
its 2013 General Comment on the concept of the child’s best interests.125 According to the Committee, 
since all rights in the CRC are in the child’s best interests, none can be ‘compromised by a negative 
interpretation of the child’s best interests.’126 Additionally, ‘an adult’s judgment of a child’s best interests 
cannot override the obligation to respect all the child’s rights under the Convention.’127 
While reinforcing the fact that the ‘child’s best interests’ is a ‘dynamic concept that requires an assessment 
appropriate to the specific context’,128 the Committee, in an attempt to clarify some of the uncertainties 
around the ‘child’s best interests concept’, notes that the principle of the ‘child’s best interests’ or ‘the best 
interests of the child’ covers three dimensions.129 This means that the principle is a ‘three-fold concept’: a 
substantive right; a fundamental, interpretative legal principle; and a rule of procedure.130 As a substantive 
right, the principle ‘creates an intrinsic obligation for States’ which is ‘directly applicable (self-executing) 
                                                                                                                                                                  
needs’; General Comment No 6 ‘Treatment of unaccompanied and separated children outside their country of origin’ (2005) paras 
20 and 21; General Comment No 9 (2006) ‘The rights of children with disabilities’ para 30; General Comment N0 12 (2009) ‘The 
right of the child to be heard’, paras 2, 16, 51, 53, 56, 61, 68, 70-74, 113, 116, 124 & 126. 
120 Archard D & Skivenes M ‘Balancing a child’s best interest and a child’s view’ (2009) 17 International Journal of Children’s Rights 
1; Thomas N & O’Kane C ‘When children’s wishes and feelings clash with their best interests’ (1998) 6 International Journal of 
Children’s Rights 138. 
121 Arts K Coming of age in a world of diversity? An assessment of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (2010) 14; Thomas & 
O’Kane (1998) 138. 
122 Elster (1987) 12. 
123  Thomas & O’Kane (1998) 138. See also arts 6, 58-70 & 78-98 of the UN Guidelines on Alternative Care. 
124 Alston P & Gilmour-Walsh B The best interests of the child: Towards a synthesis of children’s rights and cultural values (1996) 2. 
125 CRC Committee, GC 14 (2013).  
126 CRC Committee, GC 14, para 4. 
127 CRC Committee, General Comment No 13 (2011) ‘The right to protection from all forms of violence’, para 61 – restated in CRC 
Committee, GC 14, para 4. 
128 CRC Committee, GC 14, para 1. 
129 CRC Committee, GC 14, para 7. 
130 CRC Committee, GC 14, para 6. 
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and can be invoked before a court.’131 As a fundamental, interpretative legal principle, ‘*i+f a legal provision 
is open to more than one interpretation, the interpretation which most effectively serves the child’s best 
interests [based on the CRC and its Optional Protocols+ should be chosen.’132 Mezmur provides a guide to 
understanding this by positing that a practical approach is to ensure that the application of the principle 
respects the other three general principles of the CRC. Hence, any interpretation or application of the 
principle that goes against any of the other cardinal principles of the CRC (either as it affects the child 
concerned or other children) may not pass the test of correctness as being in the best interests of the 
child.133 It is submitted that this is a progressive approach because all four general principles of the CRC, as 
already stated, re-enforce one another in the realisation of all rights contained in the CRC and none can be 
said to be superior to any other. 
As a rule of procedure, the concept requires that: 
Whenever a decision is to be made that will affect a specific child, an identified group of children or children 
in general, the decision-making process must include an evaluation of the possible impact (positive or 
negative) of the decision on the child or children concerned.134 
Closely related to the above is Freeman’s elaboration on Article 3 of the CRC that the best interests 
principle is also applicable in situations of inaction i.e. failure to take an action which promotes the child’s 
best interests.135 This explanation is useful since Article 3 refers to ‘all actions concerning children’, and 
‘although the word “action” may imply an activity, failing or omitting to act in relation to a child should also 
be regarded as an action.’136  
Although the scope of the General Comment is limited to Article 3(1) of the CRC,137 the provision of Article 
3 as a whole has implications for the right to alternative care. First, it is significant that the principle of the 
best interests of the child is restated in Article 20 of the CRC which is specific to the right to alternative 
                                                 
131 CRC Committee, GC 14, para 6(a). Thus, in the face of several interests, when a child is involved, his or her best interests must be 
assessed and given a primary consideration before any decision is reached. 
132 CRC Committee, GC 14, para 6(b).  
133 Mezmur (2009) 119. 
134 CRC Committee, GC 14, para 6(c). 
135 Freeman (2007) 45. 
136 Phillips (2011) 55. 
137 CRC Committee, GC 14, para 8. It leaves out 3(2) & 3(3) which deal with child well-being and States parties obligations 
respectively. 
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care, thereby underscoring the importance of the principle to children deprived of a family environment.138 
Given the general consensus that a family environment serves the best interests of every child, it becomes 
imperative to focus on how to secure the best interests of children who lack such an environment.139 
However, securing the best interests of the child would mean that the most appropriate form of alternative 
care for each affected child will depend on the general needs of the child but more importantly, on the 
specific needs as well, as there can be no ‘one solution fits all’ approach.140 Some elements of a child’s best 
interests in such circumstances include the need for affection, security and care.141  The importance of the 
principle in the context of alternative care is further highlighted by Article 3(3) of the CRC (Article 3 being 
the umbrella provision on the best interests of the child principle), which has a direct relevance to 
institutional placement of children deprived of a family environment. Article 3(3) of the CRC provides: 
States Parties shall ensure that the institutions, services and facilities responsible for the care and protection 
of children shall conform with the standards established by competent authorities, particularly in the areas of 
safety, health, in the number and suitability of their staff, as well as competent supervision. 
Still within the context of alternative care, it is noteworthy that the CRC makes the best interests of the 
child principle ‘the paramount consideration’,142 when adoption as an alternative care option is 
contemplated. The introductory part of Article 21 of the CRC on adoption (both domestic and Intercountry 
adoption) provides that: ‘States Parties that recognize and/or permit the system of adoption shall ensure 
that the best interests of the child shall be the paramount consideration (emphasis mine)…’ There is no 
such emphasis with regards to the other forms of alternative care in Article 20. This is perhaps due to the 
permanent and generally irrevocable nature of an adoption. 
                                                 
138  See also CRC Committee GC 14, para 3. 
139  CRC Committee Day of General Discussion ‘Children without Parental Care’ (2005). 
140  As above. For example, the best interests of a victim of physical or  sexual abuse would require that the alternative care  
option chosen provides for emotional and psychological treatment by a trained professional in the field. 
141  Art 5, 1986 Declaration. 
142 Art 21, CRC. 
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A proper understanding of the concept is important for a proper application of the best interests of the 
child principle. According to Lord McDermott’s dictum in the case of J v C,143 the difference between the 
terms ‘a primary consideration’ (Article 20) and ‘the paramount consideration’ (Article 21) is as follows: 
*‘Paramountcy’ means+ more than that the child’s welfare is to be treated as the top item in a list of items 
relevant to the matter in question *which is what ‘a primary consideration’ means+… They connote a process 
whereby when all the relevant facts, relationships, claims and wishes of the parents, risks, choices, and other 
circumstances are taken into account and weighed, the course to be followed will be that which is most in 
the interests of the child’s welfare. That is … the paramount consideration, because it rules upon or 
determines the course to be followed.144 
In other words, when the best interests of the child is a ‘primary consideration’, it is not an absolute 
because it competes with other factors and other rights for consideration,145 but when it is ‘the paramount 
consideration’, all other issues must be hinged on it. Thus, in the former case, the best interests principle 
requires ‘due’ but not ‘absolute’ consideration.146 While this distinction may be valuable for understanding 
the principle, its application still depends on a case-by-case analysis of all relevant factors as already 
discussed.  
Writing against the background of Zimbabwe’s fragile economy and widespread poverty, Armstrong 
(writing about custody, education and alternative care) notes that the best interests of the child concept is 
relative to the availability of opportunities and resources to the child.147 This is due to the fact that the 
socio-economic circumstances and economic interests of the child’s family cannot be separated from 
whatever is understood as being in the child’s best interests.148 Similarly in Taiwan, it has been shown that 
judges’ interpretation of the best interests of the child in custody cases is often a reflection of cultural ideas 
as well as the ‘socio-economic climate of Taiwan.’149 These further highlight the fact that what are the best 
                                                 
143 J v C *1970+ AC 668 at 710, cited in Goonesekere S ‘The best interests of the child: A South Asian perspective’ (1994) 8 
International Journal of Law and the Family 117. 
144 Goonesekere (1994) 118. 
145 Detrick S Commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1999) 91. 
146 Alston & Gilmour-Walsh (1996) 11. 
147 Armstrong A ‘Schools and Sadza†: Custody and the best interests of the child in Zimbabwe’ (1994) 8 International Journal of Law 
and the Family 1. 
148 Armstrong (1994) 184, 185. 
149 Liu H ‘Mother or Father: Who received custody? The best interests of the child standard and judges’ custody decisions in 
Taiwan’ (2001) 15 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 185. Liu’s study reveals that since 1996 when the best 
interests of the child standard replaced the presumption of paternal custody, there has been a dramatic increase in the award of 
custody to mothers. Many reasons such as gender equality movements are responsible for this, but a significant cause as revealed 
by Liu’s study is judges’ willingness to combine social customs and traditional ideas with an explanation of what would be in the 
child’s best interests after an examination of all relevant facts. 
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interests of the child will differ from case to case depending on several often connected factors. Armstrong 
summarises it thus: ‘The best interests of the child might be different in a perfect world than they are in a 
world of limited possibilities.’150 
Unlike Article 3 of the CRC, Article 4 of the ACRWC makes the best interests of the child the primary 
consideration and not a primary consideration in all matters concerning the child and as such some 
scholars have argued that this places a weightier obligation on Member States.151 Article 4(1) of the ACRWC 
provides that: ’In all actions concerning the child undertaken by any person or authority the best interests 
of the child shall be the [emphasis mine] primary consideration.’ The import of this is that the best interests 
principle will trump any other consideration in matters concerning the child while the position under the 
CRC is to the effect that there may be situations in which other considerations may trump the best interests 
principle.152 The emphatic nature of the best interests of the child principle in the ACRWC is re-stated in the 
South African Constitution as follows: ‘*A+ child’s best interest is of paramount importance153 in every 
matter concerning the child.’154 According to South African constitutional jurisprudence, the emphasis is 
important ‘since very few measures would not have a direct or indirect impact on children, and thereby 
concern them.’155  
That Article 4 of the ACRWC on the best interests principle targets any ‘person or authority’ is another 
reason why the ACRWC provision is considered broader than that of the CRC.156  This approach of the 
ACRWC is considered relevant to the African context because ‘a majority of facilities and institutions 
providing services to children are not state initiated but are initiated by NGOs or individuals.’157 However, 
that Article 3 of the CRC makes reference to all actions carried out by ‘public or private’ institutions makes 
                                                 
150 Armstrong (1999) 189. 
151 Lim (2010) 141. 
152 See Considerations 1989 Working Group, Commission on Human Rights, 45th Session UN Doc E/CN.4/1989/48 (1989), reprinted 
in Detrick (1992), para 125. 
153 My emphasis. 
154 Art. 28(2) The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
155 See the case of M v S (Centre for Child Law, Amicus curiae) 2007 (12) BCLR 1312 (CC). 
156 Freeman (2007) 21. 
157 Lim (2010) 141. Although the manner in which the principle is to be enforced in relation to private/non-state actors is unclear, 
Mezmur convincingly argues that the state has an obligation to ensure that private/non-state actors uphold the principle in all 
matters concerning children whom they have to deal with; see Mezmur (2009) 117. 
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the principle applicable to every context where actions concerning children are concerned.158 It should be 
noted that although the ACRWC recognises the best interests of the child principle as ‘the’ primary 
consideration in all matters relevant to children,159 few countries in Africa have this principle guaranteed in 
their constitutions, whether as a or the primary consideration.160 
  
3.5.3 Life, Survival and Development 
Article 6 of the CRC provides for the recognition of every child’s ‘inherent right to life’,161 and obliges States 
to ‘ensure to the maximum extent possible the survival and development of the child.’162 Ultimately, all the 
rights in the CRC are aimed at achieving this right (life, survival, and development), as its interpretation 
cannot be divorced from all the other rights in the Convention.163 The connection between the right to life 
and development is a comprehensive and holistic approach for the full and harmonious development of 
children.164  
During the discussions surrounding the drafting of the right, there were debates as to the absence of a legal 
definition for the concept of ‘survival’ and so some States’ representatives felt that making a link between 
survival and development could jeopardise the concept of the right to development as it was 
understood.165 But, relying on the explanations given by UNICEF, it was understood that ‘life and survival 
were complementary and were not mutually exclusive’,166 given that mere survival is possible even in poor 
conditions. Thus the proper understanding is that ‘the right to survival should be supplemented by the 
                                                 
158 Hodgkin & Newell (2002) 42. 
159 Art. 4, ACRWC provides: ‘In all actions concerning the child undertaken by any person or authority the best interests of the child 
shall be the primary consideration’. 
160 Sloth-Nielsen J ‘Strengthening the promotion, protection and fulfilment of children’s rights in the African context’ in Alen et al 
(2007) 98. Ethiopia, Kenya, South Africa and Zimbabwe are examples of countries which have the best interests of the child 
principle constitutionally guaranteed: art 36(2), Ethiopian Constitution and art 28(2), South African Constitution. 
161 Art. 6(1) CRC. 
162 Art. 6(2) CRC. 
163 Lim (2010) 145; Vandenhole W ‘The Convention on the Rights of the Child’ in de Feyter K & Isa FG International human rights 
law in a global context (2009) 451; Nowak M A Commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 6: 
The right to life, survival and development (2005) 2. Some of the other rights in the CRC that show the overarching nature of article 
6 include: arts 24 & 25 (the right to health); arts 26 & 27 (social security and adequate standard of living); arts 28 & 29 (the right to 
education); and art 31 (rest, leisure and play). 
164 Verhellen E Historical perspective: Educational consequences and reflections in the CRC (forthcoming-copy on file with author; 
paper presented at the Human Rights for Development (HR4DEV) Training Programme, with a focus on Children’s Rights, 30 July to 
24 August 2012, Antwerp, Belgium) 8; Tun et al (2007) 42. 
165 Detrick (1992) 120. 
166 Detrick (1992) 120. 
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notion of healthy development.’167 It should be noted that the initial draft of the eventual Article 6 of the 
CRC did not make express reference to the ‘right to life’ but to ‘the survival and healthy development of the 
child.’168 It was due to the recognition of the fact that the right to life as already expressed in existing 
international law instruments169 is more or less jus cogens, that there was an insistence on the inclusion of 
the specific right to life.170  
While the right to life is generally understood as connoting a negative duty of not doing anything to 
deliberately take a person’s life, the right to survival is understood to carry a more positive connotation 
that requires ‘positive steps taken to prolong the life of the child.’171 Consequently, the corresponding 
Article 5 of the ACRWC additionally provides: ‘Death sentence shall not be pronounced for crimes 
committed by children.’172 Thus, the right to life, survival and development impose both positive and 
negative duties on the States Parties. Positive duties include measures taken to ensure the provision of 
nutrition, shelter, adequate healthcare and reduction of infant mortality, among others,173 while negative 
duties imply any acts targeted at depriving children of life, for example, the imposition of the death 
penalty.174  
However, in both the CRC and the ACRWC, the fulfilment of the right is limited by availability of resources 
to States Parties.175 From the explanations above and the framing of both the provisions of the CRC and the 
ACRWC,176 it can therefore be concluded that the element of ‘availability of resources’ is applicable only to 
                                                 
167 Detrick (1992) 120. 
168 The initial proposal was submitted by India (E/CN.4/1988/WG.1/WP.13). See Detrick (1992) 120. 
169 See art 3, Universal Declaration of Human Rights; and art 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, among 
others.  
170 Detrick (1992) 121. It was however agreed that the inclusion of the right to life in article 6 of the CRC was not to be used to 
reopen the discussion concerning the moment at which life begins. 
171 Detrick (1992) 121. 
172 Art 5(3) ACRWC. 
173 Sloth-Nielsen J & Mezmur B ‘2+2=5? Exploring the domestication of the CRC in the South African courts (2002-2006)’ (2008) 16 
The International Journal of Children’s Rights 5. See also CRC Committee, General Comment No. 7 (2005) para 10. 
174 Pais MS ‘Convention on the Rights of the Child’ in Manual on human rights reporting under six major international human rights 
instruments (1997) 425. See also CRC Committee, General Comment No 3 (2003), paragraph 11 of which states: ‘Children have the 
right not to have their lives arbitrarily taken, as well as to benefit from economic and social policies which will allow them to survive 
into adulthood and develop in the broadest sense of the word…’ 
175 Art 6(2) CRC & Art 5(2) ACRWC. 
176 Art 6, CRC provides: 1. States Parties recognize that every child has the inherent right to life. 2. States Parties shall ensure to the 
maximum extent possible the survival and development of the child. Art 5 of the ACRWC (which titles the right, ‘survival and 
development’) provides: 1. Every child has an inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. 2. States Parties…shall 
ensure, to the maximum extent possible, the survival, protection and development of the child. 3. Death sentence shall not be 
pronounced for crimes committed by children. 
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the survival and development aspects of the right while it is in no way applicable to the ‘right to life’; that 
is, going by the historical divide between civil and political rights, on the one hand, and socio-economic 
rights on the other. Additionally, development in relation to children goes beyond mere survival and 
encompasses all dimensions of growth and development: physical, mental, social, psychological, moral and 
spiritual, etc.177 
In the alternative care context, the importance of this right is based on the vulnerability that the lack of a 
family environment exposes children to, given that the family is the first base of support for life and 
development, ideally. Thus, the provision of an appropriate alternative for affected children is key to 
securing their right to life, survival and development. According to Nowak, the State has a responsibility to 
create an environment conducive to the realisation of this right, first, by ensuring appropriate assistance to 
families who require it in order to carry out their responsibilities towards their children.178 But in more 
difficult circumstances, such as where children are deprived of a family environment, the State becomes 
responsible to take a more active and direct role in securing the children’s right to life, survival and 
development.179 
 
3.5.4 The Right of the Child to be Heard (Child Participation) 
The last general principle of the CRC is that which is commonly referred to as ‘child participation’,180 
although the concept of participation is itself a general rule of international human rights law.181 It should 
be noted that the word ‘participation’ does not appear in Article 12 of the CRC (and Article 7 of the ACRWC) 
dealing with this right but that: 
This term has evolved and is now widely used to describe on-going processes, which include information-
sharing and dialogue between children and adults based on mutual respect, and in which children can learn 
how their views and those of adults are taken into account and shape the outcome of such processes.182   
                                                 
177CRC Committee, GC 3 (2003) para 11; Nowak (2005) 2. 
178 Nowak (2005) 38. See also the discussion in section 2.4 of the previous chapter. 
179 Nowak (2005) 38. 
180 CRC Committee, General Comment No 12 ‘The right of the child to be heard’ (2009) para 2. 
181 Tun et al (2007) 43. 
182 CRC Committee GC 12 (2009) para 3. 
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This principle, according to Van Bueren, ‘provides an opportunity for international human rights law to 
operate as a catalyst to change the value which society places upon children’s contributions.’183 
Consequently, it has been argued that participation rights of children have more to do with the status of 
children in society than with the current emphasis on children’s influences on, or involvement in, 
programmes.184  According to the CRC Committee, the right to child participation is a unique provision as ‘it 
addresses the legal and social status of children, who, on the one hand lack the full autonomy of adults but, 
on the other, are subjects of rights.’185 The Committee states further that ‘[t]his right reinforces the status 
of the young child as an active participant in the promotion, protection and monitoring of their rights.’186 
Children should therefore be respected as active participants in the family and society at large rather than 
have their views ignored or rejected merely on grounds of age and immaturity, as the significance of a 
child’s views cannot be determined only on the basis of the age of the child.187 Thus, according to 
Lansdown: 
Participation is a fundamental human right in itself. It is also a means through which to realise other rights. It 
recognises children as citizens entitled and – (…) – able to contribute towards decisions affecting them…188 
It has also been argued that the principle of child participation is about ‘empowering young people to 
confront established (adult) authority, challenge embedded (adult) assumptions about their interests and 
competences, and assert their views on issues that directly concern them’,189 rather than seeking to get the 
perspectives of children on issues based on the views and opinions of adults. Consequently, the CRC sets no 
minimum age for the exercise of a child’s right to express his or her views, and thus the CRC Committee 
discourages States from introducing age limits either in law or in practice that would restrict the child’s 
right to be heard.190  The starting point is for States to presume the child’s capacity to form and express his 
                                                 
183 Van Bueren (1995) 145. 
184 Tun et al (2007) 44. 
185 CRC Committee General Comment No 12 (2009) para 1. 
186 CRC Committee General Comment No 7 ‘Implementing Child Rights in Early Childhood’ (2005) para 14. 
187 As above. See also CRC Committee General Comment No 12 (2009) para 29. 
188 Lansdown G ‘The realisation of children’s participation rights’ in Percy-Smith B & Thomas N (eds) A Handbook of Children and 
Young People’s Participation: Perspectives from Theory and Practice (2010) 13, as quoted in Stalford H & Schuurman M ‘Are We 
There Yet?: the Impact of the Lisbon Treaty on the EU Children’s Rights Agenda’ (2011) 19 International Journal of Children’s Rights 
390. 
189 Woodland M Foreword to A Handbook of Children and Young People’s Participation (2010) cited in Stalford & Schuurman (2011) 
390. 
190 CRC Committee, GC 12 (2009) para 21. 
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own views as there is no onus on the child to prove his capacity.191 Full implementation of Article 12 
therefore requires recognition of and respect for, a combination of communication tools both verbal and 
non-verbal, the latter including forms, such as, play, body language, facial expressions, drawings and 
paintings, among others, through which much younger children demonstrate understanding, choice and 
preferences.192 Although the weight to be given the child’s preference depends on the age and maturity of 
the child, in line with the evolving capacities of the child, the CRC places no limit(s) on the contexts within 
which children can express their views; they are to be heard in ‘all’ matters affecting them.193 
Article 12 of the CRC states: 
1. States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to express 
those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given due weight in 
accordance with the age and maturity of the child. 
2. For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the opportunity to be heard in any judicial and 
administrative proceedings affecting the child, either directly, or through a representative or an appropriate 
body, in a manner consistent with the procedural rules of national law. 
This right implies that children must be allowed to take an active role in the decision-making process about 
everything that affects them, in any setting whatsoever. It has however been argued that the right to 
participate does not translate into an automatic endorsement of children’s views. Rather, due 
consideration should be given to such views and those views must have the ability to genuinely influence 
whatever outcome or decision is arrived at.194 While Article 12 of the CRC (and Article 7 of the ACRWC) is 
the umbrella provision on children’s right to participate, it is said to encompass several other rights which 
are also individually covered under the CRC.195 These include the rights to freedom of expression,196 
                                                 
191 Article 12 UNCRC. Thus, even young children should be heard: CRC Committee, GC 7 (2005) para 14. 
192 Howard A Davidson The child’s Right to be heard and represented in judicial proceedings (1991) 18 Pepperdine Law Review 2. 
193 Art 12 CRC. 
194 Pais (1997) 428. The approach of many NGOs and governments to children’s participation rights are criticized for being merely 
tokenistic rather than being based on a concrete recognition of children having a separate and individual status in law. 
195 Mezmur (2009) 151. 
196 Arts 12 CRC & 7 ACRWC. 
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freedom of thought, conscience and religion,197 freedom of association and peaceful assembly,198 and the 
evolving capacity of the child.199 
States’ obligations under the right of the child to participate involve the creation of an atmosphere that is 
conducive for meaningful engagement with the child in any decision-making process; this is said to be a 
step above merely providing an opportunity for the expression of views.200 This requires making available to 
the child all appropriate and relevant information, as well as ‘unbiased guidance on possible options and 
the foreseeable consequences arising therefrom’.201 
The right of the child to participate is particularly linked to the best interests of the child principle because 
the right to participate is not always directly exercised by the child, but is often exercised by a 
representative acting on behalf of the child. Thus, it is expected that those who represent children in the 
exercise of the right should express opinions that are presumably in the best interests of the child.202 The 
connection between a child’s participation rights and the best interests of the child principle is further 
linked to ‘the evolving capacities of the child.’203 This principle, though not in the category of the four 
general principles of the CRC, is an equally important principle because its application affects every right in 
the CRC and the ACRWC.204 The link between these three principles (child participation, best interests of 
the child and the evolving capacities of the child) is clearly highlighted by one of the measures that the CRC 
Committee directs States Parties to take in the implementation of the right to child participation: 
The Committee encourages States parties to take all appropriate measures to ensure that the concept of the 
child as rights holder with freedom to express views and the right to be consulted in matters that affect him or 
                                                 
197 Arts 14 CRC & 9(1) ACRWC. 
198 Arts 15 CRC & 8 ACRWC. 
199 Arts 5 CRC & 9(2) ACRWC. The principle of the evolving capacity of the child in the CRC and the ACRWC has to do with the 
provision of direction and guidance by parents or guardians to children in the exercise of all rights contained in the CRC. 
200 Lim (2010) 146. 
201 Lim (2010) 146. 
202 Mezmur (2009) 150. An example is the appointment of a curator ad litem to act on the child’s behalf in court proceedings. 
Speaking within the context of early childhood, the CRC Committee noted that: ‘By virtue of their relative immaturity, young 
children are reliant on responsible authorities to assess and represent their rights and best interests in relation to decisions and 
actions that affect their well-being, while taking account of their views and evolving capacities.’ See CRC Committee, GC 7 (2005) 
para 13. 
203 Arts 5 CRC & 9(2) ACRWC. See also CRC Committee, GC 12 (2009) para 1. 
204 See section 2.4.2 of the previous chapter. 
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her is implemented from the earliest stage in ways appropriate to the child’s capacities, best interests, and 
rights to protection from harmful experiences.205 (Emphasis added) 
The right to participation is thus applicable to all children’s rights. It is particularly important within the 
context of the right to alternative care since alternative care generally involves the placement of a child in 
an environment different from his original family environment. The child’s participation right is important 
in every stage of the process: from the determination of the most appropriate form of alternative care to 
actual placement and to post-placement monitoring and evaluation.206 In fact, the CRC Committee states 
clearly that in determining the most appropriate form of alternative care, ‘the “best interests’’ of the child 
cannot be defined without consideration of the child’s views.’207 States Parties therefore have an obligation 
to ensure ‘that the child’s views are solicited and considered, including decisions regarding placement in 
foster care or homes, development of care plans and their review, and visits with parents and family.’208 
This includes providing the children with all relevant information about the effect of whatever form of 
alternative care is agreed upon; this would help to ensure informed consent on the part of the child.209 
 
3.6 The Right to Alternative Care: Analysis of Articles 20 of the CRC and 25 of the ACRWC 
Article 20 of the CRC is the principal provision on the right to alternative care for children deprived of 
parental care, while Article 25 of the ACRWC is more or less the regional equivalent to Article 20 of the CRC 
on the right to alternative care, and both provisions are largely similar.  Article 20 of the CRC provides: 
1. A child temporarily or permanently deprived of his or her family environment, or in whose best interests 
cannot be allowed to remain in that environment, shall be entitled to special protection and assistance 
provided by the state. 
2. State Parties shall in accordance with their national laws ensure alternative care for such a child. 
3. Such care shall include, inter alia, foster placement, kafalah of Islamic law, adoption or, if necessary, 
placement in suitable institutions for the care of children. When considering solutions, due regard shall be 
                                                 
205 See CRC Committee, GC 7 (2005) para 14. Although this general comment is on early childhood, the Committee emphasized 
‘that article 12 applies both to younger and to older children’. 
206 Lim (2010) 147; See generally CRC Committee, GC (2009) paras 53-56. 
207 CRC Committee, GC (2009) para 56 
208 CRC Committee, GC 12 (2009) para 54. 
209 CRC Committee, GC 12 (2009) para 56. 
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paid to the desirability of continuity in a child’s upbringing and to the child’s ethnic, religious, cultural and 
linguistic background. 
According to Phillips, although Article 20 covers the four P’s of children’s rights – protection, prevention, 
provision and participation – ‘the aims of protection and provision are the most significant.’210 This is 
arguably due to the fact that the prevention aim has to do with the State obligation to address factors that 
give rise to children being deprived of their family environment in the first place. However, the 
participation aim is also discernible from Article 20 since it is a significant element in arriving at a decision 
on alternative care for the affected children, as already discussed.211 The same can be said of Article 25 of 
the ACRWC which provides: 
1. Any child who is permanently or temporarily deprived of his family environment for any reason shall be 
entitled to special protection and assistance; 
2. States Parties to the present Charter: 
(a) shall ensure that a child who is parentless, …, or who in his or her best interest cannot be 
brought up or allowed to remain in that environment shall be provided with alternative family 
care, which could include, among others, foster placement, or placement in suitable institutions 
for the care of children; 
(b) shall take all necessary measures to trace and re-unite children with parents or relatives where 
separation is caused by internal and external displacement arising from armed conflict or 
natural disasters. 
3. When considering alternative family care of the child and the best interests of the child, due regard shall 
be paid to the desirability of continuity in a child’s upbringing and to the child’s ethnic, religious or 
linguistic background. 
What follows is an analysis of key concepts that flow from Articles 20 of the CRC and 25 of the ACRWC, 
which provide the basis for a greater understanding and appreciation of the right to alternative care for 
children deprived of a family environment. 
 
3.6.1 Family Environment  
As previously discussed in Chapter 2, there are no rigid definitions for the term ‘family’; the same goes for 
‘family life’ and ‘family environment’. However, the term ‘family environment’ is a new concept uniquely 
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211 See section 3.5.4 above. 
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introduced by the CRC, and adopted by the African Children’s Charter; it has been suggested that these 
terms are overlapping concepts that are generally used interchangeably.212 During the drafting of Article 20, 
there was preference for ‘family environment’ rather than ‘parental care’; the latter was considered too 
narrow, as it did not take into consideration kinship relations applicable in many cultures.213 This means 
that there was an understanding that a child’s actual family could, from the very beginning, be composed of 
people other than the parents. To that extent, it is quite clear that kinship care was not considered to be 
alternative care because it was recognised as forming part of the child’s family environment – which is 
exactly how the family environment is generally understood in the Africa context. It can therefore be 
argued that, strictly speaking, the right to alternative care does not immediately apply upon the loss of 
parental care; it becomes applicable where there are no suitable, willing or available relatives that have 
assumed responsibility for the care of the child upon the loss of parental care.  
However, the implications of the term ‘family environment’ rather than ‘family’ are far-reaching. First, it 
avoids disputes about the nature or structure of a family by focusing on function rather than form; that is, 
the emphasis is on the quality and setting of care provided to children rather than the personalities of the 
care providers themselves.214 Secondly, ‘family environment’ rather than ‘family’ gives rise to a legally 
enforceable right since a government cannot guarantee the right to a family but can facilitate the creation 
of ‘an environment that is protective and facilitative of the relationships most important to a child.’215 
Consequently, ‘any non-institutional living arrangement in which the education [and other nurturing and 
training activities+ of children takes place under the responsibility of one or more adults’216 would amount 
to a family environment. This is so because the family as an institution is not established by State initiative 
and is ordinarily not subject to State supervision or intervention.217 However, the family environment as an 
object of State protection encompasses more than the family itself.218  
                                                 
212 Van Bueren (1995) 69. 
213 Cantwell & Holzscheiter (2008) 59; Detrick (1992) 300. 
214 Melton GB ‘The Child’s Right to a Family Environment: Why Children's Rights and Family Values are Compatible’ (1996) 51 
American Psychologist 1236. See also the discussions in chapter 2.3. 
215 Melton (1996) 1236. 
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In recognition of the different forms of family environments in existence, the CRC and the African Children’s 
Charter refer to a child deprived of ‘his or her’ family environment and not of ‘a’ or ‘the’ family 
environment.219 This again underscores the point that there is no ‘standard’ or universally acknowledged 
definition or form of family. Thus, Article 20 of the CRC makes reference to ‘family’ and not merely 
‘parents’, again a distinction in recognition of a broad understanding of the concept of a family 
environment as going beyond the mere existence of parents.220 Thus, according to the CRC Committee: 
…When considering the family environment the Convention reflects different family structures arising from 
the various cultural patterns and emerging familial relationships. In this regard the Convention refers to the 
extended family and the community and applies to situations of nuclear families, separated parents, single 
parent family, common law family and adoptive family.221 
 
The importance of a family environment is therefore not premised on the mere existence of a physical 
structure but on the psychological elements it represents. Ideally, the family environment is both a place of 
intimate relations and a social institution upon which society is based.222 It gives stability, definition and 
affirmation to an individual’s personality and as far as children are concerned, the existence of a suitable 
family environment is fundamental to the realisation of the rights contained in the CRC.223 It is submitted, 
however, that within the context of the right to alternative care, a family environment may also refer to the 
immediate home/house environment (physical structure), in terms of the setting, safety, security, and 
other practical benefits or functions that the structure provides. This is particularly important in relation to 
placement in institutional facilities, and sometimes in foster care. The reason for this is not far-fetched as 
institutions are usually perceived as cold and formal establishments which provide no room for or tolerance 
of spontaneous or informal and sometimes frivolous interactions as may be typical within a family.224 
Consequently, State supervision of such establishments usually places a premium on the physical and 
functional aspects of a family environment.225   
                                                 
219 Cantwell & Holzscheiter (2008) 32; Arts 20 CRC & 25 ACRWC. 
220 Art 20(1) CRC; Hodgkin & Newell (2007) 278. 
221 CRC Committee Day of General Discussion on the ‘Role of the family in the promotion of the rights of the child’ (1994) para 2. 
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The role of a family environment is related to a child’s right to life, survival and development.226 The 
significance of this right227 goes beyond the inherent right to life to an all-embracing approach determined 
by the quality of life available to the child, physically, psychologically, socially and otherwise.228 As a result, 
States Parties’ obligations to children go beyond the formal preservation of family relationships to the 
provision of substantive ‘entitlements that support an environment conducive to family life.’229 
  
3.6.2 Children Deprived of a Family Environment  
The scope of Article 20 of the CRC covers children deprived of a family environment either on a temporary 
or permanent basis and refers to categories of children who have either ‘lost’ or become ‘separated’ from 
their families for several reasons. Causes of loss or separation include the death of parents, children’s 
abandonment or relinquishment by parents, armed conflict, internal displacement, temporary or 
permanent incapacity of parents (due to imprisonment, illness or disability) and children removed from 
parental care, in their best interests, by an administrative or judicial decision.230 ‘Children deprived of a 
family environment’ is thus a generic term covering a wide range of children including orphans due to 
HIV/AIDS and other causes of death.231 There are also those classified as ‘destitute children’ (victims of a 
wide range of family circumstances, such as poverty) and sometimes, children of single parents (especially 
mothers) who need to work but do not have access to child care facilities are also considered as destitute 
and deprived of a family environment.232  
                                                 
226 Art 6 CRC. 
227 As discussed in section 3.5.3 above. 
228 Fottrell D (ed) Revisiting children’s rights: 10 years of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (2000) 5; CRC  
Committee General Comment No 5 (2005) para 12. 
229 Melton (1996) 1237; Gose (2002) 96. In effect, governments are expected to assist parents/families in creating and maintaining 
family environments that are protective of children and conducive to the realisation of all their rights without interfering with or 
usurping the role of parents in the family environment. Examples of government interventions where necessary include the 
provision of social assistance initiatives. See also Chapter 2.4. 
230 Arts 3 & 9 CRC; South Africa Law Commission (2002) 167. 
231 See CRC Committee General Comment No 6 ‘Treatment of unaccompanied and separated children outside their country of 
origin’ (2005) paras 7, 8 & 39. However, children within the juvenile justice system, though deprived of their family environment 
are not considered in this context because they are separately provided for. See the 1990 UN Standard Minimum Rules on the 
Administration of Juvenile Justice and 1985 Rules for Protection of Juveniles Deprived of Their Liberty. Children who are voluntarily 
outside of their family environment for recreational or other purposes are also excluded. 
232 Tolfree D Roofs and roots: The care of separated children in the developing world (1995) 38. 
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State obligations towards children deprived of their family environment take effect not only when it is 
impossible for a child to be cared for by his parents but also when ‘it is deemed that the child would be in 
danger if left in their care.’233 Thus, Article 20 covers any child within a state’s jurisdiction who, ‘for 
whatever reason, is unable to benefit, or has been removed, from the care of his or her parent and is not 
being looked after informally within the extended family.’234 Cantwell & Holzscheiter supply proof to show 
that kinship care was not originally contemplated as alternative care in the context of Article 20 of the CRC 
because care within the extended family context was understood to be care within a family environment. 
As such, no other alternative would be required. What is required is the fulfilment of State obligations 
towards the family environment as discussed in Chapter 2 in order to secure the care and protection of 
such children within the context of their existing family environment. This discussion will be pursued 
further in Chapter 4 in support of my proposition relating to the extent to which kinship care should be 
accommodated in the child protection system. 
The wording of Article 25 of the ACRWC suggests protection for a wider range of children by requiring that 
alternative care be made available to children who are deprived of their family environment ‘for any 
reason.’235 The emphasis in Article 25 is arguably a deliberate inclusion in light of the unique provisions of 
the ACRWC on the prohibition of the use of children as soldiers,236 special protection for internally 
displaced children (in the same manner as refugee children),237 special measures for the right to education 
of the girl-child,238 and the prohibition of harmful traditional practices like child marriages and female 
genital cutting.239 In effect, Article 25 is wide enough to apply to situations where children leave the family 
environment in order to avoid being forcefully married or subjected to other harmful practices. The 
resultant consequence is that such children could end up equally being deprived of their family 
                                                 
233 Cantwell & Holzscheiter (2008) 9, 63. 
234 As above; emphasis added.  
235 Art 25(1) (2)(a) ACRWC; Art 20(1) CRC. 
236 Art 22(2) ACRWC. 
237  Art 23(4) & 25(2)(b) ACRWC. 
238  Art 11(3)(e) ACRWC. 
239  Art 21 ACRWC. 
 
 
 
 
110 
 
environment and thus become in need of alternative care. These are some of the reasons for which 
children could be deprived of a family environment in the African context.240 
While the list of affected children that may be derived from both articles 20 of the CRC and 25 of the 
ACRWC is non-exhaustive, the position of street children and child-headed households has been said to be 
unclear under international law.241 However, the recognition and protection afforded child-headed 
households by the UN Guidelines for the Alternative Care of Children has changed this view.242 Further, the 
works of Phillips and Lim on child-headed households in South Africa and other African countries are 
significant in clarifying their position, based on the recent legal recognition granted to child-headed 
households in a few countries.243 It is however important to distinguish between the recognition of child-
headed households as a new family form, on the one hand, and it being a form of alternative care on the 
other. The effect of this distinction is that a child-headed household is not an alternative care placement;  
rather it is a protective measure for children found already living in this type of family unit.244 It is 
important to emphasise this distinction due to the controversial nature of expecting or permitting a child to 
undertake adult responsibilities in a household consisting only of the child together with other children.245 
Generally, the recognition of child-headed households has the advantage of keeping siblings together and 
reducing the number of children for whom alternative care would have to be provided.246 The State has an 
obligation to support and monitor such households, the recognition of which is not automatic but is 
dependent on the maturity and capacity of the child heading the household; this is in accordance with 
Article 5 CRC on the evolving capacities of the child.247 It is submitted that this approach also lends 
                                                 
240 See generally the report of the Special Representative of the (UN) Secretary on Violence against Children ‘Protecting children 
from harmful practices in plural legal systems with a special emphasis on Africa’ (2012) 29-38; available at < 
http://srsg.violenceagainstchildren.org/sites/default/files/publications_final/SRSG_Plan_harmful_practices_report_final.pdf > . 
241 Cantwell & Holzscheiter (2008) 38; CRC Committee, GC 3 ‘HIV/AIDS and the rights of the child’ (2003) also raises concerns about 
the increasing number of child-headed households due to HIV/AIDS, but makes no reference to their status or position. Authors 
such as Sloth-Nielsen and Phillips have however argued for the legal regulation of child-headed households and this has begun 
to find its way into some national legislation such as the South African Children’s Act, among others. 
242 Para 37, UN Guidelines. The guidelines will be discussed further in Chapter 4. 
243 Phillips (2011) & Lim (2010). 
244 Couzens, M & Zaal F N, ‘Legal recognition for child-headed households: an evaluation of emerging South African Framework’ 
(2009) 17 International Journal of Children’s Rights 310. 
245 Hence, the protective requirements put in place by international and domestic legislation. With reference to South Africa, see 
Matthias C & Zaal N, ‘The Child in Need of Care and Protection’ in Boezaart T (ed) Child Law in South Africa (2009) 177. 
246 South Africa Law Commission (2002) 172. 
247 Sloth-Nielsen J & Mezmur B ‘HIV/AIDS and children’s rights in law and policy in Africa’ in Sloth-Nielsen J (ed) (2008) 284;  
South Africa Law Commission (2002) 196. The acceptable minimum age in the South African Children’s Act is 16 years. See  
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credence to Article 31 of the ACRWC on the duties of the child because, historically, childhood in Africa was 
‘generally marked by constant changes in status, roles and responsibilities, rather than having a single entry 
point at a defined age.’248 In addition, recognising child-headed households further buttresses the fact that 
the loss of parents or parental care does not necessarily mean the loss of a family environment. With 
particular reference to Africa, the care of younger siblings by older children, among others, is considered a 
duty that forms part of the African kinship care system.249 To the extent that the older children are relatives 
of the younger ones, a child-headed household can be said to be part of kinship care, but to the extent that 
State intervention for the protection of such children and households is being defined and legislated upon, 
child-headed households clearly fall within the child protection system. 
While the term ‘deprivation’ usually indicates a deliberate act by a third party, within the context of the 
CRC, it denotes any reason, (justified and lawful or not), for a situation in which a child is lacking in parental 
and family care.250 Thus, deprivation is context-based in the sense that the focus is on the attachment or 
relationship lost, and not just on the physical loss of parents. This is especially important within the African 
and other non-western cultures where attachments are formed with a wide variety of people who play 
distinct but complementary roles in caring for children.251 It is important to note that deprivation in the 
context of the right to alternative care is sometimes different from deprivation which results from the 
direct intervention or initiative of the State. Examples of the latter would include situations of the 
detention, imprisonment, exile or deportation of the child’s parents as provided in Articles 9 of the CRC and 
19 of the ACRWC. In both contexts (the right to alternative care and the right not to be separated from 
parents), while alternative care will generally be required, the child protection system must of necessity be 
invoked in the case of separation from parents but this is not necessarily the case in the context of Articles 
20 CRC and 25 ACRWC.252 
                                                                                                                                                                  
also Sloth-Nielsen (2012) 118. 
248 Sloth-Nielsen (2012) 118. 
249 Cobbah (1987) 320. 
250 Cantwell & Holzscheiter (2008) 38; CRC Committee GC 3 (2003) paras 27-32. 
251 Tolfree (1995) 24.  
252 This discussion will be pursued in Chapter 4. 
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The use of the term ‘deprived’ also draws attention to the components of a family environment (in an ideal 
situation), the absence of which places a child in a disadvantaged position. A major component of a family 
environment is stability or continuity in a ‘non-exploitative caring’ relationship among the members of the 
family.253 Other components of a family environment include a warm relationship of acceptance and 
closeness between the child and the caregiver, bond formation over a period of time with members of the 
family and stimulation of the child from infancy for normal development of language, intelligence and other 
developmental traits.254 In specialised studies, the concept of ‘deprivation’ is also used to describe the 
consequences of living in institutions resulting in the absence of affection, personal care, and deep 
emotional relationships, presumably present in a family environment.255 
  
3.6.3 Special Protection and Assistance 
Article 20 of the CRC provides that children deprived of a family environment are ‘entitled to special 
protection and assistance provided by the State.’256 All children are entitled to protection and priority care 
due to the particular vulnerability associated with childhood. The recognition of this is the rationale behind 
the adoption of international instruments dedicated to children’s rights,257 but the importance of growing 
up in a family environment justifies the additional level of assistance and protection that States are 
expected to provide for children deprived of a family environment.258 They are doubly vulnerable to the 
violations of all the rights they are entitled to in the absence of the security ideally provided by a family 
environment.259 However, the CRC does not specify what form the ‘special protection and assistance’ 
should take.260 This has raised the question whether the provision of alternative care is one form of special 
protection and assistance or whether it is the mechanism through which special protection and assistance 
                                                 
253 Goonesekere S ‘Human rights as a foundation for family law reform’ (2000) 8 The International Journal of Children’s Rights 84. 
254  Tolfree (1995) 19. 
255 See the presentation by Gruppo di Lavoro per la CRC, Italy during the CRC Committee Day of General Discussion on ‘Children 
without Parental Care’ (2005) <http://www.crin.org/NGOGroup/CRC/DayofGeneralDiscussion/2005> 
256 Art 20(1) CRC. 
257 Detrick (1992) 19. 
258 Cantwell & Holzscheiter (2008) 5. 
259 This is without prejudice to the fact that there are many children who are subjected to various forms of abuse and violations of 
their rights within the confines of their family environment. Nevertheless, this does not negate the general protective role of the 
family in shielding children from harm and risks to which they would be exposed in the absence of a family environment. 
260 Detrick (1999) 235. 
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is realised. In other words, is alternative care synonymous with special protection and assistance or are 
they two separate obligations?261 
In analysing Article 20 of the CRC, Lim argues that the relevant right gives rise to two separate 
requirements for children deprived of a family environment: the right to special protection and assistance, 
on the one hand, and the right to alternative care on the other hand. She supports this position by 
reference to the general guidelines for periodic reports under the CRC reporting guidelines for States 
Parties to the CRC.262 The guidelines, in the section dealing with children deprived of their family 
environment, require States to report on measures adopted to ensure: 
 Special protection and assistance to the child who is temporarily or permanently deprived of his or her family 
environment or in whose own best interests cannot be allowed to remain in that environment; 
 Alternative care for such a child, specifying the available forms of such care (inter alia foster placement, 
kafalah of Islamic law, adoption or if necessary placement in suitable institutions for the care of the child); 
 That the placement of such a child in suitable institutions will only be used if really necessary; 
 Monitoring of the situation of children placed in alternative care; 
 Respect for the general principles of the Convention, namely non-discrimination, the best interests of the 
child, respect for the views of the child and the right to life, survival and development to the maximum 
extent.263 
Thus she concludes that State obligation to provide ‘special protection and assistance’ is different from the 
obligation to provide ‘alternative care’ and as such, the former ‘should be interpreted more broadly and 
separately from’ the latter.264 In addressing the same question, Phillips is of the opinion that ‘the 
entitlement to alternative care could be seen as (one of the forms of) protection and assistance to be 
provided by the State.’265 She further states that, although the form of special protection and assistance is 
not specified in the CRC, it can be ‘derived from relevant articles on health, an adequate standard of living 
                                                 
261 Lim (2010) 131. 
262 Art 44 CRC; CRC Committee ‘Treaty-specific guidelines regarding the form and content of periodic reports to be submitted by 
States parties under article 44, paragraph 1 (b), of the Convention on the Rights of the Child’ (CRC/C/58/Rev.2 2010). See also the 
older guidelines: CRC Committee, Periodic report guidelines (UN Doc.CRC/C/58/Rev.1, 2005) and CRC Committee, Periodic report 
guidelines (CRC/C/58 1996). 
263 CRC Committee, General Guidelines for periodic reports (1996) Part V (G), paras 80-82. See also the current CRC Committee, 
Periodic report guidelines (2010) paras 31-32. 
264 Lim (2010) 132. 
265 Phillips (2011) 57. 
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and education’, as stipulated in the Convention.266 Further, it can also be inferred from the deliberations of 
the Working Group on Article 20 that the first paragraph of the article was adopted generally as an 
introductory paragraph to the right to alternative care for children deprived of their family environment, in 
recognition of their unique vulnerability.267  
It is submitted that although neither the travaux preparatoires nor commentaries on the CRC’s Article 20 
provide guidance on the issue, it is arguable that the understanding of ‘special protection and assistance’ is 
context-based. This is evidenced by the frequent usage of the term in several human rights documents and 
national constitutions.268 As pointed out by Lim, apart from Article 20 of the CRC, ‘special care and 
assistance’ is used in some other articles of the CRC; for example, Article 23, in relation to children with 
disabilities (see also Article 13 of the ACRWC).269 In effect, special protection, assistance or care is defined 
according to the peculiar circumstances of whomever or whatever group of persons it applies to. The aim 
of the usage is generally to highlight the particular vulnerabilities of those concerned, in a bid to ensure 
that such vulnerabilities do not deprive them of the full range of rights to which they are entitled.270 
Consequently, there may be no added value in trying to distinguish between the obligation to provide 
special protection and assistance and the obligation to provide alternative care, within the context of the 
rights of children deprived of a family environment. This is owing to the fact that even where it is accepted 
that the provision of alternative care is considered to be one of the measures of special protection and 
assistance, the responsibility to ensure that children deprived of a family environment get special 
protection and assistance within whatever form of alternative care is decided upon, remains.  
In the context of Article 20, ‘special protection and assistance’ can therefore mean that children deprived of 
a family environment require particular efforts by States to secure their protection through appropriate 
                                                 
266 As above. This position also gets support from evidence during the drafting process of the article. One of the earlier versions of 
the eventual article 20 had the provision of ‘appropriate educational environment’ and ‘measures to facilitate adoption’ and foster 
care as elements of protection and assistance. See UNHCHR (2007) 13.  
267 UNHCHR (2007) 16. 
268 As noted by Lim, the use of the terms ‘special protection’, ‘special assistance’, ‘special care’ can be found in the UDHR (art. 25 in 
relation to motherhood and childhood); art. 10 ICESCR (special protection for mothers before and after birth); art 73(2) of the 
Constitution of Cape Verde (special protection to ill, orphan and deprived children); art 73(2) Constitution of Sao Tome and Principe 
(special protection for young workers). See also art 21, Hague Intercountry Adoption Convention on the provision of alternative 
care for children whose adoption process has not been completed. The article is introduced by reference to the need for the 
‘protection’ of children in such circumstances. 
269 Lim (2010) 133. 
270 Lim (2010) 134. 
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means.271 In order for special protection and assistance to be meaningful, the measures undertaken must 
reflect the lived realities of those children. Consequently, special protection and assistance is fulfilled only if 
the children concerned actually experience ‘the feeling of being cared for by a care giver.’272 This obligation 
bears a moral connotation because it goes to the root of the duty of society to children. Thus, where 
children lack parents or families to meet their essential needs, the onus falls on the larger society to care 
for them. It therefore becomes a State obligation within organised and civilized societies.273 Flowing from 
this, it has been argued that there is a fiduciary relationship between the State and children deprived of a 
family environment, within the framework of the right to alternative care. A fiduciary relationship in this 
context places a positive obligation on the State to act in the best interests of the affected children.274 As 
the ultimate guardian of all children within its jurisdiction, the State has an obligation to provide alternative 
care for children without a family environment, in accordance with domestic law, based on the best 
interests of the child principle.275 This duty is more critical in relation to early childhood, the stage for the 
formation of strong emotional attachments, upon which the survival of young children depends.276  State 
obligation towards children without a family environment therefore requires the development and 
programmatic implementation of alternative care policies and plans, in cooperation with civil society, in 
consideration of factors that are peculiar to each society.277 In practice therefore, a multidisciplinary 
approach is required for the fulfilment of state obligations in the provision of alternative care for children 
deprived of a family environment. In addition, state obligations in this regard are not discharged by the 
mere provision of an alternative care option alone, as there is need for continuous monitoring and regular 
periodic review.278 
 
                                                 
271 Cantwell & Holzscheiter (2008) 11. 
272 Stevens I ‘The impact of the national care standards in Scotland: Putting article 20 into practice?’ (2008)16 The  
International Journal of Children’s Rights 265. 
273  Hodgkin & Newell (2007) 279. 
274 Grover S ‘Nowhere to turn: The Supreme Court of Canada’s denial of a constitutionally-based governmental fiduciary  
duty to children in foster care’ (2004) 12 The International Journal of Children’s Rights 105. 
275  Art 20(2) CRC. 
276  CRC Committee General Comment No 7 (2005) para 4. 
277  Cantwell & Holzscheiter (2008) 51. 
278  Hodgkin & Newell (2007) 281; CRC Committee General Comment No 5 (2003) para 1. 
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3.6.4 The Best Interests of the Child and Continuity in Upbringing 
As discussed earlier, while Article 3 of the CRC establishes the best interests of the child principle in relation 
to all children’s rights, the principle is restated in Article 20 thereby underscoring its importance in the 
context of the right to alternative care.279 It has been argued that serving the best interests of the child 
when considering alternative care placement requires that the process should not be prejudiced by 
ideological, political or religious factors.280 However, in providing alternative care, the CRC provides that 
consideration must be given to the need to maintain continuity in a child’s ‘ethnic, religious, cultural and 
linguistic background’.281 The concept of ‘continuity in upbringing’, as used in the CRC, represents a new 
norm in international law, in the context of childcare. However, the concept does not insist on the 
conformity of the alternative care provided to the recent background of the affected children, but on the 
need for ‘continuity in childhood care’ for children deprived of their family environment with due regard 
(emphasis added) to the elements of their background, up to the point of becoming deprived of that 
environment.282 Like the CRC, the ACRWC also reaffirms the best interests of the child principle and the 
concept of continuity in upbringing, subject to the same considerations already discussed above.283  
In effect, due regard in this context would mean that in considering alternative care, a child’s background 
becomes relevant only to the extent to which maintaining it would serve his best interests. Indeed this 
position comes out clearly from the discussions of the Working Group when it was agreed that the initial 
phrase ‘particular regard’ be replaced by ‘due regard’. The rationale given for the substitution is that while 
‘factors of continuity in the child’s upbringing and background *should be considered], the best interests of 
the child should always be the primary concern.’284 Thus, the focus is on ensuring that the alternative care 
provided does not impact negatively on the child’s growth, and development rather than sticking rigidly to 
continuity. Like the best interests of the child principle, there is no ‘one solution for all’ approach in 
                                                 
279 See section 3.3.1.2. The emphasis on this principle in relation to children deprived of a family environment is further  
evidenced by its inclusion in related provisions to art 20. Such related articles include arts 9 (on separation from parents)  
&21 (adoption).  
280 Gudbrandsson B ‘Rights of children at risk and in care’ Conference Paper at the Conference of European Ministers responsible 
for Family Affairs, ‘’Changes in Parenting: Children today, parents tomorrow’’ (16-17 May 2006) Lisbon, Portugal 22. 
281   Arts 20(3) CRC. 
282 Cantwell & Holzscheiter (2008) 60. 
283 Art 25(2)(a) and (3) ACRWC. Compare art 20(1) CRC. 
284 UNHCHR (2007) 20. 
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implementing continuity. In practice, a case-by-case analysis is required, since a strict application of 
continuity may not always serve the best interests of all children deprived of their family environment. A 
rigid interpretation would be incompatible with the flexible nature of the concept, making a determination 
of ‘best interests’ in each case impossible.285 
Continuity in upbringing also refers to the need to secure children deprived of their family environment in a 
stable and constant alternative care setting, with love and understanding for harmonious development so 
as to avoid the negative effects of drifting from place to place. This rightly goes beyond mere continuity in a 
socio-cultural environment.286 In addition, the concept of continuity is relevant within the context of some 
other related provisions of the CRC. These include the right of a child to know and be cared for by his 
parents287, the right to preservation of identity,288 the cultural and identity rights of children of minority or 
indigenous background,289 and the rights to freedom of religion, expression and association.290 
 
3.6.5 Alternative Care 
Neither the CRC nor the ACRWC define ‘alternative care’. It is however clear that the child’s right to 
alternative care comes into effect upon the loss of or deprivation of not just parental care but more 
broadly, a family environment.291 
At the most basic level, ‘care’ in this context refers to the ‘function of watching, guarding, or overseeing’292 
someone or something and ‘the process of caring for somebody/something and providing what they need 
for their health or protection’.293 In the child care context or in relation to caring for children, care refers to 
the ‘provision in the household and the community of time, attention and support to meet the physical, 
                                                 
285 Hodgkin & Newell (2007) 289; Cantwell & Holzscheiter (2008) 61. 
286 Hodgkin & Newell (2007) 289; Cantwell & Holzscheiter (2008) 62. 
287 Art 7 CRC. 
288 Art 8 CRC. 
289 Art 30 CRC. 
290 Arts 13, 14 & 15; Reddy R ‘Regional practice: The Asian Pacific situation’ in Doek et al (1996) 134; Hodgkin & Newell  
(2007) 288. 
291 Roby (2011) 9: UNICEF (Child Protection Section) Working Paper. As already discussed in the previous chapter and above (3.6.1), 
‘“family environment” is defined by cultural and social norms while “parental care” is more clearly established, although in some 
cultures who is a “parent” can be questioned as well.’ 
292 Available at < http://www.thefreedictionary.com/care > (accessed on 06/08/ 2011). 
293 Available at < http://www.oxfordadvancedlearnersdictionary.com/dictionary/care > (accessed on 06/08/2011). 
 
 
 
 
118 
 
mental and social needs of the growing child and other household members.’294 In a more technical and 
broader sense, Engle and Lhotska define care as, the ‘behaviours and practices of caregivers (mothers, 
siblings, fathers, and child-care providers) to provide the food, health care, stimulation, and emotional 
support necessary for children’s healthy growth and development.’295 In addition, the manners in which 
these actions are performed (with affection and responsiveness) so as to encompass the physical, 
emotional and psycho-social needs of children are key components of the definition by Engle and 
Lhotska.296 
The elements of care as defined above are those generally accepted as being available to children within 
the context of parental care and a family environment.297 Alternative care therefore indicates the provision 
of care other than parental care to children deprived of their family environment, temporarily or 
permanently, but with such alternatives possessing the elements of care.298 In other words, alternative care 
refers to the ‘physical, material, emotional, social, educational and spiritual care for a child, not provided by 
the biological or adoptive parents.’299  
It is significant that Article 25 of the ACRWC makes reference to ‘alternative family care’300 thereby 
suggesting the priority of a ‘family-based’ or ‘family-like’ alternative for children without parental care over 
a non-family form of alternative such as placements in institutions generally.301 Thus, alternative family 
care is not necessarily synonymous with alternative care as is used in the CRC.302 The specific reference to 
‘alternative family care’ under the ACRWC may be interpreted to mean that under the ACRWC, the concept 
of ‘continuity in upbringing’ becomes more relevant in terms of taking into consideration the child’s original 
family environment or background, for example through the involvement of the extended family network. 
                                                 
294 Jallow I, ‘Ensuring effective caring practice within the family and community’, Association for the Development of Education in 
Africa (Libreville Gabon, March 27-31, 2006) cited in Lim (2010) 23. 
295 Engle PL & Lhotska L ‘The role of programmatic actions for nutrition: Designing programmes involving care’ (1999) 20/1 Food & 
Nutrition Bulletin 122. 
296 As above. 
297 Melton (1996) 1237. 
298 Art. 20(1), CRC. 
299 Phillips (2011) 118. Adoption, though a form of alternative care (to an extent) is included in the above definition because once 
an adoption is complete, rights and responsibilities attach and operate as with the case of biological parents. 
300  My emphasis, see art 2(a) ACRWC. 
301 Cantwell & Holzscheiter (2008) 23.This is without prejudice to the fact that ‘placement in suitable institutions’ is one of  
the forms of alternative care listed under art 25. 
302 Mezmur (2009) 167; Lim (2010) 137. See art 20(2) CRC and compare art 25(2)(a) & (3) ACRWC.  It should be recalled however 
that the UN Guidelines as well as the order of placement of the alternative care options in art 20 CRC, also establish the priority of a 
family-based form of alternative care over others. 
 
 
 
 
119 
 
Again, this will depend on the extent of the ‘continuity’ principle’s consistency with the best interests of the 
child principle, and Article 1(3) ACRWC on the supremacy of the universality of children’s rights over any 
cultural, religious, customary or traditional practice.303  
However, in providing for alternative care options, both Article 20 of the CRC and Article 25 of the ACRWC 
give priority to family-based options like foster care and adoption while making institutional care a 
subsidiary option, ‘if necessary’, thereby making it a secondary form of alternative care in the hierarchy of 
options.304 This is aimed at reaffirming the ‘superiority of the family environment, be it the ‘natural’ family 
environment or an alternative family placement (foster care, adoption) over other types of alternative 
care’.305 The implication of this is that between the time when a child ‘loses’ his natural family and the time 
of placement in institutional care, other alternatives should be explored unless it is necessary to place the 
child in such care in the first place, especially if for a temporary period of time. Further, although the list of 
alternative care options provided in Article 20 of the CRC is non-exhaustive, it is not expressly stated that 
there is a hierarchy to be followed in the consideration of alternative care options for children deprived of a 
family environment. However, the options listed (prior to institutional placement) appear to be ranked in 
order of permanence, that is, from the least permanent form of alternative care to the most permanent.306  
The use of ‘inter alia’ in Article 20(3) (and ‘among others’ in Article 25 of the ACRWC) indicates the non-
exhaustive nature of the options listed in the article, leaving States the discretion of making available other 
options ‘in accordance with their national laws.’307 The manner in which other models of alternative care 
have been developed will be considered in the following chapter. For now, what follows is a general 
overview of the forms of alternative care listed in the CRC and the ACRWC. These widely recognised forms 
                                                 
303 The idea of ‘continuity in upbringing’ under the ACRWC immediately follows the consideration of ‘alternative family  
care’ (art 25(3)). Under the CRC, ‘continuity in upbringing’ follows the general (but non-exhaustive) list of forms of  
alternative care (art 20(3)). 
304 Arts 20(3) CRC & 25(2)(a) ACRWC; Cantwell & Holzscheiter (2008) 16. The use of the phrase ‘if necessary’ before listing  
or permitting institutional placement is indicative of this. 
305 Cantwell & Holzscheiter (2008) 19. 
306 The order provided in art 20(3) CRC reads as follows: ‘foster care’, ‘kafalah’ and ‘adoption’. During the drafting of the article, the 
Venezuelan representative stated that it was logical to begin with measures that are relevant for temporary family deprivation and 
end with measures for deprivation of a permanent nature. In this light, it was also suggested that some form of institutional 
placement should come first; this was however not adopted since it was generally agreed that institutional placement should be 
considered only if necessary. See UNHCHR (2007) 25. 
307 Art 20(2)(3) CRC. 
 
 
 
 
120 
 
of alternative care are adoption, foster care, kafalah of Islamic law, and placement in institutions.308 Kinship 
care, and its relationship with some of these forms of alternative care will form part of the discussions in 
Chapter four.309 
 
3.6.5.1 Foster Care 
The term ‘foster care’ is open to several interpretations despite the definition given by the UN Guidelines, 
which will be discussed in chapter four of this study. However, foster care is traditionally defined as the 
legal placement of children in the care of individuals to whom they are unrelated, biologically.310 
Historically, such placement was temporary, pending reunification with the family,311 but has now evolved 
into an alternative care option that may not be temporary but quite permanent or transformed into 
adoption or quasi-adoption.312  
Although fostering covers a wide range of child-care arrangements ranging from emergency care to short 
and medium term care,313 the unique characteristic of foster care is that it does not confer full parental 
responsibilities upon the foster parents; overall parental authority is usually retained by the biological 
parents (or the state).314 In effect, the residual parental responsibilities for children in foster care are shared 
between the state and the foster parents. Consequently, it is essentially a form of social parenting that is 
subject to legal controls by the state.315 In more developed countries, foster care as a form of alternative 
care (in its various forms) is a legal/formal and specialised State-financed service.316 However, formal foster 
                                                 
308 Art 20(3) CRC. 
309 While ‘kinship care’ or more broadly, ‘informal care’ is not listed in the instruments, it can be read in based on the non-
exhaustive nature of article 20 by the use of inter alia. 
310 Williamson J A family is for a lifetime (2004) 12. 
311 Cantwell (2005) 8. 
312 Waysdorf SL ‘Families in the AIDS crisis: Access, equality, empowerment and the role of kinship caregivers’ (1994) 3  
Texas Journal of Women and Law 145. 
313 Nott V & Brisbane C Alternatives to institutional care for orphaned and vulnerable children: A model for transitional care (2008) 
11. 
314 Tolfree D Facing the crisis: Supporting children through positive care options (2005) iv. 
315 Bainham A Children: The modern law (1998) 191. ‘Parental responsibility refers to the collection of tasks, activities and choices 
which are part and parcel of looking after and bringing up a child’ and is conferred by virtue of becoming a parent (usually, a 
‘natural’ parent). See Hoggett B Parents and children (1993) 11. 
316 Lee-Jones L ‘Foster care and social work from the perspective of the foster child’ unpublished master’s thesis, University  
of Cape Town (2003) 11. 
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care is not commonly practised in Africa,317 and there are lots of grey areas in its practice and 
understanding as well as several linkages between foster care and kinship care. South Africa has gone 
further to develop other models of foster care; chiefly, cluster foster care, and this is being replicated in 
other climes (mainly Namibia which shares a common legal history with South Africa, and outside of Africa, 
Israel).318  
While foster care generally provides a child with substitute parents, similar to the typical family 
environment, its non-permanent nature can have a negative impact on a child’s psychological well-being 
and mental development.319 This is more so in cases of ‘foster drift’ where children experience placement 
in several foster families without securing permanence.320 In terms of continuity in upbringing and 
maintenance of family ties, foster care may also not be appropriate for siblings deprived of parental care 
since they may be separated.321 
 
3.6.5.2 Kafalah of Islamic Law 
The term ‘kafalah’ derives from the Arabic word ‘kafl’ which means ‘to take care of’.322 Under this Islamic 
practice of alternative care, a family is permitted to take in, care for and raise (as one of theirs), a child 
deprived of parental care on a permanent basis.323 However, unlike in an adoption, such a child is neither 
entitled to take up the family name nor entitled to an automatic right of inheritance from his new family.324 
                                                 
317 UNICEF (Innocenti Research Centre) (2006) 20. South Africa is one of the few countries in Africa where foster care is legalised 
and practised in terms of the law. 
318 See among others, Gallinetti J & Sloth-Nielsen J ‘Cluster foster care: a panacea for the care of children in the era of HIV/ Aids or a 
MCQ?’ (2010) Social work/Maatskaplikewerk 1. In Israel, up to twenty families living in a single neighbourhood take up to twelve 
children each under the Israeli cluster foster care scheme. See Colton M & Williams M The World of Foster Care: An international 
sourcebook on foster family care systems (1997) 46 - cited in Harber M ‘Social policy implications for the care and welfare of 
children affected by HIV/AIDS in KwaZulu-Natal’, School of Development Studies, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Research Report No 
17 (undated), available at < http://sds.ukzn.ac.za/files/rr17.pdf > (accessed 18 October 2012).  
319 Strijker J & Zandberg TJ ‘Breakdown in foster care’ (2005) 9/1&2 International Journal of Child and Family Welfare 76; Sallanas M 
et al ‘Breakdown of teenage placements in Swedish foster and residential care’ (2004) 9/2 Child and Family Social Work  141. 
320 Cushing G & Greenblatt SB ‘Vulnerability to foster care drift after the termination of parental rights’ (2009) 19/6 Research on 
Social Work Practice 694. 
321 Lim (2010) 156. 
322 Phillips (2011) 39. 
323 Van Bueren (1995) xxi; 
324 As above. 
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The Islamic kafalah form of child care was recognised internationally as an alternative care option for the 
first time in the 1986 Declaration.325 Although focusing on foster care and adoption, the Declaration 
recognised the existence of various alternative care institutions and particularly ‘the Kafala of Islamic 
Law’.326 Subsequently, it was included in the CRC as one of the options when considering alternative care 
for children without a family environment.327 
Kafalah as an alternative care form is more predominantly practised in countries where the Islamic Shariah 
law constitutes a part of or serves wholly as State law, for example Bangladesh, Lebanon, Iran, Pakistan and 
Syria.328 It is also practiced in states that make up the Northern part of the African continent, such as Egypt 
and Libya, and on a more limited basis in other countries in sub-Saharan Africa with large Muslim 
populations, for example Mali, Nigeria and Sudan.329 Given the significant number of countries in Africa 
where the Islamic legal system, Shariah, is in place at varying levels, the recognition and understanding of 
kafalah is a progressive development,330 for the sake of children without parental care in those 
jurisdictions. 
 
3.6.5.3 Adoption 
Adoption is ‘a type of family placement in which the rights and responsibilities of one or more parents are 
fully and irrevocably transferred to one or more adoptive parents.’331 The arrangement is meant to ‘provide 
a form of family care as close as possible to care within the child’s biological family.’332 In other words, 
permanence in a new family environment is secured for the child by severing the ties with his family of 
                                                 
325 Preamble to the 1986 Declaration, para 6. 
326 As above; para 6 of the Preamble provides: ‘Recognizing that under the principal legal systems of the world, various valuable 
alternative institutions exist, such as the Kafala of  Islamic Law, which provide substitute care to children who cannot be cared for 
by their own parents.’ For more on what kafala refers to and how it is practised, see Assim UM ‘In the best interests of children 
deprived of a family environment: A focus on Islamic kafalah as an alternative care option’, unpublished LLM Dissertation, 
University of Pretoria, 2009.  
327 UNHCHR (2007) 25. 
328 Hashemi K ‘Religious Legal Traditions, Muslim States and the Convention on the Rights of the Child: An Essay on the Relevant UN 
Documentation’ (2007) 29 Human Rights Quarterly 220; Sonbol AA ‘Adoption in Islamic Society: A historical survey’ in Fernea EW  
Childhood in the Muslim Middle East (1995) 39.  
329 Olowu D ‘Children’s rights, international human rights and the promise of Islamic legal theory’ (2008) 12 Law, Democracy and 
Development 73; Vite and Boechat (2008) 21; Hodgkin & Newell (2007) 294; Hashemi (2007) 221. 
330 Mezmur (2009) 87. 
331 Tolfree (1995) 165. 
332 Bainham (1998) 205. 
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birth.333 Adoption generally represents the most permanent form of alternative care for children without 
parental care. Unlike other forms of alternative care however, once an adoption process is completed, it is 
no longer subject to periodic review or state supervision since it confers full parental responsibilities on the 
adoptive parent(s).334  
Historically, adoption served the interests of adults and not children.335 This is because it was recognised 
and practiced for purposes of meeting the needs of childless couples. Such needs include the desire for 
children, the need for an heir or continuity of a family’s lineage or for religious purposes.336 Today, the 
focus has changed and adoption is now more child-centred by providing a home or family environment for 
a child rather than providing a family with a child.337 Adoption is further considered to be a social tool to 
improve the lives of vulnerable children through the provision of a substitute family to children whose 
parents are unable or unwilling to care for them.338 
Generally, the legal effects of adoption include: the irrevocable termination of the legal relationship with 
birth parents and the acquisition of a new status as the child of the adopters; the extinguishing of former 
parental responsibility, to the exclusion of any future role for the biological parents in the upbringing of the 
adopted child and the discharge of any existing care order by a court or any other relevant body; and the 
termination of inheritance rights with regard to the birth family.339 Notwithstanding the general features of 
adoption, there are different types of adoption and the legal effects vary depending on what type is 
engaged in.  
Broadly, adoptions may be full or simple, on the one hand, or open or closed on the other hand.340 An 
adoption may also be domestic or international/intercountry, that is it may take place in the same country 
                                                 
333 Welbourne P ‘Adoption and the rights of children in the UK’ (2002) 10 The International Journal of Children’s Rights 269; 
Bartholet (1999) 24. 
334 Cantwell & Holzscheiter (2008) 52; Quinton D et al Joining new families: A study of adoption and fostering in middle childhood 
(1998) 6. 
335 Graff (1999) 110. 
336 O’Halloran K The politics of adoption: International perspectives on law, policy and practice (2009) 1; Tolfree (1995) 170. 
337 Delplace (2006) 163; Bainham (1998) 207. 
338 Krause HD Family law in a nutshell (1991) 163; South Africa Law Commission (2002) 233. 
339 Welbourne (2002) 276; Bainham (1998) 229. 
340 Vite & Boechat (2008) 16; Duncan W ‘Children’s rights, cultural diversity and private international law’ in Douglas G & Sebba L 
(eds) Children’s rights and traditional values (1998) 17; Duncan W ‘Intercountry adoption: some issues in implementing the 1993 
Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption’ in Doek et al (1996) 84. 
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as the one in which the child was born, or involve bringing children from one country to live in the country 
of their adopted parents.341 Most intercountry adoptions are ‘trans-cultural’ and ‘trans-racial’, except those 
involving new family members such as stepparents. The former involves ‘the placement of a child with a 
family in a cultural environment different from that of her birth family’ while the latter involves ‘the 
placement of a child with a family of a different racial origin’.342 
Intercountry country adoption, though a sub-set of adoption,343 has become a subject of significant interest 
in recent years as a result of the vast increase in the number of such adoptions in the last half-century.344 
Consequently, a separate legal framework for the regulation of intercountry adoption was adopted by the 
Hague Conference on Private International Law:345 the 1993 Hague Convention on Protection of Children 
and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption (Hague Adoption Convention). It is a supplementary 
instrument to the CRC and the 1986 Declaration building on the provisions of Article 21 of the CRC on 
Intercountry adoption; it brings into practical effect (i.e. it is an ‘implementation instrument’ of) the general 
provisions on adoption contained in article 21 of the CRC (and Article 24 of the ACRWC).346  
Article 21 CRC provides for intercountry adoption for States that ‘permit’ or ‘recognise’ adoption. The same 
language is employed in article 24 of the ACRWC. However, Article 21 of the CRC is to be read together with 
Article 20, the umbrella provision on alternative care. (In the same vein, Article 24 of the ACRWC on 
adoption is to be read together with its Article 25 on alternative care). Article 21 of the CRC begins with a 
focus on adoption generally, before proceeding in 21(b) and the subsequent sub-paragraphs to focus on 
intercountry adoption. However, under the CRC and the ACRWC, intercountry adoption is to be undertaken 
as a measure of last resort after attempts have been made at securing alternative care for children 
                                                 
341  Van Bueren (1995) 96. 
342  Tolfree (1995) 207. 
343 Art 21, CRC & art 24, ACRWC. 
344 Bartholet E ‘International Adoption’ in Askeland L (ed) Children and youth in adoption, orphanages and foster care (2005) 108; 
Wallace SR ‘Intercountry adoption: The most logical solution to the disparity between the numbers of orphans and abandoned 
children in some countries and families and individuals wishing to adopt in others?’ (2003) 20 Arizona Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 692.  
345 The Hague Conference on Private International Law is a global intergovernmental organisation with the main aim of unifying the 
rules of private international law among member states. See < http://www.hcch.net > 
346 Hague Conference on Private International Law Hague Intercountry Adoption Convention - Outline (2008); Vite & Boechat (2008) 
5; Parra-Aranguren G Explanatory Report on the 1993 Hague Intercountry Adoption Convention (1994) 3.  
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deprived of a family environment within their home country.347 The Hague Adoption Convention, on the 
other hand, prescribes intercountry adoption as a form of alternative care if a suitable family cannot be 
found for a child domestically, thereby prioritising intercountry adoption over non-family-based alternative 
forms of care such as residential or institutional placement within the child’s country of origin, effectively 
making institutional care the measure of last resort.348 This approach is based on the Hague Adoption 
Convention’s emphasis on the importance of children growing up in a family environment, whether at 
home or abroad.349 
Therefore, there appears to be some conflict between the CRC and the ACRWC on the one hand, and the 
Hague Adoption Convention on the other hand, with regards to the ranking of intercountry adoption on the 
alternative care scale.350 The former appear to give preference to institutional placement within a child’s 
state of origin above intercountry adoption while the latter places intercountry adoption above 
institutional placement, even if within the child’s state of origin.351 It has however been convincingly argued 
that this approach negates a proper interpretation of Articles 20 and 21 of the CRC. While Article 20 of the 
CRC (and Article 25 of the ACRWC) provides for the various forms of alternative care in order of 
permanence (with intercountry adoption forming part of adoption), Article 21 of the CRC (and Article 24 of 
the ACRWC) provides a hierarchy only between domestic adoption and intercountry adoption, and not 
between institutional care and intercountry adoption.352 
In giving effect to the CRC provisions on intercountry adoption, the Hague Adoption Convention’s primary 
objectives include the regulation of intercountry adoption in order to avoid or deal with abuses in the 
system, which result in the violation of children’s rights. This is to ensure the best interests of the child in 
the intercountry adoption process.353 However, all over the world, controversies surround intercountry 
                                                 
347 O’Halloran (2009) 129; Hodgkin & Newell (2007) 297. 
348 Vite & Boechat (2008) 45;  
349 See the Preamble to the Hague Adoption Convention. See also Parra-Aranguren G ‘History, philosophy and general structure of 
the Hague adoption convention’ in Doek et al (1996) 65  
350 Stark B ‘Lost boys and forgotten girls: Intercountry adoption, human rights and African children’ (2003) 22 Saint Louis University 
Public Law Review 288. 
351 Davel T ‘Intercountry adoption from an African perspective’ in Sloth-Nielsen (ed) (2008) 263. 
352 Mezmur (2009) 167, 301.  
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adoption due to various political, socio-cultural and economic reasons.354 It is a subject that generates very 
strong reactions, both for and against it.355 In reaction to this, African states have taken differing, and 
sometimes, opposing positions on the subject. Up to 2008, only as few as five African countries had ratified 
the Hague Adoption Convention. But since 2009, in response to the increase in the rate of intercountry 
adoptions from Africa despite many states not being properly equipped to deal with the complexities 
involved, more African states have begun to ratify the Convention.356 To date, about 15 African countries 
are party to the Hague Adoption Convention with other states involved in plans and processes leading up to 
its ratification.357  However, apart from non-recognition of intercountry adoption by some African 
countries, factors such as obsolete legislation and weak legal institutions (to combat illegal adoptions and 
child trafficking) as well economic challenges militate against the adoption of the Convention.358 However, 
the CRC Committee in several concluding observations on reports from African States, and UNICEF have 
urged states’ governments to ratify the Hague Adoption Convention in order to ensure greater 
international cooperation in ensuring the protection of children within the context of intercountry 
adoption.359 
 
                                                 
354 Shapiro LM ‘Inferring a right to permanent family care from the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Hague 
Convention on Intercountry Adoption, and selected scientific literature’ (2008) 15 Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and 
Social Justice 196; Stark (2003) 289. 
355  Tolfree (1995) 207. 
356 African Child Policy Forum (ACPF) Africa: The new frontier for intercountry adoption (2012) v-vii. 
357 The African countries that have ratified the Hague Adoption Convention are: Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde, Guinea, Kenya, 
Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritius, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland and Togo. Ethiopia and Malawi, among 
others, have signed the Convention and are some of the states working towards its ratification. See < 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=69 >. For an appraisal of the African situation on intercountry 
adoption prior to 2009, see Sloth-Nielsen J ‘Children’s Rights and the Law in African Context: An Introduction’ in Sloth-Nielsen (ed) 
(2008) 8.  
358 Doek J ‘General Report – Children on the Move’ in Doek et al (eds) (1996) 226; Phillips (2011) 92.  Other works focused on 
intercountry adoption in Africa include: ACPF (2012); Davel (2008); Mezmur BD ‘Madonna, Mercy, Malawi, and international 
children’s rights law in adoption’ (2012) 20 International Journal of Children's Rights 24; Mezmur (2009). See also Mezmur BD ‘From 
Angelina (to Madonna) to Zoe’s Ark: What are the “A-Z” lessons for intercountry adoption in Africa?’ (2009) International Journal of 
Law, Policy and the Family 145. 
359 UNICEF (Press Centre) ‘African Governments urged to adopt Hague Conventions on children’, 23 February, 2010 < 
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3.6.5.4 Institutional or Residential Care (Placements) 
Institutional care refers to ‘a group living arrangement for children in which care is provided by 
remunerated adults who would not be regarded as traditional carers within the wider society.’360 As 
previously highlighted, the provision of alternative care through placement in institutional facilities is the 
only non-family based form of alternative care listed in the relevant instruments.361 However, the 
subsidiary position of institutional care is reflective of the negative connotations attached to institutional or 
residential care facilities.362 Historically, and all over the world, many traditional institutional 
establishments for the alternative care of children are often large, overcrowded, poorly resourced, 
understaffed, and neglectful and in some cases, they accommodate the abuse of children, in various forms 
– which often goes undetected and unreported.363 It has also been shown that children who spend the 
early developmental phase of their lives in residential facilities exhibit lower rates of cognitive, emotional, 
social, and linguistic development compared to those raised in the family or community; these further 
increase their vulnerability to the violation of their rights.364 In some cases, sustainable attachments cannot 
be formed between the children in care and their caregivers because the caregivers are untrained 
personnel who render their services on a voluntary basis. This is particularly the case with faith-based 
residential facilities.365 The same risks also exist however in facilities funded and operated by private 
individuals, NGOs or governments.366 
All the above notwithstanding, a blanket condemnation of all forms of residential care is inappropriate, 
particularly in the light of modern developments in the field of institutional care. There are different 
facilities which come under the broad categorisation of institutional or residential care and many of them 
are further classified or specialised based on the categories of children that they cater for (example, 
‘orphanages’ for orphans). Examples include ‘residential units’ like ‘group homes’, ‘family homes’, ‘family-
                                                 
360 Peterson-Badali M, Ruck M & Bone J ‘Rights conception of maltreated children living in state care’ (2008) 16 The International 
Journal of Children’s Rights 6. 
361 Cantwell & Holzscheiter (2008) 53. 
362 As above; Csaky C Keeping children out of harmful institutions: Why we should be investing in family-based care (2009) 1; Tolfree 
(2005) 4. 
363 Csaky (2009) 7; Peterson-Badali et al (2008) 100; Pinhero (2006) 175; Tolfree (1995) 60.  
364 Gudbrandsson (2006) 9; UNICEF (Innocenti Research Centre) (2006) 36; Williamson (2004) 21. Some of the rights that children in 
institutional care risk having violated are listed in Phillips (2011) 136. 
365 Delap E Every child deserves a family: EveryChild’s approach to children without parental care (2009) 22; Williamson (2004) 21. 
366 Csaky (2009) 3. 
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type orphanages’ and ‘family-like boarding schools’, ‘community-based care’ centres, ‘temporary stay 
solutions’ and, ‘placement for day or night’ among others.367 The emphasis should be on making such 
facilities as family-based as possible in order to encourage intimate relationships and interactions, which is 
vital to proper child development.368 Thus, the crucial factor is the quality of the environment into which 
the child is placed and the nature of care provided rather than the fact of institutionalisation itself. 
Significantly, institutional establishments have evolved from the traditional mode into several models more 
suitable for the needs of childcare; these will be explored in greater detail in the succeeding chapter, which 
will discuss the UN Guidelines provisions on institutional placements, among others.369  
Knowledge of, and reliance on, placements of children without parental care in institutional care facilities is 
quite a recent phenomenon in Africa; coming to the fore in just over the last decade. This is due to the 
traditional role of the extended family in absorbing children deprived of a family environment.370 The 
phenomena of HIV/AIDS, armed conflict, natural disasters, and chiefly poverty,371 among others, resulting 
in an increase in the number of children without parental care, have given rise to the proliferation of 
institutional care facilities on the continent.372 Most of these facilities are unregistered and as such, the 
actual figures of how many there are and more importantly, how many children are in institutional care is 
unknown, or at the least, inaccurate.373 
Despite the many disadvantages often associated with institutional care, institutions are useful in certain 
respects and form ‘an essential part of the child and youth care system’, under the supervision of trained 
professionals.374 Institutional care is sometimes a necessary part of the process of securing a more 
permanent form of alternative care; they serve as a time-limited interim stage towards securing permanent 
                                                 
367 Phillips divides them generally into dormitory-style institutions and household-style set-ups; (2011) 134. 
368 Baladon LG ‘A child’s journey across international frontiers: the Asian experience’ in Doek et al (1996) 124; Tolfree (1995) 64; 
Cantwell & Holzscheiter (2008) 53; Council of Europe ‘Children in Institutions: Prevention and alternative care’ (2005) presentation 
at the CRC Committee Day of General Discussion (2005). 
369 Examples include models developed by organisations such as the SOS Children’s Villages among others. 
370 Phillips (2011) 134. 
371 As a result of poverty, there are many children in residential care facilities who still have either or both of their parents alive. A 
major reason for this is that the material needs of children are often better met in these facilities than in their immediate family 
environment. See Csaky (2009) 1. 
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373 UNICEF Progress Report for Children Affected by HIV/AIDS (2009) 19; Dunn A, Jareg E & Webb D A last resort: The growing 
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alternative care placement for children deprived of a family environment, and who cannot be reunited with 
their birth families. Thus, the period spent in institutional care facilities should be used for ‘devising for 
every child in care a permanent, and preferably family, protective solution, including intercountry adoption 
when no adoptive family can be found in the country of origin’.375 The aim of an interim approach to 
institutional care is ultimately the ‘de-institutionalisation’ of children who find themselves placed therein; it 
therefore remains a measure of last resort for children deprived of their family environment. The UN 
Guidelines on the Alternative Care of Children which will be discussed in the next chapter is quite emphatic 
about this position.376  
Against the background of the fact that all forms of alternative care are expected to serve the best interests 
of the child, the principles of ‘necessity’ and ‘suitability’ when considering alternative care placement are 
applicable to all other forms of alternative care and not to placement in institutions alone.377 While 
institutional care facilities may not be the best environment within which children should grow up, the 
circumstances of each case would help to determine the best interests of the child. 
  
3.7 Conclusions 
This chapter presented a broad overview of the relevant international and regional legal and theoretical 
framework fundamental for a thorough understanding and proper application of the right to alternative 
care for children deprived of their family environment. With particular reference to children deprived of 
their family environment, it has been shown that the additional level of assistance and protection which 
                                                 
375 Yacoob A Report on professional foster care: A pilot project of the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Young People at Risk’ (1998) 11 
(Kimberley, Northern Cape Province, South Africa); Vite & Boechat (2008) 25; Cantwell & Holzscheiter (2008) 24; GC 3 (2003) 35.  
The risk of illegal Intercountry adoption of children in institutional care has however been noted even though there are low 
percentages of Intercountry adoption from such facilities. This is due in part to the fact that children in institutions tend to be 
viewed as ‘problem children’: ‘many children living in institutions are older than five and may be traumatised sick or disabled, 
potential adoptive parents *especially from other countries+ wish to adopt healthy babies without any ‘baggage’ and those are 
usually not to be found in residential care.’ See Phillips (2011) 138. 
376 Phillips (2011) 137; UNICEF Africa’s Orphaned and Vulnerable Generations: Children affected by AIDS (2006) 20. Para 23 of the 
UN Guidelines provides for the progressive elimination of institutional care for children deprived of a family environment. However, 
institutional care is also useful for keeping siblings together where there are no foster or adoptive parents willing to take them all 
in; for absorbing street children who are unable or unwilling to go home; and for providing a neutral environment for the treatment 
of children who have been traumatised by abuse within their family environment. 
377 Cantwell N ‘Towards UN Guidelines on alternative care for children: from concerns to consensus’ (2008). PPT Presentation 
available at < http://www.bettercarenetwork.nl > (accessed 18 May 2013). 
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the existing legal framework accords them is justified in light of the double vulnerability of such children to 
violations of all other rights to which they are entitled. 
Overall, four main issues have been discussed so far. First, beginning with a historical overview of the 
international instruments relevant for children’s rights and the right to alternative care alternative care in 
particular which were in place prior to the CRC and ACRWC, the chapter clearly shows that the right to 
alternative care as conceptualised today can be traced to key provisions in those earlier instruments on 
children’s rights: the Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child (1924); the Declaration of the Rights of 
the Child (1959); the Declaration on Social and Legal Principles relating to the Protection and Welfare of 
Children, with Special Reference to Foster Placement and Adoption Nationally and Internationally (1986); 
and the Declaration on the Rights and Welfare of the African Child (1979). 
Secondly, the adoption of the almost-universal CRC remains significant for establishing a rights-based 
approach to matters concerning children by being the first internationally binding instrument on children’s 
rights. Related to the CRC, it was argued that the African Children’s Charter, drawing inspiration from the 
CRC, plays a complementary role to the CRC despite being region-specific in a number of areas including 
the subject of alternative care. On the relationship between the CRC and the ACRWC, what stands out 
clearly is the fact that the two instruments cannot be understood, interpreted or implemented in isolation 
from the other, with regard to all children’s rights generally and the right to alternative care particularly, at 
least within Africa. 
Thirdly, the four fundamental principles of children’s rights (non-discrimination, best interests of the child, 
child participation, and the right to life, survival and development) in both the CRC and the ACRWC were 
presented in a manner which highlights the particular ways in which these principles are relevant to and 
important for the realisation of the right to alternative care. The emphasis on some unique aspects of the 
principles and rights as formulated in the ACRWC is of particular importance given the geographical context 
and relevance of this thesis.  
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Fourthly, the main thrust of the chapter was a presentation of a theoretical basis for the right to alternative 
care through an analysis of key concepts and principles emanating from the right to alternative care. These 
concepts such as ‘family environment’, ‘deprivation’, ‘continuity in upbringing’, among others, are key 
concepts which provide the fundamental requirements (a human or children’s rights-based approach) 
relevant for consideration when taking measures to ensure a proper realisation of the right to alternative 
care. A highlight of the chapter is the argument that kinship care was not originally envisaged as part of the 
options considered under the right to alternative care because it was understood to form part and parcel of 
what is meant by family environment. The changes that have taken place in international and local law and 
policy on the place of kinship care will be considered in the next chapter.  
In addition to the key principles of alternative care, an overview of the major forms of alternative care as 
provided in the CRC and ACRWC was also presented serving as a background to the consideration of kinship 
care in comparison with the others that will be discussed subsequently. Of significant note is the fact that 
the universal acceptance of the importance of a family environment to the proper growth and 
development of the child has resulted in a shift towards the prioritisation of family-based alternative care 
options for children deprived of their family environment. The development of family-based models of 
alternative care has become fundamental to the understanding and proper implementation of the right to 
alternative care. Some of this will be examined further in chapter four. 
It will be argued further that international and domestic measures on the right to alternative care are 
largely uncertain about the status and position of kinship care, and particularly its relationship with the 
child protection system. This will lay a proper foundation for the proposition on how kinship care should be 
placed in relation to the right to alternative care and the child protection system. 
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CHAPTER FOUR – THE CONCEPTUALISATION OF KINSHIP CARE 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the status of kinship care (relative to foster care and other forms of alternative care) will be 
considered, in light of current developments in international law and policy around the right to alternative 
care. In Chapter 3, it was argued that kinship care was not originally envisaged as or intended to fall within 
the framework of the right to alternative care as provided in the international children’s rights framework. 
This was done through an analysis of the drafting history of the CRC, particularly the eventual Article 20, 
and its counterpart, Article 25 of the African Children’s Charter. This chapter seeks to highlight how kinship 
care transitioned from being a family environment or the result of a particular family situation to becoming 
an alternative care measure within the framework of the right to alternative care. 
In the first part of the chapter, the role of the United Nations Guidelines on the Alternative Care of Children 
in recognising kinship care and locating it within the framework of the right to alternative care is explored. 
Some of the other significant ways in which the Guidelines have contributed to or impacted on the 
development of the right to alternative care are also presented. The next section presents a discussion on 
the broad forms of alternative care as provided by the UN Guidelines. This is followed by a discussion on 
kinship care, focusing on the definition, forms, nature, prevalence, benefits and challenges of kinship care 
generally and in Africa.  
An analysis of the relationship between kinship care and traditional foster is also presented followed by the 
presentation of a framework for understanding and distinguishing the different forms of kinship care and 
how they interact (or should interact) with the child protection system generally, and with foster care more 
specifically. The chapter concludes with a number of observations about kinship care within the framework 
of the right to alternative care and its interactions with the child protection system. 
 
 
 
 
 
134 
 
4.2 Conceptualising Kinship Care as Alternative Care 
A highlight of the discussion in Chapter three is the argument that kinship care was not originally envisaged 
as part of the options considered under the right to alternative care because it was understood to form 
part of what is meant by a family environment. As outlined in Chapter two, historically, ‘kinship care has 
been an ever-present family resource, frequently providing varying levels of support to family members in 
need.’1 In Africa particularly, children’s kin traditionally played various roles in the care and upbringing of 
children; a cultural requirement which can be likened to the provision of occasional, short term or other 
temporary care in contemporary understanding.2  
In more recent years however, an increasing number of extended family members especially grandmothers 
are moving away from their more traditional roles within the family, and into roles typically assumed by 
their grandchildren’s parents. Some of the factors responsible for this include changes in family structure 
and socio-economic conditions, also discussed previously.3 Consequently, relatives such as uncles, aunts, 
older siblings, cousins and especially grandparents now routinely provide full-time care for children of their 
relatives, effectively taking up the full-time parenting role of such relatives – largely on an informal basis.4 
In the past, the role of kin in the care and upbringing of children was supplementary to the role of parents,5  
but today, their role is largely primary, against the background of deprivation and the need to provide 
alternative care.6 In effect, kinship care today refers to the ‘full time care, nurturing and protection of 
children by relatives, members of their tribes or clans, godparents, step-parents, or any adult who has a 
kinship bond with a child.’7 
  
                                                 
1 O’Brien V ‘The benefits and challenges of kinship care’ (2012a) 18(2) Child Care in Practice 127. 
2 Kosberg (1992) 265.  
3 See Chapter 2, section 2.3.3. See also Backhouse J ‘Grandparents raising their grandchildren: impact of the transition from a 
traditional grandparent role to a grandparent-as-parent role’, unpublished PhD thesis, Southern Cross University, Lismore, NSW, 
2009, 1-2. 
4 See generally Cox CB ‘Why grandchildren are going to and staying at grandmother's house and what happens when they get 
there’ in Cox CB (ed) To Grandmother's House We Go and Stay: Perspectives on Custodial Grandparents (2000); Richards A Second 
Time Around: A Survey of Grandparents Raising their Grandchildren (2001); Council on the Ageing National Seniors (Melbourne 
Australia: Department of Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs) Grandparents Raising Grandchildren (2003). 
5 Their role may also be described as ‘complementary’ based on the African world view of ‘ubuntu’. See also Chapter 2, section 2.2. 
6 In chapter five of this study, some cases decided in domestic courts will be discussed, showing the different ways in which courts 
have interpreted the responsibilities of relatives in caring for children. 
7 UNICEF & ISS ‘Improving protection for children without parental care, Kinship care: An issue for international standards’ (2004) 2; 
Children’s Rights, New York ‘Overview of institutional care in the United States’ (2005) 1. 
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4.2.1 The United Nations Guidelines for the Alternative Care of Children: International 
Framework for the Recognition of Kinship Care 
Like the CRC and the ACRWC, the 2009 UN Guidelines for the Alternative Care of Children (UN Guidelines) 
do not define alternative care, but the standard for activating the right to alternative care under the CRC 
and the ACRWC differs from that under the Guidelines. The CRC and ACRWC make it clear that the right to 
alternative care comes into effect not just upon the loss of biological parents but also upon the loss of 
other relatives or persons broadly considered as forming part of the child’s family environment.8 In a 
departure from this approach, the UN Guidelines defines the child’s family as primarily comprising the 
child’s parent(s), thereby implying that ‘a child’s right to alternative care springs into effect when he or she 
is deprived of “parental care”’.9 Thus, while the phrase ‘children deprived of their family environment’ can 
be inferred from the CRC and the ACRWC, the phrase, ‘children deprived of parental care’ is that which 
runs through the UN Guidelines.10 Consequently, the Guidelines define ‘children without parental care’ as 
‘all children not in the overnight care of at least one of their parents, for whatever reason and under 
whatever circumstances.’11 
Despite this conceptual difference, the more complex and diversified nature of the ‘African society’ as 
described above and in the previous chapter, justifies the narrow focus of the UN Guidelines in its 
definition of the family. Further, regardless of how kinship care is conceptualised, the children involved find 
themselves somewhere between parental/family care and State care, with particular concerns that need to 
be addressed.12 
                                                 
8 This is defined according to the customs, culture and social norms of individual societies. See Art 5 CRC. 
9 Roby (2011) 9; Para 3, UN Guidelines: ‘The family being the fundamental group of society and the natural environment for the 
growth, well-being and protection of children, efforts should primarily be directed to enabling the child to remain in or return to 
the care of his/her parents, or when appropriate, other close family members.’ See also para 4 which provides that children with 
‘inadequate or no parental care’ are at the risk of being denied ‘a supportive, protective and caring environment that promotes 
*their+ full potential.’ 
10 See among others, paras 4, 7, 14, 15, 1, 18, 53, 69 & 70 of the UN Guidelines. Para 1 of the UN Guidelines sets out the purpose of 
the guidelines as follows: ‘The present Guidelines are intended to enhance the implementation of the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child and of relevant provisions of other international instruments regarding the protection and well-being of children who are 
deprived of parental care or who are at risk of being so.’ 
11 Para 29(a) UN Guidelines. This includes children without parental care who are outside their country of habitual residence or who 
are victims of emergency situations. 
12 Roby (2011) 9. 
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While the CRC (together with the ACRWC) provides the international legal framework for the care and 
protection of children deprived of a family environment,  it does not provide detailed guidelines as to the 
practical application of its provisions on alternative care. In other words, Article 20 of the CRC (and Article 
25 of the ACRWC) provides a broad framework for the protection of children deprived of a family 
environment, but establishes no rules for the implementation of the provisions contained therein. Until 
2009, there was no other international instrument from which guidance could be sought on the subject.13 
At the time of drafting the CRC, the rapid increase in the number of children without parental care 
(especially in Africa due to HIV/AIDS and armed conflicts, among others)14 was not foreseen and as such, 
the provisions of the CRC dealing with such children were not particularly elaborate or detailed.15  By the 
2000s, the problem of children deprived of a family environment had resulted in a crisis that could no 
longer be ignored or left unattended leading the CRC Committee to note in 2004 
the frequency with which its Concluding Observations provided to States Parties following periodic 
consideration of their reports address serious difficulties regarding care provision for children in informal or 
formal fostering, including kinship care and adoption, or residential facilities, often recommending the 
strengthening and regular monitoring of alternative care measures.16  
Consequently, the CRC Committee in 2005 devoted its Day of General Discussion to the theme of ‘Children 
without Parental Care’. Thus began the process of what eventually led to the development of the United 
Nations Guidelines for the Alternative Care of Children, 2009.17 The combination of the CRC, ACRWC, and 
                                                 
13 International Social Service (ISS) ‘A global policy for the protection of children deprived of parental care’ (2005) available at < 
http://www.crin.org/docs/A%20Global%20Policy%20for%20the%20Protection.pdf >; UNICEF ‘Children without Parental Care’ 
(2005) available at < http://www.unicef.org/chinese/protection/files/Parental_Care.pdf >.   
14 CRC Committee, Recommendation on ‘Children without parental care’, (10/2004) preamble, available at < 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/crc/decisions.htm#7 > (accessed 18 October 2012). 
15 Sloth-Nielsen (2004) 6.  
16 CRC Committee Recommendation 10/2004, preamble. The Committee, in paragraph 1 of the Decision, also commended the 
‘efforts made by regional and inter-agency bodies to define principles and standards of care for children without parental care, 
notably the Recommendation of the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers to Member States on Children’s Rights in 
Residential Institutions, and the Inter-Agency Guiding Principles on Unaccompanied and Separated Children’. 
17 The UN Guidelines were approved and welcomed by the UN General Assembly on 20 November 2009, on the occasion of the 20th 
anniversary of the CRC. The guidelines were developed by a consortium of international non-governmental organisations, 15 States 
Parties, young persons with care experience and the CRC Committee. The INGOs include Resources Aimed at the Prevention of 
Child Abuse and Neglect (RAPCAN), Save the Children UK, SOS Children’s Villages International and World Vision International. The 
States Parties known as the ‘Group of Friends’ comprised Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Finland, Ghana, Georgia, Italy, Japan, Morocco, 
Philippines, Portugal, Sudan, Sweden, Ukraine, and Uruguay. For more information on the history and development of the Un 
Guidelines, see the following: UNICEF/International Social Service ‘Improving protection for children without parental care: A call 
for international standards – A joint working paper (2004); UNICEF/International Social Service ‘Improving protection for children 
without parental care. Kinship care: An issue for international standards’ (2004); Cantwell N ‘Not just ‘’the same difference’’: A 
comparative overview of the Quality4Children Standards and the draft UN Guidelines in the field of alternative care for children’ 
(2008); International Social Service (ISS) ‘The Draft United Nations Guidelines on the Alternative Care of Children: An Ethical 
Framework on the Path to Adoption as Permanent Protection Measure’, being a presentation by Christina Baglietto at the 2nd 
International Conference on Adoption, New Delhi, 8-10 October 2007, available at < 
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the UN Guidelines form a comprehensive package of law, policy and implementation guidelines on the 
practical realisation of the right to alternative care. Although a legally non-binding instrument, the 
importance of the UN Guidelines lies in the fact that they build on the provisions of the CRC and ACRWC, 
and provide more detailed standards and principles for filling the implementation gaps in the CRC and the 
ACRWC.  
The UN Guidelines therefore serve as a reference text for State Parties’ governments, policy makers and all 
other stakeholders involved in realising alternative care for children, by providing detailed information for 
the practical implementation of the right to alternative care.18 There are two main principles (or ‘pillars’) of 
the UN Guidelines regarding alternative care for children: the ‘necessity principle’ and the ‘suitability 
principle’. These two principles are based upon the understanding that realising the right to alternative care 
requires making sure ‘that such care is genuinely needed (the ‘necessity principle’), and that, when 
alternative care is deemed necessary, the most appropriate alternative for the child concerned be made 
available (the ‘suitability principle’).’19 Through these principles, the UN Guidelines place great emphasis on 
the need to exhaust all measures to keep children in their original family environment without 
compromising the need to safeguard their best interests.20 
The emergence of the UN Guidelines is significant because it effectively places kinship care within the 
framework of the right to alternative care as an independent alternative care measure.21 According to 
Cantwell, the UN Guidelines serve the purpose of clarifying certain grey areas of the CRC on alternative care 
                                                                                                                                                                  
http://www.google.co.za/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CCQQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.crin.org%2F
docs%2FISS%2520Presentation%2520on%2520Draft%2520Guidelines%2520and%2520Adoption.doc&ei=LCuJUIWTE8y0hAf8wIC4B
A&usg=AFQjCNEitwXA1_Ctq9K0tyAJUIq1EDng6A&sig2=2LkUjtWr9WqNN2AcrPUdIw > (accessed 25 October 2012); UN Human 
Rights Council, A/HRCH/11/L.11, 2009, 31-32. 
18 Para 1, UN Guidelines; Cantwell (2008) 4. In addition to the UN Guidelines, a handbook was commissioned by an international 
consortium of funders to guide stakeholders in the step-by-step application of the guidelines. The handbook titled Moving Forward: 
Implementing the ‘Guidelines for the Alternative Care of Children’ (by Cantwell N, Davidson J, Elsley S, Quinn N, & Milligan I) was 
launched in  March 2013. See CELCIS ‘International guide on child care commissioned to implement UN framework’, 23 August 
2012, available at < www.strath.ac.uk/press/newsreleases/headline_649069_en.html > (accessed 8 October 2012). 
19 See generally, paras 3-7, & 9-10, UN Guidelines. See also Cantwell et al (2012) 22; Cantwell et al (2012) 22-23. The suitability 
principle is also described as the ‘appropriateness’ principle. See Save the Children, ‘Guidelines for the Alternative Care of Children: 
Policy Brief’, November 2012, at < http://resourcecentre.savethechildren.se/library/guidelines-alternative-care-children-save-
children-policy-brief > (accessed 28 August 2013) 
20 Para 2(a), UN Guidelines. 
21 In essence, the UN Guidelines revert to the position of the 1986 Declaration which was not adopted in the subsequent drafting of 
the CRC – reflecting a change in times and circumstances. See Chapter 2, section 3.2.3. This makes the Guidelines the second 
instrument in international law to expressly recognise and provide for kinship care within the framework of the right to alternative 
care. Both the 1986 Declaration and the UN Guidelines are however non-binding instruments. 
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including: the relationship between parental care and alternative care; state obligations with regard to 
informal care or kinship care;  the application of the best interests of the child principle; the goals of 
alternative care; the recognition of child-headed households; alternative care for children of imprisoned 
mothers;22 residential care for children under three years; the hierarchy of care options; the concepts of 
‘necessity’ and ‘suitability’ as they affect alternative care placements; and importantly, the goal of de-
institutionalisation.23 Some of these have been discussed in previous chapters24 while the subject of kinship 
care will be the focus of subsequent parts of this chapter. However, a few others will be addressed briefly 
below, in a bid to shed some more light on the contributions of the UN Guidelines to the development of 
children’s right to alternative care generally. 
 
4.2.1.1 Residential Care for Children under 3 Years 
It is important to point out that although ‘residential care’ and ‘institutional care’ are often used 
interchangeably, they are not synonymous; institutions are simply one form of residential care in line with 
the approach of the UN Guidelines.25 However, institutions as a category of residential care are historically 
equated with ‘large residential care facilities.’26 Factors generally used to distinguish institutions from other 
categories of residential care include: the size of the facility; the number of carers; and the length of 
placement.27 However, ‘in the heterogeneous and “hybrid” alternative care environment, no definitional 
method can be fool proof.28 Thus, definitions are determined by contextual realities at national level.29 This 
                                                 
22 A subject, which though missing from the CRC, is addressed in Article 30 of the ACRWC. 
23 Cantwell N ‘Improving Protection for Children without Parental Care: Developing Internationally-accepted Standards’ Paper 
presented at the European Congress in Gmunden, June 2005, at <  
http://www.crin.org/bcn/details.asp?id=11692&themeID=1001&topicID=1007 > (accessed 28 August 2013) 
24 See Chapter 2, section 2.4 on aspects of the relationship between parental care and alternative care; Chapter 3, section 3.5.2 on 
the best interests of the child principle generally; section 3.6.2 on child-headed households; section 3.6.5 on the goals of alternative 
care; and Chapter 4, section 4.2.1, para 3 above briefly on the principles of necessity and suitability. 
25 Tolfree (1995) 6. Other forms of residential care include places of safety and transit centres: Para 29(c)(iv), UN Guidelines. The 
implementation handbook of the guidelines also recognises that residential care ‘encompasses a very wide range of settings, from 
emergency shelters and small group homes to the biggest residential facilities.’ See Cantwell et al (2012) 33. See also Meintjes et al 
(2007) and Bilson A & Harwin J ‘Gatekeeping Services for Vulnerable Children and Families: A toolkit’ in UNICEF and the World Bank 
Group Gatekeeping Services for Children and Vulnerable Families: Changing Minds, Policies and Lives Toolkit (2003) iv; at < 
http://www.unicef-irc.org/publications/pdf/gatekeeping.pdf > (accessed 18 October 2012). 
26 See Chapter 3, section 3.6.5. 
27 Cantwell (2010) 12; Cantwell et al (2012) 34. 
28 Cantwell (2010) 13. 
29 UNICEF Children in Formal Care – Indicator Consultation, 18 November 2003 (unpublished document) cited in Cantwell (2010) 13. 
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is consistent with State Parties’ obligations towards alternative care.30 The emphasis should be placed more 
on the reason for a child’s presence in a particular alternative care setting than on the designation of the 
setting itself.31 In effect, the use of residential care facilities should be limited to cases where it is 
appropriate, necessary and constructive.32   
However, where children under the age of three years are involved, residential care facilities must be 
family-based.33  In fact, the adoption of the UN Guidelines is considered to be a major landmark ‘in terms of 
reaching international agreement on the decision that for children under three years of age, institutional 
care should not be an option and that family-type alternatives should be promoted and supported.’34 In 
other words, institutional placements for very young children (at least three years and below) is totally 
unacceptable.35 
  
4.2.1.2 The Goal of De-institutionalisation 
While the UN Guidelines do not call for an outright ban on institutions, institutions described above are 
expected to be the target of a ‘de-institutionalisation strategy’.36 More generally, the UN Guidelines call on 
‘each State to draw up its own strategy for progressively deinstitutionalising its alternative care system.’37 
Thus, reliance on institutional residential care facilities must be anchored on an overall 
deinstitutionalisation strategy targeted at the eventual elimination of such facilities.38 This also requires 
that any initiative to set up a new institution should be critically examined in the light of the goal of 
deinstitutionalisation because: 
                                                 
30 Art 20(2)(3) CRC and Art 25(2) ACRWC. 
31 Cantwell (2010) 13; Cantwell et al (2012) 33-34. 
32 Cantwell et al (2012) 22. 
33 Paras 21 & 22, UN Guidelines. 
34 OHCHR ‘Institutional care as a violation of rights of children under three years of age’, Document for discussion at the sub-
regional workshop on the rights of vulnerable children under three years of age, Prague, Czech Republic, 22 November 2011, 15. 
35 ‘Although UN Guidelines specifically cover the first three years of age *para 21+, it could be suggested for further consideration of 
major international and national stakeholders that all children under 5 or under 8 years of age should be raised in families, without 
exceptions.’ See OHCHR (2011) 15. 
36 Para 23, UN Guidelines; Cantwell et al (2012) 34. See also Meintjies et al (2007) 1. 
37 Para 23, UN Guidelines; Cantwell et al (2012) 33-34. 
38 Para 23, UN Guidelines. 
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Experience has clearly demonstrated that deinstitutionalisation– if it is to be successful and protect children’s 
rights – is a highly complex and multi-faceted process. It requires careful planning. Furthermore, because not 
everyone supports change, it is important that all concerned individuals and agencies agree on the reasons 
behind a de-institutionalisation policy and understand its implications.39    
This discussion highlights the fact that a clear distinction has been made between what amounts to 
‘suitable’ residential care on the one hand and the traditional understanding of institutional placement on 
the other hand.40 While institutional placement should rightly be the focus of de-institutionalisation 
strategies, it is my opinion that the development of more family-based residential facilities (see the 
discussion in the following section on ‘forms of alternative care’) for promoting the proper development of 
the child in itself represents a measure of deinstitutionalisation or an aspect of an overall 
deinstitutionalisation strategy or policy. 
  
4.2.1.3 Broadening the Scope of Alternative Care 
The UN Guidelines broaden the scope of the application of the right to alternative care by providing for 
continued care and support for young persons who require support when making the transition from care 
placements to independent living upon attaining majority (18 years).41 All children who are outside their 
states of origin or habitual residence who are without parental care are also entitled to alternative care, 
including children who are victims of emergency situations.42 Such children are described as either 
‘unaccompanied’ or ‘separated’ children.43 They are unaccompanied ‘if they are not cared for by another 
relative or an adult who by law or custom is responsible for doing so’, and separated ‘if they are separated 
from a previous legal or customary primary caregiver, but who may nevertheless be accompanied by 
another relative.44  
                                                 
39 Cantwell et al (2012) 33-34, 43. 
40 See Chapter 3, section 3.6.5.4. 
41 Paras 27 & 28, UN Guidelines; Cantwell et al (2012) 31. 
42 Paras 29 (a) & 153, UN Guidelines. 
43 Unaccompanied or separated children include refugees and asylum-seekers, irregular migrants, and victims of trafficking, 
abduction and other forms of forced migration. 
44 Para 29(a)(i)-(ii), UN Guidelines. See also CRC Committee General Comment No 6 ‘Treatment of unaccompanied and separated 
children outside their country of origin’ (2005) paras 7 & 8; CRC Committee Report of the 2012 Day of General Discussion ‘The 
Rights of All Children in the Context of International Migration’ (2012) para 39. 
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In effect, the Guidelines highlight the importance of alternative care in exceptional circumstances for 
children in situations which are already the subjects of other international laws and standards.45 The 
inclusion of these exceptional circumstances is due to the fact that the subject of alternative care has (like 
almost all other spheres of life) ‘had to confront challenges resulting from a rapid expansion of cross-border 
issues in recent decades.’46 As noted by Cantwell et al, 
Various alternative care arrangements – including informal kinship care – are made for children abroad. One 
of the main reasons for taking up this question in the Guidelines, however, was to address concerns over 
international short-term ‘hosting’ and ‘respite care’ initiatives. Programmes of this kind, involving a stay of 
several weeks with a volunteer family abroad, are very frequently organised with few safeguards and no 
oversight, particularly in terms of ensuring the suitability of the host families. This is the first time that an 
attempt has been made to tackle this issue in an international standard-setting text.47 
The wide scope of the Guidelines to include separated and unaccompanied children, and victims of 
emergency situations such as natural or man-made disasters (including international or internal armed 
conflicts and foreign occupation),48 resonates with the wider scope of the categories of children requiring 
alternative care as contemplated by Article 25 of the ACRWC, unlike the narrower scope of the CRC.49 In 
these exceptional circumstances, the Guidelines oblige ‘the State or de facto authorities in the region 
concerned, the international community and all local, national, foreign and international agencies providing 
or intending to provide child-focused services’ to pay special attention to, among others, developing 
‘necessary, temporary and long-term family-based care’; using residential care as a temporary measure; 
mandatory efforts towards family tracing and reintegration.50 These provisions are important as there are 
severe, frequent and widespread risks of ‘highly inappropriate responses to the situation of children 
identified as being without parental care in such circumstances.’51 Justifying the wider scope of the 
Guidelines to include children in emergency situations, and with particular reference to institutional 
placements, it has been noted that: 
                                                 
45 Examples include The Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Cooperation in Respect 
of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the protection of Children (1996) and the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) Guidelines on the Determination of the Best Interests of the Child (2008). See further and generally, paras 137-
141, UN Guidelines. 
46 Cantwell et al (2012) 114. 
47 Cantwell et al (2012) 115. 
48 Para 153, UN Guidelines. 
49 See chapter three, section 3.6.2. 
50 Para 154(a)-(f), UN Guidelines. 
51 Cantwell et al (2012) 117. 
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In the emergency context, the Guidelines take a far stronger line on the use of residential care than their 
consideration at a general level (notably s 21 – 23). Thus, in this special case, there is an outright prohibition 
on setting up new long-term facilities. This hard line approach is grounded largely in experience of foreign 
non-State actors arriving in a disaster zone with the intention and resources to establish a residential facility, 
regardless of existing policies. In the worst instances, they may subsequently decline to cooperate in, or even 
actively obstruct, family reunification efforts on behalf of children in their care.52 
 
4.2.2 Forms of Alternative Care under the UN Guidelines 
The UN Guidelines provide broadly for two forms of alternative care: informal and formal.  Alternative care 
is formal if the placement was ordered by a competent administrative body or judicial authority, including 
placements in residential facilities.53 Informal alternative care refers to placements based on private 
arrangements initiated by the child, his parents (or relatives) or other person(s) without the involvement of 
any administrative body or judicial authority.54 Sub-categories of formal care generally include: 
legally/judicially ordered foster care; group home care; and residential care (whether public or private).55 
Informal care comprises: kinship care; community-based care; and other family-based care arrangements.56 
It is important to note that the UN Guidelines, upon re-stating the importance of a family environment to 
the child’s proper development,57 progressively build on the non-exhaustive list of alternative care options 
provided in the CRC and the ACRWC, ‘with priority to family- and community-based solutions.’58 This is 
achieved by the development of formal options other than traditional foster care, such as: other family-
based settings; family-like settings; residential care (with institutions as a sub-category); and supervised 
independent living arrangements.59 The goal is to ensure that priority is given to the placement of a child in 
                                                 
52 Cantwell et al (2012) 117. 
53 Para 29(b)(ii), UN Guidelines. 
54 Para 29(b)(i), UN Guidelines; Cantwell et al (2012) 32. 
55 Roby (2011) 10. 
56 Roby (2011) 10. 
57 Para 3, UN Guidelines. 
58 Arts 20(3) CRC & 25(2) ACRWC; para 53, UN Guidelines; Cantwell et al (2012) 22 & 79; Cantwell (2010) 3. 
59 Para 29(c)(i)-(v), UN Guidelines. While kafalah is a type of ‘other family-based care setting’, the ‘essential difference between 
“family-based” and “family-like” is that the former involves care within an existing family’s domestic setting whereas the latter 
involves a group care arrangement, organised in a manner akin to that of an autonomous family, in which specific carers play a 
parental role but in a setting outside their domestic environment.’ See Cantwell (2010) 8; Cantwell et al (2012) 33. Supervised 
independent living arrangements are ‘designed for children and young people transitioning from a formal care setting to an 
independent life in the community.’ They are based on provisions of the Guidelines concerning an after care policy for children 
transitioning from care placements. See generally paras 131-136, UN Guidelines; Cantwell et al (2012) 34, 98. 
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a setting that closely resembles a family environment, as much as is possible.60 This is the rationale behind 
ensuring that institutional facilities for the alternative care of children are modelled after a ‘typical’ family 
setting.61 
With reference to care settings generally, the CRC Committee in 2011, and relying on provisions of the UN 
Guidelines, defined care settings broadly as follows: 
Care settings are places where children spend time under the supervision of their “permanent” primary 
caregiver (such as a parent or guardian) or a proxy or “temporary” caregiver (such as a teacher or youth 
group leader) for periods of time which are short-term, long-term, repeated or once only. Children will often 
pass between caregiving settings with great frequency and flexibility but their safety in transit between these 
settings is still the responsibility of the primary caregiver – either directly, or via coordination and 
cooperation with a proxy caregiver (for example to and from school or when fetching water, fuel, food or 
fodder for animals). Children are also considered to be “in the care of” a primary or proxy caregiver while 
they are physically unsupervised within a care setting, for example while playing out of sight or surfing the 
Internet unsupervised. Usual care settings include family homes, schools and other educational institutions, 
early childhood care settings, after-school care centres, leisure, sports, cultural and recreational facilities, 
religious institutions and places of worship. In medical, rehabilitative and care facilities, at the workplace and 
in justice settings children are in the custody of professionals or State actors, who must observe the best 
interests of the child and ensure his or her rights to protection, well-being and development. A third type of 
setting in which children’s protection, well-being and development also must be secured, are 
neighbourhoods, communities and camps or settlements for refugees and people displaced by conflict 
and/or natural disasters.62  
The provision of alternative care therefore refers to the availability of a ‘family situation’ or ‘family 
environment’ for the child under the charge of an alternative ‘permanent primary caregiver.’ With 
reference to informal care, although there are clear distinctions between kinship care, community-based 
care and others,63 the terms are often used interchangeably in literature, policy and practice concerning 
alternative care generally.64 This study however refers strictly to kinship care without interchanging it with 
community-based care or others forms of informal care. However, kinship care and informal care will often 
be used interchangeably. 
                                                 
60 See Chapter 3, sections 3.2.3 (para 3) & 3.6.5 (para 4). 
61 Examples include: ‘small family groupings of children within a larger institution; households of children within a compound of 
such houses (set apart from the surrounding community) under the care of an adult and living as a family unit within a community; 
and children placed in small family-sized units with an adult caretaker in households scattered throughout the community.’ See 
Williamson J A Family is for a Lifetime: Synergy Project (2004) 12, Available at < http://www.womenchildrenhiv.org/pdf/p09-of/of-
30-00.pdf > (accessed 19 October 2012). 
62 CRC Committee, General Comment No. 13: ‘The right of the child to freedom from all forms of violence’ (2011), para 34. 
63 Roby (2011) 21-26. 
64 Roby (2011) 11-13. 
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4.2.3 The Relationship between Informal Alternative Care and Formal Alternative Care 
The aim of this section is to point out that the UN Guidelines do not demand that kinship care or informal 
care generally should interact with the formal child protection system in the same manner as formal 
alternative care models. In other words, although the Guidelines recognise kinship care (among others) as 
alternative care, they do not intend that formal and informal care be regulated by exactly the same 
standards. On the relationship between formal and informal alternative care, the UN Guidelines 
significantly provide as follows: 
The present Guidelines apply to the appropriate use and conditions of alternative formal care65 for all 
persons under the age of 18 years, unless, under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier. 
Only where indicated do the Guidelines also apply to informal care settings,66 having due regard for both the 
important role played by the extended family and the community and the obligations of States for all children 
not in the care of their parents or legal and customary caregivers, as set out in the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child.67 
With the direct reference made to the CRC above,68 this is the closest the UN Guidelines come to the 
definition of a family environment (in relation to responsibility for the care of the child) as comprising of 
not just parents, but also ‘legal and customary caregivers’. However, this is done without the Guidelines 
shifting ground on the fact that the role of the extended family in kinship care is generally alternative care, 
albeit informal.69 Thus, it is quite clear from the above provision that the Guidelines place greater emphasis 
on formal forms of alternative care. In other words, the application of the standards of the Guidelines to 
kinship care and informal care generally is not contemplated to be at the same level as it should be with 
formal alternative care placement options. For example, with reference to the phrase ‘only where indicated 
do the Guidelines also apply to informal care settings’, it is logical to argue that matters concerning the 
assessment and training of potential foster carers, the monitoring and regulation of institutional care 
facilities, the requirement to maintain standard records and compliance with certain accommodation 
requirements among others,70 do not apply to informal (kinship) care. 
                                                 
65 Emphasis added. 
66 Emphasis added. 
67 Para 27, UN Guidelines. 
68 See Arts 5 & 18 CRC. See also Art 20(1) ACRWC. 
69 This is arguably the implication of the sentence, ‘…the Guidelines also apply to informal care settings, having due regard for…the 
extended and the community…and customary caregivers.’ 
70 See generally paras 80-100 & 105-136, UN Guidelines. 
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The Guidelines are clear on the fact that all children deprived of parental care have the right to alternative 
care, including special assistance and protection by the State regardless of whether or not the alternative 
care option provided is formal or informal. However, not all efforts at providing alternative care need go 
through the formal child protection system, especially when the reality is that the bulk of the children 
concerned are informally absorbed into kinship care.71 In fact, the inclusion of kinship care in the 
Guidelines, which no previous instrument had explicitly done, was based on the realisation that throughout 
the world, a ‘sizeable majority of children unable to live with their parents are cared for under informal 
arrangements’.72    
Consequently, the approach adopted by the Guidelines is the provision of a basic set of guidelines to guide 
States in organising informal care and its interaction with the child protection system. The relevant 
provisions in 4 paragraphs of the Guidelines are reproduced below:73 
1. With a view to ensuring that appropriate conditions of care are met in informal care provided by individuals 
or families, States should recognize the role played by this type of care and take adequate measures to 
support its optimal provision on the basis of an assessment of which particular settings may require special 
assistance or oversight.  
2. Competent authorities should, where appropriate, encourage informal carers to notify the care arrangement 
and should seek to ensure their access to all available services and benefits likely to assist them in discharging 
their duty to care for and protect the child. 
3. The State should recognize the de facto responsibility of informal carers for the child.  
4. States should devise special and appropriate measures designed to protect children in informal care from 
abuse, neglect, child labour and all other forms of exploitation, with particular attention to informal care 
provided by non-relatives, or by relatives previously unknown to the children or living far from the children’s 
habitual place of residence. 
From the above, the first point is to the effect that States are enjoined to recognize the reality of informal 
care, and provide varying levels of adequate support for different informal care settings as determined by 
particular circumstances. Second, not all informal care situations are appropriate for official notification (or 
formalisation), but this should not preclude them from accessing services and benefits necessary for the 
carers to take proper care of the children. Third, the recognition of the de facto responsibility of informal 
carers derives from the recognition of cultures where persons other than parents may have charge over a 
                                                 
71 Cantwell et al (2012) 76. 
72 Cantwell et al (2012) 76. 
73 Paras 76-79, UN Guidelines. See also para 18 which provides that should ensure the welfare and protection of children in 
informal care ‘with due respect for cultural, economic, gender and religious differences and practices that do not conflict with the 
rights and best interests of the child.’ 
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child.74 Finally, as is the case with placement in formal care, State responsibility to ensure the protection of 
the child in informal care still subsists. 
Consequently, these provisions together with Paragraph 27 (on the application of the guidelines) earlier 
cited, represent the drafters’ acknowledgement of the fact that while a rigid formalisation process for 
kinship care may be problematic, it does require ‘oversight and/or may benefit from State support to 
ensure optimum child protection. It is here that the standards [of the UN Guidelines] have their role to 
play.’75 Thus, the Guidelines do not call for the formalisation of all situations of kinship care. Further proof 
of this is provided in another section of the Guidelines as follows: 
With regard to informal care arrangements for the child, whether within the extended family, with friends or 
with other parties, States should, where appropriate, encourage such carers to notify the competent 
authorities accordingly so that they and the child may receive any necessary financial and other support that 
would promote the child’s welfare and protection. Where possible and appropriate, States should encourage 
and enable informal caregivers, with the consent of the child and parents concerned, to formalize the care 
arrangement after a suitable lapse of time, to the extent that the arrangement has proved to be in the best 
interests of the child to date and is expected to continue in the foreseeable future.76 
The above notwithstanding, some scholars and other stakeholders do advocate more or less for the 
formalisation of kinship care in general on the basis that the ‘formalisation of kinship care can increase the 
protection and well-being of children living with their relatives.’77 A general call for formalisation however 
raises questions such as what is meant by formalisation and how do you draw the line between the 
requirement of formalisation and a family’s right to privacy? These are some of the questions that 
subsequent sections and the author’s proposed framework for kinship care will attempt to answer.  
For now, it suffices to state that the position of the UN Guidelines with regards to informal care generally, is 
that States must establish measures to ensure the protection of children in such arrangements.78 Due 
account should be taken of the principle of continuity in upbringing when placing a child in alternative care 
while paying attention to the promotion of all other rights of the child.79 Given that the State has a duty to 
assist needy families in their responsibilities towards children, poverty should not be the sole justification 
                                                 
74 Arts 5 CRC & 20 ACRWC; para 27, UN Guidelines. 
75 Cantwell et al (2012) 31. 
76 Para 56, UN Guidelines. 
77 Oswald E Because we care: programming guidance for children deprived of parental care (2009) 27. 
78 Paras 18 & 27, UN Guidelines. 
79 Paras 11, 12 & 16, UN Guidelines. 
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for the removal of a child from parental care or his/her family environment.80 In fact, separation of a child 
from the family should be a measure of last resort.81 Additionally, every effort should be made to maintain 
the existing bonds among siblings unless there is other justification for their separation.82 The following two 
sections discuss various aspects of kinship care more specifically, together with a focus on the intersections 
between kinship care and foster care. 
  
4.3 Kinship Care: Definition, Forms, Nature, and Prevalence  
In 1974, Stack documented the role of the extended family in the family and child care practices of the 
African American community in the United States of America (USA), a work which inspired the phrase 
‘kinship care’.83 According to Stack, although kinship care may mean different things to different people, 
the implication is the same to the extent that it entails placing reliance on members of the extended family 
(including friends) for the day-to-day care of children to ensure their survival and development.84 Thus, the 
UN Guidelines define kinship care as ‘family-based care within the child’s extended family or with close 
friends of the family known to the child, whether formal or informal in nature’.85 Kinship care is variously 
described in different jurisdictions: ‘relative care’ is used predominantly in Ireland; ‘family and friends’ care 
in the United Kingdom (UK) and ‘kinship care’ in Australia, New Zealand and the USA. 86  
The inclusion of kinship care in the UN Guidelines is said to highlight the need to respect and promote 
traditional coping mechanisms for children in need of parental care, particularly in developing countries 
where the economic, social and cultural dimensions or issues are different. As put by Cantwell et al, 
On a wider level, there is a growing tendency to promote formalised (and often legalised) alternative care 
arrangements as the most desirable. This view has been partly inspired by the ‘Western’ approach to 
resolving social problems. It is claimed in some quarters that only formal arrangements can provide the 
accountable guarantees necessary for safeguarding the best interests and other rights of the children 
                                                 
80 Para 15, UN Guidelines. 
81 Para 14, UN Guidelines. 
82 Para 17, UN Guidelines. 
83 Stack C All our Kin: Strategies for Survival in a Black Community (1974). 
84 Stack (1974) 31. 
85 Para 29(c)(i), UN Guidelines. 
86 Broomfield L & Osborn A ‘Kinship care’ (2007) 7 Research Brief (Australian Institute of Family Studies) 1; Mason J, Falloon Jm 
Gibbons L, Spence N & Scott E Understanding kinship care (2002) 1; O’Brien (2012) 127-128;  
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concerned. But this view has a number of negative consequences. It is somewhat dismissive of (and 
underrates) the benefits of care arrangements that are based more on custom and oral commitments. In 
doing so, it actually discourages support for informal systems and carers. 
The combined consequence of this, especially in economically disadvantaged countries and communities 
where international intervention is common, include the unwarranted establishment of residential facilities, 
the introduction of culturally-unknown alternative care practices (e.g. formal foster care and adoption), or 
the promotion of inter-country adoption. The Guidelines militate against such initiatives.87 
As noted above however, kinship care is not a phenomenon that is practised only in lower income 
countries; it is a key feature of the child welfare system in many developed countries of the ‘West’ such as 
Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands, UK and the USA, albeit subject to varying considerations and 
contextual differences.88 What is significant is the fact that while kinship care has always been a globally 
dominant form of child care, its emergence in law, policy and practice within the context of the right to 
alternative care and child protection is a recent development.89   
In the African context, while evidence-based data is largely fragmented, available statistics show that at 
least 90 per cent of double orphans live with relatives in 35 countries of sub-Saharan Africa, including 
Namibia and South Africa.90 Data from 8 Latin American, 2 Caribbean and 6 Asian countries show the same 
result.91 Similarly, ‘85 per cent of children not living with at least one parent were living with the extended 
family’, with grandmothers comprising the largest number of carers in high HIV-prevalence countries.92 
Globally, the majority of kinship carers are grandparents (especially grandmothers), followed by aunts, 
uncles and older siblings.93  
                                                 
87 Cantwell et al (2012) 82. This is without prejudice to the fact that ‘certain traditional practices are not always respectful of the 
rights of children. There is evidence from many countries of children who are placed with relatives (especially uncles and aunts) 
only to be exploited or discriminated against. Not surprisingly, this is a genuine fear of many children who choose to set up and 
remain in child-headed households.’ Such situations provide some of the reasons for the preference for informal care to be 
acknowledged/recognised and subject to some form of regulation, since States remain ultimately responsible for protecting 
children from all forms of maltreatment and exploitation whether or not in alternative care. 
88 The formal placement of children in kinship care rather than in foster care was a policy decision which began in the late 1980s in 
Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America, and in the 1990s in other parts of Europe. See O’Brien (2012) 127-128. 
89 See Broad B Kinship Care: Providing positive and safe care for children living away from home (2007) 1. See also UNICEF/ISS 
(2004); Scannapieco M & Hegar RL ‘Kinship foster care in context’ in Hegar RL & Scannapieco M (eds) Kinship care: Policy, practice 
and research (1999) 1. 
90 Roby (2011) 14. 
91 See Ainsworth M & Filmer D ‘Inequalities in children’s schooling: AIDS, orphanhood, poverty and Gender’ (2006) 30(6) World 
Development 1106 – cited in Roby (2011) 14. See also Monasch R & Boerma JT ‘Orphanhood and childcare patterns in sub-Saharan 
Africa: An analysis of national surveys from 40 countries’ (2004) 18 (suppl 2) AIDS S55. 
92 USAID & UNICEF The evidence base for programming for children affected by HIV/AIDS in low prevalence and concentrated 
epidemic countries (2008) – cited in Roby (2011) 15. 
93 Broad (2007) 2: ‘For example, in Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe, 60 per cent of orphans and vulnerable children are in 
grandparent-headed households.’ See also Backhouse J & Graham A ‘Grandparents raising grandchildren: Negotiating the 
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Broadly, kinship care (like alternative care generally) is classified into two basic forms or types: ‘formal’ and 
‘informal’. Kinship care is formal if the placement was ordered by a competent administrative body or 
judicial authority.94 Thus, the family is subject to an assessment of its suitability for the child, and is entitled 
to continuous support and monitoring.95 On the other hand, kinship care is informal if the placement is 
based on a private arrangement initiated by the child, his parents (or relatives) or other person without the 
involvement of any administrative body or judicial authority.96 Other terminologies with similar meanings 
are also used by other scholars. For example, kinship care arrangements that occur without the 
involvement of the child protection system is also described as ‘private kinship care’ while those which 
involve the child protection system as termed ‘public kinship care’.97 In relation to foster care in the child 
protection system, ‘public kinship care’ is also described as ‘kinship foster care’98 while traditional foster 
care arrangements are described as ‘non-relative foster care’.99  
More recently in 2012, O’Brien notes that there are four settings of kinship placements, ‘which can be 
viewed as sequential stages in a child and family’s encounter with the child welfare system’:100 
The first type of kinship care is called ‘‘informal care’’ and this occurs when the family make their own private 
arrangements in response to a family crisis. An informal kinship placement can also occur as a result of state 
intervention, arising from a care and protection issue but, in this instance, the state diverts the child back to 
the extended family. The state may provide some level of assistance, but this is usually limited when 
compared with the supports and financial assistance available when the child is in formal care. ‘‘Formal care’’ 
is the third situation, and it is this type of care that is usually referred to as formal kinship care. A fourth 
situation is referred to as ‘‘kinship adoption’’ or ‘‘kinship guardianship’’. This applies when the kinship carer 
moves to secure the placement through legal means, such as a residence order (in the United Kingdom), or 
special guardianship or adoption laws that are used more widely.101 
‘Key differences are connected with the legal basis of entry into the care system, the reason for care and 
the length of time of time it is envisaged the child will remain in the care of the relatives.’102 Apart from 
                                                                                                                                                                  
complexities of role-identity conflict’ (2011) Child and Family Social Work 1; Roby (2011) 15; HelpAge International Forgotten 
families: Older people as carers of orphans and vulnerable children (2005). 
94 Para 29(b)(ii), UN Guidelines. 
95 Broad (2007) 2. 
96 Para 29(b)(i), UN Guidelines. 
97 US Department of Health and Human Services (USDHHS) ‘Report to the Congress on Kinship Foster Care’, June 2000, iv, available 
at < http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/kinr2c00/index.htm > and < http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/kinr2c00/full.pdf >. 
98 Takas M Kinship care and family preservation: A guide for states in legal and policy development (1993) 3. 
99 USDHHS (2000) iv; Berrick JD, Barth RP & Needell B A comparison of kinship foster homes and foster family homes: Implications 
for kinship foster care as family preservation (1994) 16(1/2) Children and Youth Services Review 33. 
100 O’Brien (2012) 128. 
101 O’Brien (2012) 128. 
102 O’Brien (2012) 128. 
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‘kinship guardianship’, O’Brien classifies the three other forms of kinship care as follows: ‘informal care’; 
‘informal kinship care’; and ‘formal kinship care’. The basic difference between the three stem from two 
factors: whether or not there was State involvement in the placement process and if so, at what stage the 
State intervention came into the process.  
Regardless of what form of kinship care is in place, in comparison to other forms of alternative care 
generally, there are certain benefits as well as challenges associated with kinship care. According to Roby, 
available evidence on both the benefits and risks associated with kinship care are mixed, as there are 
factors which in varying contexts, determine such benefits and risks.103 For example, a ‘pivotal factor’ which 
generally determines the quality of care that a child in informal kinship care would receive is the degree of 
relatedness between the child (and his parents) and the kinship carer.104 Other factors include the financial 
ability of the kin, the age and sex of the child and caregiver, the prevailing local culture and ‘the 
circumstances under which the child is brought into the family and many other factors we do not yet 
know.’105 All these notwithstanding, some of the benefits and risks generally associated with kinship care 
are explored below. 
 
4.3.1 Benefits of Kinship Care 
First, kinship care promotes and empowers local and culturally-sensitive support systems. As a model of 
care derived from the traditional extended family system, it provides an opportunity for law to be 
developed with recourse to indigenous and non-intrusive models that encourage the natural coping 
mechanisms of various societies.106 This is important considering that the practise of kinship care derives 
from cultural norms on which people and societies place significant value.107 In essence, kinship care 
promotes the ‘preservation of family *in a broad sense+, community and cultural ties.’108 
                                                 
103 Roby (2011) 16. 
104 Roby (2011) 16. 
105 Roby (2011) 17. 
106 Tolfree D A sense of belonging: Case studies in positive care options for children (2006) 1. 
107 Oswald (2009) 24. 
108 Broad (2007) 3. 
 
 
 
 
151 
 
Kinship placements have been found to promote stability in children’s growth and development process 
compared to other models of care.109 In comparison to foster care for instance, the likelihood of ‘multiple 
placements which often damage a child’s ability to bond with a caregiver’ is reduced.110 Since the risk of 
disruptions and uncertainties are minimal, the chances of children being distressed, traumatised or 
developing low self-esteem are reduced.111 This is because they do not necessarily feel a loss of identity 
since they are usually placed with relatives with whom they share a common history and culture.112 
Illustrating the importance of this element of kinship care, O’Brien cites the example of a 10-year old child, 
who was moved into kinship care after having lived in many different foster homes, who stated: ‘I’m with 
me (sic) family now you know, they know me’.113 Thus, children are generally able to make a smoother and 
easier transition into care because of the familiarity of the kinship carers.114 
Kinship care thus promotes continuity in upbringing which is an important principle of the right to 
alternative care.115 Kinship placements keep children in their original communities of origin where ‘they 
maintain their family relationships, social networks and contact with schools, places of worship, and other 
familiar places.’116 They are therefore able not only to preserve their self-identity but their cultural identity 
as well through opportunities to absorb the values of their culture, and the development a sense of 
belonging to a larger community.117 Related to this is that kinship care increases the chances of being able 
to keep siblings together in cases where a sibling group requires alternative care.118 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the provision of alternative care goes beyond meeting the physical 
needs of the child. It incorporates measures to also respond to the emotional, mental, spiritual and psycho-
                                                 
109 O’Brien (2012) 129; Broad (2007) 3. 
110 Oswald (2009) 24. It has however been noted that within the context of kinship care, there are cases of children being ‘passed 
around’ different members of the extended family over an indefinite period of time. See Broad (2007) 3; ISS & UNICEF (2004) 3-4. 
111 ISS & UNICEF (2004) 4; Broad (2007) 3. 
112 Broad (2007) 3. 
113 O’Brien V ‘Fostering the family: A new systemic approach to evolving networks of relative care’, unpublished PhD thesis, 
National University of Ireland, 1997, 301 – cited in O’Brien (2012) 130. 
114 Messing J ‘From the child’s perspective: A qualitative analysis of kinship care placements’ (2006) 28(12) Children and Youth 
Services Review 1415. 
115 See section 3.6.4 of chapter 3. 
116 Oswald (2009) 24. See also Tolfree (2006) 15. 
117 Olson K, Knight SS & Foster G From Faith to Action: Strengthening Family and Community Care for Orphans and Vulnerable 
Children in Sub-Saharan Africa (2006) 4; Williamson (2004) 4. 
118 Lim (2010) 152; May JW ‘Utah kinship placements: Considering the intergenerational cycle of domestic violence against children’ 
(1996) 22 Journal of Contemporary Law 97. See also Ministry of Gender Equality and Child Welfare (Namibia) Foster care in 
Namibia: Recommendations for the Framework (2009). 
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social needs of the child in an encouraging and supportive manner.119 Compared to institutional form of 
care, it is ‘commonly assumed that children who are raised by their relatives will be more likely to receive 
love and support by their caregivers due to kinship bonds and existing relationships’. 120 Consequently, the 
family environment provided by kinship care presents opportunities for the display and practise of love, 
affection and personal attention, which are essential to a child’s development and well-being.121 It is 
however important to not always take this assumption at face value as evidence shows that not all kinship 
relationships or care situations are ‘loving and supportive.’122 Besides, O’Brien notes that there is a dearth 
of research or literature addressing ‘the question of how safe kinship care is *in practice+.’123 
Of particular relevance to the African context is that kinship care generally expands children’s capacity for 
self-sufficiency by exposing them to experiences ‘valuable for social, cultural and economic self-sufficiency 
as the child becomes an adult.’124 This is possible because kinship carers may not necessarily feel 
constrained in the manner of child upbringing and training adopted. In other words, they do not need to 
adopt standardised methods determined by State law and policy. This element of kinship care is valuable 
provided the children are not exploited or exposed to other forms of abuse. Children in kinship care are 
therefore able to gain valuable social skills in their interactions with the wider society as well knowledge, 
skills and experience in income-generating activities.125 The importance of this cannot be over-emphasised 
when one considers the need for an after-care policy particularly for children placed in institutional 
facilities, in order to enable them gain the much needed skills for interacting with the world in their new 
status as independent adults.126 Children in kinship care may therefore transition more comfortably into 
adulthood compared to children in other models of care. 
                                                 
119 Section 3.6.5, Chapter 3. 
120 Oswald (2009) 24. 
121 Olson et al (2006) 38; Oswald (2009) 24. 
122 Oswald (2009) 24. 
123 O’Brien (2012) 131. 
124 Oswald (2009) 25. 
125 Williamson (2004) 4. 
126 See generally paras 69-75, UN Guidelines. 
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In kinship care, the relationship between the parties is generally mutually beneficial such that the children 
and their relatives provide mutual care and support for themselves.127 While the relatives are responsible 
for the care of the child, the child is also regarded as a source of physical and emotional support to the 
caregiver. 
For example, orphaned children and their grandparent caregivers rely on one another during a process of 
mourning. Children can also physically support grandparents by taking on the physically challenging 
household chores. In addition, children can later provide economic security for a grandparent as they 
increase in age.128  
Related to the above is the fact that since kinship care is based on family ties, the relationship lasts into 
adulthood and throughout life unlike other models of alternative care where the children become 
independent at 18 years and the relationships are dissolved. The continuity of kinship relations means that 
relatives can continually rely on one another for on-going support.129 In summing up the general benefits of 
kinship care, O’Brien notes that: 
… the outcomes for children in kinship care are generally seen as positive in terms of stability of placement, 
identity formation, maintaining contact with family, enabling siblings to live together, child protection, and 
greater tolerance by relatives for behavioural and mental health issues.130 
 
4.3.2 Challenges or Risks associated with Kinship Care 
The potential for abuse, as noted above, is one of the most obvious risks associated with kinship care. 
Despite the general positive outlook of kinship care, a kinship tie is not necessarily a guarantee that a child 
will receive adequate care and protection.131 There are cases of children in kinship care receiving less equal 
treatment in the household as compared to birth children in the same household in matters such as 
feeding, education and other aspects of care.132 Sometimes the child in kinship care is forced to serve as an 
                                                 
127 Oswald (2009) 25. 
128 Oswald (2009) 25. See also International HIV/AIDS Alliance & HelpAge International Building Blocks: Africa-wide briefing notes: 
Supporting older carers (2004) 4. 
129 Loudon M, ‘Implementing the UNGASS goals for orphans and other children made vulnerable by HIV/AIDS’, Eastern and 
Southern Africa Regional Workshop on Children Affected by HIV/AIDS, 25-29 November 2002; Windhoek, Namibia, 38 – cited in 
Oswald (2009) 25. 
130 O’Brien (2012) 129. 
131 Tolfree (2006) 15. 
132 Oswald (2009) 26; Broad (2007) 4-5; Tolfree (2006) 15. This is more so when children are placed with distant or previously 
unknown relatives or when the caregivers live in poverty. 
 
 
 
 
154 
 
unpaid domestic worker for the household.133 Where the child was removed from his original family 
environment due to a child protection concern, such as sexual exploitation or where the child is infected 
with HIV/AIDS, the child may be stigmatised and isolated.134 In the case of abuse, the child may be re-
exposed to abuse if the kin carer allows the perpetrator to have access to the child. This is possible because 
of the kinship bond between the perpetrator and the kin carer.135 There is also the risk of the child being 
similarly abused by the relative, especially in an informal kinship care situation where the matter is not 
brought to the attention of the relevant authorities or where (the) abuse is a ‘familial trait’.136 
Relative carers are often poor and have fewer resources than caregivers in other models, which impacts on 
the ability of the caregiver to adequately protect and provide for the child, hence the need for government 
or other external support.137 And in cases where the caregivers are uneducated, they are less likely to 
receive helpful services because of the informal nature of the arrangement and their lack of information 
and knowledge on how to access the welfare services.138  The lack of services may itself make relatives 
unwilling to care for children, leaving only the option of their being institutionalised or placed in foster 
care.139 The caregivers may also lack the requisite skills for properly parenting and communicating with the 
child, especially where the children suffer from behavioural and psychosocial issues or when the caregivers 
are too old to cope with the demands of raising children.140   
There is also the risk of children getting drawn into family conflict such as when decisions have to be made 
among several extended family members ‘over who should take care of the child, who has decision-making 
power, or the division of responsibilities for each family member.’141 Where siblings are involved, they may 
be separated among several family members in a bid to share the burden of responsibility among 
themselves. While this may seem a practical thing to do, it is not necessarily in the best interests of the 
                                                 
133 Cantwell N ‘The challenges of out-of-home care’ (2005) Early Childhood Matters 7. 
134 Oswald (2009) 26; Broad (2007) 4. 
135 Oswald (2009) 26. 
136 Oswald (2009) 26. See also ISS & International Reference Center for the Rights of Children Deprived of their 
Family (IRC) Fact sheet: A global policy for children and the family: Elaborating a lifelong plan: Kinship Care (2006) 1. 
137 Oswald (2009) 25; Broad (2007) 7. 
138 ISS & IRC (2006) 1. 
139 Oswald (2009) 26. 
140 Oswald (2009) 25; Broad (2007) 4. 
141 Oswald (2009) 26; Broad (2007) 5. 
 
 
 
 
155 
 
children who ought to be together.142 Besides, the reason for separating them may also be linked to the 
desire of each relative to benefit from a relative’s child as a labour resource.143   
The motives of kinship carers are not always altruistic. Apart from viewing the child as a labour resource, 
some relatives may also have their sights set on any property entitlement or inheritance of the child.144 And 
where the relationship between the kinship carer and the child’s parents is unhealthy, this may impact 
negatively on family reunification efforts.145 Reunification efforts may also be abandoned in cases where 
the carer ‘receives higher allowances than those available to parents.’146 Other negative motives include 
fear of being haunted by a deceased relative, getting registered for support benefits or having intentions of 
giving a kin’s female child as a wife to a friend, associate, or other relative.147  
In the face of the changed nature of many African societies due to factors such as rural-urban migration, 
changed economic systems, and the impact of HIV/AIDS among others, it is important to avoid idealising 
kinship care based on historical patterns. The fact is that in the face of various crises and chronic 
emergencies, many families can become ‘over-extended in their ability to care for additional children.’148 
There are cases of families that have lost an entire generation to HIV/AIDS such that there are very few 
relatives available to care for a significant number of orphans.149 As Loudon points out concerning Africa,  
We have to kill the myth of the capacity of the African extended family. This family has been over-extended 
for quite some time now, and is no longer the coping mechanism that communities in sub-Saharan Africa 
[once relied on].150  
Grandparents who usually take up kinship caring responsibilities ‘often suffer from health problems and 
because of their age, their time as caregivers is limited.’151 In effect, the children in such placements face 
the risk of deprivation again resulting in another cycle of alternative care seeking measures. These 
challenges represent cracks in the kinship care system which stakeholders seek to seal rather than debating 
                                                 
142 Para 17, UN Guidelines. 
143 Cantwell (2005) 7. 
144 Tolfree (2006) 15; Loudon (2002) 38 
145 Cantwell (2005) 7. 
146 Broad (2007) 5. 
147 Mann G Family Matters: The Care and Protection of Children Affected by HIV/AIDS in Malawi (2002) 29-31; Broad (2007) 5. 
148 Oswald (2009) 25. 
149 Oswald (2009) 25. 
150 Loudon (2002) 10 – as cited in Oswald (2009) 25. 
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as to whether kinship care is a suitable or an ideal system of care.152 Some of the problems associated with 
kinship care are attributable to fact that, in practice, kinship is not properly conceptualised within the 
framework of the right to alternative care, particularly when compared to foster care. What follows is a 
discussion on the relationship between kinship care and foster care with a guide as to how both should be 
understood within the alternative care framework, particularly with regards to kinship care’s interactions 
with the child protection system. 
 
4.4 The Relationship between Kinship Care and Foster Care  
In Chapter one of this study, child protection for purposes of this study is said to refer to formal responses 
or measures of intervention by the State to the abuse of children within the family or a domestic 
environment in order to protect the child from harm;153 usually by ensuring the separation of the child from 
that environment (and placing the child in the State protective custody or foster care).154 Foster care 
generally and traditionally refers to a temporary placement arrangement (usually with non-relatives of the 
child) for a period ranging from a few months to two years.155 The UN Guidelines define foster care as: 
situations where children are placed by a competent authority for the purpose of alternative care in the 
domestic environment of a family other than the children’s own family that has been selected, qualified, 
approved and supervised for providing such care.156  
The phrase ‘other than the child’s own family’ may be interpreted in two ways. First, it may simply refer to 
a domestic environment that does not include the child’s parents which would be a definition of family in 
the narrow sense of the UN Guidelines, as already alluded to.157 In that case, other relatives who are not 
the child’s parents may be his foster parents (relative foster care). The phrase may also be interpreted as a 
domestic environment comprising of people who are not biologically related to the child (non-relative 
foster care). However to the extent that, in defining kinship care (section 4.3 above), the UN Guidelines 
                                                 
152 Loudon (2002) 19. 
153 Harm here includes abuse, neglect, exploitation and all forms of violence against children. 
154 Doyle JJ ‘Child Protection and Child Outcomes: Measuring the Effects of Foster Care’ (2007) 97(5) American Economic Review 
1583. 
155 Doyle (2007) 1538. 
156 Para 29(c)(ii), UN Guidelines. 
157  See section 4.2.1 above. 
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contrast it to foster care by a particular reference to the ‘child’s extended family’; I argue that the latter 
interpretation is the intended one. This is more so because as subsequent discussions will show, issues 
around the requirements of ‘selection’, ‘qualification’, ‘approval’ and ‘supervision’ in relation to kinship 
care (or relative foster care) are not settled among scholars. Thus, the UN Guidelines arguably define foster 
care as it is traditionally understood: the (temporary) placement of a child with persons other than his 
parents and to whom he is biologically unrelated.158 Much of the controversy around the status of kinship 
care revolves around its interactions with the child protection system, particularly with regards to its 
relationship to foster care;159 hence the importance of understanding the Guidelines distinction between 
kinship care and foster care. A particular issue is around whether financial benefits should accrue to kinship 
carers and how this should be organised.160 (There is no controversy around financial payments for 
traditional foster care). 
It should be pointed out that this author cannot and does not attempt to supply answers to all the 
questions raised by these issues, particularly in the context of the ‘Western’ countries where the debates 
have been going on for years and continue to be in issue. Some of the countries that have played a leading 
role in these debates include Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the 
United States of America (USA).161 However, through an analysis of some of the provisions of the Guidelines 
in relation to the subject, I aim to provide some other perspectives that may contribute towards resolving 
                                                 
158 Williamson (2004) 12. 
159 Hegar & Scannapieco (1999) 5. 
160 Hegar & Scannapieco (1999) 6. 
161 See generally studies on the following countries : New Zealand: Connolly M Kinship care - A selected literature review (2003); 
Australia: Cashmore J ‘Kinship care: A differentiated and sensitive approach in developing practice’ (2001) Winter Developing 
Practice 5 & DCSNSW Out of home care service delivery mode: Out of home services (2007); The Netherlands: Portgengen R & Der 
Neut B ‘Assessing family strengths: A family systems approach’ in Greeff R (ed) Fostering kinship: An international perspective on 
kinship foster care (1999); Ireland: O'Brien V ‘Relative care: A different type of foster care - implications for practice’ in Kelly G & 
Gilligan R Issues in foster care: Policy, practice and research (2000); O’Brien V Assessment of the relative home. Care planning, 
assessment and decision making: Towards a Practice Model (2004); Northern Ireland: Lernihan U (2010) ‘Kinship Foster Care 
….Equal but different’, Presentation made to Queen’s university students, Commissioning Lead Adoption and Permanence Health 
and Social Care Board, 10 November, 2012;  Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety (DHSSPSNI) Standards for 
kinship foster carers in Northern Ireland Draft (2010); the United Kingdom: Pitcher D ‘Assessing grandparents carers: A framework’ 
in Broad B (ed) Kinship Care: The Placement Choice for Children and Young People (2001) 153; Talbot C & Calder M (eds) Assessment 
in kinship care (2006); Hunt J, Waterhouse S & Lutman E Keeping them in the family: Outcomes for children placed in kinship care 
through care proceedings (2008); Farmer E & Moyers S Kinship care: Fostering effective family and friends placements (2008); 
Department of Education Family and friends care: Statutory guidance in England (2010), at < 
https://www.education.gov.uk/publications/eOrderingDownload/Family%20and%20Friends%20Care.pdf >; and the United States 
of America: Scannapieco M & Hegar RL ‘A non-traditional assessment framework for formal kinship homes’ (1996) 75 Child Welfare 
567; Scannapieco M ‘Formal kinship care practice models’ in Hegar R & Scannapieco M (eds) Kinship Foster Care: Policy Practice and 
Research (1999) 71; Child Welfare League of America Standards of excellence for kinship care services (2000); Child Welfare League 
of America A tradition of caring: A guide for assessing families for kinship care (2003); Geen R (ed) Kinship care: Making the most of 
a valuable resource (2003). 
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some of the controversies, with a particular focus on Africa where the issues have only begun to be 
grappled with in recent years. 
 
4.4.1 The Relationship between Kinship Care and Foster Care: General Background 
Prior to the popularity of, and reliance on kinship care for children in need of State protection (in the 
‘West’), foster care had assumed great significance as the primary placement choice for alternative care, 
such that by the 1990s, there was a significant increase in the volume of literature on foster care.162 Over 
time however, the foster care system began to be faced with numerous challenges leading to its being 
declared to be in a crisis in many countries.163 Examples of the problems include: the rapid increase in the 
number of children in need of placement compared to the much smaller number of available foster carers 
resulting in matching difficulties; increasing employment rate of women; increase in emotional and 
behavioural problems of children which many foster carers were unable to deal with; and the waning 
popularity of traditional institutional care, among others.164 In addition, ‘Western’ nations began to pay 
attention to the role of the extended family in the child care practices of other minority racial groups and 
indigenous communities such as the African Americans in the USA and the aboriginal peoples in Australia 
and others.165 Thus, kinship care assumed significance as part of the spectrum of care placements ‘as a 
method of respecting the significance of cultural connection for indigenous persons and other minority 
groups.’166 
                                                 
162 Sellick C ‘From famine to feast: A review of the foster care research literature’ (2006) 20 Children & Society 67. 
163 Barber JG & Delfabbro PH Children in foster care (2004) 1. 
164 Hannon C, Wood C & Bazalgette L To deliver the best for looked after children, the state must be a confident parent… (2010); 
Pithouse A & Lowe K ‘Children in foster care with challenging behaviour in Wales (UK): Key themes and issues for practice and 
research’ (2008) 89 Families in Societies: The Journal of Contemporary Social Services 109; Sinclair I Fostering Now (2005); Wilson K, 
Sinclair I, Taylor C, Pithouse A & Sellick C Fostering success: An exploration of the research literature in foster care (2004). 
165 O’Brien (2012) 128; Atwool N ‘Children in Care: A report into the quality of services provided to children in care’, Office of the 
Children’s Commissioner (New Zealand), September 2010, 35, at < 
http://www.acya.org.nz/site_resources/library/Documents/Other_Resources/OCC_Children_in_Care_Report.pdf >; Ince (2009) 25. 
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159 
 
All these contributed significantly to the shift towards kinship care as a viable and preferred form of 
alternative care.167 However, the transition was neither smooth nor deliberately planned and integrated. 
Thus, ‘the growth of kinship care may have been ideologically driven in terms of family preservation rather 
than a focus on best outcomes.’168 In other words, the popularity of kinship care grew as a result of a 
scarcity of other options rather than as ‘a coherent, child-centred policy that prioritised or aimed at 
developing this care option.’169 Further, the lower levels of support available to kinship carers compared to 
higher levels support to traditional foster carers (mostly White families) led to a conclusion that kinship 
care (in the context of the USA) was a tool for the establishment of a ‘two-tiered and segregated’ child 
welfare system.170 In effect, there was no real commitment to kinship care as was the case with foster care; 
in fact, many practitioners viewed (and still view) kinship care with scepticism.171 Consequently, although 
legislation and policy on children’s care in many ‘Western’ countries provide for kinship care as a first 
choice placement, there are still uncertainties as to how it fits within the child welfare system.172 With 
regards to the generally accepted Western model of equating formal kinship care to traditional foster care, 
Kurtz notes that: 
…by accepting the formalization of kinship foster care, all participants unintentionally move to a point of 
greater risk in the face of state intervention. The parent assumes a greater risk of having parental rights 
terminated, the relative a greater risk of an agency decision to transfer the child, and the children a greater 
risk of losing family. Child welfare laws and policies fail to acknowledge that relationships, behaviour, and 
needs of all family members in kinship arrangements are likely to be different than when children reside in 
traditional foster care settings. The failure of the legal system and the child welfare system to recognize 
viable kinship networks which exist independent of foster care and the priority placed by both systems on a 
                                                 
167 O’Brien (2012) 128; Atwool (2010) 30. 
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Science Working Paper Series 26, 4, at < 
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172 See generally Doolan M & Nixon P ‘The importance of kinship care’ (2003) 25 Social Work Now 13; Connolly M ‘A kinship care 
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narrow conceptualization of permanency may in many cases gratuitously, or unnecessarily, result in the 
severance of significant family relationships from the lives of children, particularly poor children of colour.173 
Without attempting to idealise kinship care, the idea of kinship care not conforming to the standard of the 
ideal (nuclear) family may have been responsible for the initial reluctance of practitioners to address it 
distinctly (especially distinctly from foster care) by developing suitable strategies for ensuring that it is 
effectively integrated within the child welfare system. It would seem much easier and more convenient to 
graft kinship care on to the existing foster care system (either as an alternative to foster care or as a sub-
category of foster care). Perhaps this is also attributable to the fact that kinship care in most of these 
countries often applies to minority and indigenous groups within the larger society, unlike in Africa where 
the opposite is the case. Be that as it may, what is settled is the fact that kinship care as a preferred form of 
alternative care has become greatly intertwined with the foster care system, with each nation constantly 
devising and improving on strategies to regulate the relationship between both, especially within the child 
protection context. 
 
4.4.2 The Relationship between Kinship Care and Foster Care: African Context 
Although the traditional understanding of foster care as defined above (section 4.4) is not common in 
Africa, the concept of fostering or foster care is in itself not foreign. However, fostering as a concept is 
more or less the same as kinship care is broadly understood in Africa. Thus, fostering is itself rooted in the 
kinship tradition and structures discussed in the second chapter of this study – in essence, it finds its basis 
in the extended family network without necessarily contemplating ‘outsiders’ as is the case with foster care 
in the traditional ‘Western’ sense.174 However, in light of the fact that kinship care has in terms of law and 
policy, come to be understood within the framework of alternative care, it is important to highlight that 
there are other aspects of fostering in the traditional African understanding that are not necessarily linked 
to the alternative care system as is understood today. Kinship care was supplementary to, or practised 
alongside active parental care because certain other relatives had specific roles to play in transforming a 
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174 See section 2.2.2 of Chapter 2. 
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child into an adult. It did not necessarily involve the child leaving his parents’ home to go elsewhere, at 
least not for long. In the context of alternative care, kinship care was (and as is the case in contemporary 
law and policy) also understood to be the care option for orphans or other children whose parents are 
facing some crisis such as sickness, disability or loss of livelihood.  
Fostering on the other hand, and more broadly, was not necessarily practised in response to crises; it was 
rather an organised child care practice that included children from both poor and rich as well as stable and 
unstable families, and is today still practised in rural areas and between families based in rural areas and 
others in urban areas.175 Fostering in Africa traditionally refers to a family-focused form of child circulation 
within family networks, which is a ‘traditional feature of African family systems.’176 It is not considered to 
be an arrangement mainly for the child’s benefit but is viewed as a mutually beneficial exchange for both 
the child (and his parents) and the host care or family.177 
Thus, apart from crisis situations, fostering was relied upon for forging alliances or for apprenticeship. In 
such cases, children are sent as wards to the homes of relatives to learn a trade or to the homes of non-
relatives such as traditional or religious leaders, for the acquisition of traditional or religious training or 
instruction.178 Children are also fostered for domestic purposes. This includes the need to redistribute 
domestic services across related households, the need to maintain solidarity between related urban and 
rural households/families, the need to train children in certain domestic activities, and the need to provide 
emotional support to elderly or childless family members.179 Children are also sent for fostering for the 
purpose of acquiring formal education when opportunities and finances for the child’s parents to ensure 
                                                 
175 See generally Alber E, Martin J & Notermans C (eds) Child Fostering in West Africa: New Perspectives on Theory and Practices 
(2013) 1. See also Notermans C ‘The emotional world of kinship: Children’s experiences of fosterage in East Cameroon’ (2008) 15 
Childhood 355; Pilon M ‘Foster Care and schooling in West Africa: The State of Knowledge’, The UNESCO 2003 EFA Monitoring 
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http://portal.unesco.org/education/en/file_download.php/2f4f07f5fcb8cdce16506595637b2099schooling+in+West+africa.pdf > 
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176 Notermans (2008) 356; Pilon (2003) 28. 
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this are limited.180  Generally, the actual purpose and outcome would depend ‘on the nature of the 
relationship between the family of origin and the host family, and between the child and the host family.’181 
With reference to kinship care in contemporary understanding (in Africa and elsewhere), it was indicated in 
the introductory chapter of this study that a significant feature of the recent child law reform process in 
Africa is the inclusion of provisions on child protection, including the right to alternative care. However, the 
relevant instruments rarely include kinship care, and where kinship care is featured, its relationship with 
foster care is not clear. South Africa and Namibia are two of the very few countries where attempts are 
being made to grapple with kinship care issues in law and policy, hence the focus on these two countries in 
the next chapter of the study. To a certain extent, South Africa allows for the formalisation of informal 
(kinship) or extended family care, but links it to the foster care system which presents its own set of 
problems.182 These will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter, with the next section of this 
chapter providing a basis for making relevant recommendations for addressing some of the problems. 
  
4.5 Framework for Delineating Kinship Care Models and their Intersections with Foster Care 
in the Child Protection System 
This section presents a proposed framework for understanding and categorising different kinship care 
situations; with an attempt at suggesting how and to what extent each category may interact with the child 
protection system, with particular reference to the intersections between kinship care and foster care. The 
terminologies employed are not novel, they are rather based on a combination and/or reorganisation of 
the various ways in which kinship care has been sub-categorised or differently interpreted by several 
scholars. The framework may not only clarify some of the confusion involved in categorising kinship care 
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models, but may also serve as a baseline for organising or re-organising the kinship care system in its 
interactions with formal alternative care systems.183  
I am mindful of the fact that this attempt may not solve all the dilemmas associated with how kinship care 
generally interacts with the child protection system - particularly in the ‘West’ where the subject of kinship 
care within the context of the right to alternative care and child protection has been significantly 
researched upon. But for the context of Africa where the level of such research is comparably lower, it is 
hoped that the framework will serve as a basis for further engagements with the issues involved. In 
addition to the interpretations of other scholars, the framework also draws from the provisions of the UN 
Guidelines on State obligations towards informal care/kinship care as previously discussed.184  
An additional motivation for the approach I adopt is the fact that context needs to be taken into 
consideration; the reasons for children’s need for or placement in kinship care in Africa and in many 
‘Western’ countries may be significantly different. While further research is needed to ascertain and 
compare the actual reasons for care in both contexts, it is arguable that the extent to which HIV/AIDS and 
its attendant consequences has become a major trigger for alternative care is significantly different in both 
contexts. In the context of the USA for instance, abuse and neglect are major reasons for which children are 
removed from their parents’ home and placed in kinship care. The preference for kinship care over foster 
care is not only due to kinship care being the preferred or priority option, but is also due to the fact that 
many such children often have behavioural problems or conflicts with their parent(s). In addition, the 
parents ‘are more likely to have a drug or alcohol problem and are more likely to be young and never 
married.’185 While these are phenomena that run across the world, contextual differences do play a role in 
how children come into kinship care. They should also play a role in how kinship care as an alternative care 
model interacts with the formal child protection system and foster care, especially given the fact of 
resource constraints in most African countries, and the numbers involved. 
 
                                                 
183 A fourth model which is not included in the proposed framework is ‘kinship guardianship’ or ‘kinship adoption’ said by O’Brien 
to be an established form of kinship care in the United Kingdom: O’Brien (2012) 128. 
184 See section 4.2.3 above. 
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4.5.1 Private Kinship Care 
This refers to kinship care based on any private (extended) family arrangement on a temporary basis, with 
no State involvement or intervention whatsoever. The arrangement would usually be made in response to 
a crisis186 such as the loss of a parent’s job or source of income or a parent getting sick and becoming 
hospitalised. Private kinship care also includes voluntary family placements for fostering purposes in the 
traditional African understanding described earlier above.187 This scenario may therefore be viewed simply 
as a family environment not necessarily related to the right to alternative care in the child protection 
context.  
To conceive private kinship care otherwise or insist that it be somewhat formalised as alternative care may 
amount to a violation of the family’s right to privacy and autonomy. Further, the lack of State involvement 
in private kinship care translates to two things: the State plays no role in initiating or authorising the 
process; and the State ordinarily has no obligation to provide support and assistance to the family for the 
benefit of the child involved, that is, support related to or based on the fact of ‘alternative care’.188 This 
does not however affect State obligation to provide support and assistance to the family, if the family 
requires it for its sustenance as the fundamental unit of society.189  
It is important to be mindful of the fact that the situation of private kinship care may also change if for 
instance, a family crisis lingers or becomes indefinite such that the kinship carer can no longer cope and 
thereafter seeks State intervention. Private kinship care may in that case be transformed to ‘public informal 
kinship care’ as discussed below. What is important to note about private kinship care is that the reason for 
care did not result from a child protection issue such as abuse, neglect, violence or exploitation, but 
generally from an unforeseen (temporary) crisis situation or other voluntary purpose for the benefit of the 
child and the families or carers involved. 
                                                 
186 O’Brien (2012) 128. 
187 Sec 4.4.2 above. 
188 This is because parental responsibility subsists on the relatives who privately and voluntarily undertake to care for the child as 
provided in Article 5 of the CRC. However, this approach to private kinship care does not in any way affect other forms of support 
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189 See generally section 2.4 of the discussions in Chapter 2. 
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4.5.2 Informal Kinship Care 
According to O’Brien, informal kinship care is based on a private family arrangement in response to a child 
protection issue, which is subsequently endorsed by State intervention.190 In other words, relatives take in 
the child who was the subject of a child protection issue in his original family environment, and upon 
notifying or involving the relevant authorities, the State officially approves of the child’s placement with the 
kinship carer(s) concerned. A limited level of support and assistance (as compared to formal kinship care) 
will be provided by the State.191  
In addition to the above however, it is my position that informal kinship care need not be a placement in 
response to child protection issues only, as there are certain crisis situations that force relatives to assume 
the care of children of their kin, which they would not have done voluntarily if the situation did not arise. 
Particular examples in the African context include the death of a child’s parent(s) or a life-threatening 
disease such as AIDS. This is especially the case with many grandparents who are caring for their 
grandchildren in Southern Africa. In such cases, relevant authorities are notified not necessarily because 
the relatives do not want to take responsibility for caring for the children, but more because they are 
unable to bear the cost of raising the children unassisted. 
Consequently, the focus of State support and assistance in the case of informal kinship care will mainly be 
on ensuring an adequate standard of living for the child and the kinship carer as well as measures to 
support the child in addressing or coping with the effects of the reason for care. However, the kinship carer 
and family environment need not be subjected to an assessment of their suitability for the child or 
continuous supervision, as is the case with formal kinship care and foster care. This approach can be 
justified by the fact that the kinship home existed and was functioning as an alternative care placement 
prior to State intervention.192  
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The emphasis is not on requiring kinship carers to notify the authorities of their role (for formalisation 
purposes). Rather it should be on the need to offer adequate support and services to such carers who 
require them to properly discharge their care responsibilities. This approach will in itself serve ‘as an active 
encouragement to voluntary registration’ in order to access such services, since they are usually 
unavailable in the absence of some form of notification or registration.193 Since many kinship or informal 
carers are themselves usually quite poor, this approach is more attractive and practical, not only for easing 
the financial, material and psychological burdens of the carers but more importantly, for potentially 
improving the overall conditions of the children in their care.194 Thus, ‘informal care could occur throughout 
the entire continuum *of care+ without a formal recognition of that relationship.’195 
Two key things to note about informal kinship care: it is generally not initiated by the State but may be 
subsequently endorsed or approved (not ‘formalised’) by the State; the kinship carer will generally not be 
subject to ‘suitability’ and monitoring requirements similar to what is applicable to foster care. 
 
4.5.3 Formal Kinship Care  
Formal kinship care refers to a placement with relatives initiated by the State for a child in State care or 
custody, resulting from a child protection issue. ‘It usually involves an assessment of the suitability of the 
family’, and requires the provision of support and assistance as well as regular monitoring and supervision. 
The assessment is usually based on foster care regulations, hence the designation of formal kinship care in 
some literature as ‘kinship foster care’.196 Thus, the formalisation of kinship care ‘includes screening 
relatives for placement, training caregivers and on-going monitoring of the child’s well-being.’197 In this 
case, support and assistance are targeted not only at the child, but are also targeted at the family to ensure 
that the family is properly equipped to care for the child in accordance with clearly spelt out regulations.  
                                                 
193 Cantwell et al (2012) 77. 
194 Cantwell et al (2012) 77. A best practice example of this found in New Zealand is highlighted in the handbook (77) with full 
details available in A Framework of Practice for Implementing a Kinship Care Program at < www.bensoc.org.au >. 
195 Roby (2011) 28. 
196 Cantwell & Holzscheiter (2008) 37. 
197 Oswald (2009) 27. 
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Unlike private kinship care and informal kinship care, the State is generally the initiator of the placement 
process in the case of formal kinship care. Usually, the child would have been in State custody ab initio. An 
example would be a case of abuse or violence against the child noted by a social worker who sets the child 
protection process in motion. In this scenario, kinship care is considered and ordered as the first or 
preferred placement choice for the child upon the determination of the matter. 
A comparison between informal kinship care and formal kinship care shows that the latter is that which is 
most akin to traditional foster care, and as such is the one which generally intersects with the foster care 
system. This raises questions concerning the relationship between foster care and kinship care. For 
example, does the formalisation of kinship care (‘kinship foster care’) mean that formal kinship care is 
subject to the exact same regulations as traditional foster care?198 While some authors are of the view that 
the answer to this question is in the affirmative,199 in actual practice, the answer is not that straight-
forward. A recurring debate borders on whether kinship care is fundamentally different from traditional 
foster care or if both are analogous, upon the formalisation of the former.200 In most cases, child welfare 
services deal with kinship care by locating it within the foster care system, and this raises a number of 
challenges ranging from placement criteria to assessment measures.201 
 Some of the criteria for the approval of foster homes include standards around ‘housing, finances, family 
composition, family history, relationships, attitudes about parenting and a variety of other factors.’202 As it 
applies to housing for example, there are regulations as to the amount of space available and rules about 
sharing or not sharing rooms. Many kinship caregivers are not able to meet up to these high standards 
often prompting demands that some be waived, reviewed or adapted for kinship caregivers.203 It can be 
argued that ‘formalisation’ does not necessarily refer to any rigid procedure or process which other forms 
of alternative care such as foster care and adoption usually require, but can include any simple procedure 
                                                 
198 Hegar & Scannapieco (1999) 6. 
199 Broad (2007) 2. 
200 O’Brien (2012) 133; Hegar & Scannapieco (1999) 6. 
201 Hegar & Scannapieco (1999) 5. Further questions are raised mainly around how formal kinship care should be differentiated 
from informal kinship care in policy and practice, especially considering that most studies conducted on kinship care focused on 
formal kinship care. It is hoped that my outline above can contribute towards efforts at making such distinction between both. 
202 Hegar & Scannapieco (1999) 6. 
203 See Scannapieco M & Hegar RL ‘Kinship care providers: Providing an array of supportive services’ (2002) 19(4) Child and 
Adolescent Social Work Journal 315. 
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by which the children and caregivers in kinship care arrangements are known to, accountable to, and 
accounted for by the State. These issues are raised against the background of the fact that the approaches 
to assessment (covering issues of selection, criteria, certification, supervision, payment, reunification 
efforts and permanency plans) determine eligibility for funding support applicable to traditional foster care 
and not to kinship care that does not conform to the foster care standards.204  
While these are difficult issues to answer conclusively, some guidance can be obtained from the UN 
Guidelines general standards for organising kinship care. For instance, where a child is placed with relatives 
who were previously unknown to the child and whose home is away from the child’s habitual place of 
residence,205 in my view, it would be prudent to subject such formal kinship care to the same standards as 
traditional foster care, at least in the early stages. It is also important to keep in mind the fact that, the 
generally higher payments applicable to foster care and kinship foster care or formal kinship care (as the 
case may be) are also meant to ensure that the carers are able to meet the high standards that regulations 
demand for the care of the child. Another suggestion would be that where it is decided that formal kinship 
care should operate under the same conditions as traditional foster care, the kinship placement should 
similarly be conceived as ‘temporary’ (maximum of two years) with clear family reunification or 
permanency plans in place. As such, the additional investment into formal kinship care (and foster care) can 
be justified for those purposes. 
For now, on the subject of the relationship between kinship care and the child protection system, it suffices 
to highlight that only when kinship care “is ordered *formal kinship care+ or subsequently officialized 
*informal kinship care+ by a competent authority does it qualify as ‘alternative care’”.206 However, based on 
the proposed framework for classifying kinship care presented above, certain points can be established. 
First, the nature of the relationship between formal kinship care and traditional foster care may remain 
difficult to agree upon. This is more so in the absence of further broad based research to determine the 
effects of subjecting both to generally the same regulatory standards as is the case in the countries where 
                                                 
204 Scannapieco & Hegar (2002) 315; Hegar & Scannapieco (1999) 5-7. 
205 Para 79, UN Guidelines. 
206 Cantwell & Holzscheiter (2008) 37. 
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this is common. This study will attempt to provide recommendations as to how this can be addressed in the 
African context, particularly the countries of focus in the study.  
Second, on the basis of the distinctions made between formal kinship care and informal kinship care, which 
is the most common form of kinship care, informal kinship care should be clearly separated from the foster 
care system in the child protection context. This will relieve States of the heavy cost and time implications 
of having to take all kinship care situations through the formal child protection system. However, keeping 
informal kinship care out of the formal child protection system does not mean that some form of 
monitoring should not be put in place for it – since informal kinship care carries greater ‘greater risks of 
child maltreatment, child labour, child sexual exploitation and other forms of abuse, neglect, or 
exploitation.’207 Rather, methods of administering the process which do not place an undue burden on the 
limited resources of time, finances and personnel of State child protection systems will have to be 
considered. 
 
4.6 Conclusions 
This chapter has provided a more detailed discussion on issues around kinship care as an alternative care 
option. The analysis of the UN Guidelines provided in the chapter reveals that the CRC and the ACRWC 
cannot be interpreted or implemented in isolation from the Guidelines provided therein, although they are 
non-legally binding. The UN Guidelines serve as a supplementary instrument to the binding legal 
instruments and their acceptance and promotion by the Human Rights Council, the UN General Assembly 
and the CRC Committee reveal the support they enjoy as tools in advancing the rights and protection of 
children deprived of a family environment.  
Apart from filling the implementation gaps in the CRC and the ACRWC, the UN Guidelines further develop 
the concept of alternative care both in form and content. Of significant note is the development of the two 
fundamental principles relevant for the appropriate implementation of the right to alternative care: that 
                                                 
207 Oswald (2009) 27. 
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children should not be placed in alternative care unnecessarily (the necessity principle), and where 
alternative care placement becomes necessary, the care option provided must be appropriate or suitable 
for the child’s specific needs (the suitability principle). Other important contributions of the Guidelines 
include the prohibition of residential care for children less than three years and the prioritisation of the 
goal of de-institutionalisation. 
Further, the advent of the UN Guidelines has resulted in a re-examination of the all-too-simple approach of 
institutionalising children without parental care resulting in a revolution in the way that institutional or 
residential care is viewed and practiced. There is now a shift towards family-based, family-like or family-
type forms of care for children deprived of a family environment in order to safeguard their best interests. 
This is premised upon research outcomes which continue to attest to the fact that a family environment is 
important for the harmonious growth and development of the child.  
With reference to the transition of kinship care from a family environment to an alternative care model, 
four points have been made so far. First, the Guidelines formally recognise kinship care in international law 
and reconceptualise it as alternative care by effectively changing or modifying the standard for activating 
the right to alternative. This is achieved by narrowing the CRC and ACRWC’s conceptualisation of ‘family 
environment’ to a more ‘parental care’ focus. The diversification and increasingly complexity of most 
African societies in terms of family and child care practises, among others, provide some justification for 
this shift. 
Secondly, although clear provisions are made for both formal and informal models of alternative care, both 
are not held to same standards in terms of policies and regulations. There is however no compromise on 
the need to ensure that all child in need of alternative are protected, regardless of what model of 
alternative care is provided because clear guidelines are established for the organisation of informal care 
and the protection of the best interests of the children involved. Abiding by the Guidelines has the 
potential to ensure that the acknowledgment of the reality of informal care for the majority of children 
without parental care will result in the optimal protection of all children concerned and not just those who 
come into contact with State-established structures of child protection. 
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Thirdly, the chapter showed that regardless of what model of kinship care is in place, there are certain 
challenges and benefits associated with kinship care generally. These do not however diminish the 
importance of kinship care; rather, they provide room for further engagement with the issues involved in 
order to derive means of addressing them. Ultimately, the goal is to secure adequate protection and 
support for children in kinship care especially since kinship care, where available, has become established 
as the placement option of choice all across the world. 
Fourthly, by presenting a discussion on the relationship between kinship care and foster care, the chapter 
was able to result in a proposed framework for delineating models of kinship care while providing 
suggestions as to how the intersections between kinship care and foster care can be managed within the 
framework of the child protection system. The most significant of these is an understanding of State 
obligation towards kinship care, with reference to financial and other measures of assistance and support. 
On the basis of the context and framework provided in this chapter, the next chapter will attempt to 
address some of the issues raised around kinship care and the right to alternative care generally within the 
context of South Africa and Namibia. The starting point will be to identify to what extent kinship care is 
provided for in the domestic framework of the countries concerned and its relationship with foster care. By 
engaging with these issues, best practice examples can be drawn that will be of relevance to other 
countries on the continent that are grappling with responding to kinship care in law, policy and practice. 
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CHAPTER FIVE – THE STATUS OF KINSHIP CARE IN DOMESTIC LEGISLATION AND 
LINKAGES WITH SOCIAL ASSISTANCE PROVISIONING 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The overview of the international legal and policy framework for children’s right to alternative care (the 
CRC, the ACRWC, and the UN Guidelines) as presented in chapters three and four serve as a backdrop for 
the on-going child law reform initiatives in several African countries.1 This chapter seeks to examine the 
status of kinship care in the domestic law and policy of South Africa and Namibia, in comparison to the 
status of foster care. In other words, it seeks to determine whether or not, and to what extent if at all, 
kinship care is incorporated in the domestic legal and policy framework.  The recognition or lack of 
recognition of kinship care, as previously discussed, has both practical and legal implications for the 
realisation of the right to alternative care in terms of the options available for consideration and the 
processes involved in securing placements, among others.2  This is viewed against the background of the 
fact that, as indicated in the introduction to this study, the bulk of children in alternative care are in kinship 
care.3   
It will be contended that the uncertainties around kinship care have impacted on how kinship care has 
been or is being addressed in the child law reform processes in South Africa and Namibia, and in Africa 
generally. It is evident that kinship care has not received as much thought and attention as foster care in 
terms of domestic provisions on the right to alternative care, and in terms of its interactions with the child 
protection system. For example, within the last decade in South Africa alone, the number of children in 
formal foster care has increased by more than a thousand per cent.4 
Subsequent to this introductory section, the chapter shall proceed to explore generally the legal and policy 
developments and provisions on the right to alternative care in South Africa and Namibia beginning with 
constitutional provisions and provisions in their major child-specific instruments. This will include a 
                                                 
1 Articles 4 of the CRC and 1 of the ACRWC provide the legal basis for the child law reform process by placing an obligation on 
States to put in place legislative and other measures to appropriately implement all children’s rights. 
2 African Child Policy Forum (ACPF) Africa: The new frontier for intercountry adoption (2012) 3. 
3 Chapter One, section 1.3. 
4 See discussions in section 5.4. 
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discussion on some of the cases that have been decided by the courts which have contributed to the 
development of jurisprudence on the right to alternative care generally. 
 Further, the chapter will examine the existing measures of State support for alternative care generally and 
kinship care in particular, again with a focus on how measures targeted at kinship care compare with those 
targeted at foster care, and the intersections or linkages between both. This will include an examination of 
the measures taken or being contemplated for addressing the challenges and controversies arising from the 
issues of recognition, regulation and support of kinship care. Comparisons and recommendations will also 
be made based on the framework presented in the previous chapter on how kinship care can be organised 
in law and policy to ensure that the attendant challenges are meaningfully dealt with. 
With regards to the domestication of children’s rights generally, States are required to harmonise their 
national laws with the standards or stipulations of the CRC and the ACRWC.5 The harmonisation of national 
laws is an on-going process that paves the way for reviews of numerous outdated legislation scattered in 
several statutes (some subsisting from the colonial era).6 In the absence of law reform/harmonisation, the 
development of children’s rights, including the right to alternative care, will continue to be threatened by 
the existence of and reliance on obsolete legislation in many countries in the region.7 
Domestication refers to the process(es) by which States give effect to their international law obligations 
within their domestic jurisdictions. In order to give effect to the provisions above, countries adopt varying 
approaches in their child law reform process ranging from the inclusion of children’s rights in the 
constitution to amending existing children’s rights statutes in accordance with international standards, and 
the enactment of comprehensive child-specific statutes. Both South African and Namibia provide for 
                                                 
5 See arts 4 CRC & 1(1) ACRWC. 
6 The process of harmonising laws at the domestic level to conform to internationally agreed standards is indeed an on-going one 
rather than a once-off event from the date of ratification. See Doek J In the Best Interests of the Child, Harmonisation of National 
Laws with the Convention on the Rights of the Child: Some Observations and Suggestions (2007) 5. See also Sloth-Nielsen (2012 – ed 
Freeman) 120; Sloth-Nielsen J ‘A Developing Dialogue. Children’s Rights, Children’s Laws and Economics: Surveying Experiences 
from Southern and Eastern African Law Reform Processes’ (2008) 12 Electronic Journal of Comparative Law 12 < 
http://www.ejcl.org/123/art123-5.pdf >. Since the region has a history of several differing legal systems, the harmonisation process 
is an attempt ‘to synthesize common law, civil and customary laws, and to modernise and codify a myriad of outdated statutes 
affecting children that were inherited from the colonial era’. 
7 Mezmur (2009) 82; Sloth-Nielsen (2008) 1. 
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children’s rights in their constitutions and also have dedicated child-specific legislation in place for 
addressing matters affecting children.  
It has been argued that the constitutionalisation of children’s rights has the advantage of providing a 
platform for policy development and ensuring a more permanent basis for those rights since constitutions 
usually remain unchanged for longer periods of time.8 Further, the CRC Committee has observed as follows: 
Some States have suggested to the Committee that the inclusion in their Constitution of guarantees of rights 
for “everyone” is adequate to ensure respect for these rights for children.  The test must be whether the 
applicable rights are truly realized for children and can be directly invoked before the courts. The Committee 
welcomes the inclusion of sections on the rights of the child in national constitutions, reflecting key principles 
in the Convention, which helps to underline the key message of the Convention - that children alongside 
adults are holders of human rights.9 
From the above, it is clear that the CRC Committee does not consider it sufficient to have children’s rights 
placed under the ‘Directive Principles of State Policy’ section of many constitutions. These principles are 
usually aspirational objectives that are not enforceable via judicial action. In some cases, they are linked to 
socio-economic rights which are meant to be achieved progressively.10 The effect of this is that some of the 
familial rights relevant to the family and alternative care as discussed in Chapter two of this study may be 
jeopardised especially in the absence of political will. Consequently, in undertaking constitutional reforms, 
the growing practice is for States to include dedicated sections or articles on children’s rights in their 
constitutions besides other civil-political and socio-economic rights that are applicable to ‘everyone’, 
including children.11 To date, there are about 40 African constitutions which distinctly feature children’s 
rights in one form or the other.12 The inclusion of children’s rights in national constitutions, being the 
supreme law of the land, shows that premium is placed on children’s rights. Further, apart from serving as a 
                                                 
8 Duncan B Constitutional Reforms in Favor of Children (2008) 59. 
9 CRC Committee GC 5 (2003) para 21. 
10 UNICEF (Eastern and Southern Africa Regional Office – ESARO) Lessons learnt in child law reform in Eastern and Southern Africa 
(draft 2013) 8; prepared by the Children’s Rights Project, Community Law centre, University of the Western Cape – copy on file with 
author. 
11 UNICEF ESARO (2012) 8. 
12 Sloth-Nielsen J ‘Domestication of Children’s Rights in National Legal Systems in African Context’ in Sloth-Nielsen (2008) 57. The 
most recent of these constitutions include the constitutions of Zimbabwe (2013) Angola (2012), Kenya (2010) South Sudan (2010), 
Democratic Republic of Congo (2006) and Burundi (2005). 
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policy development platform, it strengthens judicial enforcement at both the domestic and (sub) regional 
levels.13  
While it remains important to include children’s rights in national constitutions, the enactment of separate 
and distinct legislation on children’s rights makes for an efficient harmonisation process.14  The CRC and the 
ACRWC, being subjects of international law means that their mode of acceptance and implementation 
within domestic jurisdictions will depend on the legal system of any particular country in question. There 
are generally two means by which international law is translated to domestic law: monism and dualism.15  
Under the monist approach, the ratification of the CRC and the ACRWC automatically equates to the 
incorporation of these instruments into domestic law, with immediate effect, that is, no other process is 
required to translate the CRC and the ACRWC into national law.16 On the other hand, the dualist approach 
requires a formal domestication process by which the international legislation (CRC and ACRWC) has to be 
transformed into national law before it can take effect or be applied within the domestic jurisdiction.17 The 
formal process is usually by an Act of Parliament or ‘where enactment has not yet taken place - through 
jurisprudence.’18    
The legal effect of dualism is that only after a formal process of the incorporation of international law into 
domestic law, does such law ‘create rights and obligations enforceable by domestic courts.’19 South Africa 
and Namibia (as is the case in many other Southern African countries) are largely dualist in the 
incorporation of international law into domestic legislation.20 This explains the enactment of separate 
domestic legislation on the rights affecting children, including the right to alternative care, the inclusion of 
                                                 
13 UNICEF ESARO (2012) 9. 
14 ACPF (2012) 4. 
15  Dugard J International law: A South African perspective (2011) 50. See also Nowak M Introduction to the International Human 
Rights Regime (2003) 36. 
16 Dugard (2011) 50; Nowak (2003) 36. 
17 Dugard (2011) 50; Nowak (2003) 36 
18 Phillips (2011) 180. Namibia and South Africa are some of the states where incorporation can be achieved by the jurisprudence of 
the courts where domestic enactment is yet to be in place although ratification has been done. 
19 Dinokopila B R ‘The Prosecution and Punishment of International Crimes in Botswana’ (2009) 7 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 1078. 
20 See Dugard (2011) 47-64 for a discourse on ‘the place of international law in South African municipal law’ which analyses the 
position during the apartheid era and after 1994, the beginning of a democratic dispensation. 
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which is a new development in some national legislation.21 Highlighting the importance of enacting specific 
legislation for children as a critical component of the child law reform process, Sloth-Nielsen notes as 
follows: 
The review of legislation that preceded the adoption of the Kenyan Children’s Act 2010 revealed the 
existence of more than 61 statutes affecting children, which the new law consolidated and modernized. The 
Children’s Act 38 of 2005 of South Africa repealed at least six discrete statues dealing with children’s status 
and welfare. The Law of the Child of Tanzania of 2009 repealed a number of previous enactments, and the 
Child Rights Act of Nigeria of 2003, in a similar vein, followed the Children and Young Persons Act of 1943, 
which was revised in 1958… The Namibia draft Child Care and Protection Act 2011 will … fundamentally 
replace the Children’s Act of 1960, imported from South Africa before independence in 1990. The Lesotho 
(Child Welfare and Protection) Act finalized in 2010 has abrogated the colonial law which forbade the 
adoption of Basotho children by their own citizens of the country, privileging adoption for Europeans only.22   
 
5.2 The Right to Alternative Care: Constitutional Provisions 
5.2.1 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996) 
The Constitution of South Africa is one of the few African constitutions with a dedicated section on 
children’s rights. Thus, Section 28 of the Constitution has been described as a ‘mini-charter’ of children’s 
rights covering a range of issues, and including both civil and political as well as economic, social and 
cultural rights.23 The inclusion of children’s rights in the constitution was influenced by the ratification of 
the CRC in 1995, coupled with the concerted efforts of numerous child rights activists and organisations.24 
On the right to alternative care, Section 28 provides that every child has the right ‘to family care or parental 
care, or to appropriate alternative care when removed from the family environment’.25 Thus, a child’s 
                                                 
21 With reference to the place of international law in South Africa however, ‘Rosa and Dutschke argue that a binding international 
instrument like the CRC should be directly applicable in any court case involving an interpretation of children’s rights. *Thus] Taking 
this argument further, if the text of a right in the Constitution has its roots in an international human rights instrument, the courts 
should consider that international law as highly persuasive. [Indeed] The South African courts have frequently relied on the CRC 
and other international and regional instruments.’ See Rosa S & Dutschke M ‘Child Rights at the Core: The Use of International Law 
in South African Cases on Children’s Socio-Economic Rights’ (2006) 2 South African Journal on Human Rights 244. See also Rosa S & 
Dutschke M ‘Child Rights at the Core: A commentary on the use of international law in South African court cases on children’s 
socio-economic rights’ (2006) A Project 28 Working Paper, May 2006. 
22 Sloth-Nielsen (2012 – ed Freeman) 120. 
23 Gallinetti J Getting to know the Child Justice Act (2009) 10; Skelton A ‘Children’ in Currie I & de Waal J The Bill of Rights Handbook 
(2013) 599; Proudlock P ‘Children’s socio-economic rights’ in Boezart T (ed) Child law in South Africa (2009) 293.  
24 Skelton A & Proudlock P ‘Interpretation, objects, application and implementation of the Children’s Act’ in Davel CJ & Skelton A 
(eds) Commentary on the Children’s Act (Revision Service 2, 2010) 1-9. Citing the Technical Committee on Fundamental Rights First 
Progress Report of 14 May 1993, 4, they point out that “the children’s section started off as one line providing for ‘the right of 
children not to be subject to neglect, abuse or forced labour’.” See also Proudlock (2009) 293. 
25 See sec 28(1)(b). 
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family is interpreted broadly to include relatives other than the parents as envisaged by the CRC and 
ACRWC. That is, the right to alternative care cannot be activated while there are other members of a child’s 
family other than the parents who can be responsible for the care of the child. In other words, a child’s 
right to care operates against its family in the broad sense (that is, including the extended family), and not 
only against its parents.26 As further discussions will however show, this is not the practice in South Africa, 
especially with regards to social assistance measures for children in kinship care. Changes in family 
structures and socio-economic conditions as discussed in previous chapters have resulted in a shift towards 
the UN Guidelines approach or standard for activating the right to alternative care. 
The child’s right to family or parental care in Section 28 is said to broadly entail a number of possible 
entitlements for a child. The first entitlement is the provision of care by the parents/family, or alternatively 
the State.27 Parents or the State generally fulfil this duty of care by providing the child with the material 
elements envisaged in the child’s right to ‘basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and social 
services’,28 and the right ‘to be protected from maltreatment, neglect, abuse or degradation’.29 Where 
parental or family care is lacking to secure these rights for the child, the State’s duty to protect the rights of 
the child is triggered.30   
The second is non-interference (by the State) with family or parental care, in recognition of the primary 
duty of parents and families to care for a child. This places an obligation on the State to respect and not 
unjustifiably interfere with existing parent-child (or caregiver-child) relationship within a family 
                                                 
26 Skelton (2013) 605-606; Skelton A ‘Constitutional protection of children’ rights’ in Boezart T (ed) Child law in South Africa (2009) 
286. Sec 28(1)(b) was originally drafted as the ‘right to parental care’ (excluding ‘family care’) in South Africa’s interim constitution 
of 1993 (sec 30(1)(b)). See Dugard (2011) 60. 
27 Matthias C & Zaal N, ‘The Child in Need of Care and Protection’ in Boezart T (ed) Child Law in South Africa (2009) 163. With 
reference to alternative care, the State’s obligation care arises not only in cases where a child is orphaned but in other 
circumstances such as where a child’s familial environment and circumstances are inappropriate for or detrimental to the child’s 
growth and developmental needs. 
28 Sec 28(1)(c). See also Skelton (2009) 286. 
29 Sec 28(1)(d). See also Skelton (2009) 286. In the case of Jooste v Botha, the Court found that the provision of care does not 
envisage the enforcement of the impossible that is, the drafters of the Constitution could not have intended to impose an 
obligation to love, cherish, recognise or show interest in a child on a parent, as such an obligation cannot be enforced and there is 
no remedy for its violation. These are intangible elements for which no legal obligation exists although it is naturally expected that 
they flow from parents to their children. Jooste v Botha [2000] 2 BCLR 187 (T) 189H. To this writer, this position is right in view of 
the discussion on what amounts to ‘care’ and ‘alternative care’ in section 3.6.5 of chapter three, the lack of which can lead to a 
claim for compensation whether in a child’s original family environment or in alternative care. To argue otherwise would be to 
negate the role of the State in safeguarding the care and protection of the child even while within parental or family care against 
the background of the fact that the State plays a fiduciary role as the overall guardian of children whether or not they have parents 
or families in the first place. See the discussion in part 3.6.3 of chapter three of this study. 
30 Skelton (2013) 607; Skelton (2009) 286.  
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environment.31 The duty of the State to intervene in favour of the child where parents are unable to fulfil 
their obligations, with particular reference to the provision of alternative care, has been highlighted in the 
case of Centre for Child Law v MEC for Education, Gauteng.32 It was held further that the State has a direct 
duty to provide for the socio-economic needs of children who have been removed from the care of their 
parents or families.33 
Finally, and related to the second is an entitlement to respect for the institution of family. The South 
African Constitution does not provide expressly for the ‘right to family life’ as contained in several 
international instruments.34 This was deliberate to ‘allow for flexibility in the recognition of different family 
forms in a diverse society.’35 Thus, the family environment, regardless of its form is considered to be the 
preferable context for the care of the child, and caution must be exercised in any attempt at removing a 
child from his family and placing him in alternative care.36     
In Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom & Others (Grootboom case),37 the court noted 
that the child’s right to parental or alternative care (Section 28(1)(b) must be read together with the right 
to the provision of ‘basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and social services’.38 Among others, 
the court had to decide on the enforcement of children’s right to children’s rights to shelter, basic nutrition 
and health care (all components of the right to alternative care) as provided for in Section 28(1)(c) of the 
                                                 
31 Skelton (2009) 285; Skelton (2013) 607:  
However, the Children’s Act intends that the mere fact that a child is found to be in need of care should not necessarily mean that 
she should be removed from her family. Instead, mechanisms which aim to maintain the family unit and to support the child within 
the family should be implemented. Removal should only happen where it is appropriate.  
32 2008 (1) SA 223 (T) (Luckhoff case). Murphy J stated that the responsibility ‘to provide care and social services to children 
removed from the family environment rests upon the state’, and the state ‘must provide appropriate facilities and meet the 
children’s basic needs’ (para 227). 
33 The Luckhoff case concerned the poor conditions of care under which children were placed at JW Luckhoff High School pursuant 
to sec 15(1)(d) of the old Child care Act on the residential placement of children who have been separated from parental/family 
care. 
34 Examples include the recognition of the family as the basic unit of society relevant for the proper growth and harmonious 
development of the child as provided in the preambles to the CRC and the ACRWC among others. 
35 Skelton (2013) 604: ‘the right is indirectly protected via the right to dignity’. See also Skelton (2009) 278 where she points out 
that reference to ‘right to family life’ has however been made in several cases, and it is usually interpreted progressively. This 
accords with the position in international law as discussed previously in section 3.6.1 of Chapter Three. Skelton notes that the right 
to family life ‘places a duty on the parents and family of children to provide care and, by implication, also places a duty on the state 
to support the institution of the family. The correlative of the duty is the child’s right to parental care. Parents cannot derive any 
rights from the section.’ 
36 Kruger H, ‘Children in Need of Care and the Children’s Act 38 of 2005’ (2009) 23 Speculum Juris 34. See also Skelton (2013) 605-
607. 
37 2000 11 BCLR 1169 (CC); 2001 1 SA 46 (CC). 
38 This point highlights the relationship between the obligation of the family and of the State to ensure an adequate standard of 
living for the child whether parental/family care or alternative care, as discussed in Chapter two of this study, section 2.4.4. 
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constitution. The case laid the foundation for what has become known as the ‘reasonableness test’ in socio-
economic rights litigation; the test is determined by the exclusion of ‘a significant segment of society’ 
whose needs are most urgent and who are most unable to enjoy the rights in question without assistance.39 
The decision of the court has been criticised for several reasons including placing internal limitations on the 
realisation of children’s socio-economic rights in the same manner as the rights of adults.40 However the 
court held that Section 28(1)(c) places an obligation on the State with regards to children lacking parental 
or family care.41 This position appears anomalous as it appears to negate the obligation of the State to 
protect and provide for children even while under the care of parents, particularly when the parents are 
unable to properly care for them.42 
 
5.2.2 Constitution of the Republic of Namibia (1990) 
The Namibian Constitution dedicates its Section 15 to the protection of children’s rights, providing among 
others that: 
                                                 
39 Grootboom case, paras 43-44. The ‘reasonableness test or standard’ has been shown to be in many ways similar or at least 
related to the ‘minimum core’ approach developed by the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, an approach 
which was rejected by the court in favour of the ‘reasonableness approach’. See Mbazira C Litigating socio-economic rights in South 
Africa (2009) 61-72. 
40 The court held that giving immediate priority to the rights of children meant that children would be used as ‘stepping stones’ for 
adults to benefit from rights to which they were ordinarily not entitled. According to the court, this was not the intention of the 
constitution since the children’s socio-economic rights obligations are placed first on adults (their parents). In effect, the court 
failed to recognise children as distinct and independent from their parents, particularly with regards to the enjoyment of socio-
economic rights. Other criticisms of the judgment include the rejection of the ‘minimum core approach’ to socio-economic rights 
litigation, failure to give content to socio-economic rights (including those directed at children), non-interrogation of budgetary 
allocations to rights realisation and of the means chosen to give effect to rights. See Mbazira (2009) 59-60. See also Sloth-Nielsen J 
& Kruuse H ‘A maturing manifesto: The constitutionalisation of children’s rights in South African jurisprudence 2007-2012’ (2013) 
21(4) International Journal of Children’s Rights 649; Liebenberg S ‘Grootboom and the seduction of the negative/positive duties 
dichotomy’ (2011) 26(1) Southern African Public Law 37; Mbazira C ‘Grootboom: A paradigm of individual remedies versus 
reasonable programmes’ (2011) 26(1) Southern African Public Law 60; Stewart L ‘The Grootboom judgment, interpretative 
manoeuvring and depoliticising children’s rights’ (2011) 26(1) Southern African Public Law 97. 
41 Grootboom case, para 79. 
42 See Chapter 2, section 2.4. See also, Liebenberg S ‘The interpretation of socio-economic rights’ in Woolman S et al (eds) 
Constitutional law of South Africa (2005) 33-1, 33-48; Sloth-Nielsen J ‘Too little? Too late?: The implications of the Grootboom case 
for state response to child headed households’ (2003) 1 Law, Democracy and Development 113; Scott C & Alston P ‘Adjudicating 
constitutional priorities in a transitional context: A comment on Soobramoney’s legacy and Grootboom’s promise’ (2000) 16 South 
African Journal on Human Rights 206; van Bueren G ‘Alleviating poverty through the Constitutional Court’ (1999) 15 South African 
Journal on Human Rights 57; de Vos P ‘The economic and social rights of children in South Africa’s transitional Constitution’ (1995) 
2 SA Public Law 233. It should be noted that in a later case, Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign (TAC case), 
the court adjusted its earlier position in the Grootboom case to note that the State’s obligation towards children subsists even 
while they are in the care of their parents, especially when they are unable to adequately care for the children. However, the court 
did not address the issue of whether children’s rights are immediately realisable especially with reference to the ‘minimum core’ 
approach. See TAC case 2002 5 SA 721 (CC). 
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Children shall have the right from birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality, and subject to legislation 
enacted in the best interests of children, as far as possible the right to know and be cared for by their 
parents.43    
The provision of Section 15 above has been interpreted by the Namibian court as providing for three 
distinct rights: the right to a name; to acquire a nationality; and to know and be cared for by one’s 
parents.44 With reference to the right to alternative care, in relation to the right to know and be cared for 
by one’s parents, it was held that: 
A child’s right, ‘as far as possible’ (an expression which implies that there may be circumstances in which it is 
not possible) ‘to know and to be cared for by its parents’ is made ‘subject to legislation enacted in the best 
interests of children’. The significance of that is that Parliament is authorised to enact legislation which may 
limit the child’s right to be cared for by its parents, if doing so would be in the best interests of the child, the 
starting point being that all children have the right to be cared for by their parents, who have the 
corresponding duty to care for them. There may well be circumstances in which, in the child’s best interests, 
that right and duty should be circumscribed. For example, it may not be in the child’s best interests to be left 
in the care of a parent whose lifestyle, mental state or conduct is inimical to the best interests of the child.45  
… Parliament may therefore enact legislation to make inroads into the child’s right to know and be cared for 
by its parents.46    
The above clearly highlights the fact that there are circumstances in which a child may be in need of 
alternative care even if one or both of his or her parents are available, giving rise to the need for the State 
to intervene in the best interests of the child. 
While both the constitutions of South Africa and Namibia contain express provisions on children’s rights 
including the right to alternative care, the provisions in the South African constitution are particularly 
strong both in language and content thereby providing a firm basis for the child law reform process that 
culminated in the Children’s Act 38 of 2005, and its provisions on alternative care. In the case of Namibia, 
other important rights for children are contained in Chapter 11 on ‘Principles of State Policy’, and as such 
                                                 
43 Art. 15(1) Constitution of Namibia, 1990. Other rights provided include the right to protection from economic and other forms of 
exploitation and the prohibition of detention for children below 16 years, who come in conflict with the law. 
44 See the case of Detmold and Another v Minister of Health and Social Services and Others 2004 NR 174 (HC) paras D-E (Detmold 
case). 
45 In the Detmold case, the old position of Namibian law which disallowed non-citizens from adopting children was declared 
unconstitutional clearly highlighting some of the circumstances in which children may be in need of alternative care and the 
responsibility of the state to act on behalf of such children to secure them alternative care. It must however be noted that the court 
in the Detmold case stated clearly that the principle of the best interests of the child as used in the Namibian constitution is not the 
same as the manner in which it is entrenched in the South African Constitution. That is, it is not ‘a constitutional imperative against 
which all legislation, except that dealing with the child’s right to know and be cared for by its parents, is to be measured.’ (paras H-
I) 
46 Detmold case (2004) paras, C-H. 
 
 
 
 
181 
 
are not ordinarily justiciable. Examples include the right to public services and social security benefits.47 
Some of these rights have been provided in the new Child Care and Protection Bill which will be discussed 
subsequently. Nonetheless, it is significant to note that both constitutions specifically provide for children’s 
rights compared to other constitutions in the region that were adopted around the same period when 
children’s rights was beginning to gain global recognition and significance (via the CRC and the ACRWC).48  
 
5.3 Child-Specific Legislation: Focus on the Status of Kinship Care in relation to Foster Care 
5.3.1 South African Children’s Act (2005) 
The Children’s Act does not define alternative care but restates the fact that it is in the best interests of the 
child to be ‘brought up within a stable family environment and, where this is not possible, in an 
environment resembling as closely as possible a caring family environment.49 A child is in alternative care if 
the child has been placed in foster care,50 in a Child and Youth Care Centre (CYCC)51 or in temporary safe 
care.52 These options are formal alternative care placement options that the Children’s Court is empowered 
to make without direct reference to kinship care.  
Key concepts relevant for the right to alternative care are provided in the Act.53 ‘Care’ is defined to include 
the provision of a suitable living environment, the maintenance of conditions conducive for the child’s 
development and the availability of adequate financial support. A caregiver is any person other than the 
(original) parent or guardian who factually cares for the child such as: a foster parent; a person caring for 
                                                 
47 Sec 95. 
48 Examples include the constitutions of Lesotho (1993) and Malawi (1994) which provide for children’s rights to a limited extent, 
and with no reference to alternative care. Older constitutions in the region include Botswana (1966) and Tanzania (1977) which 
contain no express provisions on children’s rights.  
49 Sec 7(1) (k). 
50 This includes placement in a ‘cluster foster care scheme’, which refers to a system of foster care ‘managed by a non-profit 
organisation and registered by the provincial head of social development for this purpose.’ Sec 1. 
51 CYCC is an umbrella term for a wide range of residential facilities or institutions, including orphanages, children’s homes, places 
of safety, secure care facilities for awaiting trial children, children’s villages and shelters for street children, among others. It is 
therefore not specific to alternative care placements. There are 28 CYCC ‘nationally with a total capacity of 3272 beds. During 
2010/11 a total of 8879 children were admitted to CYCCs’. See Ballard C ‘New Report sheds light on the situation of children in 
South Africa’s prisons’ (2013) 15(1) Article 40: The Dynamics of Youth Justice and the Convention on the Rights of the Child in South 
Africa 7. Temporary safe care is however generally specific to alternative care as it ‘means care of a child in an approved child and 
youth care centre, shelter or private home or any other place, where the child can safely be accommodated pending a decision or 
court order concerning the placement of the child, but excludes care of a child in a prison or police cell.’ See sec 1, Children’s Act. 
52 Secs 46(1)(a) & 167(1). 
53 Sec 1. 
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the child with (express or implied) parental consent; the head of a CYCC, a temporary safe care or a shelter; 
a community child and youth care worker; and the head of a child-headed household. Although a kinship 
caregiver or relative is not expressly mentioned, it can be inferred from ‘a person who cares for a child with 
the implied or express consent of a parent or guardian of the child.’54 This interpretation accords with the 
CRC’s definition of a caregiver,55 which has further been elaborated upon by the CRC Committee as follows: 
The definition of “caregivers”, referred to in article 19, paragraph 1, as “parent(s), legal guardian(s) or any 
other person who has the care of the child”, covers those with clear, recognized legal, professional-ethical 
and/or cultural responsibility for the safety, health, development and well-being of the child, primarily: 
parents, foster parents, adoptive parents, caregivers in kafalah of Islamic law, guardians, extended family and 
community members; education, school and early childhood personnel; child caregivers employed by 
parents; recreational and sports coaches – including youth group supervisors; workplace employers or 
supervisors; and institutional personnel (governmental or non-governmental) in the position of caregivers for 
example responsible adults in health-care, juvenile justice and drop-in and residential-care settings. In the 
case of unaccompanied children, the State is the de facto caregiver.56 
With reference to child protection generally, the main objectives of the Act include family preservation; 
giving effect to children’s right to parental or family care, or alternative care, where necessary; ensuring the 
provision of social services to children; and protecting children from abuse, degradation, maltreatment, or 
neglect.57 Thus, the provision of alternative care for children deprived of a family environment forms a 
component part of a variety of services available for children under the broader child protection 
framework.58    
The Children’s Court decides on whether a child is in need of care and protection if the child: 
a. has been abandoned or orphaned and is without any visible means of support; 
b. displays behaviour which cannot be controlled by the parent or care-giver; 
c. lives or works on the streets or begs for a living; 
d. is addicted to a dependence-producing substance and is without any support to obtain treatment for 
such dependency; 
e. has been exploited or lives in circumstances that expose the child to exploitation; lives in or is exposed to 
circumstances which may seriously harm that child’s physical, mental or social well-being; 
                                                 
54 Sec 1, ‘care-giver’ (b). 
55 Art 19(1) CRC. 
56 CRC Committee GC 13 (2011) para 33. It will be recalled that some of these were discussed in previous chapters of this study 
based on the provisions of Articles 5 of the CRC and 20(1) of the ACRWC in ‘clear recognition of the fact that the extended family 
and other de facto care-givers play a role especially in traditional and rural communities in Africa.’ See sections 2.2.2, Chapter Two 
and 3.6.1, Chapter Three. See also Mezmur (2008) 25-26. 
57 Sec 2(a)(b)(i)-(iii). 
58 Dutschke M Defining Children’s Constitutional Right to Social Services – A Project 28 Working Paper (2006) 57. Other components 
of a child protection system include prevention and early intervention measures, family reunification services, and adoption. See 
Sloth-Nielsen J ‘Protection of Children’ in Davel CJ & Skelton AM Commentary on the Children’s Act (Revision Service 2, 2010) 7-2H. 
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f. may be at risk if returned to the custody of the parent, guardian or care-giver of the child  as there is 
reason to believe that he or she will  live in or be exposed to circumstances which may seriously harm 
the physical, mental or social well-being of the child; 
g. is in a state of physical or mental neglect; or 
h. is being maltreated, abused, deliberately neglected or degraded by a parent, care-giver, a person who 
parental responsibilities and rights or a family member of the child or by a person under whose control 
the child is.59 
 
A child in any of the circumstances listed above is automatically considered to be in need of care and 
protection. Where a police officer or social worker in an emergency situation is of the view that a child is in 
need of care and protection leading to a removal of the child from his parent, guardian or caregiver, the 
Constitutional Court has held that such removal is subject to automatic review by the a children’s court on 
the day following the removal. The decision was handed down in the case of C and Others & v Department 
of Health and Social Development, Gauteng & Others,60 the first case to challenge the constitutionality of 
the Children’s Act. This is to ensure that the children and families or caregivers involved get a chance to be 
heard thereby minimising the possibility of an incorrect action or decision on the matter, leading the court 
to order the inclusion of additions to the provisions of Sections 151 and 152 of the Children’s Act.61 The 
Constitutional Court noted that the absence of a provision on automatic review in the Act as ‘retrogressive’ 
considering that it was present in the old Child Care Act.62 The court noted that the removal, in appropriate 
circumstances, of a child from parental/family care, leading to placement in alternative is a limitation on 
the child’s right to parental/family care. However, the right to alternative care is a ‘secondary right, not an 
equivalent alternative right’; the right to parental/family care remains the primary right that should not be 
carelessly interfered with.63 Thus: 
The coercive removal of a child from her or his home environment is undoubtedly a deeply invasive and 
disruptive measure. Uninvited intervention by the state into the private sphere of family life threatens to 
                                                 
59 Sec 150(1)(a)-(h). 
60 *2012+ ZACC 1. See also Zaal FN, ‘A first finding of unconstitutionality regarding the Children’s Act 38 of 2005’ (2012) 75 Journal of 
Contemporary Roman-Dutch Law 168. This was in relation to the High court decision that preceded the Constitutional Court’s 
judgment. 
61 C v Department of Health, paras 22-39.  
62 C v Department of Health, para 17. Earlier in 2009, Gallinetti already pointed out that the omission is ‘highly prejudicial’ to 
children, as well as their parents or caregivers. See Gallinetti J, ‘The wisdom of Solomon: Removal of children as part of the child 
protection system in the Children’s Act 38 of 2005’ (2009) 23 Speculum Juris 54. See also Zaal FN, ‘Imperilling children and social 
workers? Preliminary care removals under the Children’s Act 38/2005’ (2008) Social Work Practitioner-Researcher 290; Zaal FN, 
‘Child removal procedures under the Child Care Act: Some new dangers to contend with’ (1998) South African Law Journal 233; 
Matthias & Zaal ‘Can we build up a better children’s court? Some recommendations for improving the processing of child-removal 
cases’ in Keightley (ed) Children’s Rights (1996) 53-54. 
63 C v Department of Health, para 24; Skelton (2013) 605. 
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rupture the integrity and continuity of family relations, and even to disgrace the dignity of the family, both 
parents and children, in their own esteem as well as in the eyes of their community. Both sections 151 and 
152 of the Children’s Act authorise removals, yet neither section subjects removals to automatic review, 
which would enable the affected family, including the removed child, to make representations on whether 
removal was in the best interests of the child.64  
In effect, the State should not arbitrarily ‘interfere with the integrity of the family,’65 and where the 
removal of a child from the family is contemplated, it requires an adequate degree of consideration in 
relation to the best interests of the child and the sanctity of the family.66 
With reference to (f) above (returning a child to the care of a parent, guardian or caregiver), the 
Constitutional Court emphasised the importance of the quality of care available to children within the 
family environment in the case of van der Burg v National Director of Public Prosecutions.67 Although the 
focus of the case was the civil forfeiture of a home illegally used for the storage and sale of liquor, the court 
held that it was not in the best interests of the children to be raised in such an environment which exposed 
them to ‘circumstances which may seriously harm [their] physical, mental or social well-being’.68 This led 
the court to suo moto order an investigation as to whether the children concerned were in need of care 
and protection.69 
Further, the Constitutional Court has developed jurisprudence with reference to children who become in 
need of care and protection due to lawful separation from their parent(s) or caregiver(s), arising from 
incarceration or the risk of custodial sentences.70 Since consideration has to be given to the provision of 
alternative care for the children involved, it was noted in the case of S v M that the best interests of 
children should not be ‘swallowed up’ or ‘subsumed’ when considering the culpability and sentencing 
regime for the caregiver concerned.71 The court developed a set of guidelines for the sentencing process to 
among others ensure that the interests of children of a person who faces a custodial sentence are 
                                                 
64 C v Department of Health, para 23. 
65 C v Department of Health, para 24. 
66 C v Department of Health, para 27. 
67 [2012] ZACC 12. 
68 van der Burg case, para 77. 
69 Sec 155. 
70 See secs 9(4) CRC & 30(1) ACRWC. 
71 S v M (CCT 53/06) [2007] ZACC 18; 2008 (3) SA 232 (CC) paras 30, 33. 
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separately considered in the course of the case before reaching a decision as to what the most appropriate 
sentence for the caregiver should be.72  
In the subsequent case of MS v S,73 the court made it clear that recourse to non-custodial sentences for 
caregivers is not a general rule that would allow offenders who have children to use them ‘as a pretext for 
escaping otherwise just consequences of their own misconduct.’74 The court stated that there are 
appropriate circumstances where it is necessary to sentence a caregiver to a custodial sentence, 
particularly in cases where the convicted offender was not the sole primary caregiver of the child. In this 
case, it was shown that there was an adequate family support system to care for the children while S 
served her sentence. 75 It could therefore not be maintained that the court did not adopt a child-centred 
approach in arriving at a decision on a custodial sentence; in other words, the best interests of the children, 
including the quality of (alternative) care they would receive ‘in the event of her incarceration’ were duly 
considered in the matter.76 
Apart from the categories of children listed in Section 150 above, children in child-headed households and 
those found to be victims of child labour may also be considered to be in need of care and protection - 
subject to the outcome of investigations and assessments by a social worker.77 Thus, a child is ‘potentially 
in need of a state-imposed care intervention and possibly even removal to an alternative care placement 
when his or her present familial environment or other living circumstances are so inappropriate that harm 
                                                 
72 S v M, para 36. In this case, the court eventually sentenced M to a more restorative, non-custodial sentence, to among others 
secure the best interests of M’s children. See para 59. 
73 2011 (2) SACR 88 (CC); Case CCT 63/10 [2011] ZACC 7; S v S (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae) 2011(7) BCLR 740 (CC). 
74 S v M, para 35. The aim of the recourse to non-custodial sentences in appropriate circumstances ‘is to protect the innocent 
children as much as is reasonably possible in the circumstances from avoidable harm.’ It will be recalled that the matter of quality 
of care was again raised in the 2012 van der Burg case discussed previously. 
75 MS v S, paras 63-64. Thus, this case was clearly distinguished from the earlier case of S v M because the convicted caregiver in 
this case was not a single parent exclusively responsible for the care of the children. Initially, there was evidence that she had a 
mother-in-law who was willing to care for the children together with her husband. And when the mother-in-law was no longer 
willing to do so, the husband was still available and by engaging other child care resources, would be able to make sure they were 
adequately cared for while he worked long hours. 
76 MS v S, paras 63, 65. In a dissenting opinion however, Khampepe J noted that it is important to conduct an inquiry into the 
quality of the (alternative) care that would be available to the children upon the incarceration of a (co-)caregiver; this is an essential 
aspect of the guidelines developed in S v M. The learned judge noted that the ‘physical presence of the father does not mean that 
the father will be able to take adequate care of the children’, and that the fact of being married alone, ‘without regard to the 
realities of that family’s life, is too normative an assessment of how parental responsibility in marriage is apportioned’, paras 36, 
47. 
77 Sec 150(2). 
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is occurring or likely.’78 Where children in the second category are found not to be in need of care and 
protection, other measures are required to assist the child; they include counselling, mediation, and family 
rehabilitation services.79 
From the foregoing, it is clear that the South African Children’s Act does not specifically recognise kinship 
care as a form of alternative care but defines foster care as the court-ordered placement of a child in the 
care a person other than the child’s parent or guardian.80 The foster parent appointed may however be the 
child’s relative and not necessarily a non-relative.81 On the face of it therefore, the Act appears to provide 
for traditional foster care by non-relatives and ‘kinship foster care’ or ‘formal kinship care’ (operating 
within the foster care system) as discussed in the previous chapter.82  Consequently, informal kinship care 
arrangements made without recourse to the court are not covered, leaving out a significant number of 
children in kinship care.83 Highlighting the fact that kinship care is not provided for in the Act as distinct 
from foster care, Zaal and Matthias make reference to Section 167(2) which provides as follows: 
A child may not be in temporary safe care or be kept or retained at any place or facility, including a registered 
child and youth care centre, for longer than six months without a court order placing the child in alternative 
care. 
It is clear from the above that placement in temporary safe care or in a CYCC or other (institutional) facility 
is envisaged to be a short term placement until a more appropriate and longer term alternative care 
placement can be determined and made available by an order of court.84 But with reference to a child 
being in a ‘place or facility’, Zaal and Matthias note that this wide terminology raises the question ‘whether 
a relative who provides informal kinship care at her home (clearly a ‘place’) for more than six months 
without court authority contravenes s 167(2).’85 If so, ‘it would appear that the legislature’s intention is to 
prohibit informal provision of substitute-parental care (including that by extended family members) beyond 
                                                 
78 Matthias C & Zaal N, ‘The Child in Need of Care and Protection’ in Boezaart T (ed) Child Law in South Africa (2009) 163. 
79 Sec 150(3). 
80 Sec. 180(1)(a). A child may also be placed in foster care through a ministerial transfer from another alternative placement, typical 
placement in a residential facility. See Sec. 180(1)(b) in terms of sec. 171, Children’s Act. 
81 Sec 180(3)(a)(b). A person in a registered cluster foster care scheme also qualifies as a foster parent (c). 
82 See section 4.3.2 of Chapter Four. 
83 Schafer L Child Law in South Africa: Domestic and International Perspectives (2011) 467. 
84 Zaal N & Matthias C ‘Alternative Care’ in Davel CJ & Skelton AM Commentary on the Children’s Act (Revision Service 2, 2010) 11-
4. It is however possible that an order is made for a child to remain in such arrangement (for example, a CYCC) such that it is no 
longer a temporary arrangement. 
85 Zaal & Matthias (2010) 11-4. 
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a period of six months.’86 The effect of this is that kinship care is not considered to be alternative care (at 
least on a long-term basis) unless it is backed by an order of court, in which case it functions as foster care.  
However, foster care was conceived to operate solely within the child protection system87 since 
A decision to place a child in foster care is made by a children’s court which is satisfied, on the basis of a 
social worker’s report and any other evidence it calls for, that the child is in need of care and protection, that 
the prospective foster parent is a fit and proper person and that the placement is in the best interests of the 
child. Once a child is placed in foster care, there must be ongoing social work oversight of the placement, and 
subsequent reports to court, usually every 2 years, to recommend whether the foster care placement should 
be extended or whether some other care arrangement is more appropriate.88  
The extension of a foster care order, in specified circumstances, is aimed at ensuring stability in the child’s 
life89 as well as minimising the burden of monitoring and supervision placed on the limited human and 
material resources available within the social work sector.90 Where kinship caregivers are appointed as 
foster carers however, the initial placement order may be made for more than two years, and subsequently 
extended for more than two years until the child turns 18 years.91 This therefore reduces or completely 
obviates the need for court-ordered extensions where a foster care placement is with a relative or family 
member. However, it is still required that a social worker supervises the placement by at least one visit in 
two years regardless of whether the placement (and extension) is with a relative or non-relative.92  
While such allowance is made in the case of kinship foster carers, the South African approach has however 
resulted in a number of problems as a result of the intersections between the social assistance or social 
                                                 
86 Zaal & Matthias (2010) 11-4. 
87 Skelton A & Carnelley M (eds) Family Law in South Africa (2010) 318. 
88 Skelton A ‘Kinship care and cash grants – South Africa’ in Atkin B (ed) The International Survey of Family Law (2012) 336. See also 
Skelton & Carnelley (2010) 323; Secs 159(1)(a)(b) & 186(1)-(2) Children’s Act. See also sec 186(3) which provides for the continued 
supervisory role of a social worker once in two years in case of an extended foster care placement, in specified circumstances after 
the initial two years. See also Sloth-Nielsen J ‘Care and vulnerability in the context of the absence of a comprehensive social 
security system: The case of Southern and Eastern Africa’, paper presented at the International Society of Family Law Conference 
(2010) 10 – copy on file with author. 
89 Sec 186(1).  
90 Sloth-Nielsen (2010 ISFL paper) 10: In the case of foster care placement with relatives, ‘children were often looked after in safe 
long-term care by relatives, which in practice did not require on-going supervision and monitoring.’ 
91 Sec 186(2). A longer duration and extension in case of placement with a relative is considered in any of the following 
circumstances: the child has been abandoned by the biological parents; the child’s biological parents are deceased; there is for any 
other reason no purpose in attempting reunification between the child and the child’s biological parents; and it is in the best 
interests of the child.  
92 Sec 186(3). The responsibilities and rights of foster parents are spelt out in the regulations to the Children’s Act and include, the 
responsibility to ensure that any social assistance or financial contribution for the child is used for the child’s upbringing and in the 
child’s best interests, and the right to take ‘all day to day decisions necessary for the care, upbringing and development of the 
foster child in his or her care.’ See Chapter 13, section 65(1)-(4) of the General Regulations regarding Children for the full list of 
responsibilities and section 66(1)-(8) for the full list of rights. 
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grant system and foster care as a form of alternative care. With over 4 million children (about 27% of the 
total population of children) living in the care of extended family members for various reasons,93 and nearly 
70% of the country’s child population living in poverty,94 it is more beneficial to access grants targeted at 
foster care than any other available State support, considering the actual cost of caring for children.95 The 
issues leading to this development and other related matters will be discussed further in section 5.4 of this 
study. It must however be mentioned that around the period of completing this study (September-October 
2013), the Department of Social Development (DSD) introduced a bill aimed at amending the Children’s Act 
in order to proffer solutions to these problems.96 
 
5.3.2 Namibia’s Draft Child Care and Protection Bill (2012) 
Namibia ratified the CRC in 1990 and the ACRWC in 2004. However, for over a decade, the drafting process 
for a comprehensive legislation on children’s rights in Namibia has been on-going. The drafting process 
which remains the most extensively consultative in the region has resulted in Namibia’s draft Child Care 
and Protection Bill.97 The (final) draft was approved by Cabinet in 2012, and was mentioned during the 
opening of Parliament in February 2013, signifying that it is soon to be tabled for possible adoption into 
law. Thus, in this study, reference will only be made to the new Child Care and Protection Bill which repeals 
the outdated Children’s Act of 1960 (inherited from South Africa) and incorporates, with minor 
amendments, the Children’s Status Act of 2006.98 Since both countries share the same legal and social 
background, the South African process has greatly influenced Namibia’s law reform process - the Bill is in 
many respects similar to South Africa’s Children’s Act, with some variations made to accommodate 
Namibian peculiarities.99 The objective of the Bill is to comprehensively provide for and uphold children’s 
                                                 
93 Hall K, Woolard I, Lake L & Smith C (eds) South African Child Gauge 2012 (2012) 83; Jamieson L, Bray R, Viviers A, Lake L, 
Pendlebury S & Smith C (eds) South African Child Gauge 2010/2011 (2011) 80. 
94 Hall et al (2012) 82; Jamieson et al (2011) 85. 
95 It also calls into question the practicality and financial viability of paying a higher amount in grants for a much longer period of 
time for foster care which was originally designed as a temporary measure of alternative care. 
96 It is expected that the bill will become public sometime in November 2013. 
97 The law reform process has been backed by an unprecedented level of media campaigns, involved consultations with youth and 
children, with several consultative workshops held in different parts of the country with several stakeholders. 
98 The 2006 Act was driven by a gender equality agenda. 
99 Kangandiela LN and Mapaure C ‘Work in progress: The Child Care and Protection Act in Namibia’ in Ruppel O C (ed) Children’s 
Rights in Namibia (2009) 125; Sloth-Nielsen (2008 - ejournal) 2. 
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rights as enshrined in the Constitution as well as to give domestic effect to the international agreements 
that are binding on Namibia, i.e. the CRC and the ACRWC among others.100   
The Bill’s definitions section (1) also provides a list of relevant definitions that run through the Bill. 
Alternative care is defined as temporary or long term care of a child in foster care, kinship care by order of 
the Children’s Court or care in a place of safety, a shelter, a children’s home or an education and 
development centre. The latter four are residential care facilities which should be resorted to only when it 
is in the child’s best interests.101 These facilities function on the basis of the Minimum Standards for 
Residential Child Care Facilities, introduced in 2009 by the Namibian Ministry of Gender Equality and Child 
Welfare (MGECW). The standards were developed from the UN Guidelines (while in draft form) and contain 
guidelines for the care of children, the organisation of facilities, management and staff, premises, 
administration, and finances.102  
Similar to the South African Children’s Act, the Namibian Bill defines a caregiver as any person other than a 
parent or guardian, who takes primary responsibility for the day-to-day care of a child – including ‘a 
kinship-care-giver’.103  With respect to the role of kin in the care of children, the Bill defines a child’s ‘family 
member’ to mean: 
a parent of the child;  
(b) any other person who has parental responsibilities and rights in respect of the child; 
(c) a grandparent, step-parent, brother, sister, uncle, aunt or cousin of the child; or 
(d) any other person with whom the child has developed a significant relationship, based on 
psychological or emotional attachment, which resembles a family relationship 
                                                 
100 Preamble to CCPB. See also Nakale A, ‘Namibia: Child Protection Bill Underway’ NEW ERA, available at < 
http://allafrica.com/stories/20110030805.html > (published 2011; accessed 18 September 2013). Some of the specific issues which 
the proposed bill is meant to address include the protection of families and the interests of children; protection from 
discrimination, exploitation and other forms of harm against children, etc. 
101 See generally secs 59-65, CCPB (2012 final draft). A Children’s Home is a non-family based residential care facility for orphaned 
and abandoned children for whom suitable kinship or foster care is unavailable (Art 63, CCPB) while a Shelter is a facility that 
provides for the basic needs of abused children, street children and other children who voluntarily show up at the facility. Art 62, 
CCPB. 
102 Ministry of Gender Equality and Child Welfare (MGECW) Minimum Standards for Residential Child Care Facilities (2009). 
103 Others include, as is the case with the Children’s Act of South Africa, ‘a foster parent; a primary caretaker; a person who cares 
for a child whilst the child is in a place of safety; the person at the head of a facility where a child has been placed; and the child at 
the head of a child-headed household.’ Distinguishing between a care-giver and a ‘primary caretaker’, it defines ‘primary caretaker’ 
as ‘a person other than the parent or other legal care-giver of a child, whether or not related to the child, who takes primary 
responsibility for the daily care of the child with the express or implied permission of the care-giver of the child’. 
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With reference to child protection, a novel feature of the CCPB is that it replaces the usual expression ‘child 
in need of care and protection’ with a more appropriate term ‘child in need of protective services’. It is 
submitted that the latter expression is not merely an exercise in semantics; the change is appropriate 
because, as alluded to in earlier chapters of this study, all children are generally in need of care and 
protection regardless of whether or not they are in a family environment, due to the vulnerability that 
childhood presents. Consequently, the term ‘child in need of protective services’ has the potential of 
directing attention to particular categories of children in need of care and protection due to their being 
doubly or otherwise vulnerable as a result of, for example, having been deprived of their family 
environment. In the course of drafting the Bill, many stakeholders involved in the drafting process 
considered the old term (‘children in need of care and protection’) to be misleading and confusing.104 
Under the CCPB therefore, a child is in need of protective services if he or she is found to be in any of the 
following circumstances: 
a. is abandoned or orphaned and has insufficient care or support; 
b. is engaged in behaviour that is, or is likely to be, harmful to the child or any other person and the parent 
or guardian or the person in whose care the child is, is unable or unwilling to control that behaviour; 
c. lives or works on the streets or begs for a living;  
d. lives in or is exposed to circumstances which may seriously harm the physical, mental, emotional or 
social welfare of the child;  
e. is in a state of physical or mental neglect; 
f. is addicted to alcohol or other dependence producing drug and is without any support to obtain 
treatment for such dependency; 
g. is below the age of 14 years and is involved in an offence other than a minor criminal matter;  
h. is an unaccompanied migrant or refugee; 
i. is chronically or terminally ill and lacks a suitable care-giver; 
j. is being kept in premises which, in the opinion of a medical officer, are over-crowded, highly unsanitary 
or dangerous; or  
k. is being, or is likely to be, neglected, maltreated or abused.105 
 
The children listed above are more or less automatically considered to be in need of protective services. 
However, in the case of children in child-headed households,106 children of imprisoned mothers and victims 
                                                 
104 See the explanatory introduction to Chapter 11 of the CCPB on ‘Child Protection Proceedings’. 
105 Sec 127(1). 
106 There is however one main difference in how each country regulates child-headed households. The CCPB of Namibia does not 
set a minimum age limit for the child heading a household (16 years old in South Africa). The absence of an age limit for a child 
heading a household may give rise to scenarios where a child who is too young may be entrusted with the responsibility of caring 
for younger siblings, as the head of a household. See Sec 137(c) SA Children’s Act and sec 205 CCPB. It has however been noted that 
children as young as 12 head some households in Namibia due to factors such as orphanhood, parental illness or disability which 
 
 
 
 
191 
 
of child labour among others,107 each situation ‘must be referred for investigation by a designated social 
worker’ before a conclusion can be reached as to whether the child concerned is actually in need of 
protective services.108    
From the definition of alternative care above, it is clear that the CCPB makes provision for both kinship care 
and foster care as distinct models of alternative care. This was done in recognition of the vast number of 
children in kinship care, not necessarily due to child protection matters. It was thus recommended that: 
Kinship care should be authorised through less formal procedures, while a system of formalised, non-relative 
foster care should be developed as an alternative to residential care where suitable kinship care is not 
available. It was also recommended that kinship care should be the preferred option where possible.109   
Foster care is defined as the placement of a child with a person ‘who is not the parent, guardian, family 
member or extended family member of the child in terms of an order of a children’s court … after a child 
protection hearing …’110 On the other hand, 
A child is in kinship care if the child has been placed in the care of a member of the child’s family or extended 
family (“the kinship care-giver”), other than the parent or guardian of the child or a person who has parental 
responsibilities and rights in respect of the child, with the express or implied consent of the child’s parent or 
guardian, or by order of court in terms of section 141(3)(e)(i).111  
Thus, it is clear that foster care is designed to be a child protection (alternative care) measure112 while the 
Bill provides for two forms of kinship care: court-ordered kinship care (‘formal kinship care’ to operate 
within the child protection framework) and informal kinship care arranged by members of a family and not 
necessarily resulting from a child care and protection matter. Section 141(3)(e)(i) mentioned above refers 
                                                                                                                                                                  
perhaps explains the reason for not placing a minimum age limit. See Kangandiela & Mapaure (2009) 141. There are close to 4,000 
child-headed households in Namibia (one per cent of all households). See UNICEF Children and Adolescents in Namibia 2010: a 
situation analysis (2010) 42. 
107 Sec 127(2) (a)-(n). 
108 Sec 127(2). 
109 Ministry of Gender Equality and Child Welfare (MGECW), Legal Assistance Centre (LAC) and UNICEF Public Participation in Law 
Reform: Revision of Namibia’s Child Care and Protection Bill: Final Report (2010) 163. 
110 Sec 150(1). This traditional understanding of foster care in Namibia is more or less the same as what is contained in the 
Children’s Act of 1960, which the new Bill is set to repeal. There was however no provision on kinship care in the old Act, and in 
light of the problems in the South African case where a clear demarcation has not been made between kinship care and foster care, 
it became important to do so in the Namibian context given the similarities between the systems in both nations. 
111 Sec 114(1). The preamble to Chapter 8 of the CCPB on kinship care provides (para 1) that:  
Kinship care is a new concept in Namibian law (although it is already used in some other countries). It is designed to cover the 
common situation where families make their own arrangements for children to live with and be cared for by someone other than 
their birth parents – such as extended family members, friends or someone in the local community. 
112 It is construed as a professional service aimed at children who have no one to care for them including those with ‘behavioural 
problems or other special needs.’ See the introductory clause to Chapter 12 of the CCPB on foster care. 
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to the former: the placement in kinship care resulting from a children’s court hearing where a child is 
declared to be in need of protective services.113   
In the case of an informal kinship care arrangement, the child’s parent or guardian may conclude a kinship 
care agreement with the kinship caregiver, and have it registered with the court clerk. It is a compulsory 
requirement to do so where the caregiver intends to claim any social assistance benefits on the child’s 
behalf.114 The aim is to protect children from being snatched for grant purposes.115 The registration process 
is designed to be ‘a simple administrative procedure’ since the Bill anticipates ‘that few kinship care 
arrangements will be the result of court orders.’116  
Both kinship care (court-ordered) and foster care involve the transfer of parental responsibilities and rights 
to the caregiver for the duration of the placement.117 Based on a UNICEF-sponsored study on the foster 
care system in Namibia, it has been noted that there are varying kinship care situations as there are with 
kinship care, further emphasising the importance of providing separately for kinship care and foster care: 
[T]here are a range of different roles for which foster care could be utilised in Namibia: (1) short term foster 
care for emergencies or for short absences of a caregiver; (2) longer-term foster care for stays of over 6 
months; (3) permanent foster care which could be established as an alternative to adoption; and (4) respite 
foster care on weekends or holidays, which could be used to give regular caregivers a break from their duties. 
The study recommended that kinship care needs to be superimposed on the range of options presented 
above, allowing family members to provide any of these forms of care.118 
Since family members already provide for such a range of options of care for children in need of alternative 
care, the statement above should be understood as highlighting the fact that kinship care in itself does not 
pre-suppose a uniform form of care. Rather, the recognition of kinship care should be cognisant of the fact 
that kinship care, like foster care can also range from ‘emergency’ to ‘temporary’  and/or ‘permanent’, 
                                                 
113 Particularly ‘if the child does not have a parent or care-giver or has a parent or care-giver who is unable or unsuitable to care for 
the child.’ 
114 Sec 114(2). See sections 114(3)-(5) provides for the format of the agreement as well as the contents, facilitators and other 
necessary issues. 
115 Sloth-Nielsen (2010 ISFL paper) 13. 
116 Paras 3-4, Preamble to Chapter 8 of the CCPB. In the commentary introducing Chapter 12 of the bill on foster care, it is noted as 
follows: 
Because kinship care is now a separate category, the provisions for foster care by strangers will involve a much smaller pool of 
people. Foster parents, many of whom will undergo specialised training, will provide a professional service aimed at children who 
have no one to care for them.  This could include children with behavioural problems or other special needs. The Ministry will 
establish support services for children and foster parents, and develop formal guidelines and standards. (Para 2) 
117 Sec 145 CCPB. 
118 MGECW, LAC & UNICEF (2010) 162; MGECW Draft Child Care and protection Bill Summary (2009) 43. See also the study referred 
to: van Sloten B (for MGECW) Foster Care in Namibia: Recommendations for the Framework (2009). 
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depending on the circumstance(s) surrounding each case.119 Thus, the Namibian Bill not only recognises 
kinship care but goes further to place it above foster care in the hierarchy of care options, as is the norm in 
international and regional law on alternative care for children.120   
The clear distinction between foster care and care by extended family members or kinship care is a 
conscious and deliberate attempt to deviate from the South African model due to the problems associated 
with the absence of such clarity.121 The distinction is also considered to be important because it enables the 
State to better monitor and safeguard the interests of children in kinship care while respecting or 
maintaining its informality and managing the process where formal regulation is required.122   
Prominent among the problems mentioned above is the abuse of the foster care system through excessive 
workloads thereby restricting the ability of social workers ‘to do more preventative work and engage in 
efforts to assist and reunite families.’123 These problems will be discussed in greater detail in the next 
section of this chapter. 
 
5.4 Kinship Care and Social Assistance 
In the second chapter of this study, there was a discussion on the relationship between children’s right to 
social security assistance and an adequate standard of living, and the importance of these rights for 
children within the family environment, and in the context of alternative care.124 In this section, national 
measures of social assistance applicable to children, and particularly within the alternative care context in 
South Africa and Namibia will be examined. 
 
                                                 
119 Hence the use of the word, ‘superimposed’. 
120 See Chapter Four, section 4.2.1 & 4.3. 
121 Sloth-Nielsen, who was involved in the drafting process of the South African Children’s Act and who was a member of the team 
of experts that worked on the drafting of the CCPB has stressed this point. See Sloth-Nielsen (2010 ISFL paper) 17. 
122 MGECW, LAC & UNICEF (2010) 163; MGECW (2009) 43-44. 
123 MGECW, LAC & UNICEF (2010) 163. 
124 Section 2.4.4. 
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5.4.1 South Africa 
South Africa has the most comprehensive social assistance system, not only in (Southern) Africa but also 
among many middle income countries.125 Section 27 of the constitution provides the legal basis for the 
country’s social security system; it provides for the right of everyone to access social security, including 
appropriate social assistance ‘if they are unable to support themselves and their dependants.’126 The 
Constitutional Court in the case of Khosa & Ors v Minister of Social Development & Ors,127 where it was held 
that permanent residents are also entitled to claim social assistance benefits for child care purposes, 
provided the rationale for the inclusion of the right in the constitution as follows: 
The right of access to social security, including social assistance, for those unable to support themselves and 
their dependants is entrenched because as a society we value human beings and want to ensure that people 
are afforded their basic needs. A society must seek to ensure that the basic necessities of life are accessible 
to all if it is to be a society in which human dignity, freedom and equality are foundational.128 
The Social Assistance Act (2004) provides the legislative framework for the right to social security in South 
Africa. It sets out the eligibility criteria and procedures for accessing social grants for children living in 
poverty, children in need of foster care, and persons with disabilities, among others.129 With reference to 
these, the Act is implemented through the provision of the Child Support Grant (CSG), the Foster Child 
Grant (FCG) and the Care Dependency Grant (CDG). The South African Social Security Agency (SASSA) is 
responsible for the management, administration and payment of social grants.130 
Apart from Section 27 on the right of ‘everyone’ to access social security, every child also has the 
constitutional right ‘to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and social services’ (discussed 
                                                 
125 Hall K & Proudlock P ‘Orphaning and the foster child grant: A return to the “care or cash” debate’ (2011) 29(5&6) Child and 
Youth Care Worker 23; Jordann B, Kalula E & Strydom E (eds) Understanding social security law (2009) 19; Kaseke E ‘The role of 
social security in South Africa’, (2010) 53 International Social Work 160. 
126 Sec 27(1). By framing the right as a ‘right to access’ and not a ‘right to social security’, the intention is to highlight the fact that it 
is not an automatic right; it is rather a right which has to be activated through the application of certain processes. See Strydom 
EML (ed) Essential Social Security Law (2001) 21. Thus, in keeping with the socio-economic nature of the right to social security, 
section 27(1) is to be read together with section 27(2) which provides: ‘The state must take reasonable legislative and other 
measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights [that is, all rights contained in 
the Bill of Rights+.’ 
127 2004(6) BCLR 569 (CC). 
128 Khosa case, para 52. 
129 See section 5-14 Social Assistance Act 13 of 2004; sections 2-10, Regulations in terms of the Social Assistance Act 13 of 2004, 
Regulation 162, Government Gazette No 27316, 22 February 2005. See generally also Proudlock P, Dutschke M, Jamieson L, 
Monson J & Smith C (eds) South African Child Gauge 2007/20008 (2008) 1. 
130 The SASSA is established in terms of the South African Social Security Agency Act of 2004 as a public entity. Prior to the Social 
Assistance Act of 2004 was the Social Assistance Act 59 of 1992 in terms of which the payment of social security was delegated to 
the provincial departments. 
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previously in relation to the Grootboom case).131 While social services are often equated with the right to 
social security, Dutschke and Monson clearly point out that there is a distinction between the provision of 
social services and the broader right to social security. Thus, ‘the right to social services for children is in 
addition to and distinct from the broad right to social security’.132 This position accords with the South 
African White Paper for Social Welfare (1997) which in describing the areas of social security to include 
‘poverty alleviation, social compensation and income distribution’ refers to ‘social security’, ‘social services’ 
and ‘social development programmes’ as distinct factors that result in economic gains and growth.133   
In addition, the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court and legal analyses by academics suggest that 
children’s right to social services and social security as a whole must be read in the context of the care and 
protection rights of children whether within the context of existing family care or alternative care.134 The 
importance that South African courts pay to the best interests of the child, this time in the context of social 
grants, was again highlighted in the case of Allpay Consolidated Investments Holdings (Pty) Limited and 
others v South African Social Security Agency and Others.135 In the initial case at the North Gauteng High 
Court, irregularities were found in the tender process that led to the award of a contract to a company to 
provide State social grants in terms of the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act 5 of 2000; this 
led the court to declare the tender process as illegal and invalid. However, rather than set it aside, the court 
ordered the irregular contract to continue due to the adverse effect that setting it aside would have on 
over 10 million children who are the main beneficiaries of social grants.136  
                                                 
131 Sec 28(1)(c). 
132 Dutschke M & Monson J ‘Children’s constitutional right to social services’, in Proudlock P, Dutschke M, Jamieson L, Monson J & 
Smith C (eds) South African Child Gauge 2007/2008  (2008) 25. 
133 See Chapter 1 paragraph 8 and Chapter 7 of the White Paper for Social Welfare 1997. See also Dutschke M ‘Developmental 
social welfare policies and children’s right to social services’ in Proudlock P et al (2008) 29; Dutschke M Defining children’s 
constitutional right to social services (2006) 8; Olivier MP, Smit N & Kalula ER (eds) Social security: A legal analysis (2003) 49; Van 
Rensburg LJ & Olivier MP ‘International and supra-national law’ in Olivier MP, Smit N & Kalula ER (eds) Social security: A legal 
analysis (2003) 619 
134 Dutschke & Monson (2008) 25. 
135 (678/12) [2013] ZASCA 29; [2013] 2 All SA 501 (SCA); 2013 (4) SA 557 (SCA) (27 March 2013). 
136 Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd and others v Chief Executive Officer of the South African Social Security Agency 
and others (7447/2012) [2012] ZAGPPHC 185 (28 August 2012), para 73 (initial High Court case). 
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On appeal and cross-appeal however, the court found that there was no illegality in the process that could 
render the contract invalid.137 Thus, there was no merit in the appeal while the cross-appeal was upheld. 
With reference to making a decision that is in the best interests of the child, among others, the court stated 
as follows: 
We need no evidence to know the immense disruption that would be caused, with dire consequences to 
millions of the elderly, children and the poor if this contract were to be summarily dismissed. The prospect of 
that occurring has prompted the Centre for Child Law to intervene as amicus curiae in this case. We value the 
contribution they have made but they had no cause for concern. It is unthinkable that such should occur.138 
Of the three social assistance grants that relate to the care of children mentioned above (CSG, FCG and 
CDG),139 the first two are of direct relevance to this study and are discussed further below. 
  
5.4.1.1 The Child Support Grant (CSG) 
The Child Support Grant (CSG) was introduced in 1998, two years after the new constitution was 
adopted.140 The main purpose of the CSG is to provide basic sustenance to children, in response to child 
poverty and is payable to the child’s primary caregiver for the direct costs of child care.141 One of the core 
objectives of the CSG is ‘to prevent children from unnecessarily entering or remaining in statutory 
substitute care’, by ensuring that the caregivers are assisted in fulfilling their obligations towards the 
children in their care.142 The CSG which targets the child as the main beneficiary was originally available to 
                                                 
137 The Supreme Court of Appeal noted that if at all there was any irregularity, they were ‘inconsequential irregularities’ that alone 
were not capable of invalidating the contract. ‘An irregularity that leads to invalidity is one that is in conflict with the law. It is 
because it is in conflict with the law that it is not able to produce a legally valid result’, para 58. 
138 Allpay case, para 99. It is expected that this case will be taken to the constitutional court where a final decision will be reached. 
139 The Care Dependency Grant (CDG), which will not be discussed further, is available to caregivers of children with disabilities, 
determined by strict medical and other parameters which fall outside the scope of this study. 
140 It replaced the State Maintenance Grant (SMG) which catered only for children of poor white and ‘coloured’ women whose 
spouses were no longer present, during the apartheid era. See UNICEF SA & Department of Social Development (DSD) Review of the 
Child Support Grant: Uses, Implementation and Obstacles (2008) 12. 
141 UNICEF SA & DSD (2008) 7. As previously mentioned, a primary caregiver may not be related to the child, the focus is primarily 
responsible for the day-to-day care of the child. According to Skelton, this broadening of the definition ‘gives recognition to the 
many family forms and care arrangements that are commonplace in South Africa, most notably children being cared for by 
extended family members.’ See Skelton (2012) 335. See also Giese S ‘Setting the scene for social services: The gap between service 
and delivery’, in Proudlock P, Dutschke M, Jamieson L, Monson J & Smith C South African Child Gauge 2007/2008 (2008) 17, 20; 
Case A, Hosegood V & Lund F ‘The reach and impact of Child Support Grants: Evidence from KwaZulu-Natal’ (2005) 22 Development 
Southern Africa 468; Sections 6 Social Assistance Act 2004 and 4(1) and 10(3)(a) Regulation 162 (22 February 2005) of the Social 
Assistance Act 13 of 2004. This broadening of a caregiver’s definition also highlights a major difference between the old SMG, 
payable strictly to a parent and not to non-biological caregivers. See Strydom (2001) 172. 
142 Triegaardt JD ‘The Child Support Grant in South Africa: a social policy for poverty alleviation?’ (2005) 14 International Journal of 
Social Welfare 252. 
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the poorest and youngest children, up to seven years old.143 Over the years however, the age of eligibility 
has progressively increased such that the CSG is now available to all children up to 18 years.144  
The CSG is a small amount of money paid per month (R300)145 which is means tested based on household 
income set at 10 times the amount of the grant. Thus, a child is eligible for the CSG if he is in the custody of 
a single caregiver who earns a maximum of R3,000 per month and a joint income of R6,000 for a caregiver 
and spouse (if the caregiver is married).146 Despite criticisms that the amount offered in CSG is not 
sufficient for children’s actual needs,147 it has become known as one of the largest financial aid schemes or 
poverty alleviation/eradication measures for children anywhere in the world.148 It has been shown that the 
CSG, among other grants, ‘is also associated with improved nutritional, health and education outcomes.’149 
                                                 
143 Goldblatt B & Liebenberg S ‘Giving money to children: The state’s constitutional obligation to provide child support grants to 
child headed households’ (2004) 20 South African Journal on Human Rights 152. See also Meintjes H, Budlender D, Giese S & 
Johnson L ‘Children in “need of care” or in “need of cash”? Questioning social security provisions for orphans in the context of the 
South African AIDS pandemic’ (2003) Joint Working Paper of the Children’s Institute and Centre for Actuarial Research. 
144 The last increase in the threshold of beneficiaries began in 2009: 15 year-olds started benefitting from the grant on 1 January 
2010 while 16 year-olds were included on 1 January 2011 and 17 year-olds were finally included on 1 January 2012. 
145 R300 is approximately USD 30 as at October 2013 exchange rates. The CSG was introduced in 1998 at a value of R100 and has 
been progressively increased over time; it was recently increased to R300 in October 2013. 
146 Hall K ‘Income poverty, unemployment and social grants’ in Berry L, Biersteker L, Dawes A, Lake L & Smith C (eds) South African 
Child Gauge 2013 (2013) 92. For about 10 years previously (1998-2008), the eligibility threshold for CSG was based on a caregiver 
and spouse earning a joint monthly income of up to R800, if living in a formal house or an urban area, and R1, 100 if living in rural 
areas or informal housing. 
147 Skelton (2012) 335. It is noteworthy that concerted action on the part of civil society organisations (CSOs) such as the Children’s 
institute and Black Sash, among others, has been instrumental in putting pressure on the government to ensure progressive change 
and increase in the social assistance policy and legislation on the CSG, with regards to the eligibility age range, and the means test 
among others. As mentioned above for example, the means test was initially based on household income generally, with a 
distinction made between urban and rural households and between those living in formal and informal housing.  However, due to 
the fact that household income is not necessarily distributed equitably among members, a change was effected to apply the test to 
the personal income of the caregiver (and spouse, if applicable). See generally, Seyisi K & Proudlock P ‘When the grant stops, the 
hope stops. The impact of the lapsing of the child support grant at age 15: Testimonies from caregivers of children aged 15 to 18, 
Report for Parliament’, October 2009. See also See the case of Ncamile and the Children’s Institute v South African Social Security 
Agency, Eastern Cape Regional Office and Others, Case No 227/08, Eastern Cape Provincial Division of the High Court (withdrawn 
and unreported) – cited in Jamieson L, Hall K & Kassan D ‘Key legislative developments in 2008/2009’ in Pendlebury S, Lake L & 
Smith C (eds) South African Child Gauge 2008/2009 (2009) 14.  
148 Hagen-Zanker J, Morgan J & Meth C South Africa’s social security system: Expanding coverage of grants and limiting increases in 
inequality (2011) 3; Hall K ‘Children’s access to social assistance’, in Pendlebury S, Lake L & Smith C (eds) South African Child Gauge 
2008/2009 (2009) 79; UNICEF South Africa ‘Overview: Child Protection-A protective environment for children’ available at < 
http://www.unicef.org/southafrica/protection347.html >. See also South Africa Social Security Agency (SASSA) ‘Annual Report 
2009/2010’, visit < www.sassa.gov.za >. 
149 Hall (2013) 92. See also Triegaardt JD ‘The Child Support Grant in South Africa: A social policy for poverty alleviation?’ (2005)14 
International Journal of Social Welfare 254; Nkosi G ‘An analysis of the South African social assistance system as it applies to 
children in rural communities: A perspective from the Grootboom case’ (2011) 26(1) Southern African Public Law 81; Hall K 
‘Children’s access to social assistance’ in Pendlebury S, Lake L & Smith C (eds) South African Child Gauge 2008/2009 (2009) 79; 
Mirugi-Mukundi G ‘Realising the social security rights of children in South Africa, with particular reference to the child support 
grant’ (2009) 6. A research paper prepared for the Socio-Economic Rights Project of the Community Law Centre, University of the 
Western Cape (UWC). 
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The CSG is payable for a maximum of six children per household, and as at March 2013, over 11.3 million 
children (0-17 years) received the CSG.150 
The success of the South African CSG as a model of cash transfer has promoted the development of various 
cash transfer schemes in other countries in the sub-region and the continent at large. The bulk of these 
programmes target families that are most in need with a particular focus on those affected by HIV/AIDS, 
including grandparent-headed households and child-headed households.151 The CSG model has also 
received praise form the World Bank, (among other international aid assistance partners), as an efficient 
social assistance mechanism; they have drawn inspiration from it in their aid assistance programmes in 
several other countries.152 
 
5.4.1.2 The Foster Child Grant (FCG) 
The Foster Child Grant (FCG) refers to a monthly non-means tested cash grant payment payable as a 
government subsidy to foster parents of children placed in foster care after being declared to be ‘in need of 
care and protection by a children’s court.153 In the old South African Children’s Act of 1960, foster care was 
recognised and applicable in the traditional child protection sense of placing children in need of care and 
protection with non-relatives, especially children for whom adoption was considered inappropriate.154 
However, as a result of the rise in the number of orphans and child-headed households due to HIV, among 
                                                 
150 Hall (2013) 92. 
151 See among others, Hofmann S, Heslop M, Clacherty G & Kessy F Salt, soap and shoes for school, Evaluation Report: The impact of 
pensions on the lives of older people and grandchildren in the KwaWazee project in Tanzania’s Kagera region (2008). 
152 See among others Garcia M & Moore CMT The Cash Dividend: The rise of cash transfers programs in sub-Saharan Africa (2012) 
The World Bank; Arnold C, Conway T & Greenslade M (Department For International Development) DFID Cash Transfers Evidence 
Paper (2011); Arnold C, Conway T & Greenslade M (Department For International Development) DFID Cash Transfers Literature 
Review (2011); Devereux S Building social protection systems in Southern Africa (2010) Institute of Social (European Development 
Report on Development); Ellis F, Devereux S & White P Social Protection in Africa (2009).  
153 Hall et al (2012) 50; Skelton (2012) 335. 
154 Gallinetti J & Loffell J ‘Foster Care’ in Davel & Skelton (Revision Service 2, 2010) 12-1; Skelton A & Proudlock P ‘Interpretation, 
objects, application and implementation of the Act’ in Davel & Skelton (Revision Service 2, 2010) 1-1; Skelton (2012) 335. Foster 
care was also considered to be more cost effective in comparison to residential care placements. 
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others, reliance on foster care became more widespread.155  As noted by research conducted by the 
Children’s Institute: 
The number of FCGs remained stable for many years [1960-2002] while foster care was applicable only to 
children in the traditional child protection system. Its rapid expansion since 2003 coincides with the rise in 
HIV-related orphaning and an implied policy change by the Department of Social Development, which from 
2003 started encouraging family members (particularly grandmothers) caring for orphaned children to apply 
for foster care and the associated grant. Over the following five years the number of FCGs increased by over 
50,000 per year as orphans were brought into the foster care system.156 
Thus, the number of children receiving the FCG increased dramatically within the last decade. However, the 
increase was not only due to the fact that there was a drive to promote the fostering of HIV/AIDS orphans 
but also due to the higher monetary value of the FCG as compared to the CSG.157 The FCG was valued at 
R800 per month in 2012,158 and by March 2013, over 530, 000 children were receiving the FCG.159 
Consequently, the bulk of children in alternative care in South Africa are in ‘foster care’ with close to 90% of 
such placements being with relatives, usually grandmothers. Thus, about 90% of FCGs are paid to extended 
family members with less than 10% being paid for other children in foster care due to child protection 
issues such as abandonment, parental inadequacy and maltreatment.160 
The difference in amount between the two grants ‘understandably causes poor families caring for children 
who are not biologically their own to seek regularisation of their child care arrangements through the 
foster care system.’161 This is despite the fact that in a strict sense, the foster care system and the financial 
support attached to or flowing from it does not form part of the social security system.162 With over 4 
million children (about 27% of the total population of children) living in the care of extended family 
                                                 
155 Hall K ‘Children’s access to social assistance’ in Pendlebury S, Lake L & Smith C (eds) South African Child Gauge 2008/2009 (2009) 
79.  
156 Hall (2013) 93; Skelton (2012) 335-336. 
157 Skelton (2012) 335-336; Leatt A Grants for children: A brief look at the eligibility and take up of the Child Support Grant and other 
cash grants (2006) 3. Between 2000 and 2010, the number of children in formal foster care increased from just under 30, 000 to 
over half a million. See UNICEF South Africa ‘Overview: Child Protection-A protective environment for children’ available at < 
http://www.unicef.org/southafrica/protection347.html > There are however indications that the numbers have been on the 
decline since 2011. See Hall (2013) 93. 
158 Approximately USD 80 as at October 2013. See Hall (2013) 93. 
159 Hall (2013) 93. 
160 Sloth-Nielsen (2008) 6. 
161 Skelton (2012) 336. 
162 Skelton & Carnelley (2010) 318; Skelton (2012) 336. Foster care and the financial support attached to it is a specialised welfare 
mechanism to temporarily protect children who are at risk in their family environments until the risk factors are dealt with.  
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members for various reasons,163 this scenario is against the background of the fact that nearly 70% of the 
total number of children in South Africa live in poverty.164 The implication of this however is that many 
children who need not come in contact with the formal child protection system (without prejudice to the 
fact that they require other services) are brought into the system through foster care thereby placing 
undue ‘burdens on an *already+ over-stretched care and protection system.’165  
The court and social work oversight required for foster care makes the administration of the FCG much 
more cumbersome than the CSG which is easier to access through an administrative application to SASSA, 
with no oversight requirement after the initial approval of the grant.166 Thus, by 2009, it became obvious 
that the foster care system could not cope with the volume of foster care and FGC applications to the 
extent that between April 2009 and March 2011, over 110, 000 FCGs lapsed due to backlogs in the 
extension of the court orders.167 As a stopgap measure, it was then decided via a court-ordered settlement 
that the court-ordered foster care placements that had expired or were due to expire in the following two 
years (2012 and 2013) be deemed extended until 8 June 2013.168 In effect, a moratorium was placed on the 
lapsing of FCGs, and in the meantime, social workers are empowered to administratively extend foster care 
orders until December 2014 when it is expected that ‘a comprehensive legal solution’ would have been 
found to address the issue of lapses.169 This is one of the major goals of the previously mentioned on-going 
process towards the amendment of the Children’s Act. 
A more sustainable approach however is to seek how to effectively contain the large number of FCG 
applicants rather than focusing on only on how to prevent lapses in the future. This is against the 
                                                 
163 Meintjes H & Hall K ‘Demography of South Africa’s children’ in Hall K, Woolard I, Lake L & Smith C (eds) South African Child 
Gauge 2012 (2012) 83; Meintjes H & Hall K ‘Demography of South Africa’s children’ in Jamieson L, Bray R, Viviers A, Lake L, 
Pendlebury S & Smith C (eds) South African Child Gauge 2010-2011 (2011) 80. 
164 Meintjes & Hall (2012) 82; Meintjes & Hall (2011) 85. 
165 Skelton (2012) 336. According to Skelton at 337, ‘The SALRC prophesied that the foster care system would lack sufficient 
capacity to absorb the numbers of children who were orphaned or were for other reasons living with members of the extended 
family’. 
166 Hall (2013) 93; Skelton (2012) 336. With reference to FCG, SASSA is not mandated to pay the grant without a valid court order or 
extension order of foster care. 
167 Hall (2013) 93; Skelton (2012) 340. Between April 2009 and March 2010, 129, 500 FCGs lapsed and 164, 900 lapsed between 
April 2010 and March 2011. A significant portion of these lapses (39, 200 and 74, 200 respectively) was due to expiration of court 
orders as a result of failure to review the placements. See Hall & Proudlock (2011) 25. 
168 Centre for Child Law v Minister of Social Development and Others (21122/13) [2013] ZAGPPHC 305. The order was granted in 
April 2012. See also Hall (2013) 93; Skelton (2012) 341. 
169 Hall (2013) 93; Skelton (2012) 341. Under the old Child Care Act, foster care orders could be administratively extended without 
court orders unlike the position of the Children’s Act which requires extension by a children’s court. 
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background of the following facts: there is still a significant shortage of social workers (for all services 
required under the Act); the majority of the children concerned need not engage with the formal child 
protection system; and the FCG was not envisaged to be a poverty alleviation tool.170 It is therefore 
encouraging that, as previously alluded to, the DSD has initiated a process towards making amendments to 
the Children’s Act, with the question of foster care and its overlap with kinship care being one of the 
subjects to be considered for amendment in light of these challenges.171  
According to Skelton, the genesis of this crisis is traceable to the refusal of the South African Parliament (for 
political and other reasons) to adopt the proposal of the SALRC on the right to alternative care while the 
Children’s Act was still in the Bill stage.172 The proposal was to the effect that kinship care should be 
expressly provided for as distinct from foster care as, among others, care by relatives tends to be 
permanent in comparison to classic foster care, thereby requiring a different approach in law and 
practice.173 Skelton sets it out clearly below: 
The Children’s Bill produced by the SALRC provided for three models of care, namely foster care, court-
ordered kinship care and informal kinship care. Foster care was limited to children placed by the formal 
childcare and protection system in the care of persons unrelated to them. These foster carers would be 
screened and carefully selected, and the initial court order would be of limited duration, with the emphasis 
on family reunification services. Court-ordered kinship care would aim to provide care with relatives for 
children who were unable to remain in their own homes due to abuse or neglect. Although reunification 
services would often be appropriate in these cases, the court should also have a discretion to make a longer 
term order from the outset, and to dispense with social work supervision in appropriate cases. Informal 
kinship care was for the recognition of children being cared for by their families in situations where they did 
not need care and protection services, but needed social security to help the families financially.174 
She notes further that while deliberations on kinship care and foster care were on-going, it was noted that 
‘there is a difference between family care and alternative care, and that kinship care should be resuscitated 
to solve the problem of the high uptake of foster care by caregivers related to children.’175 This was 
however not reflected in the Bill since the parliamentarians did not want to held responsible for preventing 
                                                 
170 Skelton (2012) 338, 342; Hall & Proudlock (2011) 26; Leatt (2006) 4; Barberton C The cost of the Children’s Bill (2006) 94; SALRC 
‘Report on Project 110: Review of the Child Care Act’ (2002) 318. 
171 Skelton (2012) 341. 
172 Skelton (2012) 338-340; Budlender D, Proudlock P & Jamieson L Developing social policy for children in the context of HIV/AIDS: 
A South African case study (2008) 43. 
173 SALRC ‘Discussion Paper on the Review of the Child Care Act, Project 110’ (2001) 17.2.2. See also Mahery P ‘Partial Care’ in Davel 
& Skelton (Revision Service 2, 2010) 5-4. 
174 Skelton (2012) 337. 
175 Skelton (2012) 339. 
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relatives from accessing the much higher FCG, coupled with the fact that the definition of foster care ‘had 
eclipsed the concept of kinship care in the Children’s Bill.’176 It is submitted that the issues that should have 
been considered include factors such as were discussed in the previous chapter on amongst others, the 
requirements for foster care in the classic sense – coupled with deliberations on how to close the gap 
between the FCG and the CSG or at least, how to justify the higher value of the former.177 The SALRC had 
recommended different and separate approaches to grants for foster care, court-ordered kinship care and 
informal kinship care as follows:178 
• Kinship care placements not requiring court intervention should be facilitated through a non-means-tested 
child grant (payable in respect of all children in need who are South African citizens and resident in the 
Republic) or, in the absence of such a measure, a specific grant designed for this purpose. This grant should 
be supplemented with an additional needs-based grant such as the care dependency grant if the child has 
special needs with cost implications. 
• Foster care placements with persons unrelated to the child should be supported through a non-means-
tested grant as is presently the case. Should a child grant be introduced, this would be an additional source of 
support for persons willing to provide substitute care for children in need thereof. 
• Children who require formal protective services and are placed in care with relatives by means of a court 
order should qualify for a grant, which could be structured on the same basis as the foster care grant. In 
addition to the current foster care grant, an allowance should be paid to foster parents and relatives caring 
for children with special needs. 
Thus, it was recommended that foster care be supported via the FCG as it currently operates with the 
exception that it was meant to be applicable to classic foster care of children by non-relatives. An addition 
which also did not make it to the final draft was that the CSG would also be payable to the foster carer as 
an additional source of support.179  
With reference to court-ordered kinship care, the recommendation was that the applicable grant should 
equally be structured in the same manner as foster care. That is, the provision of support through a non-
                                                 
176 Skelton (2012) 338-339; Budlender, Proudlock & Jamieson (2008) 43. 
177 Some of these were also addressed in section 4.5 of Chapter Four. 
178 SALRC (2002) 230. See also Skelton (2012) 338. It was also recommended that recipients of any of the grants should be ‘should 
be exempted from school fees in respect of the children at whom the grant is targeted.’ SALRC (2002) 319. 
179 In a joint submission by the Children’s Institute (UCT), the AIDS Law Project (University of Witwatersrand), and the Alliance for 
Children’s Entitlement to Social Security (ACESS) - endorsed by the AIDS Consortium and the AIDS Legal Network pointed out an 
additional grant in the form of the CSG should not be available to foster carers as the provision of ‘both grants would not help with 
efforts to move towards substantive equality in the child care system, specifically with reference to children in urban versus rural 
settings.’ SALRC (2002) 230. But in circumstances where a person may be able to claim more than one grant, it was also 
recommended that with reference to a ‘care by relative situation’ (kinship care, court-ordered), the amount payable as FCG may be 
lower than the usual amount. SALRC (2002) 320. 
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means tested grant, which could be the FCG applicable to foster care. Additionally, where foster carers or 
court-ordered kinship carers are placed with children with special needs, it was recommended that an 
additional allowance be paid in either case.  
Finally, non-court-ordered kinship care was to be facilitated through a means tested grant in the method 
developed as the eventual CSG. While an additional grant would also be payable to an informal kinship 
carer if caring for a child with special needs (for example, the CDG), it is clear that the CSG was not 
envisaged to be applicable to court-ordered kinship care. Since the bulk of children in kinship care are 
informally placed, this approach ‘would assist in the prevention of children being drawn into the care and 
protection system.’180 
It can be observed that the proposals set out by the SALRC above are in many respects similar to the 
framework presented in the previous chapter on how kinship care models should be delineated, and to 
what extent kinship care should intersect with the child protection system.181 Foster care was proposed to 
be maintained in the traditional sense with an emphasis on its temporary nature and family reunification 
services, such that where foster care becomes long-term or extended, measures should be put in place for 
its conversion to adoption in appropriate cases.182 ‘Court-ordered kinship care’ is more or less the same as 
‘formal kinship care’ (or ‘kinship foster care’) while ‘informal kinship care’ remains the same in both 
proposals, with adequate provision for other measures of assistance outside the child protection system.183 
In order to place a child in foster care or regularise an existing care arrangement (ordinarily (informal) 
kinship care) as foster care, the court has to make a finding that the child is in need of care and protection 
                                                 
180 Skelton (2012) 338. 
181 Sec 4.5. The framework presented recommends a clear demarcation between kinship care and foster care with foster care 
remaining within the child protection system, as a temporary alternative care measure in the classic sense. The FCG or other similar 
grant will be applicable in this instance. Second is the provision for court-ordered kinship care (which may also be described as 
‘kinship foster care’ or ‘formal kinship care’), which may also be linked to the child protection system but with some room for 
flexibility in terms of specific requirements when compared to traditional foster care. Skelton suggests a means-tested grant system 
for court-ordered kinship care, which to my view is practical given the recommendation that there should be some flexibility 
related to that model of care unlike traditional foster care. Finally, informal kinship care which is the most common of all should 
not interact with the child protection system; a universal grant system (‘following the method of the child support grant 
administration’) should be made available in this circumstance to cater for children informally placed in the care of relatives. Where 
the parameters for each model of alternative care are clearly spelt out, it becomes easier to avoid the possibility of jumping from 
one form to the other due to differences in the grants system. To this end, Meintjes et al have argued that the means-test (in the 
case of informal kinship care) should be abolished to accommodate as many children in need as possible ‘irrespective of their 
parental circumstances’. Meintjes et al (2003) 54. See also Skelton (2012) 338. 
182 Skelton (2012) 338. 
183 See sections 4.5.1, 4.5.2 and 4.5.3 of Chapter Four. 
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based on the circumstances listed in section 150 of the Children’s Act mentioned previously. The first of 
these grounds is what has turned out to be the most controversial in relation to the interaction between 
kinship care and the foster care system. It provides that a child is in need of care and protection if ‘the child 
has been abandoned or orphaned and is without any visible means of support.’184  While the Act was still a 
Bill however, the ‘and’ was rendered as ‘or’, but it was eventually deleted and replaced with ‘and’. This 
seemingly small change has however resulted in a situation where different courts interpret the meaning of 
the provision differently, leading to ‘inconsistency and unequal application of the law.’185 Some courts 
(particularly lower courts) hold the view that a child already in the care of a relative (especially a 
grandmother) cannot be said to be in need of care and protection by virtue of not being abandoned. 
Further, they hold the view that the child cannot be said to be without visible means of support since 
grandmothers are generally entitled to a separate grant (old age grant) which can assist with raising the 
child. Consequently, the care arrangement would not be regularised as foster care to enable the caregiver 
receive the FCG.186 This position is apparently correct considering the fact that the manner in which sec 
150(1)(a) was framed was a deliberate attempt ‘to oust children already being cared for by their relatives 
from the care and protection system, thereby excluding them from foster care and the accompanying 
grant.’187 However, the fact that the Act provides that a child can be fostered by a relative with no 
specifications as to under what circumstances leaves the provision open to differing interpretations.188  
In SS v Presiding Officer Children’s Court, Krugersdorp,189 an uncle and an aunt were denied access to the 
FCG for the care of a relative-child in their care, and the decision was reversed upon appeal.190 The child in 
this case had been living with his uncle and aunt for 8 years after which his caregivers, on the advice of a 
social worker, approached the children’s court to have boy legally placed in their (foster) care so they could 
                                                 
184 Sec 150(1)(a). 
185 Skelton (2012) 343. 
186 Skelton (2012) 339, 343; Sloth-Nielsen (2010 ISFL paper) 18. 
187 Skelton (2012) 342. 
188 Skelton (2012) 342. 
189 2012 (6) SA 45 (GSJ). 
190 The case originated as Krugersdorp Children’s Court; case no 14/1/4/-206/10. 
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access the FCG rather than the CSG which they were already receiving.191 The issue in question therefore 
was the determination of whether the child was ‘without visible means of support’ requiring placement in 
foster care.192 The argument for the caregivers centred on the fact that the Act permits foster care by 
relatives and the case should be so interpreted. It was however held that foster care was designed for 
children who had no one to care for them and that the FCG was not for ‘income maintenance’ as it was 
clear that ‘the main reason for this enquiry is to alleviate the parties’ financial position by a foster care 
order.’193 On appeal to the South Gauteng High Court, the reversal of this judgment turned on the fact that 
under common law, an uncle and an aunt do not owe a duty of support to a nephew or niece, and as such, 
the child in question was ‘without visible means of support’ in which case he could be placed in foster care 
as a child in need of care and protection.194 Further, ‘visible’ (means of support) should be interpreted 
ordinarily with a focus on the child ‘rather than on others upon whom he or she is dependent.’195 
Consequently, the court concluded as follows: 
A child who has been orphaned or abandoned, and who is living with a caregiver, who does not have a 
common law duty of support towards such child, may be placed in foster care with that caregiver.196 
It was hoped that the outcome of this appeal would provide some temporary solutions to the crisis even 
though there is an acknowledgment of the fact the judiciary alone cannot provide answers to all the issues 
involved.197 Indeed, the judgment has only further served to prove that unless firm and concrete changes 
are made to the entire system in terms of separating foster care and its accompanying grant from kinship 
care, there will continue to be inconsistencies in how decisions are arrived at as a subsequent case in the 
same court will show. 
                                                 
191 The child was an orphan as his mother (who raised him as a single mother) was dead and father unknown. The mother and son 
had lived with his grandmother for the first two years of his life. It was upon the death of his grandmother that his mother placed 
him in the care of the uncle and aunt a while before her own death. 
192 It was settled that he was an orphan although he has started living with his caregivers before his mother’s death. 
193 Judgment, Krugersdorp Children’s Court, case no 14/1/4/-206/10 – cited in Skelton (2012) 343. 
194 In effect, the caregivers are entitled to the FCG for the care of the child. 
195 Krugersdorp case (“the Stemele matter”), paras 7, 30-31. 
196 The Stemele matter, para 29. 
197 Skelton (2012) 343. 
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In Manana and Others v Presiding Officer of the Children’s Court Krugersdorp,198 a grandmother sought to 
access the FCG for the care of three grandchildren in her care.199 The Court held that the Commissioner in 
the initial case had erred in the enquiry by holding that they were not in need of care necessitating foster 
placement as they were already being cared for; and that they were not without visible means of support 
since they had a capable and suitable caregiver.200 Children having a visible means of support should not be 
interpreted as the same as having a caregiver who has a visible means of support (that is a secondary 
enquiry determined by whether a legal duty of support rests upon such a person).201 It was argued that 
since grandmothers owe a duty of care to their grandchildren at common law, the child could not be said to 
be ‘without visible means of support’ and in need of care and protection.202  This was the main point of 
distinction between the SS case above and this one.203 The court held that although such a duty rests on 
grandparents, no such distinction is made in the Act; therefore to follow the reasoning in the earlier 
decision may therefore ‘result in untold hardships for children who end up being classified into groups of 
those who have caregivers who have a legal duty of support and those who do not.’204 Further, ‘such a 
conclusion would exclude children in the care of their grandparents who are found to be abandoned or 
orphaned from accessing government sources of support.’205 
Such constitutes unjustified discrimination which is contrary to section 7 of the Bill of Rights. This is surely not 
in keeping with the spirit of Ubuntu and it will certainly not be in the best interest of children if this 
distinction persists. All orphaned children are to be treated equally before the law.206 
Two points are particularly striking to me from the foregoing. First is the fact that it appears the CSG is not 
considered to be a ‘government source of support’ basically because it is not as high as the FCG or perhaps 
because the court is not involved in the CSG administration. This again puts into perspective the need for a 
change in the manner in which the grant system currently operates as it applies to alternative care, 
                                                 
198 South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg, unreported Case No A3075/2011 (12 April 2013). 
199 Her daughter, the biological mother of the three children died in 2008 with the father unknown. She and the children had been 
living with the grandmother up to her death. 
200 Manana case, para 13. 
201 Manana case, para 13, 21, 30-31. 
202 Thereby denying her of access to the FCG as a foster parent. 
203 Like the earlier case however, she was receiving the CSG on behalf of each child, but the amount was shown to be insufficient 
for their needs therefore putting a strain on the caregiver. 
204 Manana case, para 24. 
205 Manana case, para 24.  
206 Manana case, para 24, para 28. 
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particularly kinship care and foster care. The need for a reconceptualisation of the social assistance system 
in connection to kinship and foster care is thus urgent. This will begin with a clear separation of the two and 
a review or re-creation of the accompanying grants, including the requirements and rationale behind each. 
If clear demarcations are made between foster care and models of kinship care, regulations can also be 
developed as to what social grant accompanies which and under what circumstances. This may serve to 
resolve questions around the appropriateness and effectiveness of making the FCG available for kinship 
care generally.207 
Second is the reference to the ‘spirit of Ubuntu’. I think it is significant that it is (perhaps unwittingly) 
juxtaposed with the position of common law on relatives who owe a duty of care and those who do not. It 
will be recalled that in the second chapter of this study, it was made clear that kinship care in traditional 
African societies placed a greater obligation on uncles and aunts than on grandparents with reference to 
caring for children, especially when they are orphaned.208 It is thus quite interesting to observe that the 
position at English common law is opposite to what obtains in African cultural norms underlined by the 
principle of Ubuntu. I therefore feel that the decision of the court in this direction is welcome as it places 
due regard on the African understanding of caring for children without parental care. This shows an 
attempt at linking the traditional understanding of kinship care in Africa to its ‘new’ identity as a model of 
alternative care which was hinted at in Chapter one of this study.209  
Further, with regard to contemporary developments on the right to alternative care and with reference to 
‘visible means of support’, it is unfair to expect grandmothers (or other relatives) to rely on other grants to 
which they are personally entitled for the care of children in their de facto care - by law or as of right. Such 
grants are provided on the basis of the individual needs of the persons concerned in the same manner that 
grants targeted towards children are met for the needs of the children. The focus should therefore be on 
whether the caregiver has sufficient financial means to properly care for the child not on whether or not a 
duty exists at common law. This does not however mean that foster care and the FCG should be seen as the 
                                                 
207 Hall (2013) 93; Meintjes et al (2003) 1. 
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solution; the suggested changes to the understanding of kinship care in relation to foster care and the 
accompanying grants would be proper steps in the right direction for more sustainable solutions.210 
 
5.4.2 Namibia 
As previously noted, the provision of welfare benefits to various categories of people in Namibia is 
contained only in the non-justiciable ‘Principles of State Policy’ chapter of the constitution.211 It provides 
that the ‘State shall actively promote and maintain the welfare of the people by adopting, inter alia, 
policies aimed at’: 
enactment of legislation to ensure that the unemployed, the incapacitated, the indigent and the 
disadvantaged are accorded such social benefits and amenities as are determined by Parliament to be just 
and affordable with due regard to the resources of the State.212 
Thus, the Preamble to the CCPB provides among others that the Bill aims to provide for kinship care of 
children, for foster care and ‘to provide for grants payable in respect of certain children.’ Grants are 
provided for in Chapter 17 of the Bill, and the introduction to the chapter provides as follows: 
This chapter adjusts the existing means-tested state maintenance grant, to make it available to a parent, 
guardian, or kinship caregiver who is looking after a child. There are currently a vast number of cases in 
Namibia where families need the assistance a grant can provide but are unable to receive it as both parents 
are alive. A means tested grant under these revised criteria will also remove a huge bottleneck in the courts, 
because family members caring for children will no longer need court-ordered placements to be eligible for 
grants. This has been accomplished by treating foster care by strangers separately from kinship care by family 
members. This should produce a considerable savings in administration costs and free up social workers for 
more proactive work.   
The amounts of each grant and the eligibility requirement and other rules are to be provided for by 
regulation through the Minister. He or she must fulfil the following requirements: 
                                                 
210 While most of the cases around qualification to apply for the FCG centre around cases of children already in the care of relatives, 
it must be borne in mind that the mere fact that a child is in the care of a relative does not automatically translate to the child 
receiving proper care, support and protection especially if the child comes into care via a child protection issue (other than 
orphanhood). The child may require certain child protection services which may require a change or at least a review of the present 
care circumstances. Thus, there is the need to acknowledge the fact that all kinship care situations are not the same such that in 
situations that intersect with the child protection system, provisions are made to ensure a different treatment or approach. See 
previous discussions in Chapter four (section 4.5). 
211 Sec 95(e)-(g). 
212 Sec 95(1)(g). others include the ‘ensurance that every citizen has a right to fair and reasonable access to public facilities and 
services in accordance with the law’; and ‘ensurance that senior citizens are entitled to and do receive a regular pension adequate 
for the maintenance of a decent standard of living and the enjoyment of social and cultural opportunities’ (e)(f). 
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(a) prescribe the amounts payable during a financial year, and the schedule and method of payment, in 
respect of any grant contemplated in terms of this Chapter; and 
(b) prescribe additional requirements to be complied with by the recipient of any grants contemplated in 
terms of this Chapter; 
(c) prescribe procedures to monitor and prevent possible misuse or mismanagement of aid or a grant 
contemplated in this Chapter; 
(d) prescribe the circumstances in which a grant which has been suspended or cancelled may be reinstated; 
(e) adjust the amounts of any grants payable in terms of this Chapter from time to time to keep pace with 
rising costs.213 
Children who receive any of the grants are automatically exempted from school fees, and ‘exemption from 
payment of any fees when applying for official documents from any organ of state. They are also entitled to 
‘subsidised school uniforms, shoes and stationary; and free basic health care.’214 These exemptions are to 
ensure that the grant does not become ‘simply a transfer from one ministry’s budget to another’s.’215 It is 
also significant to note that a grant may be extended until a person is 21 years, in circumstances prescribed 
by regulation.216  
The Bill provides for five types of grants that are applicable to children in differing circumstances. They are: 
the state maintenance grant; the foster parent grant; the residential child care facility grant; the child 
disability grant; and the short-term emergency grant or assistance in kind. While all of the grants are 
relevant to the subject of alternative care generally, only three of them, which are most relevant to this 
study (and for purposes of comparison with the South African grants previously discussed), will be 
elaborated upon below: the state maintenance grant; the foster parent grant; and  the short-term 
emergency grant or assistance in kind. 
 
                                                 
213 Sec 229(1)(a)-(e). 
214 Sec 223(a)-(d). 
215 MGECW, LAC & UNICEF (2010) 163. 
216 Sec 229(2). 
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5.4.2.1 The State Maintenance Grant (SMG) 
The SMG217 is payable to any ‘parent, guardian or care-giver of a child’ (including a child who heads a 
household) upon the caregiver satisfying the following requirements: 
(a) that the child or children normally resides or reside with him or her and that he or she is in fact primarily 
responsible for the daily, physical care of the child or children;  
(b) that the grant will be used for the benefit of the child or children;  
(c) that the child or children has or have Namibian citizenship or permanent residency;  
(d) that the child or children is or are under the age of 18 years;  
(e) that he or she satisfies the prescribed means test; and  
(f) that he or she satisfies any other requirements as may be prescribed: Provided that such requirements 
may not include any limit on the total number of children in a single household who may receive such a 
grant.218   
The SMG is more or less the Namibian equivalent of the CSG; it will be recalled that the CSG in South Africa 
was transformed from the SMG that obtained in South Africa prior to the democratic dispensation. Thus, 
the Namibian SMG is also subject to a means test, is payable to one who factually cares for the child daily 
and is for the benefit of the child or children. Unlike the CSG however, no limit is placed on the number of 
children for which applications can be made for the SMG in Namibia.219  
It is important to point out that by virtue of the introduction to Chapter 17 on grants quoted above, it is 
clear that the SMG is the grant that is applicable to kinship care and no other. One is not quite certain if this 
is the right approach seeing that one of the strong recommendations made by the MGECW was the 
creation of a specific kinship care grant ‘that is means tested with a sliding scale related to the size of the 
household and the number of children in the care of one primary caregiver.’220 Alternatively, if a general 
basic income or child care grant (such as the SMG) is maintained for kinship carers, an additional allowance 
                                                 
217 Sec 217. The amount and frequency of payment are to be prescribed by regulation as appropriated by Parliament or another 
source (1)-(2). 
218 Sec 217(2). 
219 Further, a successful SMG application will be paid out to the actual caregiver regardless of who put in the application and an 
adult supervising a child-headed household may also apply for it on behalf of the children in the household. Sec 217(4)(5). Prior to 
the CCPB however, the SMG was payable for a maximum of three children per household. 
220 van Sloten (2009) x. 
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should be provided ‘to cover the costs of fostering the child’,221 such addition not being the grant 
prescribed for foster care. And where a dedicated kinship care grant is created, the application process 
should be administratively comparable to the SMG for ease of processing except in cases where there is a 
child protection issue requiring investigation.222  
In my view, a clear recognition of kinship care as distinct from foster care demands a separate grant. This is 
because a general basic income is ordinarily applicable to all children in need, not necessarily in the context 
of alternative care, while a specific kinship care grant should be organised within the framework of the right 
to alternative care. Both the SMG and the foster care grant are currently fixed at the same amounts (200 
Namibian dollars - N$);223 perhaps this explains why it is not considered important to maintain a designated 
‘kinship care grant’. However, the SMG is means-tested and one is not certain if a means-test is appropriate 
to all situations of kinship care.224 It remains to be seen what changes will be made in terms of the means 
test, although it is clear that the threshold will be lowered.225 
 
5.4.2.2 The Foster Parent Grant (FPG) 
This is a non-means tested grant payable to a foster parent in whose care a child has been placed by order 
of court.226 The Bill is clear on the fact that this grant is of a separate category that is strictly applicable to 
non-relative foster care as defined by the Bill.227 To further buttress this, the Bill provides: 
                                                 
221 van Sloten (2009) x. 
222 van Sloten (2009) x. 
223 Approximately USD 20 as at October 2013 exchange rates. 
224 The means test prior to the CCPB reads thus: ‘A biological parent who earns less than N$1000 per month and supports a child 
under 18 years of age, where either the other parent receives an old-age pension or a disability grant, or is unemployed or is in 
prison for six months or longer; or has died is eligible for this grant.’ See Gender Research & Advocacy Project (GRAP) & Legal 
Assistance Centre (LAC)  ‘Alternative report to Namibia’s first, second and third periodic reports on the implementation of the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and two optional protocols’ (1997-2008) (2012) 11. See also MGECW Child 
welfare grants in Namibia (pamphlet) 2010. The rigidity of the means test (prior to the CCPB) perhaps offers an additional 
explanation for why relatives would seek to be named as foster parents in order to receive the non-means tested foster care grant. 
225 In the build-up to the CCPB, a universal grant was recommended in place of means tested grants. This was against the 
background of the fact that Namibia had in fact pioneered ‘the first universal cash-transfer pilot project in the world’ for 24 months 
up to December 2009, which resulted in a significant drop in household poverty. The government was however dismissive of the 
idea from the outset as reflected by the outcome of the final Bill. See GRAP & LAC (2012) 12-13. See also C Haarmann et al Making 
the difference! The BIG in Namibia (2009) 13-17. 
226 Sec 218(1). 
227 See the introduction to Chapter 12 on foster care, para 3. 
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A court order contemplated in section 150(1) and a kinship care agreement concluded and registered in 
terms of section 114(2) serve as authorisation for a foster parent or kinship care-giver who complies with the 
prescribed requirements to gain immediate access to such aid or grant which a child in foster care or kinship 
care is entitled to.228 
A distinction is thus made between the grant which applies to kinship care and that which applies to foster 
care. Not more than six children can be placed in one foster home (and thus entitled to a FPG) unless it is 
otherwise determined to be in the best interests of the children.229 As a measure to prevent the crisis of 
lapsed foster care grants in South Africa, the Namibian Bill further provides that: 
Where a foster parent grant is terminated upon the lapsing of an order placing a child in foster care in terms 
of section 147(1) but the child remains in such foster care, such grant must be extended until such time as 
the children’s court has made a decision on whether or not to extend the order placing the child in foster 
care.230 
The Namibian Children’s Act of 1960 did not provide for kinship care and so many caregivers who had the 
children of other relatives in their care went to the courts to be named foster carers in order to be eligible 
for grants available to foster carers.231 This increased the burden placed on courts, and social workers, 
which in turn caused delays in accessing the grant in approved cases.232 In many cases, approval was 
granted for private arrangements to be registered as foster care enabling the caregivers to access the 
grants. However, there were also inconsistencies in the decisions since many others, regardless of their 
financial status did not have their placement arrangements authorised as foster care and as such were 
denied from accessing the grant.233 There were also concerns in Namibia that many were abusing the foster 
care system by utilising it as means for accessing financial benefits through children. These among others 
revealed the urgent need to overhaul the entire grants system as linked to alternative care, resulting in the 
radical changes introduced by the CCPB.234 
                                                 
228 Sec 222(1). 
229 Sec 154. 
230 Sec 218(2). 
231 GRAP & LAC (2012) 12. 
232 UNICEF Children and Adolescents in Namibia 2010: a situation analysis (2010) 44; van Sloten (2009) x. 
233 Hubbard D, Paper presented at the Miller Du Toit and UWC Child and Family Law Conference, March 2011, Cape Town, South 
Africa (on file with the author). Hubbard and the Legal Assistance Centre in Windhoek, Namibia have been at the forefront of the 
production of the new Bill. 
234 Sloth-Nielsen (2010 ISFL paper) 12. 
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As at 2010, the foster care grant in Namibia was valued at 200 Namibian dollars (N$) per month, for the 
first child (including general household expenses), and an additional N$ 100 for additional children.235 Given 
that the South African rand and Namibian dollars are equivalent, the South African foster care grant is four 
times the amount of the grant in Namibia. Combined figures show that the number of children who have 
received child welfare grants (including the SMG and foster care grant) has grown from 9,000 beneficiaries 
in 2002 to 113,995 in April 2010.236 It may therefore be safely assumed that the money is not a huge driver 
for the preference of the foster care grant. Rather, it is the more stringent means test applicable to the 
SMG and not applicable to the foster care grant that drives the push for individual seeking to be named as 
foster carers thereby becoming eligible for the accompanying grant. 
  
5.4.2.3 The Short-term Emergency Grant or Assistance in Kind  
The short-term emergency grant is a new grant introduced by Namibia in the CCPB.237 The importance of 
this grant relates to the wider scope of children to which alternative care is applicable as discussed in the 
previous two chapters.238 The short-term emergency grant is payable in cash or kind (including food aid)239 
in emergency situations caused as a result of: 
(a) the accidental loss by a child of his or her family; 
(b) the accidental loss by a child of his or her home or possessions; 
(c) natural disasters and which are not covered by any other Government relief measures;   
(d) as a result of armed conflicts; 
(e) illness of the child or his or her financial provider; and 
(f) as may be prescribed. 
                                                 
235 MGECW, LAC & UNICEF (2010) 162. 
236 MGECW The Effectiveness of Child Welfare Grants in Namibia (2010); UNICEF (2010) 32. 
237 GRAP & LAC (2012) 12. 
238 Section 3.6.2, Chapter Three and section 4.2.1.3, Chapter Four. 
239 Sec 221(1)(2). 
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These are circumstances which may eventually lead to the child requiring placement in alternative care. 
However, the provision of the grant is a positive first step towards stabilising the child and planning for 
family reunification or permanency where possible. 
 
5.5 Conclusions 
This chapter presented an overview of national legislation and policy guiding alternative care generally at 
the domestic level, in South Africa and Namibia. It is clear the national laws have been influenced in a 
general way by the CRC and the ACRWC especially considering the inclusion of rights specific to children in 
the constitutions of the two countries. Both constitutions recognise the right to parental care and the 
primary obligation of parents to provide care and support for their children. South Africa is however a step 
ahead in that it clearly provides for the right to alternative care where parental care is no longer available 
or adequate. Through several cases decided in South African courts, considerable jurisprudence has been 
developed for understanding and interpreting the right to alternative care in practical ways. Namibia (and 
indeed many other countries) may be guided by such a rich legal culture in taking forward the realisation of 
the right to alternative when the Child Care and Protection Bill becomes law. 
Both the South African Children’s Act and the Namibian Child Care and Protection Bill are very 
comprehensive with regards to children’s rights generally, and the right to alternative care in particular. 
They also both provide a wide variety of key terms and detailed descriptions of situations in which children 
are categorised as being in need of care and protection and in need of alternative care specifically. Further, 
they have developed various (and in some cases novel) forms of alternative care especially in the area of 
residential or institutional care; these include temporary safe care or places of safety, child and youth care 
facilities, shelters as well as education and development centres. This development is a welcome one as 
both countries are in compliance with the UN Guidelines in this regard. It is also significant that both the 
Act and the Bill maintain that such facilities be regarded as measures of last resort and should be relied 
upon only when it is in the best interests of the children concerned. Additionally, the Act and the Bill are in 
conformity with the UN Guidelines in terms of the recognition of and provision for child-headed 
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households. The UN Guidelines further urge States to take special measures to ensure that the head of a 
child-headed household enjoys all rights inherent to his or her child status including access to education 
and leisure.240 The two instruments are cognisant of this fact and address it through the provision of 
adequate supervision for all children in child-headed households.241  
The major distinction between both instruments is with regards to the status of kinship care. The Namibian 
Bill is noteworthy for expressly embodying this form of alternative care in law, while clearly distinguishing it 
from foster care. This approach is quite revolutionary in that it not only provides for the recognition of 
kinship care but also rightly places it above foster care in the hierarchy of care options. It is submitted that 
this position is cognisant of the realities of alternative care in the African context, and presents a more 
practical manner of addressing the problem which affects the vast majority of children deprived of their 
family environment and therefore in need of alternative care. By providing separately for kinship care and 
foster care in terms of law and regulations, the Bill is in full compliance with the UN Guidelines, and in 
many respects, with the framework provided and discussed in the previous chapter.242  
The Bill can be said to acknowledge ‘private kinship care’ (which would ordinarily attract no State obligation 
as discussed in chapter four)243 while providing for ‘informal kinship care’ since it is recognised that there 
will be few cases of ‘court-ordered kinship care’ (‘formal kinship care’).  However, since a registration 
process and a written agreement (between the original caregiver and kinship caregiver) are required for a 
kinship caregiver to access grants, the line between ‘informal kinship care’ and ‘formal kinship care’ seems 
to have been blurred. This is further highlighted by the fact that there is no provision for a ‘kinship care 
grant’ as is the case for ‘foster care grant’. Rather it is the SMG that is available to kinship care. Full 
compliance with the framework presented in chapter four requires a specific grant for ‘formal kinship care’ 
while a general or basic grant such as the SMG will be accessible to informal kinship carers, among other 
                                                 
240 Para 37 UNG. 
241 See generally sections 137 SA Children’s Act and 127 CCPB. 
242 Sections 4.2.1, 4.2.3 and 4.2.5. 
243 Section 4.5.1. 
 
 
 
 
216 
 
categories of children generally in need of care whether in parental or alternative care. This was better 
captured in the rejected proposal of the SALRC before the adoption of the South African Children’s Act.244 
It has been shown that the general opening provided for kinship carers to be identified as foster care 
(within the foster care system) has resulted in a situation where financial motivation is the catalyst for the 
dramatic increase in the number of children in foster care within the last decade – in both South Africa and 
Namibia. However, it is expected that the implementation of the Child Care and Protection Bill and 
accompanying regulations (when it becomes law) will be significant in turning the tide based on the 
foundation of providing separately for kinship care and foster care. In the case of South Africa, with three 
amendment Bills to the Children’s Act now in circulation and a court-imposed deadline of 2014, it is 
expected that clear strategies that will provide sustainable solutions will be adopted. With specific 
reference to the relationship between kinship caregivers and foster care grants, it is hoped that the current 
stability and decline in the upsurge of recipients will be maintained while operating a sustainable 
alternative arrangement.245 While recent cases on the subject have attempted to provide a way forward, 
other strategies have to be adopted by the other arms of government to arrive at a more wholesome 
solution. 
In the next chapter of this study, which is the concluding chapter, some of the recommendations that have 
been made by other scholars and academics will be re-visited without attempting to raise new issues. With 
reference to South Africa, in the face of the on-going consultations towards the amendment of the 
Children’s Act, it is important to synthesize various thoughts and opinions as to the way forward in order 
contribute towards a viable and feasible way forward. One of the thoughts that immediately come to my 
mind is that South Africa may need to borrow in part from the Namibian approach. Alternatively, there may 
be a need to revisit, in part or in whole, the initial/original proposal of the SALRC on providing for models of 
kinship care distinct from foster care, and the accompanying grants, while the Children’s Act was still in the 
Bill stage. One fact is however obvious: there are no simple solutions to all the issues involved. 
                                                 
244 Sec section 5.4.1.2 of this chapter. 
245 New FCG applicants and recipients have declined since 2011 due to factors such as the termination of the grants for 
beneficiaries who have turned 18, and perhaps the lapse of many grants leading to a moratorium on FCGs lapsing until 2014. See 
Hall (2013) 93. 
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CHAPTER SIX – CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: TOWARDS EFFECTIVE 
RECOGNITION AND UTILISATION OF KINSHIP CARE AS ALTERNATIVE CARE 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This research presents an insight into the right to alternative care for children deprived of parental 
care/family environment, with a focus on the status of kinship care in comparison with foster care 
generally. This is achieved through analysis of international treaties and declarations, regional instruments, 
universal guidelines and other relevant international instruments. At the domestic level, national legislation 
relevant to alternative care in two southern African countries are also presented and analysed in terms of 
their conformity with international and regional law on alternative care again with a focus on the status of 
kinship care in domestic law and policy coupled with measures of social assistance provisioning for kinship 
care and foster care. 
In this concluding chapter, the central question around the changing context of kinship care from a family 
environment to an option of alternative care is discussed by highlighting the answers to the research 
questions posed at the beginning of the study in order to bring the thesis to a close. More conclusions will 
be drawn and recommendations targeted at the improvement of law and policy-making on kinship care will 
be made. 
 
6.2 Kinship Care: The Transition from a Traditional Family Environment to Alternative Care 
In Chapter two, this research provided an insight into the utilisation of kinship-based family environments 
and the child-rearing practice of kinship care among African families in historical and contemporary 
periods. It drew attention to the various ways in which families constructed kinship networks and the 
purposes they served: family preservation and identity formation as well as a coping mechanism or survival 
strategy, amongst others. This history plays a decisive role in how kinship patterns of family organisations 
subsist even today. Consequently, despite the changes that have impacted on the traditional practice of 
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kinship care over time due to factors such as migration, the rise of the nuclear family system, modern 
economic systems and labour relations, HIV/AIDS, poverty and other socio-economic conditions, kinship 
families and systems have had to adapt rather than be annihilated.  
However, the result of the erosion on the structure of the historical/traditional family by these factors on 
the ancient child-rearing practice of kinship care is to a large extent no longer an automatic expectation. 
The gradual shift from kinship care as a shared responsibility to kinship care largely being the sole 
responsibility of an individual relative (or branch of the larger extended family) is a major trigger for the 
transition of kinship care into a form of alternative care in contemporary understanding. Most families and 
individuals are severely overburdened that they may not willingly and adequately take up the role of caring 
the children of their relatives without assistance. 
  
6.2.1 Kinship Care: Status in International and Regional Law and Policy 
Upon establishing the fact that kinship care has always been an integral part of child care in African 
societies, it was pointed out that kinship care is only just beginning to be acknowledged in studies and 
practice around child welfare/child protection and children’s rights generally – within the framework of the 
right to alternative care. In most contemporary studies and literature on kinship care, kinship care is largely 
presented as a self-standing form of alternative care within the care continuum, in the same manner as 
foster care, adoption or placement in institutions, and it is promoted as the best form of family-based 
alternative that should be adopted for the care of children deprived of parental care.1 This despite kinship 
care being the least protected and supported form of alternative care for children deprived parental care, 
and in which the majority of children in alternative care are informally placed. 
This prompted the discussions in Chapter three on the international rules and regulations guiding the right 
to alternative care. This chapter presented an analysis of the key instruments on children’s rights including 
alternative care, mainly the CRC, the African Children’s Charter and the Hague Intercountry Adoption 
                                                 
1 See among others Save the Children UK (2007); EveryChild and HelpAge International Family first: Prioritising support to kinship 
carers, especially older carers (2012); Cantwell et al (2012). 
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Convention. While the CRC and the ACRWC provide for the obligation of States Parties to secure alternative 
care, neither makes any direct reference to kinship care as a form of alternative. In fact, it was clearly 
shown that the original intent of the CRC was not for care by extended family members to count as 
alternative care but rather as part and parcel of a child’s family environment. The African Children’s Charter 
provides for a wider notion of the ‘family’ based on the recognition of the role of the extended family and 
larger community in the upbringing of children in African, as discussed in chapters two and three. This 
serves to explain the non-reference to kinship care as alternative care in the Charter. However, in light of 
contemporary developments resulting in kinship care becoming accepted as alternative care as discussed in 
chapter two and four, the reference to ‘alternative family care’ rather than ‘alternative care’ in the Charter 
has become in my opinion a basis for inferring kinship care as alternative care in terms of the African 
Children’s Charter. 
It will be recalled that beginning with an analysis of instruments that were adopted prior to the CRC and 
ACRWC, the discussions in chapter three further revealed the history and discussions around the 
conceptualisation of the right to alternative care as it is understood and interpreted today. With reference 
to kinship care, the 1986 Declaration first provided for ‘care by relatives of the child’s parents’ as the first 
alternative care measure to be considered where the parents are ‘unavailable or inappropriate’.2 This 
provision did not make it into the eventual CRC and ACRWC based on the understanding of ‘family 
environment’ with regard to child care as mentioned in the preceding paragraph. Thus chapter three also 
elaborated on certain key concepts crucial for understanding the right to alternative generally and the 
transition of kinship care into that framework. The concepts, which also laid the foundation for further 
discussions in subsequent chapters include: ‘family environment’; ‘children deprived of their family 
environment’; ‘special protection and assistance’; ‘the best interests of the child’; ‘continuity in upbringing’; 
and ‘alternative care’. 
   
                                                 
2 Art 4 of the Declaration on Social and Legal Principles relating to the Protection and Welfare of Children, with Special Reference to 
Foster Placement and Adoption Nationally and Internationally (1986). 
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6.2.2 Kinship Care: Conceptualisation as Alternative Care 
Following from the above, the thesis proceeded in Chapter four to dwell on the conceptualisation of kinship 
care as alternative through the UN Guidelines on the Alternative care of Children (2009). As already 
discussed, kinship had long before 2009 started to be reflected as a form of alternative care, but the role of 
the UN Guidelines is significant in universally establishing it as such. This is achieved by a shift in the 
standard for activating the right to alternative care under the UN Guidelines which is different from the 
standard in terms of the CRC and the African Children’s Charter. The main focus of the UN Guidelines in 
activating alternative care is the loss of ‘parental care’, and not ‘family environment’ as broadly defined 
previously to include members of the extended family. This is cognisant of the structural changes that the 
family has undergone before and after the adoption of the CRC as well as the ACRWC. The diversification 
and increasing complexity of most African societies with regard to family and child care practices reveal 
that it is idealistic to assume that the kinship network or system is an automatic haven of care for children 
deprived of parental care. 
The UN Guidelines however develop the right to alternative care more progressively by establishing the 
two pillars of alternative care: the necessity principle and the suitability principle. Both principles are 
central to kinship care whether interpreted as family environment or in the framework of alternative care. 
Through the necessity principle the Guidelines place a great emphasis on the need to exhaust all measures 
to keep children in their original family environment before contemplating alternative care. This means in a 
situation where a child’s existing/original/primary family environment is based on kinship care, as discussed 
in the introductory chapter to this study, family preservation measures must be taken to keep the family 
together through financial and other resources thereby ensuring that the child does not become deprived 
of his family environment unnecessarily. While kinship care generally enjoys the status of being the most 
natural, least intrusive and family-based model of alternative care, the suitability principle requires that 
there must be clear evidence of this in particular cases before deeming it appropriate for the child or 
children concerned as the focus is on the importance of safeguarding the best interests of the child or 
children concerned. Despite the beneficial aspects of kinship care as presented in Chapter four, the risks 
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involved must not be ignored or underestimated which pre-supposes that the decision as to the suitability 
of kinship care ought to be arrived at on a case-by-case basis. 
Also discussed in the chapter is the clear distinction that the UN Guidelines make between formal 
alternative and informal alternative, the latter mostly comprising kinship care generally. This set the basis 
for an examination of the interactions between kinship care and the child protection system in comparison 
to foster care. While (non-relative) foster care is relatively unknown or practiced in Africa, it was made 
clear the concept of fostering is not a strange concept to African culture. Although rooted in kinship 
tradition, aspects of fostering as traditionally understood in Africa were highlighted in order to distinguish it 
from the understanding of kinship care as alternative care, especially in contemporary law and practice.  
It must however be borne in mind that foster care as a component of child protection has been introduced 
into the legislation of many African countries; it is one of the new features prompted by the child law 
reform processes all across the continent. Its introduction is largely considered a response to the scourge of 
HIV/AIDS and other disasters that have impacted on the care of children in Africa by crippling the 
traditional kinship care system.  However, the fact that kinship care still absorbs the lion’s share of children 
deprived of parental care shows the introduction of (non-relative) foster care without a focus on the status 
and role of kinship care is in my opinion, not a holistic approach. This is without prejudice to the fact that 
foster care as well as other emerging forms of alternative care should be provided for; it is imperative to 
have a variety of care options to choose from in order to determine that which is most suited to the needs 
and best interests of the child.  
In that light this writer, drawing inspiration and guidance from the UN Guidelines and the works of other 
authors on the subject, presented a framework for delineating models of kinship care and their 
intersections with the child protection system in comparison to foster care which is historically a child 
protection device. Thus, private kinship care, informal kinship care, and formal kinship care were re-defined 
and differently aligned or non-aligned with the child protection system in terms of formalisation. A blanket 
demand for the formalisation of kinship care (particularly within the framework of foster care) is 
problematic for several reasons such as the huge and largely unrealistic burden it places on the social 
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welfare departments or formal child protection system as discussed in Chapter five. Others include the fact 
that some children drop in and out of kinship care because the placement is not static. There are also 
concerns about the intrusion of the State into family life and the impact this may have on further 
development of traditional kinship care structures, among others.3 An example of this is ‘customary 
adoption’ which may be jeopardised by perceived State intrusion into family life.  
‘Customary adoption’ is in many respects what is understood as fosterage in the African context, as 
discussed in Chapter four; it is conducted by agreement between the families and involves government 
institutions or officers.4 States Parties, the CRC Committee and the ACERWC should give attention to how 
customary adoptions can be developed in promoting children’s right to alternative care rather than 
dismissing it for lack of information or understanding about it.5 While it has been suggested that the deep-
rooted nature of customary adoption is a reason why common law adoption is not common in Africa, it is 
also clear that the level of government involvement (perceived as intrusion) in the latter is a major 
hindrance.6 However, once there is support for it (as alternative care), legal and policy intervention 
measures can be more readily received as a critical strategy for the protection of the children involved.7  
The discussions in Chapter four also provided for appropriate circumstances where the formalisation of 
kinship care should be promoted, especially where the need for alternative care arises out of a child 
protection issue. In such cases, vulnerable and otherwise victimised children can access other services 
specific to their needs and can receive a higher degree of monitoring for the prevention of further abuse, 
exploitation or neglect. What all these suggest is that ‘careful decisions need to be made about whether or 
not kinship care is formalised, based on the needs and wishes of the child and the family, and the capacities 
                                                 
3 EveryChild and HelpAge International (2012) 17. 
4 See also Bennet (1995) 107. Customary adoption is common is many African countries and continues to be practised in, among 
others, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, and Uganda. 
5 Mezmur (2009) 49, 325-326. 
6 EveryChild Making social work: Improving social work for vulnerable children and families around the world (2012); Mezmur 
(2009) 47-48; Ngwafor E ‘The Family Code: A satisfactory gestation period’ in Bainham A (ed) The International Survey of Family 
Law (2006) 128. 
7 Mezmur (2009) 49. 
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of social services departments.’8 ‘Regardless of whether or not care is formalised, child protection 
measures should be in place and children and carers should be fully supported.’9 
 
6.3 Kinship Care: Status in National Legislation and Policy 
In Chapter 1 and 5 (among others), it was pointed out that the on-going child law reform processes across 
several African countries are intended to repeal obsolete legislation concerning children while harmonising 
new ones with the standards of the CRC and the ACRWC as part of efforts to domesticate those 
instruments. A significant feature of all the child law reform processes is the inclusion of provisions on child 
protection and the right to alternative care. Thus, this thesis, after analysing the right to alternative care at 
the international and regional levels focused on the place of the right at the national level, using South 
Africa and Namibia as focal points.  
The inclusion of children’s rights in national constitutions generally is a relatively new and progressive 
development. It was therefore significant to note that children’s rights not only notably feature in the 
constitutions of the countries under study, the right to alternative is also specifically provided for, with 
particular reference to the constitution of South Africa. Section 28 of the constitution clearly states that 
every child has the right ‘to family care or parental care, or to appropriate alternative care when removed 
from the family environment’.10 It was pointed out that the family environment as provided in the 
constitution is understood to be inclusive of kin or other relatives of the child apart from the biological 
parents. However, the implementation has not been that simple due to the overlaps between kinship care 
and foster as provided in the South African Children’s Act; a situation arising from the structural and other 
changes that the family has undergone as discussed in Chapter 2. 
                                                 
8 EveryChild and HelpAge International (2012) 18. 
9 As above: ‘However kinship care is formalised, family resistance to the formalising of care is likely to be reduced if officials are 
sympathetic and operate in partnership with the family.’ 
10 Sec 28(1)(b). 
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With regards to the right to alternative care in the child-specific legislation of both countries – the 
Children’s Act and the Child Care and Protection Bill – both provided for a range of alternative care 
measures including foster care, but address kinship care differently. 
  
6.3.1 Kinship Care: Comparisons with Foster Care 
Although the South African Children’s Act does not expressly provide for kinship care as alternative care, 
kinship care is subsumed within the foster care system since an appointed foster carer may be the child’s 
relative. The challenge with this approach, as discussed previously, is that the foster care system which was 
designed to operate as a child protection mechanism has become over-burdened with cases of children 
who ordinarily should not fall within the child protection system. 
In the case of Namibia, kinship care is expressly provided for and a list is provided to give clarity on who is 
understood to be a ‘family member’ and therefore a (potential) ‘kinship caregiver’. It is submitted that this 
is good practice to help guide the separation of kinship care from foster care as alternative care measures. 
It maintains the understanding of foster care in the classic/traditional sense of care provided by non-
relatives with kinship care being restricted to alternative care provided by relatives of the child. A clear line 
of demarcation between kinship care and foster care is in line with the directions provided by the UN 
Guidelines on how the alternative care of children should be regulated and managed. It also makes data 
collection easier for planning purposes; where kinship care and foster care are mixed up, it may be difficult 
to investigate and address particular problems applicable to each form of alternative care, among others. 
The Namibia Bill also introduces the concept of ‘children in need of protective services’ as against ‘children 
in need of care and protection’. This distinction is significant in the context of kinship care because it draws 
attention to the discussions in Chapter 4 about the fact that there are circumstances in which children in 
kinship care may interact with the child protection system – highlighted by the delineation of kinship care 
models as discussed in that chapter (private kinship care, informal kinship care and formal kinship care). 
The distinction also draws attention to the fact that, as discussed in Chapter 5, kinship care just like foster 
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care is applicable for a range of situations ranging from ‘emergency’ to ‘temporary’ and ‘long-term’ 
depending on the circumstances of each case. 
  
6.3.2 Kinship Care: Social Assistance Provisioning 
One of the subject matters discussed in Chapter 2 of this study is the importance of the rights to social 
security and an adequate standard of living as it applies to children and their families. It was clearly pointed 
out that the right to an adequate standard of living cannot be separated from the right to social security; 
the latter generally serves as the means through which the former is realised. These rights serve as a basis 
for the provision of social assistance through grants as it concerns the right to alternative care and 
particularly kinship care. This is because as previously highlighted, the socio-economic condition of poverty 
and changes in the economic systems and structures impact greatly on the nature and quality of 
parental/family care which in turn give rise to the need for alternative care. Increasingly therefore, States’ 
obligation to provide the right to alternative care for children deprived of their family environment or 
parental care cannot be separated from States’ obligations to guarantee children’s rights to social security 
and an adequate standard of living. 
Chapter 3 of this study alluded to Principle 6 of the 1959 Declaration of the Rights of the Child which stated 
that States have a duty, through the payment of State and other assistance, to ‘extend particular support to 
children without a family and to those without adequate means of support.’ This duty is even more 
relevant in today’s context in light of the challenges militating against many families, especially poverty. In 
the context of alternative care, the need for the provision of support by the State to children in kinship care 
cannot be overemphasised. This is because while kinship carers may be motivated based on a sense of 
moral duty (unlike classic foster care), the reality in Africa is that a broad base of support is required to 
carry through with the care of children in one’s care. This is especially the case where the caregivers are 
themselves not financially stable because, ‘while caregivers are highly motivated, an overload of 
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responsibility can contribute to negative outcomes.’11 States cannot rely on individual acts of kindness 
where the best interests of the child is in issue; laws and policies have to change in accordance with the 
changes in society, and children do not have the luxury of time to wait for effective change that impacts on 
their growth and development. It is therefore important to stress that social policies targeted at the 
provision of support for kinship care should be based on law in order to ensure sustainability.  
Various forms of social assistance are provided for kinship caregivers in many African countries but there is 
very little government involvement in the process; non-governmental organisations and civil society 
organisations generally are the drivers of the process.  While this is commendable, it must be emphasised 
that it is the responsibility of the State to secure the protection of all children within its territory, and the 
provision of assistance where necessary is one major way of fulfilling the obligation placed upon States 
Parties. Indeed, the fact that social assistance provisioning relevant to kinship care are provided in 
legislation in both South Africa and Namibia, informed the decision to focus on these two countries in this 
study. The inclusion of socio-economic rights as justiciable rights in national constitutions and other 
legislation is one way to entrench the obligation of States as well as monitor or measure implementation. 
The challenges faced by children deprived of parental care/family environment cannot be left to the 
discretion of the government.12 As some of the cases previously discussed have shown, decisions 
concerning children’s care arrangement cannot be done without giving consideration to the socio-
economic conditions of the children and their caregivers. Thus, while legislation provides the foundation for 
establishing State obligation, it also serves as a tool for moving political will in the direction of facilitating 
other measures (non-legal) for effectively raising the profile of kinship care and establishing regulatory 
standards around the subject. 
However, the manner in which support is provided for kinship care has to be carefully considered and 
organised. The discussions in the previous chapter showed that where the lines between foster care and 
kinship care are blurred, it becomes complicated to organise social grants system around them as the focus 
may be shifted from what form of alternative care is most appropriate for a particular child to what form of 
                                                 
11 Ince (2009) 335. 
12 UNICEF Handbook on legislative reform: Realising children’s rights (2008) 21. 
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alternative care provides a certain form, calibre or amount of support. In both South Africa and Namibia, it 
has been shown that treating kinship care separately from foster care will drastically reduce the number of 
children in the child protection system thereby eliminating or at least reducing the undue burden placed on 
the social work or social welfare system. This does not however mean that children in kinship care but out 
of the child protection system are left without support, but that the medium of support is changed to 
eliminate the technicalities around the foster care system. 
In the South African context, there may be the need to review the child support grant as it currently stands 
against the foster child grant. It is hoped that the on-going consultations with a view to amending the 
Children’s Act will provide solutions in this regard. The most obvious recommendations for now are those 
highlighted by Skelton and discussed in Chapter 5 as well as those elaborated upon within the framework 
provided in Chapter 4 of this study. For now, it is practical to ensure that all kinship caregivers currently 
entitled to the FCG continue to receive it until the 2014 deadline after which they will be incorporated into 
the new and emerging regime. This will include the provision of all grants deemed extended by the court 
while new/future applications will be processed in terms of the new approach to be developed. A more 
sustainable approach however, is to consider bringing together a range of support services beyond the 
provision of social grants to sustain kinship care as a stable form of alternative care both within and outside 
the child protection system.13 
Further, it is submitted that since children are the target in terms of the provision of support when in 
kinship care, the children in kinship care should also be made aware of the financial incentives and other 
forms of support made available to their caregivers on their behalf. This promotes the participation of 
children in matters concerning them and may also boost their self-esteem so they are not made to feel like 
they are burdens on their caregivers when due provisions have been made. Further, the children are in a 
better position to speak up whenever they are not benefitting from provisions made on their behalf, and 
appropriate action can be taken to remedy the situation. 
 
                                                 
13 Ince (2009) 337. 
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6.4 Recommendations 
 
In this section, a number of recommendations are provided for different stakeholders concerned with 
children’s rights generally and the right to alternative care in particular. These recommendations are aimed 
at suggesting and encouraging further action towards the full implementation of the right to alternative 
care, particularly kinship care. 
6.4.1 The Roles of the CRC Committee and the ACERWC 
 
It has been suggested previously that it is important for the CRC Committee to issue a general comment on 
the right to alternative care, including ‘explanatory principles that enable States to harmonise national 
rules and regulations with the UN Guidelines.’14 This writer recommends the same because as has been 
shown in the course of this study, there are several subjects that require clarification and interpretation by 
the CRC Committee to enable States comply with their obligations as they concern children’s right to 
alternative care. Examples include the position of child-headed households, the relationship between 
parental care and family environment, and with particular reference to the subject of this research, the 
status of kinship care and its relationship with foster care, as well as the importance of highlighting the role 
of the State in providing various forms of support for kinship care. 
 It is submitted that it is even more important for the ACERWC to also issue a general comment on the right 
to alternative care with a particular focus on the predominance of kinship care across the continent. It will 
be recalled that in Chapter 3, a distinction was made between the right to ‘alternative care’ as expressed in 
the CRC and the right to ‘alternative family care’ as contained in the ACRWC. It was shown that this points 
to an African understanding of the care of the child within a family environment. It is important for the 
general comment to incorporate elements of the right to social security and social assistance, as derived 
from other rights and as discussed in this study, particularly against the background of the lack of express 
                                                 
14 Phillips (2011) 287. 
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provisions on social security in the ACRWC as discussed in Chapter 2. In addition to the general comment, it 
is also recommended that the general comment should be preceded by the dedication of a Day of the 
African Child (DAC) celebration to the theme of alternative care for children deprived of parental care in 
Africa.15 All these will serve towards understanding and tailoring kinship care and the right to alternative 
care generally in a manner that is responsive to the realities of family life and alternative care across the 
continent. 
6.4.2 The Role of States Parties 
 
A central theme of the thesis is the proposition that kinship care needs to be expressly recognised as 
alternative care separate and distinct from foster care in order for the concerns of children and caregivers 
in such circumstances to be adequately understood and responded to. Thus, States Parties, as part of the 
on-going harmonisation of child law process need to take this into account and comply accordingly in line 
with the standards in international law as already discussed. While the majority of the new legislation on 
children’s rights provides for foster care, no clear provisions are made for kinship care; this despite the fact 
that classic foster care is not a common practice in Africa while kinship care is the predominant form of 
alternative care for children deprived of parental care. Without clear laws and policies in place, proper 
standards cannot be put in place and regulation cannot be guaranteed for situations where it is required. 
The situation where the status of kinship care is not clear or where it is not (legally) recognised although it 
is being practiced, does not augur well for the best interests of the affected children and for their overall 
survival and development. It is also the responsibility of States to put in place practical measures for making 
all rules, guidelines and standards accessible and understandable to the general public, including those who 
are poor and illiterate. This will ensure that the entire populace owns and supports the process, which will 
                                                 
15 The DAC is an annual celebration/event (every June 16) by which the ACEWRC calls on political leaders and other children’s rights 
stakeholders to assess and improve upon their obligation to effectively promote and protect children’s rights across the continent. 
In 2012, the selected theme was ‘The Rights of Children with disabilities: the duty to protect, respect, promote and fulfill’, and for 
2013, it is ‘Eliminating Harmful Social and Cultural Practices affecting children: Our Responsibility. 
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further ensure that as many children as are in kinship care can be reached and adequately protected; this is 
true for the realisation of all children’s rights in Africa.16 
Considering the predominance of kinship care, and the significant number of children involved, it is not 
sustainable for States to expect relatives and other kinship caregivers to bear the financial and other 
burdens alone. Else, the States abdicate their role as the ultimate guardian of every child within their 
territory which is in violation of the duty to promote and protect the rights of the child. On the basis of the 
framework presented in Chapter 4, States should establish an efficient alternative care system with kinship 
care given the honour and assistance it deserves. Where necessary, it should be formalised, and as 
previously discussed, it is left to the discretion of the State whether or not to merge formal kinship care 
with the foster care system within the child protection system or to organise both separately. It must 
however be re-iterated that kinship care as a model of alternative care must generally be distinguished 
from foster care which operates more strictly within the child protection system. There can be no 
justification for a situation where foster carers are entitled to State support (on the basis on being legally 
recognised) while maintaining kinship care as an unpaid responsibility of the carer. This goes against the 
fundamental non-discrimination principle of children’s rights earlier discussed in Chapter 3. All caregivers of 
children require assistance and compensation; what is required is for the prescribed standards and 
requirements to be put in place and properly monitored. 
It is equally important for States to work with other stakeholders within the civil society who have been at 
the forefront of promoting and providing assistance for kinship carers of children deprived of parental care. 
Along with drawing from the examples provided by South Africa and Namibia in this study, this forms part 
of the duty of the State to seek assistance ‘within the framework of international co-operation’ in order to 
secure the rights of the child.17 The realisation of all children’s rights requires both human and financial 
resources;18 the full implementation of the right to alternative care is one area where this need is even 
                                                 
16 Kaime (2010) 645. 
17 Art 2 CRC. 
18 ACPF The African Report on Child Wellbeing 2011: Budgeting for Children (2010) 21. 
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more evident.19 Thus, while political will backed by the law is important, the importance of resources 
cannot be over-emphasised if effective implementation is to be achieved.20 Although many sub-Saharan 
African States face the challenge of inadequate resources, there is still an urgent need to improve in terms 
of budgetary allocations to children’s rights over a long period of time.21 It must be borne in mind that the 
provision of adequate resources does not only relate to the provision of direct cash assistance but also to 
the need to train competent professionals, such as social workers and kinship carers where necessary, to 
adequately implement children’s right to alternative care. It will be recalled that even in South Africa, which 
is classified as a middle income country, there remains a shortage of adequately trained professionals and 
this poses a threat to the implementation of children’s rights especially in the context of the right to 
alternative care.22 
6.4.3 Further Research and Data-Based Interventions 
 
This research is largely qualitative and based analysis and desk review of relevant international instruments 
and other materials. Thus, the focus has been on providing insight into understanding the right to 
alternative care more broadly and kinship care as alternative care particularly. The subject of kinship care is 
however one which will benefit immensely from quantitative research, particularly with regards identifying 
the different factors giving rise to kinship care and the various practices of kinship care. This will be useful 
for purposes of delineating the different forms of kinship care as discussed in Chapter 4 in order to address 
each one differently. 
The role of the CRC, the ACRWC and other international instruments relevant for children’s rights and 
welfare, is to make children a subject of focus beyond the family or private sphere without attempting to 
usurp the role of the family (in an ideal situation). They ensure this by establishing the recognition of 
                                                 
19 Doek J ‘Policy and Legislative Frameworks Providing for Family Based Care’, presented at the First International Conference in 
Africa on Family Based Care for Children, 28-30 September 2009, Intercontinental Hotel, Nairobi, Kenya. 
20 Arts (2010) 10. 
21 ACPF (2010) 105. 
22 South Africa is said to have a shortage of over 50,000 social workers, a shortage which has crippled the efficiency of child welfare 
services generally. See among others Mike Waters (Shadow Minister of Social Development) ‘South Africa has a 77% social worker 
shortage’, August 2013, available at < http://www.da.org.za/newsroom.htm?action=view-news-item&id=12781 >; Earle N ‘Social 
Work as a Scarce and Critical profession’, research commissioned by the Department of Labour, South Africa, March 2008. 
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children as ‘visible human beings’ fully entitled to rights so as to live lives of dignity and fulfilment in the 
here and now. The concept of children’s rights combines the idea of every individual being entitled to rights 
with the idea of children as individuals and therefore, equally deserving of rights.  Consequently, the CRC 
Committee places great emphasis on ‘the development of a comprehensive national strategy or national 
plan of action for children, built on the framework of the Convention.’23 Further, 
If such a strategy is to be effective, it needs to relate to the situation of all children, and to all the rights in the 
Convention.  It will need to be developed through a process of consultation, including with children and 
young people and those living and working with them…, meaningful consultation with children requires 
special child-sensitive materials and processes; it is not simply about extending to children access to adult 
processes.24 
With regards to alternative care and kinship care therefore, there is value in research which pools together 
the actual experiences of children in kinship care as well as kinship caregivers in different African countries 
to gain a broad picture of what the contextual issues are. The CRC Committee makes it clear that the 
experiences of children should be given serious consideration in the development of effective strategies. In 
addition, the CRC Committee recommends that the 
Collection of sufficient and reliable data on children, disaggregated to enable identification of discrimination 
and/or disparities in the realization of rights, is an essential part of implementation.  The Committee reminds 
States parties that data collection needs to extend over the whole period of childhood, up to the age of 18 
years.  It also needs to be coordinated throughout the jurisdiction, ensuring nationally applicable indicators.  
States should collaborate with appropriate research institutes and aim to build up a complete picture of 
progress towards implementation, with qualitative as well as quantitative studies.  The reporting guidelines 
for periodic reports call for detailed disaggregated statistical and other information covering all areas of the 
Convention.  It is essential not merely to establish effective systems for data collection, but to ensure that the 
data collected are evaluated and used to assess progress in implementation, to identify problems and to 
inform all policy development for children.  Evaluation requires the development of indicators related to all 
rights guaranteed by the Convention.25 
While this study focuses on kinship care, it must be mentioned that the above are relevant for all aspects of 
the right to alternative care including getting data-based information on children in kafalah of Islamic law, 
children in institutional or residential care facilities, and children in child-headed households, among 
others. The outcome of such research will impact on the development of broader and more progressive 
policies and programmes for the proper implementation of the right to alternative care as a whole. This 
study merely represents an exploratory attempt understanding the right to alternative care and kinship 
                                                 
23 CRC Committee General Comment 5 (2003) para 29.  
24 As above. 
25 As above, para 48. 
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care as well as providing insights into problems and opportunities and identifying gaps and subjects for 
subsequent research projects. 
 
 
6.5 Concluding Remarks 
The universal acceptance of the CRC (and the ACRWC) represents global consensus on matters concerning 
children by providing the world with shared norms, standards and values in relation to children and 
childhood. Thus, although children can generally not be protected in isolation from a family environment 
(the ideal is for children to be raised within a family environment), every individual member of society at 
large, has a role to play in ensuring the protection of children, at the very least, due to the particular 
vulnerability of children. Kinship care, a practice which is almost certain to endure for all time is a tradition 
which brings to focus the collective responsibility of all individuals, families, societies and States towards 
children. It is an established child care tradition and practice in many cultures and societies despite the 
changes that the family as an institution continues to undergo. Thus, more emphasis should be placed on 
securing the wellbeing and protection of all children in this age-old tradition based on helping, caring and 
sharing. 
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